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SUMMARY 
 
 
This study examines the topic of the interaction of children’s rights, education rights and 
freedom of religion in South African schools from a legal perspective. It comprises of a 
discussion on the historical development of religion in South African schools; South Africa’s 
international obligations with regards to children’s rights, education rights and freedom of 
religion and the South African substantive law pertaining to children rights, education and 
freedom of religion as impacting on legal issues pertaining to religion in schools.  
 
The study utilises a desktop approach, which comprises of a wide range of legal and other 
literary sources, international instruments, statutes and case law on children’s rights, 
education rights and freedom of religion. Importantly, it highlights the integral connection 
between these aforementioned rights when dealing with issues pertaining to religion in 
schools.  
 
This thesis illustrates that much of the historical development of religion in schools took place 
without consideration of children’s rights, or more particularly, the best interests of the 
learners. Instead, (a particular brand of) religious beliefs were promoted in education above 
other religions and the well-being of school-children. Furthermore, despite the introduction of 
specific children’s rights into the Constitution, this thesis emphasises that the rights of 
children have still not been recognised sufficiently in education laws and policies. It is 
submitted that children’s rights have a paramount and practical role to play in matters 
pertaining to religion in South African schools. Consequently, it is recommended that 
children’s rights, more particularly the best interests of the child principle, should be 
expressly introduced into education legislation and policies. This will create legal obligations 
for school administrators and SGBs on the inclusion of children’s rights in religious 
exemption procedures. Furthermore, it is recommended that national guidelines on 
religious/cultural exemptions (which incorporate children’s rights) be developed which will 
set legal parameters for the handling of religious/cultural exemption procedures in schools. 
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This thesis also argues against the interpretation that the right to establish private schools 
includes the right to require religious conformity from non-adherent learners by way of a 
complete waiver of their religious freedom. Despite the importance of respecting the right of 
religious communities to protect and preserve their faith in private schools, it is submitted that 
this right cannot be exercised without regard for the religious freedom, dignity and best 
interests of non-adherent children. As a result, it is submitted that the waiver of the freedom 
of religion of non-adherent children is not consistent with the values which South African 
society reveres and therefore cannot be enforced. This thesis suggests that there is a way for 
the rights of private schools and the rights of non-adherent children to co-exist in harmony 
through the application of the reasonable accommodation principle in private schools. 
Reasonable accommodation of different faiths teaches religious tolerance to leaners in private 
schools and ensures that they are prepared to grapple with the religious diversity that they will 
inevitably face outside of the school environment. It is submitted that the enforcement of 
reasonable accommodation in private schools is to the benefit of all learners in private schools 
and to South African society in general.  
 
Moreover, this study questions and analyses the state’s provision of compulsory religion 
education in public schools through the National Policy on Religion and Education. A 
theoretical distinction is made between religion education and religious instruction in the 
National Policy itself. Religious instruction refers to the teaching of specific religious beliefs. 
Religion education refers to the teaching about different religions and worldviews from an 
academic perspective. It is submitted that the National Policy is correct in removing religious 
instruction from public schools as this would not be in accordance with freedom of religion or 
equality rights of learners who are not of the majority faith. It is submitted further that, 
although the provision of compulsory religion education in public schools impacts upon the 
freedom of religion of learners and their parents, (if taught correctly) it is a reasonable and 
justifiable limitation on freedom of religion in that it pursues the legitimate state goal of 
nation-building through the teaching of religious tolerance and “celebrating diversity” in 
schools. In light of South Africa’s history of religious discrimination, it must be recognised 
that the current position (although not problem- free) is a significant step forward in the 
protection of minority religious rights in South African schools.  
 
Despite this, it is submitted that there are numerous problems with the implementation of the 
National Policy that impact upon the dignity, equality and other rights of the learners 
xxii 
 
concerned. These problems cannot be ignored since they impact upon the daily lives of school 
children. However, many of these problems can be minimised through more effective teacher 
training in this subject area. Accordingly, this thesis recommends that the current position be 
maintained as an acceptable compromise between the two extremes of providing religious 
instruction in one faith and removing religion education from public schools altogether. 
However, it emphasises that the state has to make a concerted effort to improve teacher 
training in this subject area in order to ensure that the objectives of the National Policy are 
carried out as envisaged.  
 
Furthermore, this thesis finds that certain provisions of the National Policy contain not only 
educational goals, but spiritual goals. Also in some instances, it is difficult to determine 
whether the religion education curriculum borders on being religious or not. In accordance 
with freedom of religion, it is submitted that the line between religion education and religious 
instruction must be clearly drawn in law and in practice. Consequently, the state must 
reconsider the National Policy and the corresponding religion education curriculum to ensure 
that they are aligned with the objectives of nation-building in all respects, meaning that any 
provisions or learning outcomes which have purely spiritual goals-  must be amended or 
removed.  
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 “Differences are not intended to separate, to alienate. We are 
different precisely in order to realize our need of one 
another.”1 
 
1  INTRODUCTION 
 
It is said that no issue has divided human society as much as religion.2  Furthermore, no topic 
is more controversial than the relationship between religious belief and human rights.3 All 
over the world, religious sects continue to perpetuate hostility, discrimination and even war in 
the name of religion. The controversy over religion may arise from one group’s disapproval 
of another group’s beliefs; or one group’s opinion that their belief system represents the 
exclusive truth. Aside from these major disputes between religions, there is also continued 
internal feuding within religions, over denominational differences. Further conflict arises 
when one religion is endorsed by the state and allowed to dominate public space, at the 
expense of others.  
 
It is clear that the issue of whether and how to accommodate religious beliefs in a multi-faith 
society is a matter of global concern. Increased globalisation has resulted in most countries 
being religiously diverse.4 As Lubbe states:  
 
                                                          
1  Archbishop Desmond Tutu. 
2  Discrimination & Development at http://www.munfw.org/archive/47th/3rd1.htm (Date accessed: 1 May 
2009).  
3  Steiner et al International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics and Morals (2008) 569.  
4  Ross “Children and Religious Expression in School: A Comparative Treatment of the Veil and Other 
Religious Symbols in Western Democracies”, The George Washington University Law School Public Law 
and legal Theory Working Paper No. 408 Legal Studies Research Paper No. 408 (26 February 2008) 1-2. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
2 
“This migration of people has come to mean that our traditions of 
faith no longer live in isolation from each other. We are 
interdependent everywhere on earth, we are all neighbours 
somewhere, minorities somewhere, majorities somewhere. The 
result of this interpenetration of communities is that we can no 
longer neatly divide the world in terms of religious affiliation. 
The map of the world in which we now live cannot be colour-
coded according to Christian, Muslim and Hindu identity, but 
each part of the world features a rich mosaic of colours and 
textures of the whole religious reality of planet earth.”5   
 
In truth, however, wherever there is diversity, there is also a host of complex problems 
relating to religious and cultural differences, assumptions and expectations which play out 
in the public realm, including the school environment. A variety of religious beliefs and 
issues of cultural heritage may come into conflict with school rules or with the religious 
beliefs of others within the environment.  
 
From the outset it must be noted that even though religion and culture are dealt with as 
separate rights, one cannot make a blanket distinction between the two. Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines religion as:  
 
“a [human’s] relation to Divinity, to reverence, worship, obedience, 
and submission to mandates and precepts of supernatural or 
superior beings. In the broadest sense [religion] includes all forms 
of belief in the existence of superior beings exercising power over 
human beings by volition, imposing rules of conduct, with future 
rewards and punishments.”6 
 
However, religious practices are not only based on faith, but also on the customs of a 
community. Similarly, cultural beliefs do not develop in a vacuum and may be based on the 
community’s religious beliefs. Therefore, it is possible for the belief or practice to be entirely 
religious or cultural and it is also possible for a practice to be a mixture of the two.7  As a 
result, in many issues of religion dealt with in this thesis, issues of culture are irrevocably 
intertwined.  
 
                                                          
5  Lubbe “Religious Pluralism in South Africa” in Du Toit & Kruger Multireligious Education in South Africa 
(1998) 3.   
6  Black Black’s Law Dictionary (6ed) (1990) 1292.  
7   MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Navaneethum Pillay 2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC) (“Pillay”) at para 47. 
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Many multi-faith states, including South Africa, have had to deal with controversial cases 
regarding the right of learners to exercise religious freedom and to be “different” in schools. 
The relationship between education and religion poses a particularly complex dilemma in 
societies where human rights are at the core of the educational and political systems; because 
in these societies, religious rights may clash with the rights to equality and human dignity 
(amongst other rights) which are at the core of human rights culture.8  
 
Consequently, there is constant tension between religion and the law and religion and other 
competing rights in numerous institutions, particularly schools. It is submitted that schools are 
a centre for conveying a wide range of values and aspirations of a society to its younger 
members and therefore a study of this nature in the specific context of schools is imperative. 
Schools have an essential role to play in assisting the youth in coming to grips with complex 
social issues.9 They serve as forums for the exchange of ideas between learners of different 
cultural and religious backgrounds. Schools, therefore, must foster a culture of tolerance and 
impartiality, so that everyone within the school environment feels equally free to participate 
and make a contribution.10 The way that learners are taught to interact in the school 
environment will be carried through to their interaction in the broader society.11 
 
Since the topic at hand relates to the school environment, it stands to reason that it concerns 
children in particular. In all matters involving children, the best interests of the child is 
considered to be of paramount importance in South Africa.12 As a result, this thesis will 
illustrate that issues pertaining to religion in schools cannot be discussed without considering 
children’s rights as contained in section 28 of the Constitution. In fact, this thesis analyses the 
role that children’s rights have played and should play such matters.  
 
Also linked to the issues pertaining to religion in schools are education rights. Importantly, 
education is the tool to provide equal opportunity in a country where education was separate 
and severely unequal in the past.13 In addition, education is the basis for the development of 
                                                          
8  Section 7(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (“Constitution”).  
9  Address by the Minister of Education, Naledi Pandor MP, at the De Klerk Foundation conference on    
diversity, Cape Town (28 February 2008); Lekhela submits that education determines the direction in which 
society will develop. See Lekhela Tendencies in the History of Bantu Education in South Africa (1972) 14. 
10   Ross v New Brunswick School District No 15 [1996] 1 SCR 825 [42]. 
11   Pillay at para 185; Smit “Balancing rights in education: applying the proportionality test” 2008 40(3) Acta 
Academica 210 211.  
12  Section 28 (2) of the Constitution. 
13   Pillay at para 121.  
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respect for human rights and values, and schools are the forum in which this development 
takes place.14 An examination of the manner in which religious diversity is dealt with from an 
educational perspective, will assist in understanding the issue from a broader perspective and 
will hopefully impact on society as a whole. This necessitates exploring education rights as 
contained in section 29 of the Constitution, as well as other relevant education legislation and 
policies.  
 
For obvious reasons, the topic warrants a discussion on the right to freedom of religion itself- 
as contained in section 15 of the Constitution. This would include defining the content of the 
right as well as its limitations. Consequently, this thesis examines children’s rights, education 
rights and freedom of religion and the impact of these rights on matters pertaining to religion 
in schools, from a South African legal perspective. It highlights the connection between these 
aforementioned rights when dealing with religion in schools and illustrates that issues 
pertaining to religion in schools must be observed through the prism of children’s rights and 
education rights. It is submitted that a discussion of freedom of religion alone would lead to a 
bare outcome.  
 
Overall, this thesis deals with the following issues: the historical development of religion in 
South African schools; South Africa’s international obligations with regards to children’s 
rights, education rights and freedom of religion; the South African substantive law that 
governs decision-making on children rights, education and freedom of religion (as is relevant 
to issues pertaining to religion in schools) and the manner in which that law has been applied 
in South African cases. Furthermore, the thesis identifies and analyses certain problematic 
legal issues related to the topic at hand and makes recommendations for a future approach.  
 
2  STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM  
 
The exercise of religious rights in the school setting raises numerous controversial and 
multifaceted legal concerns that impact on many constitutional rights of learners within that 
setting.   
 
                                                          
14   Dickinson & van Vollenhoven “Religion in Public Schools: Comparative Images of Canada and South 
Africa” September 2002 20(3) Perspectives in Education 1 10. 
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Inevitably, there are many divergent views on the role religion should play (if any) in a multi-
faith society and more particularly in schools, with each viewpoint giving rise to its own set 
of concerns. On the one hand, it is acknowledged that religion is an important part of human 
life. For many religious followers, a relationship with God/a higher power is fundamental to 
all aspects of their lives. Religion is a matter that is so important, personal and intertwined 
with people’s identities that the United Nations has recognised freedom of religion as a basic 
human right.15 It is clear that religious bodies play a significant role in public life.16 In fact, 
the making of law, which is recognised in modern times as a practical and rational human 
process of the secular order, has its origins rooted in religious beliefs of some kind. 
Furthermore the relationship between the state and the church has dominated politics in many 
parts of the world for centuries.17  
 
On the other hand, however, the relationship between the state and the church has proved to 
be an “unholy alliance” resulting in the religious persecution of many people by the state.18 
There have been many instances in which public institutions have discriminated against 
people on the grounds of religious belief, particularly in schools.19 It is in reaction to these 
forms of persecution that the idea of human rights and the calls for secularism20 first began.21  
 
In some instances the hostility and competitiveness amongst religions is caused by the state 
engaging in religious favouritism. When one religion is endorsed by a state and privileged by 
the law; it leaves the other faiths to be discriminated against or marginalised.22 In some cases 
a particular religion is not endorsed by the state, but religion on the whole is revered by the 
state and its importance in public life is promoted over non-religion- which is meant to be 
                                                          
15  Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 
December 1948.   
16   Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another (CCT 60/04) [2005] ZACC 19; 2006 (3) BCLR 
355 (CC); 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) (“Fourie”) at para 90. 
17   Moosa “Tensions in Legal and Religious Values in the 1996 South African Constitution” in Mamdani (ed) 
Beyond Rights Talk and Culture Talk: Comparative Essays on the Politics of Rights and Culture  
(2000)121; Sherr “Religion and Human Rights: Redressing the Balance” in Ghanea et al  (eds) Does God 
Believe in Human Rights? (2007)109.   
18  De Waal & Currie et al The Bill of Rights Handbook (2001) 288-289.  
19  National Policy on Religion and Education, as approved by the Council of Education Ministers on 4th 
August 2003 para 2 (Ministers Forward).  
20   Secularism is defined as “[t]he doctrine that morality should be based solely on regard to the well-being of 
mankind in the present life, to the exclusion of all considerations drawn from belief in God or in a future 
state.” See Onions (ed) The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993) 1926. 
21   De Waal & Currie (n18) 288-289.  
22  Illustrated in Chapter 2.  
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equally respected and protected.23  However, it must be accepted that in societies where the 
majority are very religious, it may be considered fair for the majority to be acknowledged by 
the law. It stands to reason that social context is an important consideration in determining the 
fairness of the law.  
 
Nevertheless, this acknowledgment of the majority faith must not unfairly discriminate 
against other faiths. The state must ensure that all religions (and other belief systems) are 
equally protected and respected by the law.24 This leads to the question of what constitutes 
unfair discrimination on the basis of religion. Does it require merely an absence of coercion or 
even-handedness by the state? Does is require that all religions (and other belief systems) be 
treated in exactly the same way in all respects, or does fairness dictate differential treatment at 
times? These are pertinent questions which need to be addressed.  
 
Another controversial issue is whether or not religion should form part of the public school 
curriculum and if so, the format in which it should be provided. There are religious 
proponents who believe that religious instruction in schools is vital to instilling learners with 
particular values.25 Contrastingly, others believe that religion is a private concern that should 
be kept completely out of public domains such as schools in order to avoid the 
marginalisation and segregation that occurs as a result of religious differences.26 According to 
this perspective, schools should encompass religious neutrality,27 thereby ensuring equality 
amongst all religions. After all, many people draw on values, ethical principles and an 
understanding of the world from sources that are not religious and these could be used to 
produce good citizens.28 This would not interfere with a learner engaging in private religious 
studies should they wish to; but, so the argument goes, it need not be a public issue. 
 
                                                          
23   De Waal & Currie (n18) 290. 
24  Section 9 of the Constitution.  
25   Ryerson Report on a system of public elementary instruction for Upper Canada in Hodgins (ed) 
Documentary history of education in Upper Canada (Vol 6) (1896-1910) 148; Dickinson & van 
Vollenhoven (n14) 3; Mitchell et al state: “In the midst of considerable cultural and religious diversity, 
Religion education is an important aspect of multicultural education.” See Mitchell et al (for the ICRSA) 
The End of the Tunnel (1993) 13.   
26  Adhar & Leigh Religious Freedom in a Religious State (2005) 241; Professor John Hull argues that a school 
is for education; it should not be turned into a “worshipping community”. See quote by Professor John Hull 
in Cumper “School Worship: Praying for Guidance” 1998 1 European Human Rights Law Review 45 55.  
27  Adhar & Leigh (n 26) 236. 
28   National Policy on Religion and Education para 14 (Values). 
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Alternatively, some believe that public schools have an educational responsibility to teach 
children about different religions from a purely academic standpoint - in a way that is 
different to religious instruction.29 Religious instruction entails subjecting learners to doctrinal 
religious teachings of one religion. Religion education, on the other hand, entails teaching 
about religions from an educational, non-devotional standpoint.30 In this regard, John Stuart 
Mill argued that there could be no objection to education about religions, meaning that people 
should learn about the fundamental beliefs; doctrines; significant characters; events and 
customs of others.31 It can be argued that education of this nature would promote tolerance 
and help shape a society where people have a better understanding of each other’s religions 
and cultures.32 Studying religion for historical, cultural or sociological reasons could be 
valuable in equipping learners to operate in a multi-faith and multi-cultural society. However, 
it must be questioned whether or not a subject as contentious and as personal as religion can 
be taught from an “objective” point of view (in any format) in a way that does not somehow 
compromise the freedom of religion of any learner in the environment; and if so, whether this 
is constitutionally justified in South Africa.33  
 
Aside from teaching about religion, the right to conduct religious observances in schools 
protects the display of religious symbols, individual and collective scripture readings, prayers, 
moments of silence, worship, and messages by members of the clergy.34 There is concern 
about the manner in which and the religious perspective from which these observances may 
be conducted in public schools. If the law permits public schools to determine their own 
religious ethos which best suits the interests of each school;35 then it may be within the rights 
of the school to conduct religious observances solely from the perspective of the majority 
religion within the school. Albeit that it may be considered to be acknowledgement of the 
majority; the school still has to determine an appropriate method of dealing with learners who 
do not belong to the chosen faith in times when religious observances are being conducted.  
 
Some schools see religious exemption processes as the answer to this challenge. In other 
                                                          
29  Adhar & Leigh (n26) 245. 
30  National Policy on Religion and Education, definition section and paras17 and 23.   
31            Mill On Liberty (1959) in Spitz (ed) Annotated Text of On Liberty (1975) 99. 
32           Adhar & Leigh (n26) 245.  
33  In terms of section 36 of the Constitution.  
34  Foster et al “Religion, language and education: Contrasting Constitutional Approaches” 1999 Education & 
Law Journal 211 221(fn33); See Van der Schyff The Right to Freedom of Religion in South Africa (2001) 
151. 
35  Section 20(1)(a) of the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996.   
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words, if a parent does not wish for his or her child to participate in religious 
observance/instruction, he or she could apply for a religious exemption. Many schools operate 
on this basis, believing that this amounts to the sufficient accommodation of religious 
minorities. However, schools often fail to consider the rights and best interests of the child 
during these religious exemption procedures. It is illustrated later on in this thesis that 
religious exemptions that are insensitively handled have implications for children’s rights. 
 
Furthermore, a contemporary contentious issue relating to religion is the right to wear 
religious/cultural attire and adorn religious/cultural symbols in the school environment. It is 
accepted the freedom of religion encompasses not only the right to hold beliefs but also to 
manifest these beliefs.36 It is therefore the state’s responsibility to create positive 
circumstances for the exercise of religious rights. However, where religious beliefs are 
manifested in a public space, they naturally impact upon the rights of other people within that 
space. As a result, the right to adopt religious beliefs is absolute; however, the right to 
manifest those beliefs in public may be limited.37 It is the state’s (school’s) responsibility to 
limit the manifestation religious rights in order to protect the rights of others and other 
legitimate state interests.38  
 
School are charged with the difficult task of deciding which forms of religious expression to 
accommodate and how far that accommodation should extend. On the one hand, prohibiting 
all forms of religious/cultural dress and symbols is contrary to religious and cultural rights as 
well as freedom of expression.39 On the other hand, permitting these forms of expression may 
create practical problems for the school and may impact upon the rights of others within the 
school environment. As a result, schools have to reasonably accommodate religious and 
cultural diversity while at the same time maintaining order and discipline within the school. 
The pertinent question is: how far must an educational institution go in accommodating 
learners’ religious expressions?  
 
                                                          
36  Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 
December 1948;   Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly 
resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966; Section 15 of the Constitution.  
37   Freedman “Up in smoke: Judicially mandated constitutional exemptions for religiously motivated conduct” 
2002 1 STELL LR 135 135. 
38  See Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape 2002 (3) BCLR 231 (CC) (“Prince”).  
39  Van der Schyff (n34) 145.  
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A further area of concern is where the state permits the establishment of private schools that 
cater to specific cultural, linguistic or religious needs.40  On the one hand this right enhances 
religious, cultural and associational rights by allowing communities to perpetuate their way of 
life through education. On the other hand, it allows for the creation of exclusive groups of 
school-children who are divided along cultural, linguistic and religious lines. In order to 
protect the religious ethos of the school, private schools are permitted to exclude non-adherent 
children or to require religious conformity through the waiver of the religious rights of the 
non-adherent child by his or her parent.41 However, a complete waiver of the religious rights 
of a child has severe implications for the children’s rights, dignity and religious rights of the 
child concerned. Also, this gives rise to a possible conflict between parental authority over a 
child’s education42 and religious upbringing and a child’s individual religious rights. 
Consequently, the constitutionality of a waiver of the religious freedom of a child43 attending 
a private school- must be questioned.  
 
3  THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT  
 
Although the majority of South Africans claim allegiance to Christianity, South Africa can be 
described as a “multi-cultural mosaic” comprising of Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, 
Buddhism and African traditional religions amongst others, each with its own strong religious 
heritage.44  
Significantly, Christianity was the favoured religion in the education system since the 
inception of formalised education in South Africa. As a result, religious instruction and 
religious observances from a Christian perspective became an integral part of the school 
system;45 while other religions were marginalised and not afforded a voice.46 This unequal 
                                                          
40  Section 29(3) of the Constitution; De Waal & Currie (n18) 484-485.  
41  Wittmann v Deutscher Schulverein, Pretoria 1998 SACLR LEXIS 43, 1999 (1) BCLR 92 (T), 1998 (4) SA 
423 (T) (“Wittmann”) at para 90.  
42  Article 26(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 
December 1948; Article 11(4) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child OAU 
Doc.CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force on 29 November 1999; Article 13 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and 
accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 entry into force 3 January 
1976, in accordance with Article 27; See Chapter 3. 
43  In terms of section 15 of the Constitution and Article 14(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, 20 November 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25 (also available on Internet at 
http://www.hri.ca/uninfo/treaties/25.shtml (Date accessed: 19/03/03).  
44  National Policy on Religion and Education para 9.   
45  Dickinson & van Vollenhoven (n14) 10. 
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treatment of religions in education severely impacted upon a vast number of South African 
school-children.  
There is no doubt that many Christians expected the new South Africa to emerge as a 
Christian state or, at least, for Christianity to be given prominence. In fact, the entire religious 
sector probably over-estimated the role that religion would play in the new constitutional 
democracy.47 What emerged instead is the new South Africa as a democratic constitutional 
state based on human rights and values,48 which entrenches equality49 and religious freedom 
for all.50  
 
The “new” South Africa does not endorse a state religion. However, the Constitution does not 
create a complete “wall of separation between church and state” either.51 In fact, the Preamble 
of the Constitution makes a controversial52 reference to God, which reads as follows: “May 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
46  Moosa in Mamdani (n17) 123. 
47   125. 
48  See sections 1 and 7(1) of the Constitution. 
49  Sections 9(1) of the Constitution states: “Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
protection and benefit of the law.” 
50  Section 15(1) of the Constitution states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, 
belief and opinion.” 
51   Moosa in Mamdani (n17) 128; Wulfsohn “Separation of Church and State in South African Law” SALJ  90 
92; This is in contrast to the United States of America, for example, where the establishment clause ensures 
separation between church and state. See Steiner (n3) 570; In the United States case of Newdow v. U.S. 
Congress (9th Cir. 2003), Newdow, the father of a public school student in California filed a lawsuit in 
Federal court in California alleging that the California law requiring the recitation of the Pledge of 
Allegiance in public schools, violates the Establishment Clause in that the Pledge contains the words “one 
nation under God”. The recitation of the pledge, he believed violates the rights of non-believers who were 
forced to watch and listen to the ritual which proclaims that there is a God, and that the USA is “one nation 
under God”.51 A divided United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the words “under 
God” constituted a violation the Establishment Clause. The dissenting judges in this case acknowledged that 
the reference to God is “an undoubtedly religious reference” but found that it is nevertheless neutral and 
believed that removing the term would favour atheism over religion. The court would surely have not found 
the statement to be neutral had the word “God” been substituted by the word “Allah”, the Arabic word for 
God. Nevertheless, a massive public outcry ensued after the decision was announced.  The school appealed 
to the U.S. Supreme Court (Elk Grove Unified School District v Newdow, 124 S Ct 2301 (2004)) which 
found that Newdow lacked proper standing to bring the matter before court. The Supreme Court failed to 
make a decision about the substantive issue and as a result the reference to God remained in the pledge by 
default. Some believe that the Supreme Court ruling resolved the issue by not removing the reference to 
God. Others believe that the court evaded the issue so as not to offend the sensibilities of the American 
public and once again confirmed that the law is designed to promote the majority religion at the expense of 
minorities. See Gunn “Religious Freedom and Laicite: A Comparison of the United States and France” 2004 
Brigham Young University Law Review 419 495-502 and Thomas God in the Classroom: Religion and 
America’s Public Schools (2007) 180-181; Bilchitz and Williams discuss various models of state-religion 
relationships and suggest that the “positive recognition” model best suits South Africa in light of its 
historical, textual and social context. See discussion of various options in Bilchitz & Williams “Religion 
and the public sphere: Towards a model that positively recognises diversity” 2012 28(2) SAJHR 146-175. 
52  These references to God have been criticised as depicting a bias towards theists or reflecting Christian 
undertones. See Moosa in Mamdani (n17) 128 and Kumar “Religious Pluralism and Religion Education in 
South Africa” 2006 18 Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 273 276 (also available online at 
www.brill.nl); Some believe that these references to God are a departure from the principle of equality 
 
 
11 
God protect our people. God bless South Africa.” This statement sets the tone for the 
remainder of the Constitution and clearly shows the drafters’ intentions to respect and even 
promote the place of religion in South African public life. The Preamble coupled with the 
South African national anthem, “Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrica”, (translated as “God Bless Africa”) 
emphasises the state’s recognition of the importance of religion in South African society. This 
reverence for religion in the Constitution has translated into education legislation and policies 
which show due respect for religion in general.53  
 
The 1996 Constitution is a document containing a Bill of Rights (Chapter 2), which aims to 
uphold the values of human dignity, equality and freedom for all.54 This cultivation of respect 
for human rights is essential in the light of the inequality and discrimination that existed under 
the old regime, particularly with regards to the education of children. The adoption of the new 
Constitution concretised the move from apartheid to democracy. As stated in S v 
Makwanyane:55 
 
  “The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the 
people of South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the 
past, which generated gross violations of human rights, the 
transgressions of humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and a 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
envisaged by the Constitution. See Devenish The South African Constitution (2005) 90; du Plessis states: 
“From a religious freedom perspective, the multilingual reference to ‘God’ in the closing sentences of the 
preamble can be seen to favor monotheistic beliefs.” See du Plessis “Freedom of or Freedom from 
Religion? An Overview of Issues Pertinent to the Constitutional Protection of Religious Rights and 
Freedom in ‘the New South Africa’” 2001 Brigham Young University Law Review 439 444; However, In 
the Constitutional Court’s certification judgment, In re Certification of the Constitution of the RSA 1996, 
1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC) (“Certification”) at para 33, the court held that “the invocation of a deity [does 
not] constitute any form of discrimination against non-theists.”  
53  For example, the National Policy on Religion in Education and section 20(1) of the South African Schools 
Act 84 of 1996. This will be illustrated in Chapter 5; du Plessis observes: “Although South Africa is now 
internationally respected and applauded for the fact that it has changed into a democratic state, it holds true 
that its existing legal system developed within a Christian-historical framework. Regardless of the country’s 
political change, the majority of South Africans remain Christian. Inevitably governance and laws, even in 
the democratic dispensation, will show resemblances with principles and values distilled from the Christian 
religion and the Christian-based development of South African law. This may not necessarily directly 
hamper the move towards sustainable democratic change itself, but it may impact on the observances of 
religious minority groups (such as Islam or Hindu) as far as tolerance with and the fulfilment of their 
religious-related human rights are concerned.” See du Plessis “The Fulfilment of Human Rights Related to 
Religion”, Paper prepared for the ICS Workshop on Secular and Religious Sources of Human Rights Law in 
Berlin 15 (17 –20 May 2006) 8 (footnotes omitted).   
54  Section 1(a) of the Constitution; Section 7(1) of the Constitution, affirms the founding values upon which 
the Constitution based.  It states that the Bill of Rights: “enshrines the rights of all people in our country and 
affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.”  Furthermore, section 39(1) of the 
Constitution compels courts to promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom when interpreting the Bill of Rights. 
55  CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3; 1995 (6) BCLR 665; 1995 (3) SA 391; [1996] 2 CHRLD 164; 1995 (2) SACR 1 
(6 June 1995). 
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legacy of hatred, fear, guilt, and revenge…”56 
 
Accordingly, the 1996 Constitution is supreme law and any law or conduct that is inconsistent 
with it, is invalid.57 This is particularly significant because prior to 1993, South African 
constitutional law was based on an extreme version of parliamentary sovereignty, which did 
not allow for the testing of laws and conduct against a higher norm.58 This meant that the laws 
of Parliament could not be challenged - even through the courts. Whereas, constitutional 
supremacy means that human rights are now protected from state-sanctioned abuse.59 
Importantly, the Constitution is supreme law over and above religious law, meaning that 
religious practices are subject to limitations that are “reasonable and justifiable”60 in an “open 
and democratic society.”61 
 
Importantly, the Constitution applies not only to legislation, but also to regulations, rules and 
conduct carried out by the state or private institutions, more particularly, private schools. This 
is emphasised in section 8, which provides that: 
 
“8(1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, 
the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state. 
    (2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic 
person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into 
account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty 
imposed by the right.” 
 
Evidently, section 8(2) binds private persons to the extent that it is applicable, taking into 
account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right. Section 8(2) 
                                                          
56  Para 237. 
57  Section 2 of the Constitution; See Certification at para 194, in which the court stated: “no-one exercises 
power or authority outside of the constitution.”  
58  De Waal & Currie (n18) 2-3; Venter “Introductory Notes”11 at 
http://web.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/15338/South%20Africa.pdf. (Date accessed: 13 July 2013).   
59  De Waal & Currie (n18) 2. 
60  See section 36(1) of the Constitution which states that: “The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only 
in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant 
factors.” These factors include- “(a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the 
limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; 
and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose”; Section 36(2) states that: “Except as provided in 
subsection (1) or in any other provision of Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of 
Rights.” 
61   Section 36(1) and Section 39(1)(a). 
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requires the judiciary to carry out a contextual determination of whether the relevant 
provision, is “capable, fit and suitable”62 for application to private persons.  
 
Furthermore, the inclusion of the values of human dignity, equality and freedom in the first 
section of the Constitution63 is particularly important. These values act as guiding principles 
for the legislature, executive and judiciary and inform the understanding of all constitutional 
rights. Although, they are premised upon universal moral and ethical norms and values, they 
also find expression in African custom.64 According to Goldstone J and Ackerman J, the 
inclusion of values in the Constitution emphasises that the Constitution is more than merely 
“a formal document regulating public power. It also embodies …an objective normative value 
system.”65  
 
This is encapsulated in section 39(1) of the Constitution which compels courts to promote the 
values that underlie an “open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom” when interpreting the Bill of Rights. This means that constitutional interpretation in 
the new constitutional era is driven by the values articulated in the text.66 Furthermore, the 
influence of constitutional values on the interpretation and development of the law is 
mandated by section 39(2) of the Constitution.67 
 
The importance of human dignity and its central place in the Constitution cannot be 
overemphasised. In South Africa, human dignity is not only articulated in the Constitution as 
a founding constitutional value but also as a self-standing right.68 The Constitutional Court 
                                                          
62  Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) at paras 35-45.  
63  See section 1 of the Constitution; The founding values are recurrently referred to in various other provisions 
of the Constitution, notably sections 7(1), 36(1), and 39(1), 143(2) and 195(1). 
64  Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) 12. See discussion of Ubuntu as a value 
in S v Makwanyane at para 308.  
65  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) para 54; Discussed in O’Regan “From Form to Substance: The Constitutional 
Jurisprudence of Laurie Ackermann” in Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order: the Critical 
Jurisprudence if Laurie Ackerman (2008) 6-7.   
66  Venter (n 58) 6.  
67  Section 39(2) states that: “When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights.” 
68  Section 10. 
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recognised the central position of the value of human dignity in Dawood and Another v 
Minister of Home Affairs and Others, 69 in which it was held that:  
 
“The value of dignity in our Constitutional framework cannot 
therefore be doubted. The Constitution asserts dignity to contradict 
our past in which human dignity for black South Africans was 
routinely and cruelly denied. It asserts it too to inform the future, to 
invest in our democracy respect for the intrinsic worth of all human 
beings. Human dignity therefore informs constitutional adjudication 
and interpretation at a range of levels. It is a value that informs the 
interpretation of many, possibly all, other rights...”70 
 
De Waal and Currie observe that dignity is perceived to be what gives people their intrinsic 
worth.71 For this reason, it has been asserted that dignity is “above all price and admits to no 
equivalent.”72 Essentially the value of dignity is central to the philosophy of constitutionalism 
upon which a constitutional government is based.73  
 
Integrally linked to human dignity is the value of equality.74  The value of equality “permeates 
and defines the very ethos upon which the Constitution is premised”.75 The Constitutional 
Court emphasised the importance of the value of equality in a democratic society, in the case 
of Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another (“Fourie”). The court stated:  
 
“The hallmark of an open and democratic society is its capacity to 
accommodate and manage difference of intensely-held world views 
and lifestyles in a reasonable and fair manner. The objective of the 
Constitution is to allow different concepts about the nature of 
human existence to inhabit the same public realm, and to do so in a 
manner that is not mutually destructive and that at the same time 
                                                          
69  Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Shalabi and Another v Minister of Home 
Affairs and Others; Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC); 
2000 (8) BCLR 837 (CC).  
70  Para 35.  
71  De Waal & Currie (n18) 231.  
72  Jones Kant’s Principle of Personality (1971) 127.  
73  Devenish (n64) 12. 
74  This link between dignity and equality was recognised by the Constitutional Court in the case of Fourie at 
para 15, in which the court stated: “The sting of the past and continuing discrimination against both gays 
and lesbians’ lies in the message it conveys, namely, that viewed as individuals or in their same-sex 
relationships, they ‘do not have the inherent dignity and are not worthy of the human respect possessed by 
and accorded to heterosexuals and their relationships.’ This ‘denies to gays and lesbians that which is 
foundational to our Constitution and the concepts of equality and dignity’ namely that ‘all persons have the 
same inherent worth and dignity’, whatever their other differences may be.” Furthermore in Pillay at para 
62, the court said that “religious and cultural practices are protected because they are central to human 
identity and hence to human dignity which is in turn central to equality.” 
75  Devenish (n64) 35.  
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enables government to function in a way that shows equal concern 
and respect for all.”76 
 
This concept of equality is fundamental to the maintenance and propagation of all rights in the 
Bill of Rights77 and is therefore particularly important in a society that was acutely divided 
along racial, religious and linguistic lines.78  It finds specific expression79 in section 9 of the 
Constitution, which states that: “everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
protection and benefit of the law.”80 
 
The value of freedom entails having the choice to participate in political, social and economic 
life.81 The concept of freedom can primarily be characterised by the absence of coercion or 
constraint.  If a person is compelled by the state, or the will of another, to a course of action or 
inaction which he/she would not otherwise have chosen, he/she is not acting of his own 
volition and he cannot be said to be truly free.82 In Ferreira v Levin NO and Others and 
Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others (“Ferreira”)83 the court gave an extensive 
and generous interpretation to the value of freedom. According to Ackermann J: 
 
“[A]n open society’ most certainly enhances the argument that 
individual freedom must be generously defined. It is a society in 
which persons are free to develop their personalities and skills, to 
seek out their own ultimate fulfilment, to fulfill their own humanness 
and to question all received wisdom without limitations placed on 
them by the State. The ‘open society’ suggests that individuals are 
free, individually and in association with others, to pursue broadly 
their own personal development and fulfilment and their own 
conception of the ‘good life’.”84 
 
                                                          
76  Fourie at para 95;  Pojman and Westmoreland remarked that: “[I]t is one of the basic tenets of almost all 
contemporary moral and political theories that humans are essentially equal, of equal worth, and should 
have this ideal reflected in the economic, social, and political structures of society.” See Pojman and 
Westmoreland (eds) Equality: Selected Readings (1997) 1.   
77  Devenish (n64) 35.  
78  See discussion in Chapter 2.  
79  This value of equality is expressed in other parts of the Constitution but most specifically in section 9.  
80  Section 9(1).  
81  Albertyn “Draft paper on ‘Equality [and culture]’ for Constitutional Court Review Conference” 10‐11 
December 2009 17. 
82  See discussion on R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd (1985) 13 CRR 64 in Chapter 6.  
83  1996 (1) SA 984 (CC); 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) (“Ferreira”). 
84           Ferreira at para 50.  
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According to the court, this interpretation is congruent with the transformative objectives of 
the Constitution.85 
 
Significantly, in the case of Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 
(“Christian Education”),86 the Constitutional Court observed:  
 
“The state has an obligation to ensure that the learner’s constitutional 
rights are protected. It has an interest in ensuring that education in all 
schools is conducted in accordance with the spirit, content and 
values of the Constitution.”87 
 
For that reason, the values of human dignity, equality and freedom must be borne in mind 
throughout this thesis.  
 
Aside from its Constitution, South Africa has signed and/or ratified numerous international 
instruments dealing with children’s rights, education, freedom of religion and their 
interconnected rights. It has thereby made a commitment to uphold international standards 
with regards to these rights. In addition, South Africa has enacted legislation and adopted 
policies88 which give content to the constitutional provisions on the aforementioned rights and 
provide a framework within which schools can develop an approach on dealing with religion 
in schools.  
 
Furthermore, South African courts, have encountered numerous cases involving children’s 
rights, education and freedom of religion. These cases illustrate the conflict and tension 
between religion and secular laws. Although many of these cases do not specifically deal with 
religion in schools, the principles developed in these cases can be applied to the arguments 
relating to religion in schools. It is therefore important to discuss and analyse the relevant 
                                                          
85  Also in this case, the Constitutional Court observed that the values in the Constitution are not mutually 
exclusive but in fact enhance and reinforce each other.  The court stated as follows: “Human dignity has 
little value without freedom; for without freedom personal development and fulfilment are not possible. 
Without freedom, human dignity is little more than an abstraction. Freedom and dignity are inseparably 
linked. To deny people their freedom is to deny them their dignity.” Ferreira at para 51. 
86           2000 (4) SA 757 (CC); 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 (CC) (“Christian Education”). 
87  Christian Education at para 12.  
88  The most relevant to the topic at hand are: the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, South African Schools Act 84 of 
1996, Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 and the National Policy 
on Religion and Education. 
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South African law in relation to each of the relevant rights and the approach of the South 
African courts in these cases and to make recommendations for the future. 
  
4    RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The approach that is used in this study is essentially a desktop approach which comprises of a 
discussion of the historical development, international law, South African law and prominent 
case law pertaining to children’s rights, education rights and freedom of religion in South 
African schools. Essentially, a wide range of literary sources, international instruments, 
statutes and cases on religion have been utilised. 
 
5  PURPOSE OF THE THESIS 
 
The purpose of the thesis is therefore: 
 
 To highlight the connection between children’s rights, education rights and freedom 
of religion in relation to issues pertaining to religion in schools 
 To outline the historical development of the law pertaining to religion in South 
African schools 
 To discuss the international instruments relevant to children’s rights, education rights 
and freedom of religion which are applicable to South Africa  
 To discuss the substantive law passed by South Africa on children’s rights; education 
rights and freedom of religion which is relevant to issues pertaining to religion in 
schools  
 To discuss the prominent case law on children’s rights, education and freedom of 
religion that has impacted – directly or indirectly - on issues pertaining to religion in 
schools 
 To make recommendations about a desired future approach 
 
6   STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
  
Chapter 2 deals with the historical development of religion in South African schools. The 
discussion is divided into three key time periods: namely 1652 - 1803: Dutch Reformed 
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religious education; 1803- 1938: Uncertainty in educational policy and 1939 - 1996: 
Apartheid and Christian National Education. It is imperative to explore the historical 
background on religion in South African schools in order to understand the rationale behind 
the current legislation/policies and case decisions on the issue.  
 
Chapter 3 deals with South Africa’s obligations to protect children’s rights, education rights 
and freedom of religion through customary international law and the various human rights 
instruments, at world level and regional level, to which South Africa has become a party. 
These instruments include: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights89; the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination90; the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights91; the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief92; the United 
National Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child.93 Although the primary focus of the thesis is on South Africa, the 
purpose of Chapter 3 is to set an international context for the discussions on South African 
law contained in the remaining Chapters.  
 
The aim of Chapter 4 is to illuminate the importance of considering children’s rights when 
dealing with issues pertaining to religion in schools. This Chapter discusses children’s rights 
as contained section 28 of the Constitution, particularly the best interests of the child 
principle, as well as the child’s right to dignity and equality. It also discusses the applicable 
provisions of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, as well as prominent case law dealing with the 
application of the best interests of the child principle. This Chapter sets the theoretical 
background for the guidelines on the role of children’s rights in religious exemption 
procedures- dealt with in Chapter 7.  
 
Chapter 5 aims to show to importance of considering education rights when dealing with 
issues pertaining to religion in schools. It contains a discussion on education rights as 
encompassed in section 29 the Constitution. It also focusses on the education legislation 
relevant to religion in schools, namely: the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996. In addition, 
                                                          
89         General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948.  
90        G.A. res. 2106 (XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 
195, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969. It was ratified by South Africa on 10 December 1998.  
91  General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. 
92  United Nations General Assembly Resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981. 
93  OAU Doc.CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force on 29 November 1999. 
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it contains a discussion on the National Policy on Religion and Education94 and the Bill of 
Responsibilities for the Youth of South Africa. Most importantly, this Chapter introduces a 
discussion on the freedom of religion of children in private schools, which is subjected to 
more in depth analysis in Chapter 7. 
 
Chapter 6 outlines and assesses the current South African law pertaining to freedom of 
religion in schools, the basis of which is section 15 of the Constitution.  The discussion is 
divided into the following the following themes: 1) the protection of religion in the 
Constitution 2) the nature of freedom of religion; 3) the waiver of freedom of religion 4) 
unfair discrimination on the basis of religion; 5) the relationship between religion and culture; 
6) determining centrality and sincerity in cases involving religion and culture 7) the 
relationship between religion and freedom of expression; 8) a school’s duty to limit freedom 
of religion and 9) reasonable accommodation of religious practices in schools. It also contains 
a discussion on the South African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms, which aims to 
enhance the religious rights in section 15.  
   
Chapter 7 identifies three major problem areas pertaining to religion in schools that warrant 
analysis, namely: 1) the role of children’s rights in issues pertaining to religion in schools; 2) 
the freedom of religion of children in private schools and 3) the teaching of religion in public 
schools. The Chapter contains a summary of the current law on each of these issues, a 
discussion of problems associated with the current approach on each of the issues, as well as 
recommendations for improvement. 
 
The final Chapter contains a summary of the findings and recommendations of the thesis.  
 
7   CONCLUSION 
 
It is clear that the relationship between children’s rights, education and religion poses a 
particularly complex dilemma for schools. It gives rise to numerous, controversial issues that 
impact upon many inter-related constitutional rights. Since schools serve as the forum for the 
exchange of ideas and development of relationships amongst South African youth, the manner 
in which this issue is handled in a school setting, will inevitably be carried through into 
                                                          
94     This discussion impacts on the broader discussion and analysis of the National Policy on Religion and 
Education in Chapter 7.  
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broader society.   
 
South Africa is a country with a rich and diverse religious (and cultural) heritage. This thesis 
contends that the state needs to protect the freedom of religion, the right to equality, education 
rights, dignity and best interests of children and at all times ensure that young people are 
protected from unfair religious discrimination or religious coercion at schools.95 As a 
democratic society with a population comprised of many different cultures, languages and 
religions; the school environment needs to be a place which respects diversity and the “right 
to be different”.96 Essentially what is required, is the establishment of “a system infused with 
tolerance”97 where all people- more particularly all learners, are treated with dignity” 
regardless of their religion. That is what the Constitution aims to do.  
 
In summary, the aim of this study is to assist in increasing understanding about the central 
issues and in addition, to make a contribution to development of South African law with 
regard to issues pertaining to religion in South African schools in the future. 
 
 
  
                                                          
95  National Policy on Religion and Education (Ministers Forward). 
96  Christian Education at para 24. See Chapter 6. 
97  Van der Schyff “Cannabis, Religious Observance and the South African Bill of Rights” 2003 TSAR 122 
128. 
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“We endeavour to throw light upon the dark future by means of 
our knowledge of the intellectual tendencies of the past. We even 
see those things realised in the future, which the present has not 
yet fulfilled. The value we place upon the past and present 
determines our consideration of the future.”- Rein98  
 
 
1   INTRODUCTION 
 
The relationship between state, church, education and religion is a highly contentious issue 
facing South African schools. With South Africa being the religious and culturally plural 
society that it is, South African schools are continuously confronted with conflicting religious 
and cultural interests. In order to better understand the complexities of the relationship 
between religion and education, it is necessary to examine the historical context in which this 
relationship has developed.  
 
The purpose of this Chapter is to trace the historical development of religion in South African 
schools from a legal perspective, between 1652 and 1996. This period marks the beginning of 
informal education, encompassing religious instruction in one faith; until the adoption of the 
final Constitution, which entrenched freedom of religion99 and the right to equality100 for all.  
                                                          
98   Rein (referred to as one of Germany’s greatest educators) quoted in Malherbe Education in South Africa 
(1652-1922) (1925) 3.  
99   Section 15.  
100  Section 9.  
 
CHAPTER 2 
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT  
OF RELIGION IN  
SOUTH AFRICAN SCHOOLS 
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This historical development clearly illustrates how South African education has been 
characterised by religious inequality and diversity intolerance, most of which has impacted on 
children. Consequently, this Chapter provides insight into the rationale behind the push for 
equality, non-discrimination, respect for diversity and children’s rights contained in many of 
the current legislation and policies on religion in South African schools. These themes are 
explored further in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6.  
 
It must be borne in mind that children’s rights were constitutionally entrenched in South 
African law, for the first time, with the adoption of the interim Constitution in 1993101 and 
then later in the final Constitution in 1996.102 This means that, most of the historical 
development of the role religion in schools, took place without necessarily considering the 
best interests of the children concerned. Instead, religious beliefs were a greater concern. If 
and when the needs of children were considered, it was certainly not in respect of all children, 
equally.  
 
Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge from the outset the existence of the African 
traditional religion/s of the indigenous people of South Africa, prior to the arrival of European 
settlers in 1652. Although it is difficult to trace precise sources reflecting the beliefs and 
practices of that period,103 it must be noted that traditional Africa held spiritual beliefs which 
entailed that “[n]ature, man and the spirit world constitute one fluid coherent unit.”104 
Although certain aspects of belief may have differed between Khoisan and Bantu tribes, the 
basic principles of African traditional religion105 may be summarised as follows: the belief in 
                                                          
101  Section 30; the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 was already in place.  
102  Section 28.  
103  Hexham and Poewe remark as follows: “It is remarkably difficult to reconstruct ‘traditional African 
religion’ prior to 1910. Almost all our information about traditional African beliefs comes from missionary 
sources alone.” See Hexham and Poewe “Christianity in Central Southern Africa Prior to 1910” 1 5 (a 
revised version of this paper appears in Elphick & Davenport Christianity in South Africa (1997); Hofmeyer 
& Pillay note: “The lack of documentary evidence and written records has meant that historians have 
neglected the religious and cultural practices of African societies.” See Hofmeyer & Pillay (eds) A History 
of Christianity in South Africa Vol 1 (1994) 11. 
104   Turaki Christianity and African gods: a method in theology (1999) 98; The “San also created vast numbers 
of rock paintings- South Africa contains the bulk of the world’s prehistoric art still extant -which express an 
extraordinary esthetic sensibility and document San hunting techniques and religious beliefs.” See Library 
of Congress Federal Research Division “South African country study” at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+za0015) (Date accessed 9 April 2012). 
105  Gehman contends that although individual expressions may differ, certain common basic beliefs pervade 
throughout Africa, therefore African traditional religion may be referred to in the singular. See Gehman 
African Traditional Religion (1990) 30; Ramose states that: “Africa is a heterogeneous cultural entity 
although similarities of culture are sometimes observable in the lives of African people.”  See Ramose 
African Philosophy Through Ubuntu (2002) 63; Hexham & Poewe write: “The religions of the various 
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a Supreme Being; the belief in a spiritual realm that infiltrates and controls the natural world 
and all of life and the belief in the sanctity of living as a unified society.106 African religious 
rituals do not involve direct worship of the Supreme Being but rather communication 
(offerings of food and other items, prayers and observation of proper rites) through 
intermediate spiritual beings or ancestors,107 who offer guidance to the living. In African 
traditional religion, a person’s connection to his or her community is the most important part 
of life.108 Harmony with one’s community means adherence to ancestral laws and customs109 
which are passed down from the elders in the community to the younger generation, through 
the telling of stories. The teaching of religion/custom is primarily based on the oral 
tradition,110 in terms of which the elders are fully trusted as the final authority.111  
 
It was the arrival of European settlers that prompted the religious conversion of indigenous 
African people to one or other denomination of Christianity, with minimal regard for African 
traditional religion as a legitimate belief system. These indigenous religious beliefs were 
repeatedly denied and debased by European settlers as mere superstition and “false” 
religions.112 European settlers, who held their own moral and religious institutions to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
African communities of Transorangia during the 19th century differed from each other.” “The available 
evidence suggests that Zulu traditional religion centred on ancestors and did not involve a belief in a high 
god, while the Tswana-Sotho recognized an overarching, impersonal force, similar to a high god. Yet, 
despite differences in beliefs and ritual practices they shared many beliefs as, for example, in witchcraft, 
prophecy, and a concern for healing powers.” See Hexham and Poewe (n103) 5; Setiloane points out that 
the Sotho-Tswana do not appear to have had a creation myth but that the Ndebele, like the Zulu, do. See 
Setlioane, “Modimo: God Among the Sotho-Tswana” September 1973 (4) Journal of Theology for Southern 
Africa 11. 
106    Sibiso “African Traditional Religion, Ubuntu and ancestral spirits: comments from a Christian raised in a 
sangoma home”, VCHO Conference, Pretoria (2001). 
107   Ramose (n105) 55-57; Amoah and Bennet argue that African traditional religion should not be reduced to 
ancestor worship as the religion is far more complex than that. They state that: “Since colonial times, a 
major problem with foreign perceptions of African religions has been a tendency to over-generalize and, in 
the process, to reduce all the indigenous systems to little more than animism and ancestor worship. 
However, any generalization about a matter as complex as religion, especially in a continent as diverse as 
Africa, is clearly an audacious undertaking.” See Amoah and Bennet “The Freedoms of Religion and 
Culture under the South African Constitution: Do traditional African Religions enjoy equal treatment?” 
(2008) 1-2.  
108   Horn “African traditional Religion, Western Religious Shifts and Contemporary Education” 2003 39(3&4) 
Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap 51 56. 
109   Turaki (n104) 98.  
110  du Toit “Religious Freedom and Human Rights in South Africa After 1996: Responses and Challenges” 
2006 Brigham Young University Law Review 677 688; Seroto The impact on South African Legislation on 
(1948-2004) on Black Education in Rural Areas: a Historical Education Perspective (2004) 60; Molema 
The Bantu past and present: an ethnographical and historical study of the Native races of South Africa  
(1920) 122-123.  
111   See http://www.sahistory.org.za/african-traditional-religion (Date accessed: 3 March 2012); Note that this 
paragraph constitutes a brief overview of African Traditional Religion.  
112   Moosa in Mamdani (n17) 122; Lekhela states: “The nature of education that the missionaries offered was 
predominantly religious, calculated to win the Bantu for God, and rid them of their heathen beliefs and 
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superior to those of Africans, proceeded to suppress various aspects of African culture.113 The 
Christianising of indigenous Africans therefore became the settlers’ primary objective.114 The 
underlying assumption of the conversion process was that Christianity is the “true 
religion”.115 The process of “civilising”116 indigenous Africans through the introduction of 
Christianity brought about the assimilation of European culture into many aspects of African 
life and, correspondingly, led to the abandonment of the traditional customary African 
lifestyle in many respects.117  
 
“The foreign, mostly Western, religious groups that compete for the 
souls of Africa stand accused of transplanting their religious rivalries 
onto African soil and, in so doing, of promoting adversarial religious 
perceptions and conflict within previously like-minded and peaceful 
communities. Those engaged in advocating the cause of extraneous 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
customs. So keen were the missionaries to use education as an instrument of exorcism that they took no note 
of the deep-seated religious feelings of the Bantu: if anything they condemned their beliefs openly.” See 
Lekhela (n9) 14. 
113   Moosa in Mamdani (n17) 143; Mutua states: “Messianic religions have been forcibly imposed or their 
introduction was accomplished as part of the cultural package borne by colonialism. Missionaries did not 
simply offer Jesus Christ as the saviour of benighted souls, his salvation was frequently a precondition for 
services in education and health, which were quite often the exclusive domain of the Church and the 
colonial state. It makes little sense to argue that Africans could avoid acculturation by opting out of the 
colonial order; in most cases, the embrace of indigenous societies by the European imperial powers was so 
violent and total that conformity was the only immediate option.”  See Mutua “Human Rights, Religion and 
Proselystism” in Mutua Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique (2002) 94; Lubbe in Du Toit & 
Kruger (n5) 3.   
114  Msila states: “Therefore, whilst the missionaries provided western education to the African for the public 
good, they had many private interests that they wanted to fulfil….the missionaries used education to attain 
their political goals.” “[Missionary Education] was geared to make the Africans docile and tame through the 
use of the Christian philosophy.” See Msila “From Apartheid Education to the Revised National Curriculum 
Statement: Pedagogy for Identity Formation and Nation Building in South Africa” 2007 16(2) Nordic 
Journal of African Studies 146 148. 
115  According to Ramose: “Christianity justified its domination and elimination of indigenous African religions 
by appeal to Jesus Christ’s instruction: go ye and teach all nations. So it is that colonisation and Christianity 
assumed epistemological dominance crystallizing in their unilaterally conferred, though no less 
questionable, right to determine and define the meaning of experience, knowledge and truth on behalf of the 
indigenous African.” See Ramose (n105) 11; He states further: “…Christianity holds itself to be the true 
religion for all humanity.” See Ramose (n105) 25; He goes on to say: “On this basis the at times enforceable 
imposition of the Christian religion upon the people of Africa was no more than an extension of the 
European ‘spiritual empire’ alongside the political expansion of European imperialism” See Ramose (n105) 
28; Nicolson observes: “But the underlying assumption is still that Christianity in the true religion….” See 
Nicolson “Religious education in state schools in a future South Africa” 1994 7(1) SAJE 43 45;  du Toit 
states: “Many believed that it was the preordained will of God that whites, who represented the ‘only true’ 
religion and civilization, had to colonize Southern Africa three hundred years ago to evangelize its people.” 
See du Toit (n110) 680; It is contended that: “Christianity as always been considered the only authentic 
religion.” See Summers & Waddington (eds) Religious Education for Transformation (1996) 2. 
116   Kallaway writes: “Civilising the natives to conform to Western ideas of social life and morality was also of 
significance.” See Kallaway “Education, health and social welfare in the late colonial context: the 
International Missionary Council and educational transition in the interwar years with specific reference to 
colonial Africa” 2009 38(2) History of Education 217 220. 
117   Ramose (n105) 56; According to Kallaway: “Christian education at this time was in part an ideological 
aspect of imperialism through which indigenous peoples were inducted to Western languages, culture...” 
See Kallaway (n116) 217 220. 
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religions are almost invariably totally insensitive to the values 
imbedded in traditional African religion. Abandonment of indigenous 
African institutions and the customary African lifestyle—ranging 
from the clothes they wear and the food they eat to the education they 
receive and the language they speak—is mostly insisted upon as a 
conditio sine qua non of religious conversion.”118 
 
Essentially, it is the more formalised teaching of the Christian religion in South African 
schools that is linked to the arrival of the Dutch United East India Company (DUEIC) at the 
Cape in 1652. The arrival of the Dutch and, the subsequent annexation of the Cape by the 
British in 1795, resulted in a formal education system in South Africa that reflected both the 
influence of the Calvinistic Dutch and the liberal, Anglican English.119 Christianity was 
therefore the favoured religion in education since the inception of formalised education in 
South Africa.   
 
Christianity was, from a historical perspective, the recognised religion in South Africa. 
Christianity constituted the dominant norm with respect to religion and it influenced both 
colonial policy and the law within the apartheid regime, with little or no regard being held for 
other religions.120 This observation is illustrated in the subsequent discussion. The law that 
regulated the educational system during apartheid authorised the ideology of Christian 
National Education, which required an education system based on Christian values.121 This 
dominance of and favouritism towards Christianity was at the expense of other religions.122  
 
It must be pointed out that the development of religion in schools takes place against the 
backdrop of a host of other complex, interrelated issues: the move from colonialism to 
independence;123 the language clash between the Dutch and English and later between 
Afrikaans and English; and racial segregation and varying political ideologies. Although it is 
acknowledged that the issues of religion; language; race and politics are inextricably linked, 
                                                          
118  van der Vyver “Constitutional Perspective of Church-State Relations in South Africa” 1999 Brigham 
University Law Review 635 645.  
119   Dickinson & van Vollenhoven (n14) 10. 
120   Moosa in Mamdani (n17) 123. 
121  Summers & Waddington (n115) 5; See Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953; National Education Policy Act 39 of 
1967; Education of Training Act 90 of 1979 and National Education Policy Amendment Act 103 of 1986.  
122  Moosa in Mamdani (n17) 122. 
123  The Status of the Union Act 69 of 1934, declared the Union of South Africa to be a “sovereign independent 
state.” The Act was the South African counterpart to the Statute of Westminster of 1931. It adopted the 
Statute of Westminster into South African law. South Africa became a Republic on 31 May 1961, by way of 
the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 32 of 1961.  
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this Chapter specifically endeavours to focus on the law relating to religion in education and 
on the events which impacted significantly on religion in education.   
 
The discussion on the historical development is divided into three key time periods: namely 
1652 - 1803: Dutch Reformed religious education; 1803 - 1938: Uncertainty in educational 
policy and 1939 - 1996: Apartheid and Christian National Education.  
 
2   1652- 1803: DUTCH REFORMED RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 
 
In 1652, Jan Van Riebeek took up appointment as the first Commander at a resting station 
established at the Cape of Good Hope.124 At the time, the Dutch inhabitants125 followed the 
traditions of their forbearers and attempted to transplant the old life of the Netherlands as little 
changed as possible.126 At the Synod of Dort in the Netherlands held between 1618 and 1619, 
the Dutch Reformed Church had been proclaimed as the “community of the elect”127 or, the 
religion of the people. An edict issued by this Synod in relation to religious instruction 
proclaimed it mandatory for religious instruction to be conducted in schools and permitted 
only orthodox Christians to teach in schools.128 As a result, it became one of the DUEIC’s 
chief objectives to establish the Dutch Reformed Church of South Africa (DRC) at the Cape 
of Good Hope, and subsequently, to cultivate a Christian community which could disseminate 
the teachings of the DRC.129 As Reformation tradition had dominated in the Netherlands, so 
too did it dominate in South African education since the arrival of the Dutch.130   
                                                          
124   Boucher “The Cape under the Dutch East India Company” in Cameron (ed) A new illustrated history of 
South Africa (1991) 61; Seroto (n110) 61; Rose and Tunmar (eds) Documents in South African Education 
(1975) 85; Cf. Katzen “White Settlers and the Origin of a New Society, 1652-1778” in Wilson & Thompson 
(eds) The Oxford History of South Africa (1969) 183-232. 
125   These inhabitants are often referred to as “settlers”, however at the time, they had no intention to establish a 
Dutch colony in South Africa and settle here. Therefore the term “inhabitants” is preferred. See Malherbe 
(n98) 40.  
126  25; McKerron A History of Education in South Africa (1652-1932) (1934) 15. 
127   Coertzen states: “In the Netherlands the Reformed Churches confessed the Dutch/Belgic Confession of 
Faith. This Confession also became part of the Dutch Reformed Church that came to South Africa in 1652, 
as was also the case in the Dutch Reformed Churches in the other colonies of the Dutch Republic.” See 
Coertzen “Freedom of Religion in South Africa: Then and now 1652-2008” 1 5;  Article 36 of the Dutch 
Confession states that: “the government’s task is not limited to caring for and watching over the public 
domain but extends also to upholding the sacred ministry, to remove and destroy all idolatry and false 
worship of the Antichrist, to promote the kingdom of Jesus Christ and to see that the Word of God is 
preached everywhere so that God might be honoured and served by everyone, as He commands in His 
Word.” (Belgic Confession, Harare 2000). 
128  Rose and Tunmar (n124) 113.  
129          Initially the DEUC’s intention was not to expand the refreshment station beyond the area surrounding Table 
Mountain, however, this was the eventual result. Gerstner “A Christian Monopoly: The Reformed Church 
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It follows, therefore, that education at the Cape was based on the teachings of the DRC from 
1652. At the time, lessons were given in the homes of settlers and later by aspirants called 
“meesters” and were solely based on the “divine”.131 Formal education outside of the home 
did not exist.132 The intention behind education was solely to provide religious instruction. 
The event which marked the beginning of religious education for Black Africans was the 
arrival of Angolan slaves who were captured at sea by a Dutch warship. Van Riebeek took 
issue with the fact that they did not speak Dutch and were “heathen” people133 and therefore 
arranged for them to receive religious instruction.134 Interestingly, Van Riebeek’s journal at 
the time indicates how important “Christianising” slaves was to the Dutch, so that they would 
resort to enticing them into attending religious instruction.135 It states: 
 
“To encourage the slaves to attend and to hear or learn the 
Christian prayers, it is ordered that after school everyone is to 
receive a small glass of brandy and two inches of tobacco.”136 
 
Significantly, attendance of religious instruction by slaves, their acceptance of the DRC brand 
of Christianity and their confirmation into the Church was one of the means for a slave to 
acquire the status of an autonomous human being.137 
 
In due course, the first public school opened in the Cape in 1658 and it was primarily 
established for slaves to learn Dutch and receive religious instruction.138 This was essentially 
the beginning of formalised education in South Africa. Religious education in South Africa 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
and colonial society under Dutch rule” in Elphick & Davenport (eds) Christianity in South Africa: A 
Political, Social, and Cultural History (1997) 16.  
130  McKerron (n126) 15.  
131  Holmes Religious Education in the State School: A South African Study (1962) 28.  
132  McKerron (n126) 156.  
133   Rose and Tunmar (n124) 85; The use of the word “heathen” indicates the complete disregard for African 
traditional religion. 
134   85; Behr Education in South Africa: Origins, Issues and trends: 1652-1988 (1988) 91.  
135   Elphick states: “The DRC brand of Christianity was the emblem of white identity and the marker that 
separated them from the dark-skinned slaves.” See Elphick in Stanley (ed) Missions, Nationalism and the 
End of an Empire (2003) 56.   
136   Balkema Van Riebeeck’s Diary, Vol II (1652) 258-259.  
137   Elphick in Stanley (n135) 56.  
138  Behr & Macmillan Education in South Africa (1971) 357; Du Plessis A history of Christian missions in 
South Africa (1965) 29-30; Instruction in the schools was given by a siekenrooster (sick comforter), with 
religious instruction as the main emphasis of lessons. See McKerron (n126) 156; At this stage there was no 
formal segregation of schools on the basis of race. The first segregation policy was introduced in 1671 by 
the Dutch Reformed Church Council. See Seroto (n110) 63.  
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therefore, in practice, meant instruction in the Christian faith and no other.139  It is worth 
noting that some now regard this form of religious education as a “Calvinist attempt to 
convert students to Christianity rather than genuine education in religion.”140 At the time these 
schools fell under the control of local kerkraden (church councils)141 whose main concern was 
ensuring that teachers adhered strictly to the doctrines of the Dutch Reformed faith. They had 
the authority to visit and examine schools in order to ensure against the dissemination of false 
religious doctrine.142  
 
Subsequent to the Van Riebeek era, Pasques de Chavonnes, the Dutch Governor at the 
Cape,143 issued an Ordinance in 1714144 which created the Commission of the Scholarchs as a 
formal controlling body for education. The aim of the Ordinance was to regularise existing 
practices.145 This was the first attempt at creating proper educational legislation. This 
Ordinance accepted that the content of education should be almost entirely religious146 and it 
reaffirmed the DRC control of schools147 by stating:   
 
“Whereas for the prosperity of the good of the colony and welfare of 
the land it is not of slight importance that the young from their 
childhood should be well instructed in the fear and knowledge of 
God and be taught all good arts and morals from their youth, and 
thereto it is above all necessary that they should be provided with 
competent and God-fearing teachers, and that those should be 
prohibited who show desire to teach otherwise than is practiced in 
the Reformed Churches…”148 
 
                                                          
139  Seroto notes that many writers do not make a distinction in their work between religious instruction in 
homes and churches and formal education during this period, since education initially consisted of mainly 
religious instruction. See Seroto (n110) 6; Malherbe notes that church life and school life were inherently 
interwoven since schools prepared pupils for “participation service of public worship”. See Malherbe (n98) 
21.   
140  Summers & Waddington (n115) 6. 
141  These councils were based on prototypes established in the Netherlands.  
142  McKerron (n126) 16. 
143  From 1714 to 1724.  
144  This was the first attempt at proper educational legislation. See Malherbe (n98) 35.   
145  See Rose and Tunmar (n124) 85.   
146  McKerron (n126) 16. 
147   See Rose and Tunmar (n124) 87.  
148          Thirty years after the De Chavonnes Ordinance, the Cape was visited by the Governor General of India, van 
Imhoff, who journeyed into inland South Africa and was astonished not only by what passed as education 
but what he saw as degeneration in religious observance at the time. He observed: “…what an indifference 
and ignorance a great part of the country people lived in this respect, caring little or nothing for religious 
worship, so that it appeared to him to be rather an assemblage of blind heathens than a colony of Europeans 
and Christians…” See Resolution as to Country Teachers, February, 1743 in Report, Education 
Commission 1863, (Appendix) 6. Quoted in Rose and Tunmar (n124) 88.   
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This DRC controlled system of religious education, based on Calvinistic principles, continued 
until the inception of the de Mist administration in 1803.149 
 
3   1803- 1938: UNCERTAINTY IN EDUCATIONAL POLICY 
 
The 19th century may be described as a period of educational uncertainty. The English took 
occupation of the Cape for a brief period from 1795 - 1803 but did not have any significant 
impact on educational policy during this period.150 The year 1803, however, saw the 
Batavian151 Government take possession of the Cape152 and this marked the beginning of what 
can only be described as a see-saw in policy on religion in education.  
 
After the French revolution, the revolutionary ideals of “equality, freedom and brotherhood 
for all men”153 began to influence the thinking of many politicians, including de Mist, the 
Commissioner-General of the Cape at the time.154  de Mist’s Policy of 1804 entailed that the 
state assume responsibility for education, relieving churches from this obligation.155  He 
advocated for the establishment of a secular educational system in South Africa for the first 
time.156 His policy entailed “that education should be vocational, universal and without regard 
for colour or creed....”157 While the policy noted that religious instruction was an important 
part of the school day, it provided that it would no longer dominate the school curriculum. 
The significance of this policy was that it no longer accepted the dominant position of the 
DRC.  
 
It is uncontroversial to state that de Mist’s ideals were, in the South African context, 
exceedingly advanced and liberal for the time. The conservative Cape Dutch community 
accordingly battled to accept the new policy. Unsurprisingly, the de Mist Policy was labelled 
as “godless” by the majority of the Cape Christian population.158 The impact of the de Mist 
                                                          
149  Holmes (n131) 28.   
150   Coertzen (n127) 5; Seroto (n110) 64.   
151  Batavia refers to the Netherlands from 1795 to 1806 as a French vassal state.  
152  Theal Short History of South Africa and its People (1909) 91. 
153  National motto of France originating during the French revolution.  
154   Holmes (n131) 29; Coetzee African Studies Programme- Occasional Papers 4 (1968) 16 23-30; Rose and 
Tunmar (n124) 109 and 115. 
155   Cape Educational Commission Report 1863 No.9 (Appendix V) 10 ff (abridged); “….he became the more 
convinced of the pressing necessity of an entirely new creation of a regular school system to be erected by 
the authority of the Government….” See Rose and Tunmar (n124) 43. 
156  Coertzen (n127) 5. 
157  Tunmer & Muir African Studies Programme- Occasional Papers 4 (1968). Quoted in Rose and Tunmar 
(n124) 109 and 113. 
158   Holmes (n131) 29.  
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Ordinance was halted by the English re-occupation of the Cape in 1806, much to the relief of 
the Cape Dutch inhabitants who regarded it with “profound suspicion for its secular 
tendencies.”159 de Mist’s notion of a secular, non-discriminatory, nation-building system of 
education would arise once more with the fall of apartheid in the early 1990’s.                   
 
After 1806, English rule at the Cape resulted in an attitude of laissez faire, where governors of 
the Cape attempted to create a semi-secular system of education,160 with clerical supervision 
to appease the conservative Dutch community.161 The association between school and church 
therefore was restored under British rule. Also, during this period, the Bible and School 
Commission was established and it began to assume the functions of a modern Education 
Department.162  At this stage, the task of education was seen as producing “the most salutary 
effects of moral and religious improvement.”163  
 
A radical change occurred under the leadership of Lord Charles Somerset as Governor of the 
Cape in the 1820’s.164 Somerset halted the growing autonomy of the Bible and School 
Commission and subjected it to his personal objectives165 of anglicising the Dutch and 
suppressing mother-tongue (Dutch) education.166 His system required that the principles of 
Christianity be taught to the children of Dutch colonists and “heathens if required”,167 but that 
it be taught in English. Ultimately, however, the DRC stronghold in the Cape was too 
powerful to concede to Somerset’s system of education. The result was the establishment of a 
great number of Dutch private schools168 which aimed to preserve the Dutch language,169 
which was regarded as “speech of religion”170 by the Dutch community; meaning that it was 
inextricably linked to their religious beliefs and identity.  
 
                                                          
159   See Rose and Tunmar (n124) 94. 
160  The system was semi-secular in so far as it looked upon the establishment of schools as a matter of state 
control and not a matter to be controlled entirely by a religious body, but still placed clergyman on the 
Board of Education that supervised the system and required religious instruction in schools in accordance 
with denominations of parents. Malherbe (n98) 51.   
161   Holmes (n131) 30.  
162   See Rose and Tunmar (n124) 94-95. 
163   Kitshoff “The Role of Religious Education in Building a Nation in Multiethnic South Africa” 1994 89(3) 
Religious Education 313 315-316; Behr New Perspectives in South African Education (1984) 5.  
164   Holmes (n131) 30. 
165          Referred to in Rose-Innes Superintendent Report for 1854 15 August. 
166   Rose and Tunmar (n124) 97; Take note that the issues relating to language and religion are irrevocably 
linked throughout history and therefore language issues will inevitably form part of the discussion.  
167   Behr (n134) 89. 
168  Malherbe (n98) 84. 
169  Holmes (n131) 31. 
170  30. 
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Thereafter, in 1838, the so-called Herschel Report171 on education was published. According 
to Herschel the aims of education were to ensure the teaching of English and “to form good 
citizens and men, by instructing them in the relations of the social civil life and to fit them for 
a higher state of existence, by teaching them those which connect them with their Maker and 
Redeemer.”172 This Report was influential in that its principles on the importance of religion 
in education were incorporated verbatim into the Government Memorandum on Education, 
passed on 23 May 1839. This Memorandum set out a daily hour for the perusal of Holy 
Scriptures as part of the curriculum; provided pupils with facilities for religious instruction by 
their pastors and also provided for a leave of absence to be granted to any conscientious 
objectors.173 It is noteworthy in that it introduced the religious exemption procedure into the 
education system.174 
 
Also significant during this period was the appointment of an impartial, full-time official 
known was the Superintendent–General of Education175 at the Cape in 1839, an event which 
gradually led to formation of an Education Department through which he and his officials 
could exercise their duties.176 James Rose-Innes was the first to hold the position and he 
remained in office until 1859. He recognised the need for respect between the different 
Christian denominations within the school setting and made the following comment in that 
regard:  
  
“To Christian men of all denominations, the Bible is the common 
source of religious truth and faith.  Let that be the sole foundation 
                                                          
171  Contained in two letters to the Government written by Sir John Frederick William Herschel (a renowned 
English astronomer who gave public lectures at the Cape and who was requested to investigate educational 
matters in the Cape), dated 17 February 1838 and 6 March 1838. These letters were later copied and 
circulated as a Report. See Malherbe (n98) 75-77; As a secondary issue, the impact of this Report was that it 
formed the foundation of the so-called “Herschel system”, which introduced two separate classes of 
schools: the English medium classical schools which charged a small fee and second-class schools, which 
were free schools in which Dutch could be used as a medium of instruction where required. Both categories 
of schools would maintain offering religious instruction as part of the curriculum. For the first time, there 
existed a formalised division of schools based on language. See Walker A History of South Africa (1935) 
247; McKerron (n126) 16. Holmes (n131) 31; Referred to in Muller 500 Years: A History of South Africa 
(1981) 208.  
172  Letter dated 6 March 1838, quoted in Malherbe (n98) 77 and 84; The Constitution of the South African 
Republic, formulated in 1858 reads: “The people desire the building up, prosperity and welfare of the 
Church and State and on that account direct that provision should be made to satisfy the want felt for Dutch 
Reformed ministers and school masters.” See Rose and Tunmar (n124) 113. 
173   Greyling Godsdiensonderwys in die Skool (1946) 39.  
174  Holmes (n131) 32.   
175   James Rose-Innes was the first to hold the position and he remained in office until 1859.  
176  McKerron (n126) 16. 
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of Christian teaching in our school; as to denominational doctrines 
and forms, let each church take care of that.”177  
 
Evidently there was a move towards inter-denominational tolerance at this time.  
 
Behr regards the appointment of Rose-Innes as the event that signalled the transfer of 
responsibility of education from church to state.178 In this regard, Mckerron notes further that 
the right of state control over schools was more clearly recognised at this point, since the 
government could exercise more effective control through the Superintendent.179   
 
Subsequently, a contrasting shift took place when the Education Act 13 of 1865, with its 
accompanying “Schedule of Regulations”,180 made provision for non-compulsory religious 
education. This meant that if religious instruction was offered at school, it would be outside of 
ordinary school hours and not part of the compulsory curriculum.181 Article 7 of the 
Regulations to the Act stated: 
 
 “The managers of the school may provide for the religious 
instruction of the scholars at an hour set apart by them for that 
purpose in addition to the ordinary school hours; but no scholars 
shall be compelled to attend at that hour for religious instruction 
without the consent of their parents or guardians.” 
 
Article 7 raised objections from many within religious communities. The schools which 
adhered to the provision were labelled as “godless”182 and the ensuing 21 years consisted of 
attempts preserve compulsory religious education, mostly through the establishment of church 
and private schools. Eventually, in 1886, the aforementioned objections resulted in the Cape 
Parliament accepting a motion by Jan Hofmeyer183 to reintroduce Bible reading and religious 
instruction into schools.184  
 
                                                          
177  Greyling (n173) 40; Quoted in Holmes (n131) 31-32. 
178  Behr (n134) 12. 
179  McKerron (n126) 16. 
180  Referred to in Malherbe (n98) 95.  
181  Holmes (n131) 32; McKerron (n126) 27.     
182  Holmes (n131) 33.  
183  South African born, Dutch-speaking Politician and intellectual.  
184  Holmes (n131) 33. 
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Between 1835 and 1846, English attempts to anglicise the Cape Dutch had resulted in the 
Great Trek185and the later establishment of the Boer186 Republics, known as the South African 
Republic (later known as the Transvaal) and the Orange Free State.187 As a result, significant 
laws and policies on religion in education were being introduced in the South African 
Republic from the early 1870’s onwards.188 For instance, an 1874 Draft Ordinance was issued 
by Rev T.F Burgers, the then President of the South African Republic, which contained 
provisions for full state education. The Draft Ordinance proclaimed, for example, that no 
religious instruction should be given during school hours;189 that teachers need not be 
members of the church190 and that teachers must refrain from doing anything offensive to the 
religious beliefs of others.191 The Draft Ordinance was extremely unpopular amongst the 
conservative population and therefore had to be modified.192 In order to appease religious 
objectors, the resultant Act 4 of 1874 (known as Burgers’ Act) contained a clause including 
                                                          
185  A large segment of frontier whites (referred to as Boers- meaning farmers), having been alienated from 
British rule, undertook a mass migration between 1836 and 1845, known as the Great Trek.  The trek 
initially resulted in the founding of the Republic of Natalia, where the British followed the Boers and took 
over the territory in 1842. The Boers then moved westwards across the Drakensberg Mountains where they 
established the Republic of the Orange Free State and northwards, where they established the South African 
Republic. See Theal (n152) 124-125; See a full study in Muller Die Oorprong van die Groot Trek (1974); 
Referred to in Debroey South Africa: to the Sources of Apartheid (1989) 173; Stimie The Education of 
Whites in the Republic of South Africa (1975) 2. 
186   This term makes reference to the Afrikaans community. Afrikaans is a simplified version of the High Dutch 
spoken by their forebears but with added words of German, Portuguese and Bantu origin. (See Ransford 
“The Great Trek” at    http://www.ourcivilisation.com/smartboard/shop/ransford/chap1.htm (Date accessed : 
1 March 2012)); van Niekerk notes that: “The Afrikaners, who are the descendants of the Dutch settlers, and 
of Protestant settlers of other nationalities, mainly French and German, who also came to the Cape, became 
the chief bearers of reformed Christian ideas….” See van Niekerk “The impact of reformed books on the 
educational philosophy of the early Dutch colonists (1652-1795): a preliminary overview” 2001 21(3) SAJE 
146 146.  
187  Msila (n114) 148; Theal (n152) 148-157; Information on the development of education in the Orange Free 
State is scant compared to that of the Cape and the Transvaal. In this regard, McKerron notes that for many 
years after its establishment, the fate of the Republic of the Orange Free State was uncertain (with the fear 
of British invasion and people living under pioneering conditions) and therefore little attention was given to 
education. The first attempt at providing stable education was only made in 1872. Restoration of this system 
after the Anglo-Boer war was exceedingly difficult. See McKerron (n126) 35-38; Malherbe notes that with 
the exception of the Cape Province on which a few accounts on the history of education have been written, 
the rest of the country is “virgin soil” on the topic. See Malherbe (n98) 1;  Therefore developments in the 
Orange Free State area are not focussed on for purposes of the topic at hand. 
188  The colony of Natal was recognised as British territory in 1843. The arrival of British immigrants ensued 
from 1848 and therefore the territory endured many years of conflict between them and the Bantu in Natal 
and Zululand. For many years it was reliant on the Cape Colony until a legislative council was established 
in 1857. A full parliamentary government was only established in 1893. Therefore development in 
education in this area was slow and less significant than the Cape and Transvaal for purposes of the topic at 
hand. See Theal (n152) 124-125. 
189  Article 26. 
190   Article 4. 
191   Article 51.  
192  For full discussion, see Jeppe “Transvaal Book Almanac” (1877) 38, referred to in Malherbe (n98) 246.    
 
 
34 
Bible reading and Bible history as part of the compulsory curriculum.193 Despite this, the Act 
was still found to be too modern and too secular to be successful in this area.194 
 
Subsequently, Rev. du Toit was appointed as Superintendent of Education in the South 
African Republic. Rev. du Toit’s Education Act 1 of 1882,195 (in contrast to Burger’s Act) 
resulted in the introduction of state-aided schools in which parental involvement in the 
curriculum (including religious instruction), was encouraged. These schools opened and 
closed with prayer and the Bible was read, but not from a particular denominational 
standpoint. The policy applied at these schools is viewed as the early beginning of Christian 
National Education.196  In general, Rev. du Toit’s policies made religious instruction a 
dominant aspect of teaching.197 Mansvelt, who succeeded Rev. du Toit, framed the new 
Education Act 8 of 1892. This Act was based on the similar principles relating to religious 
instruction as Rev. du Toit’s Act; however it altered the denominationally neutral policy 
prevalent at the time by formalising favouritism towards the Protestant faith.198   
 
An intervening event, namely the Anglo-Boer War,199 ensued between the British and the 
combined forces of the Boer Republics between the years 1899 and 1902. This event further 
intensified religious and linguistic differences between the English and Afrikaans 
communities.200 The war left the Boer Republics defeated and subject to British rule.201 By 
                                                          
193   Article 26 of Act 4 of 1874.  
194  Malherbe (n98) 246.    
195  259.  
196   Holmes (n131) 35. 
197   Behr (n134) 97.  
198          Take note that the Reformed denominations in South Africa included the DRC (Nederduitse Gereformeerde 
Kerk), the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk, the Gereformeerde Kerke in Suid-Afrika and the Afrikaans 
Protestant Church (Afrikaanse Protestantse Kerk). See de Gruchy The Church Struggle in South Africa 
(1979) 20-21; Gerstner states: the Reformed faith, sometimes called “Calvinism” was one of the principal 
branches of the Protestant Reformation…” See Gerstner in Elphick & Davenport (n129)  1; Hofmeyer & 
Pillay state that the Protestant tradition in South Africa has its origins with the arrival of the Dutch in 1652, 
the early German settlers in 1660 and the French Huguenots in 1668. See Hofmeyer & Pillay (n103) 11. See 
also the “History of the Presbyterian Church in Southern Africa” which states: “In 1517 Martin Luther 
nailed his 95 Theses to a church door in Wittenberg, Germany. This public challenge to the practices of the 
church of his time led to the formation of a new family of churches known as the Protestant Churches. The 
two main streams of Protestant churches are the Reformed Churches and the Lutheran Churches.” Found at 
http://users.iafrica.com/d/da/danman/history.html (Date accessed: 29 July 2012). 
199  See Judd & Surridge The Boer War (2002); Also known as the “South African War”. See Nassan The South 
African War (1999); Theal (n152) 181 and 189; Malherbe Education in South Africa. Volume II: 1923-1975 
(1977) 297; Eybers Selected Constitutional Documents illustrating South African History 1795-1910 (1918) 
xvii; Bloomberg Christian-Nationalism and the rise of the Afrikaner Broederbond in South Africa, 1918-48 
(1990) 59; Behr (n134) 10; Rose and Tunmar (n124) 101; Stimie (n185) 3; Hofmeyer & Pillay (n103) 11; 
Debroey (n185) 97.  
200  Rose and Tunmar (n124) 101. 
201  Msila (n114) 148; Theal (n152) 91. 
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way of the Treaty of Vereeniging in 1902, the Boer Republics (now the Transvaal and Orange 
River Colony) were incorporated into the British Empire.202  
 
Lord Milner, as former Governor of the Cape and High Commissioner of Southern Africa,203 
was called upon to take over the administration of Transvaal and Orange River Colony, once 
they were annexed by the British. Lord Milner’s policy of anglicisation was introduced in the 
Transvaal. Inevitably, the policy met with increasing resistance from leaders in the DRC.204 
The opposition to Milner’s policy lead to the Movement for “Vrye Christelike Nasionale 
Onderwys”, which was aimed at establishing private Dutch205schools which were Christian-
based.206 Eventually, the reaction to Milner’s policy was embodied in the Public Education 
Ordinance 7 of 1903,207 which endorsed the establishment for free Christian National schools. 
From the outset, the government refused to fund schools adopting this program. It stands to 
reason that these schools did not survive due to economic pressure. As a result, the Christian 
National Education movement remained dormant between 1903 and 1907.208  
 
A significant turn of events took place in the Transvaal under the leadership of Jan Smuts, 
(later Prime Minister of South Africa) who was strongly committed to reconciliation between 
Afrikaans speakers and English speakers.209 He favoured local control over many aspects of 
education. Importantly, Smuts sought to create blended English and Afrikaans culture so there 
could be one single education system.210 In 1907, Smuts introduced the Education Act 
                                                          
202  Bloomberg (n199) xx. 
203  McKerron (n126) 38 and 45.  
204   An extract from letter by Lord Milner to Mr Lyttleton dated 13/06/04 states: “In September, 1903, the 
Director of Education was approached by the clerical members of the Christelijks Nationaal Onderwijes 
Comissie, representing all branches of the Dutch Church. [The current system] continues to be opposed by 
those who are regarded as the leaders of the Boer opinion”; An extract from a letter signed by Rev. H.S. 
Bosman, Moderator of the Dutch Reformed Church in Transvaal states: “The present system, it is declared, 
must be opposed ‘even to the shedding of blood.’ Independent schools must be established, and no 
negotiations with the Education Department entertained”; An Extract from letter by Lord Milner to Mr 
Lyttleton dated 16/05/04 states: “Opposition to the government scheme was organized on racial lines by the 
Dutch Reformed Church ….The predikants demanded that teachers should be appointed by School 
Committees chosen by the people, and that Dutch and English languages should be placed on equality.” 
Taken from Headlam The Milner Papers (1931) 513-516, quoted in Rose and Tunmar (n124) 101-103.  
205  Afrikaans only replaced Dutch as an official medium of instruction in schools in the 1920’s; Behr (n134) 
100.  
206  They schools were similar to private schools that had been established in the Cape Colony after the Hershel 
policy. See Rose and Tunmar (n124) 101. 
207   Referred to in McKerron (n126) 38 and 45.  
208  Holmes (n131) 38.  
209   Blumfield states: “He saw it as a means to “effect reconciliation between Boer and Briton and to use 
education for the creation of a ‘new nation’”. See Blumfield “A timeline of South African events in 
Education in the Twentieth Century: 1900 – 1999” (2008). 
210  Rose and Tunmar (n124) 114. 
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(known as Smuts’ Act), which was non-denominational when it came to religion. The Act 
provided, for example, that: the school day shall begin with a prayer and Bible reading; Bible 
history would be studied in the first half hour of the day in either Dutch or English; Bible 
reading and Bible history did not apply to schools established or maintained for attendance by 
non- Christian children; no child whose parents had objected to religious instruction in 
writing would be compelled to attend instruction in Bible history and no doctrine of dogma 
particular to any religious denomination would be taught in public school.211 This Act was 
neither un-Christian nor irreligious. It promoted Christianity but at the same time required that 
freedom of conscience be maintained and that minority religions be respected - much to the 
dissatisfaction of conservative Christians.  
 
The year 1910 is particularly significant as this was the year in which the four colonies (now 
called Provinces) of the Cape, Transvaal, Natal and the Orange River Colony212 were 
amalgamated to become the Union of South Africa.213 Initially, the Provinces (through 
Provincial Councils) retained control over primary and secondary education within its 
boundaries and the Union Department of Education214 assumed responsibility for higher 
education.215  However, this division of education between provincial and central government 
proved to be unpopular and unsatisfactory and led to calls for an “integrated national system 
of education”216 Therefore the advent of the Union marked the beginning of the development 
of a national217 system of education.218  
 
Significantly, in 1937, the Nicol Commission was appointed by the Transvaal Provincial 
Council to inquire into the educational system of the Province.219 In 1939, the Commission 
released a Report which found that there was practically a unanimous demand that schools 
should remain Christian and that Christianity should be the basis of the educational system, 
                                                          
211  Section 34 of Education Act of 1907; See Director of Education Report (Transvaal) 1906-7.  
212  Renamed the Orange Free State.  
213  South Africa Act of 1909; Eybers (n199) lxxiv; Republic of South Africa Official Yearbook of the Republic 
of South Africa (1986) 43.  
214  Later the Department of National Education. 
215  From 1912, the Union Department gradually took control over issues that the provinces could not handle. 
See Stimie (n185) 12-13. 
216  12-13.  
217   This term “national” was used in the administrative sense to denote one system, controlled by the central 
government; not “national” in the ideological sense which would entail that educational policy would be 
applicable to all population groups in the country in the same way- there would still be a distinction between 
different race groups. The ambiguity of the term “national” is explained in Malherbe (n199)141. 
218   Lekhela (n9) 15-16.  
219   Malherbe (n199) 40. 
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failing which the country would be heading in the direction of becoming a “heathen state”.220 
The Report contained comments to the effect that there were too many non-Christian pupils in 
certain schools and that pagan atmospheres prevailed in the homes of pupils, thereby 
necessitating that schools teach the Bible in a reverent and sympathetic way and do whatever 
possible to develop Christian virtues.221 This demand for the establishment of a Christian-
based education system would eventually materialise and manifest itself during the apartheid 
era.  
 
4   1939- 1996: APARTHEID AND CHRISTIAN NATIONAL 
EDUCATION 
 
A pivotal event occurred in 1939, when a church conference organised by the Federasie van 
Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge (FAK) was held in Bloemfontein,222 its main topic for 
discussion being Christian National Education.223 As a result of this conference, the Institute 
of Christian-National Education (ICNE)224 was formed to ensure:  
 
“continual propagation and furtherance of the historically-developed 
idea of Christian and National education and for insuring that the 
general lines of policy laid down ... [by the Institute] ... should find 
acceptance in a systematic way.”225  
 
In 1948 this Committee released a Policy Statement known commonly as Beleid,226 which 
served as the foundation principles for the Christian National Education policy227  enforced by 
                                                          
220  Report of the Provincial Education Commission (Nicol Commission): Province of the Transvaal (1939) par. 
11 and 542.  
221   Par.11 and 544. The Nicol Report served as the origin of the religious instruction clauses of the Ordinance 
of 1953, which formed the new legal basis for Christian Education in state schools in the Transvaal. 
222  The National Party (NP) was associated with a number of Afrikaner Nationalist bodies which together 
constituted a Nationalist movement. One of those bodies included the FAK. The NP was the Afrikaner 
political organ after 1948 and the FAK was on the cultural front, safeguarding confessionalism and all 
aspects of Afrikaner life. Many NP leaders were once office bearers in the FAK. See Bloomberg (n199) 
xxvi-xxvii.  
223  See Malherbe (n199) 50; Rose and Tunmar (n124) 117; Ostrowick “Christian National Education” (1993) 1 
(research paper).  
224  Rose and Tunmar (n124) 107; Van Heyningen “Christian National Education” 50.   
225   ICNE “Christian National Education Policy” (1949) 2; See Blumfield (n209).  
226  In 1972 the Human Science Research Council was asked to report to the Minister on its deliberations on 
differentiated education and publish its findings. If placed side by side with Beleid, it is clear that white 
education in the 1970’s South Africa was almost identical to the formulations contained in Beleid in 1948. 
See Rose and Tunmar (n124) 142; A publication in 1951 of the Commission of enquiry into education in the 
Orange Free state, which begun two years before the Beleid was published, stated: “The positive acceptance 
of the Christian principle as educational policy of the Province and the thorough permeation of our schools 
with the Christian atmosphere are strongly urged in evidence on the ground that Christian character can be 
formed only a Christian milieu.” See Rose and Tunmar (n124) 107-109; In 1945, the Pretorius Commission 
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the apartheid government from 1948 into the early 1990’s.228  This policy statement reflected 
the existing Afrikaner thinking on the relationship of schools to church and state.229 The 
intention of the policy as far as the Afrikaner schools were concerned, was clarified by J.C. 
Van Rooyen, Chairman of the FAK as follows:  
 
 “Our Afrikaner schools must not only be mother-tongue schools; they 
must also be in every sense of the word Christian and National 
schools, they must be places where our children are steeped and 
nourished in Christian National spiritual culture of our nation. We 
want no language mixing, no cultural mixing, religious mixing nor 
racial mixing.”230  
 
Furthermore, Article 15 of Beleid contains what may be described as being the basis of 
apartheid education. It states:   
 
“We believe that the calling and task of White South Africa with regard to 
the native is to Christianize him and help him on culturally, and that this 
calling and task has already found its nearer focusing in the principles of 
trusteeship, no equality and segregation. We believe besides that any 
system of teaching and education of natives must be based on the same 
principle. In accordance with these principles we believe that the teaching 
and education of the native must be grounded in the life and worldview of 
the Whites most especially those of the Boer nation as senior White 
trustee of the native…”231 
 
The year 1948 marked a crucial turning point in South African history. It was in this year that 
the National Party (NP) won the election and introduced apartheid, a system of racism232 and 
segregation which led to the systematic deterioration of the position of non-white people in 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
investigated into education in the Orange Free State and it emphasised the “importance of cultivating in a 
pupil a Christian and national outlook.” See Behr (n134) 26.  
227  These foundation principles for CNE Policy  included: The use of mother-tongue instruction and a policy of 
no mixing of languages and cultures in schools; The preparation of Black people for an inferior station in 
life beneath White people; The preservation of the cultural status of Black people who were regarded as still 
being in “cultural infancy” and requiring to be in the trusteeship of White people; The teaching of religion 
in schools and the teaching of all subjects in accordance with Calvinist tenets. See summary in Seroto 
(n110) 106; See also summary in Bloomberg (n199) xxiii-xxv 
228  Ostrowick (n223) 1. 
229   See translated Preface of Beleid originally written by Van Rooyen, paraphrased in South African Teachers 
Association “Christian National Education: a critical commentary” 4-5. 
230  See Rose and Tunmar (n124) 108 and 119.  
231  Quoted in Msila (n114) 148-149. 
232   For example, the National Party enacted the Immorality Act 21 of 1950, which forbade inter-racial marriage 
and inter-racial intercourse between blacks and whites; the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950, which created 
different residential areas for different races and the Populations Registration Act 30 of 1950, which 
classified all South Africans into particular racial groups; See further details in Muller (n171) 481-490.  
 
 
39 
South Africa.233 The state based the legitimacy of the apartheid laws on religious grounds234 
with the moral support of the DRC.235 Apartheid education in South Africa promoted 
separateness along racial, class, gender and ethnic lines, issues which are inevitably 
intertwined with religion.236  It was children, in particular, who had to endure unequal 
education and discriminatory practices at school. Robinson comments that: “The degradation 
imposed upon, and profound humiliation suffered by, children’s parents under the apartheid 
system, had a severe impact on [children].”237  
 
Overall, the education policy and curriculum development in apartheid South Africa was 
used as an ideological state apparatus to promote the interests of the ruling apartheid 
government, which included the ideology of Christian Nationalism.238 The NP government 
also reintroduced Christian National Education239 as the guiding philosophy of education.  
Although the intention behind Christian National Education was the preservation of 
Calvinism, it became identified with the survival of the Afrikaner people and, therefore, 
                                                          
233  Kallaway refers to a systematic scientific approach to “native policy” in Kallaway The history of education 
under apartheid, 1948-1994: the doors of learning and culture shall be opened (2002) 17; Seroto (n110) 
101-102; Bloomberg (n199) xxviii; See discussion on the theory of apartheid in Louw The Rise, Fall and 
Legacy of Apartheid (2004) 27-50; See “The rise of Apartheid” at 
              http://overcomingaprthied.msu.edu/unit.php?id=5&page =3 (Date accessed: 5 February 2011).  
234   van den Heever “Diversity: Religion and the Study and Religion” 2004 11(3&4) Religion and Theology 199 
200-202; Bloomberg (n199) xxiii-xxv and 133; Seroto (n110) 101; Kitshoff states that: “It is important to 
note that some of these ‘white’ master symbols which contributed to the destabilization and disruption of 
South African society found their way via (biblical) religious education transported into the Christian 
National Education system, into the schools.” See Kitshoff (n163) 332.  
235          Kuperes argues that: “the NGK’s heavy political involvement with the state began in the early 1900s when it 
advanced a Neo-Calvinist, ideological justification of apartheid.” See Kuperus “Resisting or embracing 
reform? South Africa’s democratic transition and NGK-State relations” 1996 38(4) Journal of Church and 
State 841 843; Bosch states that: “For many decades, the National Party and the Dutch Reformed Churches 
were seen as jointly responsible for keeping the laager intact, buttressing the weak spots and keeping up the 
moral of the people. After the National Party came into power in 1948, the entire legislative machinery was 
harnessed with this one purpose in mind, namely to safeguard the Afrikaner identity once and for all….” 
See Bosch “The Afrikaner and South Africa” 1986 43(2) Theology Today 203 208; Lave “A Nation at 
Prayer, A Nation in Hate: Apartheid in South Africa” (1994) Stanford Journal of International Law 
483 499-501 (noting that in 1948, the Church accepted a report called Racial and National Apartheid in the 
Bible, which was the first attempt to justify apartheid based on the Bible).  
236  Msila (n114) 146; Naicker “From Apartheid Education to inclusive education: The challenges of 
transformation”, International Education Summit for a Democratic Society (26-28 June 2008) 1; Daniel & 
Greytak state: “Though segregationist legislation was certainly not confined to education, it did produce 
some of apartheid’s most visible disparities. Educational policy under apartheid essentially divided South 
Africans into four racially-segregated education systems…” See Daniel & Greytak “An analysis of the 
‘right’ to education in South Africa and the United States” 2012 27 SAPR/PL 344 347. 
237  Robinson “Children’s Rights in the South African Constitution”11. 
238   Msila states: “The CNE principles on education for the Africans were declared as a way of maintaining the 
black South Africans in permanent state of political and economic subordination. The education system had 
been an obvious instrument of control to protect power and privilege.” See Msila (n114) 149.  
239  van den Heever points out that although the policy contained the terms “Christian” and “National”, it only 
served the interests of a small group of the population, certainly not all Christians nor the whole nation. See 
van den Heever (n234) 205-206.  
 
 
40 
became “a factor in the development of apartheid.”240 At the time, Christianity was thought to 
be “the only solution for all the great and grave problems we face in this country of ours.”241 
In fact, legislation during the apartheid era demonstrated a manifest Christian preference in 
many instances other than in education.242  
 
Importantly, in 1949, the Eiselen Commission was established to specifically investigate the 
education of Black pupils.243 The outcome was the Report of the Eiselen Commission244 of 
1951, which recommended that a distinction be drawn between Black and White education.245 
The Report endorsed a policy in terms of which Bantu education would in content be dictated 
to by the needs of children brought up in the Bantu culture, “endowed with a knowledge of 
                                                          
240   Hexham “Religious conviction or political tool? The problem of Christian National Education” March 1979 
26 Journal for theology of Southern Africa 20; Kitshoff states that very often the style of education was 
described as “Christian nuture”. See Kitshoff (n163) 316; Nation-building was reserved only for White 
people. H.F Verwoerd stated: “When I talk about the nation I talk about the white people of South Africa.” 
See Giliomee  “Nation-building in South Africa: White perspectives” in Swilling (ed) Views of the South 
African State (1990) 32; Kitshoff observes that syllbi from as late as 1989 aimed: “To bring each child 
nearer a living parctical faith in Christ, and nearer the love and service of God through the knowledge 
acquired”, at “the moulding of the Christian character”, “the pursuit of a Christian way of life”; and to 
prepare the pupil “to accept Christ as his personal Saviour and for a life of service to God and his fellow-
man.” See Kitshoff (n163) 317; See also Kruger Sweeping whirlwinds. a study of religious change 
Reformed and civil religion in the city of Pretoria (Tshwane) 1855- 2000 (2003) 104.  
241  Coetzer & Masumbe “Interdenominational Schooling and Social Transformation” August 2003 Missionalia 
305 315; It is also contended that: “As Christianity is the only religion taught, the common aims obviously 
relate directly to the teaching of Christianity…Education authorities feel that it is important for students to 
know something about the Bible. It is hoped that reading large portions of the Bible, learning versus off by 
heart or simply listening to ‘Bible stories’ will somehow lead to the production of ‘better’ people and, 
consequently, a ‘better’ society. A conversion to the Christian religion would be paramount.” See Summers 
& Waddington (n115) 8; Roux states: “Spirituality was also never seen as part of moral education and 
learners were not exposed to the opportunity to become spiritual in a broader sense, except from a Christian 
religious point of view.” See Roux “Children’s spirituality in social context: a South African example” 
April 2006 11(1) International Journal of Children’s Spirituality 151 152. 
242  For example, censorship under the Publications Act 42 of 1974 was invoked to protect “a Christian view of 
life”; Sunday observance laws required respect of the Christian Sabbath day and other Christian Holy days; 
only Christian oaths were utilised in criminal tribunals (section 162(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act Act 51 
of 1977). See van der Vyver “Religion” in Joubert & Scott (eds) The Law of South Africa vol 23 (1986) 
197-200. Also discussed in du Plessis (n52) 443-444; “Legislation of a not so overtly religious nature, such 
as the infamous Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 55 of 1949 and the controversial section 16 of the 
Immorality Act, were enacted at the behest of, amongst others, the Afrikaans churches in an attempt to 
prevent ‘miscegenation.’” Quoted in du Toit (n100)  678; See also du Plessis “Religious Human Rights in 
South Africa” in van der Vyver & Witte (eds) Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Legal 
perspective (1996) 443-444. 
243  Naicker “Imbalances and Inequities in South African Education: A Historical-educational survey and 
appraisal” (1996) 51; Coetzer & Masumbe (n241) 312-313.  
244  Report of the Eiselen Commission (1951) 13, 131; The Report of the Eiselen Commission found no evidence 
that “the intelligence of black children was of so special and peculiar a nature as to demand on these 
grounds a special type of education.” It also stated: “The Bantu child comes to school with a basic physical 
and psychological endowment that differs . . . so slightly from that of the European child that no provision 
has to be made in educational theory or basic aims.”  
245  The Report of the Eiselen Commission para 1; Coetzer & Masumbe state: “The apartheid state abhorred 
interethnic mixing and by implication, interdenominationalism and cross-border cultural exchange because 
it would educate the Bantu to the point where they would challenge racial discrimination.” See Coetzer & 
Masumbe (n241) 313. 
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the Bantu language and imbued with values, interests and behaviour patterns”246 characteristic 
with a Bantu.247 In other words, it endorsed a policy whereby Black children would be 
subjected to an inferior education system than White children.248 The needs of children were 
determined along racial lines. Moreover, the Report stated that “[t]he desire for schooling as a 
means of fathoming the Christian religion was and remains a powerful motive.”249  
 
The impact of the Eiselen Report was that its main recommendations were embodied in the 
Bantu (Black) Education Act 47 of 1953, 250 which established a national system of Bantu 
education.251 This Act placed the education of Black people under the control of a single state 
department.252 The establishment of the Christian National Education policy is reflected in the 
Bantu Education Act.253 Subsequently, the Education of Training Act 90 of 1979 provided for 
the education of Black people and it too required that education have a Christian character.254   
                                                          
246  The Report of the Eiselen Commission.  
247   It was stated on the House of Assembly debates that: “The new educational system should have its roots ‘in 
the spirit and being of a Bantu society’ and serve the respective ethnic communities.” See House of 
Assembly Debates, (1953) cols.3585-3585; Davenport and Saunders comment that the education policy for 
Blacks was “based on the assumption of an inferior potential in African minds” and as “explicitly designed 
to prepare blacks for an inferior place in society.” See Davenport & Saunders South Africa: A Modern 
History (2000) 674; When HF Verwoerd spoke on the new education system in 1954, he stated: “There is 
no space for him [the “Native”] in the European Community above certain forms of labor. For this reason it 
is of no avail for him to receive training which has its aim in the absorption of the European Community, 
where he cannot be absorbed. Until now he has been subjected to a school system which drew him away 
from his community and misled him by showing him the greener pastures of European Society where he is 
not allowed to graze.” See Verwoerd “Bantu Education: Policy for the Immediate Future” (1954) and 
quoted in Kallaway Apartheid and Education: The Education of Black South Africans (1984) 92-93.  
248  Dr Verwoerd, described the purpose of Bantu education as follows: “Racial relations cannot improve if the 
wrong type of education is given to natives. They cannot improve if the result of native education is the 
creation of frustrated people who, as a result of the education they received, have expectation in life which 
circumstances in South Africa do not allow to be fulfilled immediately, when it creates people who are 
trained for professions not open to them, when there are people who have received a form of cultural 
training which strengthens their desire for the white-collar occupations to such an extent that there are more 
such people than openings available.” See House of Assembly Debates of 17 September 1953 col 3576.  
249   Behr (n134) 33.  
250   Kallaway (n247) 171; February notes that the state used the Bantu Education Act of 1953 to close down 
many non-public or religious schools, in order to ensure the government’s monopoly on black education - 
which it intentionally geared towards careers in trade or labour. See February “From Redress to 
Empowerment” in Featherman et al (eds) The Next 25 Years: Affirmative Action in Higher Education in the 
United States and South Africa (2010) 81. 
251  Lekhela (n9) 20. 
252  Kallaway (n247) 171; Behr (n134) 35-36; van den Heever observes that: “As official reason for the move it 
was said that mission and church schools undermined the authority of parents in their children’s education, 
but the real reason was the racist philosophy encapsulated by this Bill of Europeans being the guardians of 
blacks. The concept of guardianship allowed the State to use the state machinery at its disposal to transform 
Christian National Education into a totalitarian education system.” See van den Heever (n234) 205; Also see 
Mitchell cited in van den Heever “Religion, Erziehung und Rechte zur Religionsausiibung. Perspektiven aus 
dem entstehenden ‘Neuen’ Siidafrika,” 1996 Spirita. Zeitschrift fiir Religionswissenschaft 15 18.  
253  Rose and Tunmar (n124) 108 and 119; Take note that South Africa became a Republic on 31 May 1961 by 
way of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 32 of 1961; van den Heever  (n234) 205.  
254  Behr (n134) 87; Seroto (n110) 138.   
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In later years, separate legislation was passed for the education of Coloured people, namely 
the Coloured People’s Education Act 47 of 1963, and for Indians, namely the Indian 
Education Act 61 of 1965.255 Christianity played a prominent role in the education of 
Coloured pupils during the apartheid era.256 The only apparent difference was the use of the 
word “Scripture” when referring to Coloured people’s education as opposed to “Bible”. On 
the other hand, Christianity was not specifically mentioned in relation to the education of 
Indian people.257  
 
Congruently, the National Education Policy Act 39 of 1967258 established an integrated 
national system of education for White people.259 It provided for education with a Christian 
character but with due respect for the religious convictions of parents and pupils. Moreover, 
education had to have a broad national character, and the mother-tongue, if English or 
Afrikaans, would be used as the medium of instruction.260 The Act, with its insistence on 
mother-tongue instruction and segregated education, ties in significantly with the principles 
relating to Christian National Education formulated in Belied.261   
 
Subsequently, increasing tensions over language issues in education ensued and eventually 
erupted in the mid-to late 1970’s.262 Accordingly, In June 1980, the government requested the 
                                                          
255  Behr (n134) 96-97.  
256  96.  
257   Indian people represented the smallest of the population groups were predominantly of the Hindu faith.  
258  And later the National Education Policy Amendment Act 103 0f 1986. 
259  Dovey “De-Mystifying Christian National Education: a Programme for Teacher Training Courses” 1979 
Journal of Education 27 27; Stimie (n185) 2. 
260  Extract from Hansard Parliamentary Debate (22 February 1967), relating to the objection to the separation 
of white pupils into English and Afrikaans medium schools:  
               Dr. C.P Mulder: “We on this southern point of Africa are a Christian people….Must we, for the sake of a 
few people who object, change the entire nation’s character? That would be foolish.”  
               Mr. L.E.D. Winchester: “Under this Bill apartheid is being applied amongst the white race. The other races 
in this country are separated on the grounds of colour; now the white race is going to be separated on the 
grounds of language differences. …I consider the Bill to an attack on religious freedoms and the rights of 
parents….”  
Minister of Education: “My interpretation of ‘the Christian character of education’ is that education shall 
build on the basis of traditional Western culture and view of life which recognize the validity of the Biblical 
principles, norms and values. I challenge any hon. Member to tell me that that is sectional; that it includes 
one group of Christians and excludes another.” 
261  Chetty Problems experienced by teachers in a multicultural classroom setting (1997) 54.   
262  The Soweto uprising was triggered by the Department of Education’s decision to enforce Afrikaans as a 
medium of instruction in some subjects in Black schools on the Witwatersrand. On 16 June 1976, a well-
organised mass protest of some 6000 children from Soweto lead to a confrontation with police and the 
deaths of several school children. This event triggered off riots, violence and unrest, which spread through 
South Africa. A massive country-wide boycott ensued in Black schools in 1980. On a positive note, this 
uprising marked the beginning of resistance against segregated schooling and inspired world-wide protests 
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Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) to conduct a comprehensive investigation into all 
aspects of South African education taking into account all population groups. The Main 
Committee of the Council adopted eleven principles that would be used as points of departure 
for its recommendations for the provision of a system which would take into account 
commonality and diversity; individual and group expectations and the needs of country as a 
whole. Included in these principles was: “recognition of what is common as well as what is 
diverse in the religious and cultural way of life and the language of the inhabitants.”263 The 
results of the investigation were published in July 1981, under the title Provision of Education 
in the RSA (or the so-called De Lange Report) which called for a uniform compulsory 
education policy.264 Importantly, the De Lange Report stressed that: “the distribution of 
education will have to be organised in such a way that everyone will receive a rightful share 
regardless of race, colour, socio-economic context, ethic context, religion,265 sex or 
geographic location.”266  
 
The De Lange Report met with massive criticism from the Afrikaner community. The 
Congress of Afrikaner Educationalists and Intellectuals was held in Bloemfontein to reflect on 
the contents of the Report. In the end the Congress accepted the Report of the Main 
Committee subject to the explicit qualification that Christian National Education and mother-
tongue instruction not be negotiable for Afrikaners.267 As a result, in 1983, the government 
published a White Paper268 containing its response to the De Lange Report in which it 
reaffirmed the position that Christian National Education was to be maintained.269 It should be 
noted that although the contents of the Report were rejected by the government at the time, it 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
against apartheid. See Giliomee “A Note on Bantu Education, 1953 to 1970” March 2009 77(1) South 
African Journal of Economics 190 197; Chetty (n261) 42-43; Behr (n134) 37; Christie The Open Schools: 
Racially mixed catholic schools in South Africa, 1976-1986 (1990) 1. 
263   Main Report, HSRC (1981); Behr (n134) 39. 
264   HSRC Report of the Main Committee of the HSRC: Investigation into Education: Provision of Education in 
the RSA (1981) 184; SANEP Report The structure and operation of the South African education system 
1985 7. 
265  Emphasis added.  
266  Republic of South Africa “Parliamentary Register 1910-1982” in The Encyclopaedia of South Africa 
Biography (1981) 204.  
267  Behr (n134) 57.  
268  Republic of South Africa White Paper on the Provision of Education in the Republic of South Africa, 1983.  
269  Squelch Teacher education and training for multicultural education in a multicultural society (1991) 34; 
Behr (n134) 58; Coutts Multi-cultural education: the way ahead (1992) 11; The National Policy for General 
Affairs Act 76 of 1984 provided some improvements in black education but maintained the generally 
segregated schooling system. 
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influenced educational policy in the 1990’s and left a legacy for the new democratic 
government.270  
 
Similar sentiments as contained in the White Paper were further entrenched in the 1983 
Constitution,271 a document which reflected Calvinist principles.272 Its Preamble stated: 
 
“IN HUMBLE SUBMISSION to Almighty God, Who controls the 
destinies of peoples and nations, Who gathered our forebears together 
from many lands and gave them this their own, Who has guided them from 
generation to generation, Who has wondrously delivered them from the 
dangers that beset them, WE DECLARE that we ARE CONSCIOUS of 
our responsibility towards God and man; ARE CONVINCED of the 
necessity of standing united and of pursuing the following national goals: 
To uphold Christian values and civilized norms, with recognition and 
protection of freedom of faith and worship…” 
 
This prominence of Christianity was further emphasised in section 2 of the 1983 Constitution 
which stated that: “The people of the Republic of South Africa acknowledge the sovereignty 
and guidance of Almighty God.”273  
 
All the while, South Africa continued to endure international condemnation for its 
discriminatory laws and practices during the apartheid era274 and by the late 1980’s apartheid 
                                                          
270  Kallaway (n233) 18.  
271  Under the 1983 Constitution, White, Coloured and Indian people would be represented in a Parliament 
consisting of three Houses: A House of Assembly (for White people); a House of Representatives (for 
Coloured People) and a House of Delegates (for Indian People). Black People were not represented in 
Parliament. The administration and control of affairs pertaining to Black people was vested in the State 
President. The 1983 Constitution made a distinction between “own affairs” (matters which specifically 
relate to a population group) (section 14) and “general affairs” (matter which were not the own affairs of a 
population group) (section 15). It defined education as an “own affair” (as per Schedule I). See Van Zyl The 
De Lange Report: ten years on (1991) 16.  
272  Chidester et al Religion in Public Education: Options for a new South Africa (1994) 16.  
273  Other examples of 1980’s legislation which reflected Christian morals include: the Liquor Act 27 of 1989, 
which prohibited the sale of liquor on “closed days”, which according to section 2 includes Sundays, Good 
Friday and Christmas - all days which are of significance to the Christian religion; Prior to Fraser v Fraser 
v Children’s Court , Pretoria North 1997 (2) SA 2 61 (CC), section 18(d) of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 
discriminated against fathers of certain non-Christian marital unions, for example Islamic and customary 
law marriages, that were not considered to be legal for being potentially polygamous. The relevant section 
discriminated on the basis of religion and marriage performed under that religion. The children of these 
unions were regarded as illegitimate, thereby discriminating against them. See Blake & Litchfield 
“Religious Freedom in Southern Africa: The Developing Jurisprudence” 1998 Brigham Young University 
Law Review 543-544.  
274   Dickinson & van Vollenhoven (n14) 10; Apartheid was declared a Crime against Humanity by the United 
Nations in Article 1 of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid, G.A. res. 3068 (XXVIII)), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974), 1015 
U.N.T.S. 243, entered into force July 18, 1976 and also in Article 7(1)(j) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9); On 6 November 1962, the United Nations 
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and Christian National Education began to unravel.275 For example, Njungwe comments that 
the Organisation of African Unity (now African Union)276 had particular concern for the 
position of children living under the apartheid regime, and, as a result, unyieldingly 
condemned apartheid.277  
 
This resulted in the adoption of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, known as the 
interim Constitution,278 in order to have constitutional provisions in place before the first 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
General Assembly passed Resolution 1761 (XVII), The Policies of Apartheid of The Government of the 
Republic of South Africa, condemning apartheid policies; On 7 August 1963 the United Nations Security 
Council passed Resolution 181 [S/5386] calling for a voluntary arms embargo against South Africa.   
275  Chetty states: “The repeal of the Population Registration Act of 30 of 1950, by which people were given 
racial identities, and the Group Areas Act, that prescribed specific residential areas for each race group, laid 
the foundation for a shift to non-racial education in South Africa.”  See Chetty (n261) 49; Kallaway (n233) 
18; In 1990, the South African government considers opening White schools to Black students if 90 percent 
of White parents vote in favour of the motion. See Hlatshwayo Education and Independence. Education in 
South Africa, 1658-1988 (2000) 111. This referendum materialised in 1992; In 1992, the South African 
Teachers Association produced a document which noted that educational policy had to recognise “the fact 
that South Africa is a multi-cultural and multi-faith society.” See Kitshoff (n163) 315-318; See discussion 
on the end of apartheid in Louw (n233) 164-174.  
276  Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Republic of South Africa states that: “The 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa, on signature of the 
OAU Charter by representatives of 32 governments. A further 21 states have joined gradually over the 
years, with South Africa becoming the 53rd member on 23 May 1994. The OAU aims to promote the unity 
and solidarity of African States; co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better 
life for the peoples of Africa”. See http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/oau.htm (Date 
accessed: 19 September 2012)  
277  Njungwe “International Protection of children’s rights: an Analysis of African attributes in the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child” June 2009 39(1) CJDHR 4 5; See The Manifesto on 
Southern Africa proclaimed by the Fifth Summit Conference of East and Central African States held in 
April 1969 in Lusaka, Zambia (The Lusaka Manifesto) and The Mogadishu Conference and Declaration, 
October 1971, which condemned apartheid policies. 
278  The interim Constitution protected religion, children’s rights and educational rights in the  following 
provisions:   
Section 14: Religion, belief and opinion  
“(1) Every person shall have the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion, which 
shall include academic freedom in institutions of higher learning.  
                (2) Without derogating from the generality of subsection (1), religious observances may be conducted at 
state or state-aided institutions under rules established by an appropriate authority for that purpose, 
provided that such religious observances are conducted on an equitable basis and attendance at them is 
free and voluntary.  
 (3) Nothing in this Chapter shall preclude legislation recognising-  
 (a) a system of personal and family law adhered to by persons professing a particular religion; and  
      (b) the validity of marriages concluded under a system of religious law subject to specified procedures.”  
                Section 30: Children  
“(1) Every child shall have the right-  
      (a) to a name and nationality as from birth;  
      (b) to parental care;  
      (c) to security, basic nutrition and basic health and social services;  
      (d) not to be subject to neglect or abuse; and           
      (e) not to be subject to exploitative labour practices nor to be required or permitted to    perform work 
which is hazardous or harmful to his or her education, health or well-being.  
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democratic elections took place in 1994.279 The need for the establishment of a culture of 
human rights prior to the election, was imperative. The early 1990’s therefore marked the 
beginning of a positive educational transformation in South Africa.280  
 
After the election in 1994, the newly established Government of National Unity immediately 
set about reforming the South Africa’s education system. The Review Committee on School 
Organisation, Governance and Funding, established by the government, suggested the urgent 
need for establishing multicultural education in all schools in South Africa. This would mean 
formulating a new curriculum which removed any content which was “racist, sexist or 
otherwise offensive, or which was inaccurate or outdated.”281 This meant that South African 
children would no longer be subjected to the teaching or dissemination of discriminatory and 
distorted values, through the school curriculum.282 Furthermore, religious instruction in 
accordance with the CNE model could not be continued in the new system.283  
                                                                                                                                                                                            
(2) Every child who is in detention shall, in addition to the rights which he or she has in terms of section 25, 
have the right to be detained under conditions and to be treated in a manner that takes account of his or 
her age.  
(3) For the purpose of this section a child shall mean a person under the age of 18 years and in all matters 
concerning such child his or her best interest shall be paramount.”  
Section 32:  Education  
“Every person shall have the right-  
(a) to basic education and to equal access to educational institutions;  
(b) to instruction in the language of his or her choice where this is reasonably practicable; and  
(c) to establish, where practicable, educational institutions based on a common culture, language or religion, 
provided that there shall be no discrimination on the ground of race.” 
279  Dickinson & van Vollenhoven (n14) 11; For more on the drafting process of the interim Constitution and its 
clause on freedom of religion (section 14), see du Plessis (n242) 443-465.  
280  Education Rights Project “Religion in schools” (2005) 1; Chetty (n261) 54.    
281  Chetty (n261) 53-54.  
282  Children had endured racial discrimination and the dissemination of discriminatory values through 
unequal/segregated schooling. Furthermore, religious education (through the CNE policy) had impacted 
upon children’s education rights, religious rights; equality rights and dignity into the early 1990’s. For 
example, according to a manual for Biblical Instruction published in 1990, learners were expected to 
embrace Christian principles. It stated: “Children must personally accept, and trust for their personal 
salvation, the triune God introduced to them in the Bible.” See Department of Didactics Biblical Instruction 
(HED) (1990) 30; Also quoted in Chidester “Religion Education in South Africa: Teaching and Learning 
About Religion, Religions, and Religious Diversity”, printed in Teaching for Tolerance and Freedom of 
Religion or Belief, a Report from the preparatory Seminar held in Oslo December 7-9, 2002; A widely used 
Pre-1994 textbook for Religious Education and Biblical Studies stated that South Africa “is a Christian 
country and it is only right that our children be taught in the Christian faith—also in our schools.” 
Furthermore, a “child who follows the Christian faith is more likely to behave in a moral way than a non-
Christian or an un-religious child.” See Kitshoff & Van Wyk Method of Religious Education and Biblical 
Studies (1995); Evidently, the rights of children adhering to minority faiths were disregarded by the 
education system. Also, the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 did not provide a child with a clear right to express 
views and wishes if able to do so, and, it did not mention the “best interests of the child”. See South African 
Law Commission “Review of the Child Care Act: Executive Summary” (2002) viii.  
283  Dreyer “The National Policy on Religion and Education in South Africa: Reflections from a Public Practical 
Theology” Practical Theology in South Africa 2007 22(2) 40 42; See the National Policy on Religion and 
Education (2003) is discussed in Chapter 5.   
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Finally, in 1996, the Constitution was adopted as supreme law.284 The 1996 Constitution is a 
document which upholds the values of human dignity, equality and freedom”285 and includes 
“freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief” for everyone.286 The Constitution also 
enshrines the rights of children,287 including the “best interests of the child”288 principle. 
Furthermore, it includes educational rights, which entitles everyone to the right to basic 
education;289 also mentioning “the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory 
laws and practices”.290 The inclusion of special protection for the rights of “every child”291 
and educational rights was an important development for South African school-children, most 
of whom had suffered under apartheid for many years.  All of these rights impact on current 
issues relating to religion in schools.292   
 
 
5    CONCLUSION  
 
South Africa’s history has undoubtedly been characterised by the unequal treatment of 
religions. The arrival of European in South Africa initiated the religious conversion of African 
people to one or other denomination of Christianity. Ever since then, Christianity has been 
promoted in many aspects of the law, including education, with little regard for other 
religions. By and large, Christianity was the favoured religion in education since the 
beginning of formalised education in South Africa, with complete disregard for pupils 
adhering to minority faiths.293 
 
The law that regulated the educational system during apartheid established an education 
system that was Christian-based.294 Apartheid education was a system characterised by 
segregation in education along racial, class, gender and ethnic lines, issues which are 
                                                          
284  Section 2 of the Constitution. 
285   Section 1(a) of the Constitution. 
286  Section 15; Discussed in detail in Chapter 6.  
287  Section 28.  
288  Section 28(2).  
289  Sections 29(1); Discussed fully in Chapter 5.  
290  Sections 29 (2) (c).  
291  Section 28(1).  
292  See Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
293  According to Chidester, religious education: “was driven by a particular kind of Christian confessionalism 
and triumphalism, a confessionalism that required pupils to embrace prescribed religious convictions and a 
triumphalism that explicitly denigrated adherents of other religions.” See Chidester “The ICRSA RE 
Project” at http://folk.uio.no/leirvik/OsloCoalition-ICRSA.htm (Date accessed: 20 July 2006). Quoted in 
Dreyer n283 43. 
294  Summers & Waddington (n115) 5; See Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953; National Education Policy Act 39 
of 1967; Education of Training Act 90 of 1979 and National Education Policy Amendment Act 103 of 1986.  
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inherently interconnected with religion. As illustrated above, the apartheid education policy 
and curriculum, which included Christian National Education, was used as a device to 
promote the interests of the apartheid government.295  As Nicolson notes:  
 
 “In part the purpose of Christian National Education was to create a 
homogenous society…however those who do not share in the 
religion are excluded from full membership of the community. 
Attempting to force people into one religious mould is nationally 
divisive and destroys the community.”296  
 
It has been evidenced that colonialism, apartheid and Christian Nationalism were the main 
factors which resulted in the favouritism of one particular brand of Christianity in South 
African schools, thereby marginalising all other denominations and faiths. It is clear that 
elevating one denomination into a privileged position in the school environment does not 
correspond with the now constitutionally recognised freedom of religion of those belonging to 
other denominations.  
 
Undoubtedly, in light of the historical overview presented in this Chapter, it was imperative 
that the South African government embark on an extensive transformation of the educational 
laws and policies on religion in schools. This is illustrated particularly in the discussion of the 
National Policy on Religion and Education and the analysis of the issue of teaching religion 
in public schools contained in Chapter 7. The next Chapter focusses on the international law 
principles which informed the said transformation.   
                                                          
295   Msila states: “The CNE principles on education for the Africans were declared as a way of maintaining the 
black South Africans in permanent state of political and economic subordination. The education system had 
been an obvious instrument of control to protect power and privilege.” See Msila (n114) 149.  
296   Nicolson (n115) 44.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON CHILDREN’S 
RIGHTS,  
 EDUCATION RIGHTS &   
FREEDOM OF RELIGION  
 
 
 
“Where after all, do human rights begin? In small places, close to 
home – so close and so small that they cannot be seen on any maps of 
the world. Yet they are the world of the individual person; the 
neighborhood he lives in; the school or college he attends; the factory, 
farm or office where he works. Such are the places where every man, 
woman and child seeks equal justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity 
without discrimination. Unless these rights have meaning there, they 
have little meaning anywhere.”297 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The political transformation of South Africa from a racist state into “an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom”,298 led to the subsequent 
accommodation of religious diversity that was largely informed by the principles of 
international law.299 International law principles have also stimulated changes in children’s 
rights and educational rights in South African law.  
 
This Chapter deals with South Africa’s obligations to protect children’s rights, the education 
rights and freedom of religion, through customary international law and the various human 
rights instruments, at both world level and regional level. It focusses on international 
instruments to which South Africa has become a party or which have significantly influenced 
                                                          
297  Eleanor Roosevelt, the first chairperson of the UN Human Rights Commission. She was also the United 
States delegate to the United Nations General Assembly from 1946-1952. 
298   Section 39 (1)(a) of the Constitution.  
299  van der Vyver “The Contours of Religious Liberty in South Africa” 2007 21 Emory International Law 
Review 77- 78.  
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South African law. The scope of the present Chapter does not permit a comprehensive 
analysis of the wide, complex and multifaceted subject of international law on the 
abovementioned rights. The aim is rather to clarify the place of these international obligations 
in South African law and discuss the impact of the various provisions of these instruments 
which are relevant to the legal issues around religion in South African schools. It provides an 
international context for the discussion on South African law contained in the Chapters to 
follow.  
  
This Chapter consists of an overview of the most prominent world and regional instruments 
related to the topic at hand that are applicable to South Africa. These include: the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights;300 the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination;301 the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights;302 the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and 
of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief;303 the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child304 and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.305  
These instruments are significant in that they assist with shaping human rights law and in 
establishing a world order in relation to the relevant rights and freedoms. By signing and/or 
ratifying these instruments, South Africa has shown its commitment to abide by international 
standards of human rights protection.  
 
Subsequent to a discussion on the place of international law in South African law and an 
overview of each of the international instruments mentioned above; this Chapter contains a 
discussion of the relevant provisions of these instruments in accordance with the following 
themes: 1) children’s rights 2) education rights and 3) freedom of religion. 
 
 
 
                                                          
300          General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948.  
301          G.A. res. 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965.    
302   General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. 
303   United Nations General Assembly Resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981. 
304   United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25 (also available 
on Internet at http://www.hri.ca/uninfo/treaties/25.shtml (Date accessed: 19/03/03).  
305     OAU Doc.CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force on 29 November 1999. 
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2 THE PLACE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN SOUTH AFRICAN 
DOMESTIC LAW 
 
International law has been defined as the body of rules and principles which are binding upon 
states in their relationships with one another.306 Before embarking on a discussion of the 
relevant instruments, it is important to establish the place of international custom and treaties, 
in the South African legal system.  
 
Significantly, South Africa has adopted specific constitutional provisions regarding the status 
of international law in South African law.307 In terms of section 232 of the Constitution, 
customary international law is recognised as being part of South African law to the extent that 
it is not inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. Treaties, on the other 
hand, are only binding on South Africa once they have been approved by resolution by both 
houses of Parliament.308 A ratified treaty only becomes a part of South African law when it is 
incorporated into law by national legislation.309 The application of treaties depends greatly on 
the status of international human rights law in a national legal system. It is highly unlikely 
that municipal courts will make a finding based on the provisions of an international treaty if 
it is not regarded as part of national law. The courts would then most likely use it only as an 
interpretive aid.310  
 
In this regard, section 233 of the Constitution, dealing with the application of international 
law, states that: 
 
“When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any 
reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with 
international law over any alternative interpretation that is 
inconsistent with international law.” 
 
                                                          
306   Dugard International law: a South African Perspective (2000) 1.  
307   Maluwa “The incorporation of international law and its interpretational role in municipal legal systems in 
Africa: an exploratory survey” 1998 SAYIL 45 52; See discussion in Chetty Child sex tourism in South 
African law (2006). 
308    Section 231 (2). 
309    Section 231 (4). 
310   Lloyd “A theoretical analysis of the reality of children’s rights in Africa: An introduction to the Africa 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child” 2002 2 African Human Rights Law Journal 11 12.  
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Congruently, section 39 of the Constitution provides that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, 
a court “must consider international law”.311 This means that South African courts must use 
international law as an aid in the interpretation and application of legislation and the 
Constitution itself.312 Section 233 is very wide and if taken literally, it could mean that all 
courts would have to test any legislation in question before them, against international law. It 
is, however, doubtful that the courts will adopt such a wide approach. It is more likely that 
before a court will feel obliged to consider section 233, the legislation will have to 
demonstrate some “international element”.313  
 
In this regard, the Constitutional Court pronounced in S v Makwanyane that both binding and 
non-binding international law can be used to interpret the Bill of Rights. Chaskalson P stated 
that international agreements provide “a framework within which Chapter 3314[of the interim 
Constitution] can be understood” and “may provide guidance as to the correct interpretation 
of particular provisions.”315 This statement means that the scope of international law 
encompasses not only “hard law” of customary rules and treaties, but also the “soft law”316 
contained in resolutions, declarations and guidelines drawn up by international bodies, and 
even international law not binding on South Africa.317 The Court stated that aside from 
custom and treaties, international law includes: 
 
“[the] decisions of tribunals dealing with comparable instruments, such 
as the United Nations Committee on Human Rights, the Inter- 
American Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, the European Commission on Human Right, and the 
European Court of Human Rights and, in appropriate cases, reports of 
specialised agencies such as the International Labour 
Organisation…”318 
 
                                                          
311   Section 39(1)(b); In Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa 1995 4 SA 631 (CC) at para 51, 
the Constitutional Court held that: “[w]e need to locate ourselves in the mainstream of international 
practice.” 
312   Maluwa (n307) 59.  
313   Botha “National Treaty Law and Practice: South Africa” in Hollis, Blakeslee & Ederington (eds) National 
Treaty Law and Practice (2005) 604.  
314          Chapter 3 of the interim Constitution is now Chapter 2 of the final 1996 Constitution.  
315         S v Makwanyane at paras 35-37; Cheadle, Davis & Haysom South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of 
Rights (2002) 745.   
316  This is the name given to rules of international law that do not provide concrete rights or obligations for the 
legal persons to whom they are addressed. They are rules of law but their content is inherently flexible or 
vague. See Dixon International Law (2005) 47.  
317       Maluwa (n307) 60.  
318   S v Makwanyane at paras 413-414; See Strydom “South Africa and the International Criminal Court” 2002 
6 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 348- 349. 
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Furthermore, the Constitution requires that courts must adopt an interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights which promotes international law where it is substantively relevant and where it 
reflects the constitutional values of “an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom.”319 International law would thereby help to clarify and give content to 
those very values.320  However, courts are evidently precluded from following international 
law directives that are contrary to constitutionally protected rights.321 In the case of 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom, (“Grootboom”)322 the 
Constitutional Court stated that: 
 
 “[t]he relevant international law can be a guide to interpretation 
but the weight to be attached to any particular principle or rule of 
international law will vary. However, where the relevant principle 
of international law binds South Africa it may be directly 
applicable.”323 
 
As noted above, where conflict arises between international law and the Constitution or an 
Act of Parliament, the Constitution or Act will prevail.324 However, almost every provision in 
the Bill of Rights has a corresponding provision in an international human rights treaty, or is 
governed by principles of international customary law. There would, as a result, be very few 
circumstances where international law would not be applicable under these provisions.325 
   
Interestingly, aside from the adoption of international charters into South African law, section 
234 of the Constitution provides for the adoption of national Charters of Rights in order to 
“deepen the culture of democracy established by the Constitution.”326 The South African 
government has made use of Section 234 for the first time with the signing of the South 
African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms, signed by every major religious group in 
South African as well as representatives of leading South African Constitutional 
                                                          
319     S 39(1)(a) of the Constitution.  
320   Scott & Alston “Adjudicating constitutional priorities in a transnational context: a comment on 
Soobramoney’s legacy and Grootboom’s promise” 2000 16 SAJHR 206 222. 
321          Fourie at para 565. 
322  2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) (“Grootboom”). 
323    Para 26.  
324   Sections 231 and 232 of the Constitution. 
325   Maluwa (n307) 60.   
326         Section 234.  
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Commissions in 2010. If passed into law, the Charter could serve as a guide in future cases 
relating to religious rights and freedoms.327  
 
3 PROTECTION OF RELEVANT RIGHTS AT WORLD LEVEL 
 
3.1    INTRODUCTION 
 
As a consequence of the foregoing discussion, it may be argued that the global instruments 
relating to the relevant rights, which have been signed or ratified by South Africa; are relevant 
on a national level. This section provides an overview of the relevant global human rights 
instruments.  
 
3.2    UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS328 
 
One of the most significant international instruments that provide protection for children’s 
rights, education rights and religious freedom, is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), adopted by the United Nations in 1948. This landmark document recognises a broad 
spectrum of rights relevant to the topic at hand.   
 
In 1948, the National Party came into power in South Africa and this marked the 
establishment of the apartheid regime, which systematically discriminated against non-white 
South Africans and denied them basic human rights. Clearly, this system was contrary to the 
principles expounded in the UDHR.329 Apartheid was later declared a Crime against 
Humanity by the United Nations Organisation.330 However, after the 1994 democratic 
election in South Africa, a new Constitution, based on the principle of non-racialism emerged. 
Significantly, it contains a Bill of Rights based largely on the provisions of the UDHR, thus 
making the UDHR relevant to the discussion.  
                                                          
327   Benson “South African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms Constitutional framework, formation and 
challenges” 2011 4(1) International Journal for Religious Freedom 125 128-129; A discussion of the status 
of the Charter, the drafting process leading to its signature and its most prominent provisions is included in 
Chapter 6. 
328          General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948.   
329       Fourie at para 102.  
330          Article 1 of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 
G.A. res. 3068 (XXVIII)), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974), 1015 U.N.T.S. 
243, entered into force July 18, 1976; Article 7(1)(j) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9); See http://www. sahistory.org.za (Date accessed: 9 November 2001).  
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The UDHR focuses on individual human rights and not on group protections for minorities. In 
other words, where a person’s rights are violated or restricted because of a group 
characteristic, such as race, religion, ethnic or national origin, or culture, the matter could be 
taken care of by protecting rights on a purely individual basis, mainly by utilising the 
principle of non-discrimination.331 
 
Although the UDHR is not a treaty and therefore imposes only a moral obligation upon all 
nations,332 it is significant in that its adoption paved the way for later documents333 which 
created legal obligations to comply with the instrument’s principles relating to religious 
rights. However, many international lawyers believe that the UDHR creates at least some 
legal obligations on Member States and some view it as part of customary international 
law.334 The UDHR proclaims that it is “a common standard of achievement for all peoples 
and all nations.”335 As Donnelly asserts, human rights are:  
 
“general rights that arise from no special undertaking beyond 
membership in the human race. To have human rights, one does not 
have to be anything other than be born a human being.”336  
 
Therefore, human rights are an inherent part of every person’s humanity and all human beings 
ought to be treated in accordance with the UDHR everywhere.337 
                                                          
331  See Otto Klineburg quoted in the UN Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 (1979) reprinted as UN Pub.E.78.XIV.1 (1979) 
note 25. This is mentioned in the South African Constitutional Court case of The Gauteng Provincial 
Legislature In re: Dispute Concerning the Constitutionality of Certain Provisions of the School Education 
Bill 1996 (3) SA 165 (CC); CCT 39/05 (“Gauteng Education”) para 59.   
332  Davis “The Evolution of Religious Freedom as a Universal Human Right: Examining the Role of the 1981 
United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on 
Religion or Belief” 2002 Bringham Young University Law Review 217 225.  
333  The  International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965; the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966; the United Nations Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief of 1981; the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, the African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force 
Oct. 21, 1986 and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child of 1999; See Dugard (n306) 
204.  
334  Buergenthal International Human Rights in a Nutshell (1995) 33-34; du Plessis “The Protection of 
Religious Rights in South Africa’s transitional Constitution” 1994 59(2) Koers 151 158; Dugard (n306) 41. 
335  Preamble.  
336  Donnelly “Human rights and human dignity: An analytical critique of non-Western conceptions of human 
rights” 1982 76 American Political Science Review 303 306. 
337  Donnelly “The Universal Declaration model of human rights: A liberal defence” (2001) available at 
http://www.du.edu/humanrights/workingpapers/papers/12-donnelly (Date accessed: 13 September 2009), in 
which he notes that the global human rights regime is rooted in the Universal Declaration (emphasis added). 
 
 
56 
 
Regardless of its legal character, the UDHR has had a significant influence on the contents of 
the South African Constitution. This is illustrated in the discussion on various constitutional 
rights in the remaining Chapters.  
 
3.3      INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS 
OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION338 
 
In 1960, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning “all 
manifestations and practices of racial, religious and national hatred” as violations of the 
UDHR. It called on governments to “take all necessary measures to prevent all manifestations 
of racial, religious and national hatred.”339 Resultantly, in 1965, the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) was adopted, in an effort 
to prevent worldwide discrimination on the basis of race. It was ratified by South Africa on 10 
December 1998. The ICERD has been enacted into South African law by way of the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair & Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (“the 
Equality Act”).340 
 
This significance of this instrument to the topic at hand, is that race, descent and ethnicity, are 
inextricably linked to religion. The ICERD defines racial discrimination as: 
 
“any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, 
colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or 
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, and cultural or any other 
field of public life.”341  
 
Notably, there is no express reference to religion as a ground of racial discrimination in this 
definition. However, the elimination of racial discrimination in all forms and guarantee of the 
                                                          
338    G.A. res. 2106 (XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 
195, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969.  
339  United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1510 (XV), December 12, 1960. 
340   Section 2(h). See SAHRC “Shadow Report on South Africa’s Compliance with the Provisions of the 
International Convention against All Forms of Racial Discrimination” (June 2006) 54. 
341   Article 1(1). It is noteworthy that the ICERD only mentions discrimination that takes place in the “field of 
public life” and does not expressly mention discrimination carried out in private.  See “The Right to 
Equality and non-discrimination in the administration of Justice” at  
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training9chapter13en.pdf (Date Accessed: 30 June 2010).  
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enjoyment, without distinction, of the right to freedom of religion and cultural rights, are 
encapsulated in Articles 5 (d)(vii) and 5(e) of this instrument.  
 
In order to enforce its provisions, Article 8 of the ICERD has established a Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination consisting of eighteen experts of “high moral standing” 
and “acknowledged impartiality” elected by States Parties.342  States Parties to ICERD have 
undertaken to submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for consideration by the 
Committee, a report343 on the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures which 
they have adopted, which give effect to the provisions of this Convention within one year344 
after the entry into force of ICERD and thereafter every two years.345  
 
States Parties to ICERD condemn racial discrimination, particularly apartheid.346 In light of 
South Africa’s history of discrimination and repression, as elaborated on in Chapter 2, its 
ratification of this Convention is particularly noteworthy.  
 
3.4   INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS347  
 
Almost all international human rights instruments adopted by the United Nations bodies since 
1948 elaborate upon principles set out in the UDHR. The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 1996, (ICCPR) is an example of this. Its preamble states that: 
 
“in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can 
only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may 
enjoy his or her economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his or 
her civil and political rights.” 
 
Before the adoption of the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR),348 the UDHR stood alone as the international standard of 
                                                          
342   Article 8(1).  
343   South Africa submitted its first three period reports in the form of one document (CERD/C/461/Add.3), in 
2002. These reports were examined during the 69th session of the CERD 31 July - 18 August 2006. The 
SAHRC has noted that report is outdated and that some information provided in the report is incomplete. 
The follow-up report which was due by 18 August 2007 was not received. See SAHRC (n340) 51. 
344   Article 9(1)(a). 
345   Article 9(1)(b).  
346  Articles 2 and 3.  
347   General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966.  
 
 
58 
achievement in the area of human rights. Today, the UDHR, together with the two Covenants, 
constitute the International Bill of Rights. The Covenants place legal as well as moral 
obligations on member States to promote and protect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.349 
 
The ICCPR opened for signature on 19 December 1966 but did not come into effect until 
December 23, 1975.350 The ICCPR has been ratified by 148 nations to date. South Africa only 
ratified the instrument on 10 December 1998.351  
 
For purposes of enforcement, the ICCPR established a Human Rights Committee352 
composed of nationals of the States Parties with competence in the field of human rights.353 
States Parties are to submit reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for 
consideration by the Committee, on the measures they have adopted to give effect to the 
rights specified in the ICCPR.354 Reports must be submitted within one year of the entry into 
force of the ICCPR355 and thereafter upon the request of the Committee.356  
 
Significantly, the ICCPR expands significantly on the protection of religious rights afforded 
by the UDHR and creates357 a legal obligation on member States to promote children’s rights 
and freedom of religion.  
 
3.5   DECLARATION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF 
INTOLERANCE AND OF DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RELIGION 
OR BELIEF358 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
348  Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) 
of 16 December 1966. South Africa signed the ICESCR on 3 October 1994, but has not ratified it.  
349   See http://www.universalrights.net/main/world.htm (Date accessed: 11 November 2011).  
350  Article 49(1) states: “The present Covenant shall enter into force three months after the date of the deposit 
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or instrument 
of accession.” 
351   Strydom (n318) 345-346. 
352   Article 28 (1); Discussed in Stamatopolou Cultural Rights in International Law: Article 27 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and Beyond (2007) 50.  
353   Article 28 (2).  
354   Article 40 (2).  
355   Article 40 (1)(a). 
356   Article 40 (1)(b). 
357          Article 18. 
358   United Nations General Assembly Resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981.  
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The 1981 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (the Declaration) is one of the most important 
international documents protecting religious freedom. The Declaration contains the broadest, 
most comprehensive list of rights to freedom of religion of all international human rights 
instruments. In fact, it has been remarked that: “against the historical backdrop of civil strife, 
international warfare and ideological conflict fuelled by religion, the Declaration stands as the 
milestone in the progressive development of human rights norms.”359   
 
It is contended that although the Declaration does not have binding status, it carries the weight 
of a United Nations statement and therefore has persuasive force.360 Sullivan asserts that 
although the Declaration lacks the nature of an international agreement, it is “regarded 
throughout the world as articulating the fundamental rights of freedom of religion and 
belief.”361    However, it had been contended that the use of mandatory language in certain 
provisions362 indicates that the General Assembly intended the Declaration to be normative 
and not merely persuasive.363 In fact, Tahzib controversially contends that: “[s]tates regard the 
1981 Declaration, or at least some of its provisions, as normative in nature and part of 
customary international law.”364 
 
Importantly, the Declaration gives more concrete content to the general provisions of the 
UDHR and the ICCPR on freedom of religion. It also may serve as a valuable guide for the 
uniform interpretation and application of the various international statements on religious 
freedom.  
 
                                                          
359  Sullivan quoted in Tahzib “Freedom of Religion or Belief: Ensuring Effective International Legal 
Protection” (1996) 165 fn 334.  
360  Davis (n332) 230.   
361  Sullivan “Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief through the UN Declaration on the Elimination of 
Religious Intolerance and Discrimination” 1988 82 American Journal of International Law 487 487.  
362  For example, Article 7 of the Declaration, which requires that the rights freedoms contained in the 
Declaration be given effect in national legislation. 
363  Tahzib (n359) 187; Sullivan (n361) 487 (Referred to in Steiner (n3) 595).  
364        See Tahzib (n359) 187; Durham notes: “A plausible case can be made that [the Declaration] articulates 
what has now become international customary law, even in the absence of a binding convention, but no 
position is being taken on that issue here.” See Durham “Freedom of Religion or Belief: Laws Affecting the 
Structuring of Religious Communities”, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Review 
Conference, September 1999, ODIHR Background Paper 1999/4; Davis contends that it carries “an 
expectation of obedience within the international community to the degree that it is seen as the standard 
bearer of religious human rights.” See Davis (n332) 230. 
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3.6 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD365 
 
The primary treaty related to the international protection of children is unquestionably the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”). It is the first binding 
universal treaty dedicated in its entirety to the protection of children’s rights.366 The CRC 
establishes in international law that States Parties must ensure that all children benefit from 
protection and assistance which caters to their specific needs and are informed about and 
participate in achieving their rights in an active manner.367  
 
Article 1 of the CRC defines a child as “every human being below the age of 18 years”, 
unless such person has been afforded majority status under the law applicable to him or her. 
The CRC therefore relates to all children within a particular country’s territory.368 South 
Africa’s Children’s Act, (South Africa’s primary legislation on children’s rights) defines a 
“child” as person under the age of 18 years369 and under the “age of majority” clause states 
that a child becomes a major upon reaching the age of 18.370  
 
The CRC was unanimously adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 20 
November 1989 and came into force on 2 September 1990.371 For the first time, human rights 
standards pertaining to children’s rights were encompassed into a single legal instrument.372 
Significantly, the CRC has established legally binding principles and international standards 
for states to meet in their domestic legislation. The CRC has been ratified by virtually the 
entire community of nations, thus providing a common legal and moral framework for the 
development of an agenda for children. In fact it has been ratified by more countries than any 
other human rights treaty in history.373  
 
                                                          
365   United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25 (also available 
on Internet at http://www.hri.ca/uninfo/treaties/25.shtml (Date accessed: 19 March 2003). 
366  Fottrell “One step forward or two steps sideways? Assessing the first decade of the Children’s     
Convention on the Rights of the Child” in Fottrell (ed) Revisiting Children’s Rights (2000) 1. 
367  Articles 12, 13 17, 19 and 28; See Sloth-Nielsen “Ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child: Some implications for South African Law” 1995 11 SAJHR 401 401-403.  
368     Fottrell (n 366) 411. 
369  Section 1(1)(g). 
370  Section 17.  
371  Jinabhai “The situation of the Child in South Africa” in CDS et al (eds) International Conference on the 
Rights of the Child: Papers and Reports of a Conference Convened by the Community Law Centre Cape 
Town, June 1992 (1992) 57; Freeman “Introduction: Children as Persons” in Freeman (ed) Children’s 
Rights: A Comparative Perspective (1996) 1.  
372    Lloyd (n310) 30.   
373    13.  
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South Africa ratified the CRC in June 1995 and in doing so bound itself to taking measures to 
protect children. In fact, the Children’s Act, which was enacted to supplement the children’s 
rights374 conferred by the South African Bill of Rights;375 makes specific mention of the 
importance of the CRC in its preamble.  
 
Primarily, the CRC constitutes a common reference against which progress in meeting the 
standards for children rights can be assessed and results compared. States Parties are required 
to submit periodic reports on their progress in achieving all the rights to the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child (“CRC Committee”), a committee of internationally elected and 
independent experts in children’s rights.376 The principal function of the CRC Committee is to 
operate this system of reporting as provided for in Articles 44 and 45.  
 
In effect the adoption of this CRC has inspired a process of change and the implementation of 
its provisions in all parts of the world. The CRC contains a coherent set of legally binding 
norms and principles within which legal and policy development can take place in South 
Africa.377 Its provisions have served as a standard for the development of children’s religious 
and cultural rights within the Constitution.378  
 
4 PROTECTION OF RELEVANT RIGHTS AT REGIONAL LEVEL: 
THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON THE RIGHTS AND WELFARE OF 
THE CHILD379 
 
Significantly, African states found it necessary to give Africa a “voice” by setting out the 
standards for human rights in regional treaties.380 The adoption of regional instruments was 
seen to be the best way for Africa, with its unique culture, traditions and history, to resolve its 
                                                          
374          Section 8.  
375          Section 28.  
376   Viljoen “‘Supra-national human rights instruments for the protection of children in Africa: Convention on 
the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child” 1998 31 CILSA 199 
200. 
377     Sloth-Nielsen (n367) 420. 
378     Section 28.  
379      OAU Doc.CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force on 29 November 1999; See discussion in Chetty 
(n307) 44-48.  
380  Lloyd (n310) 13; Reasons found in Vrancken & Chetty “International Child sex Tourism: A South African 
Perspective” 2009 53 Journal of African Law 111 129; See Assefa “The contribution of the African 
Children’s Charter and its monitoring committee in the advancement of children’s rights in Africa: A 
critical reflection” (October 2011) 1 5.   
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own human rights issues.381 The regional document which is relevant to the topic at hand is 
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (“ACRWC”).  
 
The CRC has been criticised for having insufficient African influence382 in that only three 
African states were involved in drafting the CRC for five out of the nine years of the drafting 
process.383 Also, there is a belief that there are certain issues, unique to Africa, that are 
insufficiently addressed in or absent from the CRC.384 The ACRWC overcomes this by 
confirming and strengthening the global standards in the CRC in African member states.385  
 
The ACRWC was adopted by some of the Member States of the Organisation of African 
Unity (now the African Union). It was ratified by South Africa on 7 January 2000. States 
Parties to the ACRWC agree to recognise the rights and freedoms contained within it and to 
take the necessary steps to adopt legislative and other means necessary to achieve its 
provisions.386 The ACRWC contains provisions related to the protection of the right to 
education and religious freedom of children. A child is defined as every person under the age 
of 18, without any limitations.387  
 
It is vital that States Parties’ compliance with their obligations to protect children be 
monitored. The task of monitoring and enforcement of the ACRWC lies with the African 
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (“African Committee”), 
established in 2001. Its task, although similar to that of the CRC Committee, in that it may 
examine state reports on the measures that have been adopted, is far broader. The African 
                                                          
381         Wako “Towards an African Charter on the Rights of the Child” (May 1998) 7, paper delivered at a workshop 
on the Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child in Nairobi.  
382   Lloyd (n310) 15; Olowu “Protecting children’s rights in Africa: A critique of the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child” 2002 10 The International Journal of Children’s Rights 127 128.  
383  Viljoen (n376) 200; Muthogo “Analysis of the International Instruments for the Protection of the Rights of 
the Child” in CDS et al (n371) 123.  
384      Viljoen (n376) 206.  
385  Take note that other relevant regional documents include the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) Charters, Protocols and Codes. The SADC has a membership of 15 States, namely: Angola, 
Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The 
SADC initially formed for the purpose of the political liberation of Southern Africa. It was preceded by the 
Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which was established on April 1, 
1980. On August 17, 1992, Member States signed the SADC Treaty and Declaration that transformed the 
SADCC into the SADC with the objective of creating a Community which provides for regional peace and 
security and an integrated regional economy. South Africa acceded to the SADC Treaty on 29 August 1994. 
See http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/sadc.htm (Date accessed: 14/12/11). Provisions from 
SADC documents are referred to in this Chapter where relevant.  
386     Article 1(1). 
387  Article 2. 
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Committee may also receive and consider communications from any person, group of persons 
or NGO.388  
 
In essence, the ACRWC is significant to the topic at hand in that it amounts to the collective 
recognition of the children’s rights, education rights and religious freedom of African children 
in particular and establishes a legal framework for their protection at regional level.389 It 
confirms and strengthens the global standards in the CRC. Although the ACRWC has not 
been incorporated into South African law by national legislation, it is still relevant in terms of 
sections 39 and 233 of the Constitution, as discussed above. 390  
 
5   RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS  
 
5.1    INTRODUCTION 
 
This section contains a discussion of the relevant provisions of the above international 
instruments and their impact on South African law, in relation to the following themes: 1) 
children’s rights, 2) education rights and 3) freedom of religion. 
 
5.2   CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 
 
It can be argued that children are more vulnerable to human rights violations than adults.391 
As a result, there is particular concern in international human rights law for the position of 
children. Kaime asserts that: “Conferring rights on children is viewed as recognising their 
moral equality with adults, thereby underscoring the moral worth of all human beings, 
irrespective of their situation.”392  
 
Undoubtedly, the healthy development of children is essential to the future well-being of any 
society. In this regard, the CRC requires that States Parties undertake to ensure the child the 
                                                          
388          Article 44(2); See Viljoen (n376) 210.  
389   Lloyd (n310) 15.  
390   Bhe & Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha & Others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) (“Bhe”). 
391  Njungwe (n 277) 5; Sloth-Nielsen (n367) 401; Robinson (n237) 11.  
392  Kaime African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child: A socio-legal perspective (2009) 6.  
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protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being.393 In addition, the CRC 
recognises the right of every child to live according to a standard that is adequate for his or 
her physical, mental, spiritual and moral development.394 This coincides with the South 
African constitutional right that children are not to be required or permitted to perform work 
or provide services that “place at risk the child’s well-being, education, physical or mental 
health or spiritual, moral or social development.”395 
 
Importantly, Article 1 of the UDHR states that all human beings are “born free and equal in 
dignity and rights.” This Article stresses that all people are endowed with reason and 
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. This corresponds 
with the principle in Article 5, which states that no one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The interpretation of this provision has 
effectively ended the use of corporal punishment in schools in many countries.396 The impact 
of this on education and freedom of religion is elaborated on in the discussion of Christian 
Education below. 
 
Also in this regard, the CRC states that States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to 
ensure that school discipline is administered in a manner consistent with the child’s human 
dignity.397 The CRC Committee has recognised the horizontal application of this provision 
and has urged States to adopt legislative measures to ensure that this principle is applied even 
in private schools.398  In addition, Article 37 of the CRC requires that States Parties shall 
ensure that: “No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.399 These provisions indicate that “human dignity” is an exceedingly 
important part of children’s rights.  
                                                          
393  Article 3(2) states that this must be done “taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents”; 
Correspondingly, section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution states that: “Every child has the rights to family care 
or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the family environment.”    
394          Article 27.  
395  Section 28 (1)(f)(ii); In this regard, at regional level, see the SADC’s Code of Conduct on Child  Labour.   
396   See Lundy “Schoolchildren and Health: The Role of International Human Rights Law” in Harris & 
Meredith (eds) Children, Education and Health (International Perspectives on Law and Policy) (2005) 9. 
397          Article 28(2).  
398  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: the United Kingdom (UN Doc.CRC/C/15/Add.34. 1995), para 
16; Verheyde A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Article 28, The 
Right to Education (2006) 63.  
399      Article 37(1)(a); This corresponds with South Africa’s international obligations
 
under the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. South Africa ratified 
this Convention on 10 December 1998; The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment in its preamble recognises “the inherent dignity of the human person” 
and refers to Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 7 of the International 
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Furthermore, Article 19 of the CRC states that States Parties must “take all appropriate 
legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms 
of physical or mental violence”,400 with no express reference to corporal punishment. 
However, in its General Comment 8, the CRC Committee confirmed that there was an 
“obligation of all State parties to move quickly to prohibit and eliminate all corporal 
punishment and all other cruel or degrading forms of punishment of children.”401 In fact, the 
CRC Committee on the Rights of the Child has taken the position that corporal punishment of 
children is inconsistent with the CRC as a whole. It confirms that:  
 
“In the framework of its mandate, the Committee has paid particular 
attention to the child’s right to physical integrity. In the same spirit, it 
has stressed that corporal punishment of children is incompatible with 
the Convention and has often proposed the revision of existing 
legislation, as well as the development of awareness and education 
campaigns, to prevent child abuse and the physical punishment of 
children.”402  
 
The CRC Committee’s interpretation on this point has been explicitly rejected by several 
States Parties to the Convention, including Australia403 Canada and the United Kingdom. 
 
In addition, Article 11 of the ACRWC dealing with education rights, requires that States 
Parties take all appropriate measures to ensure that school and parental discipline is 
administered in a manner consistent with “humanity” and the child’s inherent human 
dignity;404 whereas the CRC only deals with school discipline and not parental discipline 
under educational rights.405 Some regard the reference to “humanity” in the ACRWC as 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both of which provide that no-one shall be subjected to torture, or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.     
400          Article 19(1). 
401          CRC General Comment No. 8 (2006): The Right of the Child to Protection from Corporal Punishment and 
Other Cruel or Degrading Forms of Punishment (Arts. 19; 28, Para. 2; and 37, inter alia), CRC/C/GC/8. 
402       See Report of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on the Seventh Session, UN Doc.  CRC/C/34, 
Annex IV, at 63 (Nov. 1994). 
403   Simalis “Aussie parents to defy UN smacking ban” The Sunday Telegraph (Sydney). 
http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/national/aussie-parents-to-defy-un-smacking-ban/story-e6frf7l6-
1225843384853?from=public_rss. (Date accessed: 21 March 2010). 
404    Article 11 (5); See De Vos “Sparing the rod: what it really entails” at 
http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/category/freedom-of-religion/ (Date accessed: 18 October 2013). 
405   Article 28 (2).  
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affording greater protection than the CRC but others argue that “human dignity” (as referred 
to in the CRC) and “humanity” have the same impact.406  
 
South African has given detailed expression to the above provisions through the inclusion of 
the rights to human dignity,407 freedom and security of the person408 and children rights409 in 
its Constitution. Correspondingly, section 10 of the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996 
(“Schools Act”) provides that:  
 
      “(1) No person may administer corporal punishment at a school 
to a learner.  
        (2) Any person who contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of an 
offence and liable on conviction to a sentence which could 
be imposed for assault.” 
 
By including section 10 in the Schools Act, Parliament was merely complying with its 
international law obligations and following an international trend that had been undertaken by 
most democratic countries.410  
 
This provision was challenged in the South African Constitutional Court case of Christian 
Education. In this case, the court held that section 10 of the Schools Act, which prohibits the 
administration of corporal punishment in schools, with no exception for schools operating on 
a Christian ethos, did indeed limit the appellant’s freedom of religion; but that the 
infringement was justified owing to the harm and indignity caused by corporeal punishment 
                                                          
406  Gose The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child: An assessment of the legal value of its 
substantive provisions by means of a direct comparison to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(2002)117.  
407          Section 10 of the Bill of Rights states that:  
     “Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.”  
408           Section 12 of the Bill of Right states that:  
             “(1) Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes 
                     The right- 
(a) not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause; 
(b) not to be detained without trial; 
(c) to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources; 
(d) not to be tortured in any way; and 
(e) not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way. 
    (2) Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes 
         the right- 
(a) to make decisions concerning reproduction; 
(b) to security in and control over their body; and 
                 (c) not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without their 
informed consent.” 
409       Section 28 of the Constitution, discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  
410     Christian Education at para 13.  
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in schools.411 In this case, the respondent, namely the Minister of Education, cited South 
Africa’s international obligations
 
under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,412
 
and the CRC,413 which require the 
prohibition of corporal punishment in schools.414 The court stated:  
 
“The state is further under a constitutional duty to take steps to help 
diminish the amount of public and private violence in society 
generally and to protect all people and especially children from 
maltreatment, abuse or degradation. More specifically, by 
ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, it undertook to take all appropriate measures to protect the 
child from violence, injury or abuse. The Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination 
Based on Religious or Belief declares in art 5(5) that: ‘practices 
of a religious or belief in which a child is brought up must not be 
injurious to physical or mental health or to his full 
development…’”415 
 
Significantly, this case recognised that South Africa’s international obligations to protect the 
dignity, mental well-being, and physical safety of all children, outweighed the freedom of 
religion of (private) schools.  
 
To further safeguard the standards by which children live, the CRC states that in all actions 
concerning children, the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration.416 This 
means that all legislation, administrative acts, judicial decisions, political decisions and 
government policy should be formulated and/or applied with the best interests of the child in 
mind.417 It may be argued that the “best interests of the child” standard underpins all other 
provisions in the CRC.418 This would include provisions relating to religion and education.  
 
A positive aspect of the ACRWC is that it emphasises that the best interests of the child is 
“the” primary consideration419 which is a higher standard than that provided for in the CRC, 
                                                          
411   Paras 49-50. 
412  South Africa ratified this Convention on 10 December 1998.  
           413        South Africa ratified this Convention on 16 June 1995.   
414        Christian Education at para 13. 
415         Para 40.  
416     Article 3.  
417     Sloth-Nielsen (n367) 409.  
418  Freeman A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Article 3, The Best 
interests if the Child (2007) 1.  
419  Article 4.  
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which merely refers to “a” primary consideration.420 The use of a definitive article in the 
provision has significant practical ramifications for children. The lower standard of 
considering the best interests of a child as “a” primary consideration is a procedural fairness 
requirement, namely that, judges must “consider” what is in the best interest of the child but 
the decision may not reflect these interests.421  
 
The Constitution reiterates the above principles in section 28(2), which states that “[a] child’s 
best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.” The 
constitutional right is given further content by the Children’s Act,422 which also requires the 
best interests of the child standard,423 taking into account the child’s “physical and emotional 
security and his or her intellectual, emotional, social and cultural development.”424 This 
entails that the best interests of the child must be a paramount consideration in matters 
relating to the educational rights and the exercise of freedom of religion in schools. Sloth-
Nielsen praised the inclusion of the best interests of the child standard as a constitutional 
principle and noted that with constitutional status, it will “become a benchmark for reviewing 
all proceedings in which decisions are taken regarding children.”425  
 
Although the CRC requires States Parties to recognise the rights of parents to give appropriate 
direction and guidance to their children in the exercise of rights by the child, this must be 
done in accordance with the evolving capacities of the child.426  This indicates that parental 
control over a child diminishes as a child evolves. Moreover, Article 12 of the CRC requires 
that a child who is capable of forming his or her own views, be given the right to express 
those views freely in all matters affecting the child and that the views of the child be given 
due weight.427 In addition, the ACRWC requires that a child who is capable of forming their 
                                                          
420  Davel “The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Family Law and Children’s Rights” 
2002 35(2) De Jure 281 282; Commentators have opined that “a primary consideration” leaves room for 
rare situations where other factors may outweigh the best interests of the child, for example, the health of a 
mother during child birth. See Mason “The best interests of the child” in Todres et al The U.N Convention 
on the Rights of the Child: an Analysis of Treaty Provisions and Implications of U.S Ratification (2006) 
123; Discussed in Gose (n406) 25-26.    
421        Lloyd (n310) 17.  
422        Discussed in Chapter 4.   
423         Section 7 (1).  
424         Section 7 (1)(h).  
425  Sloth-Nielsen “Chicken soup or chainsaws: Some implications of the constitutionalisation of children’s 
rights in South Africa” in Keightley (ed) Children’s rights (1996) 25. 
426  Article 5.  
427         Article 12(1).  
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own views, must be given the opportunity to express those views directly or indirectly, in all 
judicial or administrative proceedings affecting a child.428 Eekelaar has commented that: 
 
“the goal is to bring a child to the threshold of adulthood with the 
maximum opportunities to form and pursue life-goals which reflect 
as closely as possible an autonomous choice.”429   
 
In addition, the CRC requires that the child be provided the opportunity to be heard in any 
judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a 
representative.430  
 
A criticism of ACRWC in this regard, is the confusion created by Article 31, which deals with 
children’s responsibilities. In terms of this provision, children are required to “respect parents, 
superiors and elders at all times”, which could conflict with the child’s right to express their 
views in decisions that affect them. Interestingly, Article 31 corresponds with South Africa’s 
controversial Bill of Responsibilities for the Youth of South Africa,431 which expressly places a 
duty on children to respect and honour their parents. The Department of Basic Education 
launched the Bill in March 2008, to be taught in South African schools as part of the 
Lifeskills curriculum. It is meant to be a tool towards the practical application of the South 
Africa Bill of Rights in guiding active citizenship among school children in South Africa. 
 
Another important aspect of children’s rights is the right not to be discriminated against. 
Special attention is provided to the position of children in Article 24(1) of the ICCPR, which 
requires that children, in particular, be given the right to such measures of protection as are 
required by their status as minors, without any discrimination on the basis of race, language or 
religion, amongst other criteria.  
 
Specifically related to discrimination in the school setting, Article 2 of the CRC requires that 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against 
all forms of discrimination on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs 
                                                          
428         Article 4(2).  
429  Eekelaar “The Interests of the Child and the Child’s Wishes: The Role of dynamic self-determinism” 1994 8 
International Journal of Law Policy, and the Family 230 231.  
430          Article 12(2).  
431        The Bill is the creation of the Department of Education and LeadSA. It’s also sanctified by the National 
Religious Leaders Forum.  Its content is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
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of the child’s parents. Article 2 of the CRC was expressly referred to by the Constitutional 
Court in Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others (“Bhe”).432  
 
Furthermore, Article 3 of the ACRWC deals with non-discrimination, in which each child is 
given the right to equal enjoyment of the rights in the Charter irrespective of the child’s or 
his/her parents’ or legal guardians’ race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin.” Particularly pertinent to South Africa is Article 26 
of the ACRWC, which provides protection against apartheid and discrimination and requires 
that States Parties undertake to “accord the highest priority to the special needs of children 
living under regimes practising racial, ethnic, religious or other forms of discrimination”433 
and to “direct their efforts towards the elimination of all forms of discrimination and 
Apartheid on the African Continent.”434  
 
With regard to all forms of discrimination against schoolchildren, including religious 
discrimination, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education noted that “schools reflect 
the surrounding setting and may reinforce prejudicial portrayals of victims of 
discrimination”435 and therefore education must be the utilised to eliminate discrimination and 
inequality through the creation of new values and attitudes within schools.436 This will ensure 
that all children, regardless of their religious affiliation, if any, are equally protected and 
respected at school. 
   
 
 
 
                                                          
432   Bhe at para 9, the court stated:  “In denying extra marital children the right to inherit from their deceased 
fathers, it also unfairly discriminates against them and infringes their right to dignity as well. The result is 
that the limitation it imposes on the rights of those subject to it is not reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society founded on the values of equality, human dignity and freedom.” In arriving at its 
decision, the court emphasises South Africa’s international obligations and quotes Article 2 of the CRC to 
support its reasoning. 
433   Article 26 (2).  
434   Article 26 (3).  
435  Tomasevski “Annual report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to education,” submitted pursuant to 
Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/29, E/CN.4/2002/60 (7 January 2002), para. 33.  
436       Para. 33. See discussion in Fisher “The Content of the Right to Education-Theoretical Foundations”, Center 
for Human Rights and Global Justice Working Paper, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Series Number 
4, 2004 10. 
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5.3   EDUCATION RIGHTS  
 
International law emphasises that the right to education is part of the child’s basic rights.437 
The right to education is acknowledged in Article 26(1) of the UDHR. This provision 
recognises that free and compulsory education must be provided at elementary level; whereas 
education beyond the fundamental stages, such as technical or professional education, must be 
generally “available” and “equally accessible.” In addition, Article 26(3) states that parents 
have a “prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.” This 
provision guarantees parents the right of choose between public and private education.438 A 
corresponding provision is found in Article 11(4) of the ACRWC which states:  
 
“States Parties to the present Charter shall respect the rights and 
duties of parents, and where applicable, of legal guardians to 
choose for their children's schools, other than those established 
by public authorities, which conform to such minimum 
standards may be approved by the State, to ensure the religious 
and moral education of the child in a manner with the evolving 
capacities of the child.” 
 
This provision confers on parents the right to have their children educated in religion-based 
private schools.  
 
Importantly, Article 28(1) of the CRC, reiterating the UDHR, requires that all States Parties 
recognise the right of the child to education; including making primary education compulsory 
and free to all.439 Furthermore, the CRC aims to “encourage the development of different 
forms of secondary education” and to make it available and accessible to all children.440 
Importantly, Article 28(1) of the CRC refers to the child as the holder of the right to 
education, without reference to the rights of parents regarding the education of their 
children.441 
 
                                                          
437  See Taiwo & Govindjee “The Implementation of the Right to Education in South Africa and Nigeria (Part 
1)” 2012 33 Obiter 93, for a discussion on states’ obligations under the international human rights 
instruments regarding the right to education. 
438  Ssenyonjo Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (2009) 360.  
439  Article 28(1)(a). 
440   Article 28(1)(b).  
441  Verheyde (n398) 63.  
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Notably, it must be mentioned that the right to education is enshrined in the ICESCR.442 
South Africa signed the ICESCR on 3 October 1994, but has still not ratified it.443 Although 
most of the socio-economic rights in the ICESCR are included in the South African 
Constitution; the ICESCR guarantees other rights that are not clearly protected in the 
Constitution.444  
 
Article 13(1) of the ICESCR guarantees the “right to education”,445 meaning free primary 
education with a progressive introduction towards free education even at secondary and 
higher education levels.446 De Waal and Currie comment that the ICESCR requires more than 
a duty on states to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of the rights in the Convention; 
it requires that state’s take positive steps towards fulfilling the rights.447  
  
Furthermore, in order to effectively monitor compliance to its provisions, the ICESCR has 
introduced a “minimum core obligation”.448 According to the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, the minimum core with respect to the ICESCR includes: 
 
“[A]n obligation: to ensure the right of access to public educational 
institutions and programmes on a non-discriminatory basis; to ensure 
that education conforms to the objectives set out in article 13(1); to 
provide primary education for all in accordance with article 13(2)(a); 
                                                          
442  Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) 
of 16 December 1966. 
443  Take note that in October 2012, Cabinet announced that the recommendation to ratify the ICESCR will be 
tabled before Parliament in line with section 231(2) of the Constitution. This means that the ICESCR will be 
legally binding on South Africa. See Community Law Centre “South Africa to Ratify International Socio-
Economic Rights Covenant” at http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/news/south-africa-to-ratify-
international-socio-economic-rights-covenant (Date accessed: 12 December 2012); See also Pan: Children 
“South Africa to ratify International Socio-Economic Rights Covenant” at 
http://children.pan.org.za/node/9109 (Date accessed: 12 December 2012); See ICESCR Booklet (Jan 2013) 
“Civil Campaign for the Ratification of: the International Covenant of Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) and  its Optional Protocol” which states that: “Yet to date South Africa has not ratified the 
ICESCR” found at http://www.spii.org.za/agentfiles/434/file/ICESCR%20Booklet%20(Jan2013).pdf (Date 
accessed: 29 October 2013); See People’s Health Movement- South Africa “ICESCR Ratification 
campaign” at http://phm-sa.org/icescr-ratification-campaign/ (Date accessed: 29 October 2013). 
444          Such as the “right to work” in Article 6.  
445   Article 13(1) states as follows: “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone to 
education. They agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and 
the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. They 
further agree that education shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups and 
further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.” 
446          Article 13(2) (b) and (c). 
447  De Waal & Currie (n18) 437.  
448  Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) General Comment No.3 “The Nature of 
States parties Obligations (art 2, para 1)” 14/12/90 para 10.  
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to adopt and implement a national educational strategy which 
includes provision for secondary, higher and fundamental education; 
and to ensure free choice of education without interference from the 
State or third parties, subject to conformity with ‘minimum 
educational standards’ (art.13 (3) and (4)).”449  
 
This aims to ensure satisfaction of at least the minimum essentials of the rights in the 
ICESCR.450  
 
However, the South African case of Grootboom451 the Constitutional Court rejected the 
notion of a minimum core obligation with regard to socio-economic rights,452 choosing 
instead to determine whether the government had undertaken “reasonable measures”.453  
 
The Constitution guarantees the right to “basic education” section 29.454 The South African 
government regards basic education as “…the cornerstone of any modern, democratic society 
that aims to give all citizens a fair start in life and equal opportunities as adults.”455 Moreover, 
section 29 states that “further education” must be made accessible and available by the state 
“through reasonable measures”.456 This provision recognises that the right to further education 
is largely dependent on the availability of the financial and other state resources.457 All other 
legislative rights on education in South Africa are based on this constitutional provision.458 
 
Furthermore, in order to pursue the elimination of racial discrimination in all settings- 
including schools, States Parties to ICERD agree to guarantee civil and political rights and 
                                                          
449  See ICESCR General Comment No 13 E/C.12/1999/10 of 8 December 1999, para 57. 
450  Beiter The Protection of the Right to Education by International Law (2006) 384; Mbazira Litigating Socio-
Economic Rights in South Africa: A choice between corrective and distributive justice (2009) 61.  
451  2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
452      Para 98; See also Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No.2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) and 
Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
453  Para 42; Discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. See also Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and 
Others CCT 39/09[2009] ZACC 28; 2010 (3)BCLR 239 (cc); 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) (8 October 2009) in 
which the Constitutional Court delivered a judgment concerning the right of access to water entrenched in 
section 27 of the Constitution. The court held that: “ it is clear that the right does not require the state upon 
demand to provide every person with sufficient water without more; rather it requires the state to take 
reasonable legislative and other measures progressively to realise the achievement of the right of access to 
sufficient water, within available resources” (para 50).   
454   Section 29 (1). Discussed fully in Chapter 5.  
455  Tomasevski Human Rights Obligations in Education: The 4-A Scheme (2006) 47. 
456   Section 29 (2).  
457  Malherbe “The Constitutional Dimension of the Best Interests of the Child as applied in Education” 2008 
(2) TSAR 267 275-276.  
458  This is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
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economic, social, and cultural rights in a non-discriminatory manner.459 Also, States Parties 
undertake to eliminate racial discrimination in all forms and guarantee enjoyment without 
distinction of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion460, cultural rights461 and 
the right education and training.462 In addition, Article 2 of the ICERD encapsulates the 
responsibilities on States Parties toward eliminating racial discrimination. It demands that 
laws and regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination be 
abolished.463 It requires that measures which afford protection against racial discrimination by 
third parties be taken464 and that States Parties take special measures to ensure the adequate 
development of disadvantaged racial groups for the purpose of guaranteeing them the equal 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.465  
 
Reiterating the importance of “equal” accessibility mentioned in the UDHR,466 Article 28(1) 
of the CRC recognises the right of the child to education, “with a view to achieving this right 
progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity.” These provisions are particularly 
pertinent to South Africa where the education system was affected by racial divisions.  In this 
regard, the CRC Committee stated that: 
 
“Racism and related phenomena thrive where there is ignorance, 
unfounded fears of racial, ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic or 
other forms of difference, the exploitation of prejudices, or the teaching 
or dissemination of distorted values. A reliable and enduring antidote to 
all of these failings is the provision of education which promotes an 
understanding and appreciation of the values [of the aims of education], 
including respect for differences, and challenges all aspects of 
discrimination and prejudice. Education should thus be accorded one of 
the highest priorities in all campaigns against the evils of racism and 
related phenomena. Emphasis must also be placed upon the importance 
of teaching about racism as it has been practiced historically and 
particularly as it manifests or has manifested itself within particular 
communities.”467 
 
                                                          
459    Article 5. 
460   Article 5(d)(vii).  
461    Article 5(e)(vi). 
462   Article 5(e)(v).  
463    Article 2(1)(c). 
464    Article 2(1)(d). 
465   Article 2(2).  
466  Article 26 (1).  
467       CRC General Comment No. 1: The Aims of Education, 17 April 2001, CRC/GC/2001/1 para 11(emphasis 
added).  
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An example of the implementation of these principles in South African law is section 29(3) of 
the Constitution, which affirms the Constitution’s commitment to respecting cultures by 
allowing for the establishment of private schools that cater for the particular needs of cultural, 
linguistic or religious groups.468 Significantly, section 29(3)(a) expressly prohibits admission 
criteria that are based solely on race.  
 
Furthermore in relation to the aims of education, Article 29(1) of the CRC requires that States 
Parties that the education of the child be directed to:  
 
“(b) The development of respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the 
United Nations;  
(c) The development of respect for the child's parents, his or her own 
cultural identity, language and values, for the national values of the 
country in which the child is living, the country from which he or 
she may originate, and for civilizations different from his or her 
own;  
(d) The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in 
the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and 
friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious  groups 
and persons of indigenous origin.” 
 
The CRC Committee has commented that Article 29(1):  
 
“insists upon the need for education to be child-centred, child –
friendly and empowering…” and also that “[t]he education to 
which every child has a right is one designed to provide the child 
with life skills, to strengthen the child’s capacity to enjoy the full 
range of human rights and to promote a culture which is infused 
by appropriate human rights values.”469 
 
Article 5(3) of the Declaration emphasises the need for education to promote understanding, 
tolerance and friendship among all religious groups. On this issue, the Special Rapporteur on 
freedom of religion referred to a study prepared under the guidance of his predecessor, which 
states:  
“[w] hat is relevant is that education on religious trends, traditions 
and movements as well as convictions, be provided in a fair and 
objective way, stimulating the curiosity of the audience, encouraging 
it to question their bias and stereotypes about cultures, religions and 
                                                          
468    Discussed in Chapters 5 and 7. 
469   CRC General Comment No. 1: The Aims of Education, 17 April 2001, CRC/GC/2001/1 para 2.   
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views other than the one which they see as being part of their own 
identity. Succeeding in portraying the others so that they can 
recognize themselves provides not only a valuable and inspiring 
educational experience; it also help create understanding and mutual 
respect between different communities or world-views.” 470  
 
These principles correspond with the objective of South Africa’s National Policy on Religion 
in Education,471 which is to advance the role of religion in education by promoting a wide 
range of religious activities in school, but in a way that differs from purely providing religious 
instruction.472 This entails that religion education is to remain in the school curriculum with 
the aim of educating learners about religions and religious diversity within South Africa and 
the world in order to increase religious tolerance.473  
 
Lastly, in the context of education, Article 11 of the ACRWC requires that education be 
directed toward the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.474 
Similarly to the CRC, the ACRWC requires that education must promote understanding, 
tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups.475 This is contrary to 
the religious exclusivity created in religion-based private schools which require non-adherent 
children to waive their religious freedom in order to gain admission into the school. The 
children in these schools are not exposed to different religions or belief systems in order to 
gain an understanding of them. This key issue is addressed in detail in Chapter 7. 
 
5.4     FREEDOM OF RELIGION  
 
Undoubtedly, freedom of religion places high on the priority list of basic human rights that 
have been singled out for protection in international law.476 In fact, it is even regarded by 
some as “the most sacred of all freedoms”.477  
 
                                                          
470  Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Heiner Bielefeldt  (December 2010) para   
26.  
471     Discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
472  See the difference between religion education and religious instruction in Chapters 1 and 6.  
473       See National Policy on Religion and Education (2003).   
474  Article 11(2)(b).  
475   Article 11 (2)(d); Also at regional level, Article 5 of the SADC Protocol on Education and Training 
provides for co-operation and mutual assistance in basic education between Member States. Article 5(3) 
requires that each Member State must strive to provide universal basic education for at least nine years. The 
Protocol was signed on 9 September 1997 and entered into force on 31 July 2000. 
476  du Plessis (n242) 463.  
477  Robertson (ed) Human Rights for South Africans (1991) 124.   
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On the issue of the protection of religious freedom at world level, Article 18 of the UDHR, 
states that: “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community 
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, 
worship and observance.” Importantly, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion is specifically conferred in children in Article 14(1) of the CRC and Article 9(1) of 
the ACRWC.  
 
As explained in Chapter 1, aside from religious beliefs, people may hold opinions that are not 
connected to religion. In this regard, Article 19 of the UDHR contains a separate provision 
stating that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, which includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas through any media. This is translated into a constitutional provision which encompasses 
both freedom of religion and freedom of opinion within one right, articulated in section 15.478  
The UDHR provisions articulated above, paved the way for the corresponding ICERD 
provision which also guarantees the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion479 
and provides that:  
 
“States Parties undertake to adopt immediate and effective measures, 
particularly in the fields of teaching, education, culture and 
information, with a view to combating prejudices which lead to 
racial discrimination and to promoting understanding, tolerance and 
friendship among nations and racial or ethnic groups, as well as to 
propagating the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights….”480  
 
Furthermore, Article 18(1) of the ICCPR includes the “freedom to have or to adopt a religion 
or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community481 with others and in 
                                                          
478      Section 15 of the Bill of Rights states that:  
             “(1)Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion.  
   (2)Religious observances may be conducted at state or state-aided institutions, provided that: 
   (a) those observances follow rules made by the appropriate public authorities;  
   (b) they are conducted on an equitable basis; and 
   (c) attendance at them is free and voluntary.” 
479    Article 5(d)(vii). 
480    Article 7.  
481  Durham states: “While religion can be an intensely private matter for some, it is fair to say that most 
religions cannot be practiced in isolation. [M]any aspects of religious life have an associational dimension, 
but if anything, they deserve far stronger protection than other associational rights, because of the intimate 
connection between religiously motivated association and core religious beliefs and practices.” See Durham 
(n364).  
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public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship,482 observance, practice and 
teaching.” In addition, Article 18(2) states that no person shall be subject to coercion which 
would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. This coincides 
with section 14(3) of the CRC483 and section 15(2) (b) and (c) of the Constitution.484  
 
Significantly, in a General Comment on Article 18 of the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the Human Rights Committee485 confirmed that:  
 
“Article 18 protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as 
the right not to profess any religion or belief… 
… 
Article 18 is not limited in its application to traditional religions or to 
religions and beliefs with institutional characteristics.”486 
 
This means that Article 18 protects not only religion, but also other beliefs that are not 
religious.   
 
In the South African case of Wittmann v Deutscher Schulverein, Pretoria and Others 
(“Wittmann”),487 Judge van Dijkhorst held that: 
 
“[Religion] cannot include the concepts of atheism or agnosticism 
which are the very antithesis of religion. The atheist and agnostic is 
                                                          
482   According to the Human Rights Committee in General Comment No. 22: The right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion (Art. 18): 1993/07/30. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, para 4: “The freedom to manifest 
religion or belief may be exercised “either individually or in community with others and in public or private. 
The freedom to manifest religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching encompasses a 
broad range of acts. The concept of worship extends to ritual and ceremonial acts giving direct expression to 
belief, as well as various practices integral to such acts, including the building of places of worship, the use 
of ritual formulae and objects, the display of symbols, and the observance of holidays and days of rest. The 
observance and practice of religion or belief may include not only ceremonial acts but also such customs as 
the observance of dietary regulations, the wearing of distinctive clothing or headcoverings, participation in 
rituals associated with certain stages of life, and the use of a particular language customarily spoken by a 
group. In addition, the practice and teaching of religion or belief includes acts integral to the conduct by 
religious groups of their basic affairs, such as the freedom to choose their religious leaders, priests and 
teachers, the freedom to establish seminaries or religious schools and the freedom to prepare and distribute 
religious texts or publications.” 
483  Article 14(3) states: “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” 
484  Section 15 of the Constitution is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
485   Created by Article 28 (1) of the ICCPR.  
486   General Comment No. 22, U.N. GAOR, Human Rts. Comm., 48th Sess., 1247 mtg. P2, U.N.    Doc. 
CCPR/a21/Rev.l/Add.4 (1993); Discussed in Boyle “Freedom of Religion in International  Law” in Rehman 
& Breau  (eds) Religion, Human Rights and International law (2007) 40; Discussed in  Steiner (n3) 591.  
487  1999 (1) BCLR 92 (T); 1998 SACLR LEXIS 43; 1998 (4) SA 423 (T). Discussed in Chapters 5 and 7. 
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afforded his protection under the freedom of thought, belief and 
opinion part of this section [on freedom of religion, belief, and 
opinion]. There is conceptually no room for him under the freedom 
of religion part. Freedom of religion does not mean freedom from 
religion.”488 
 
The nature of freedom of religion is a pertinent issue that is explored in greater detail in 
Chapter 6.  
 
The Declaration is yet another instrument which recognises freedom of religion. According to 
the Declaration, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, includes the right 
have a religion, “or whatever belief” of a person’s choice; as well as the freedom to manifest 
that belief as an individual or in group, whether publicly or privately.489 The insertion of the 
word “whatever” before the word “belief” in the Preamble and in Article 1 can be interpreted 
as protecting all world views, including agnosticism, atheism, and rationalism.490 Also 
included under freedom of religion is the right to be free from any coercion which would 
impair the freedom to have a religion or belief.491  
 
In addition to Article 1, the Declaration provides a comprehensive list of rights to freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion.492 This list sums up all components of the content of the 
                                                          
488   Para 449. 
489    Article1(1).  
490  Davis (n332) 229; See U.N. Doc. A/c.3/SR.43; The Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance confirms 
that the scope of Protection in the Declaration includes theistic, non-theistic, and atheistic beliefs. See 
Amor, Implementation of the Declaration on the elimination of all forms of intolerance and of 
Discrimination based on Religion or Belief, U.N.Doc. E/CN.4/1995/91. At 147 (1995); In a comparison of 
this provision to UDHR and ICCPR clauses on religion, an expert has concluded that: “although they varied 
slightly in wording, all meant precisely the same thing: that everyone has the right to leave one religion or 
belief and to adopt another, or to remain without any at all. This meaning…is implicit in the concept of the 
right of freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief, regardless of how the concept is presented.” 
See Obio Benito, Study of the Current Dimensions of the Problems of Intolerance and Discrimination on 
Grounds of Religion or Belief, U.N. Doc E/CN/4/Sub.2/1987/26 (1986) para 21.  
491    Article1(2).  
492        “(a) [t]o worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to establish and 
maintain places for these purposes;  
              (b) [t]o establish and maintain appropriate charitable or   humanitarian institutions;  
         (c) [t] o make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and materials 
related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief;  
              (d) [t]o write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas;  
              (e) [t]o teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes; 
              (f) [t]o solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals 
and institutions;  
        (g) [t]o train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate leaders called for by 
the requirements and standards of any religion or belief; 
              (h) [t]o observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with 
the precepts of one's religion or belief;  
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right more comprehensively than any other international instrument. It lists the right to teach 
religion as part of the right, however, it must be mentioned that section 15 of the Constitution 
does not include the right to receive religious instruction in schools. This was further 
confirmed by the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the components of the right.493  
 
Importantly, Article 18(3) of the ICCPR states that the freedom to manifest one’s religion or 
beliefs may be limited by the law as necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or 
morals or the fundamental rights of others.494 A noteworthy case from an international 
context, relevant to the principles contained in Article 18(3) of the ICCPR, is Sahin v Turkey 
(“Sahin”),495 in which the European Court of Human Rights had to decide whether or not 
there was a violation of the applicant’s right to education496 arising out of the restriction on 
the applicant from wearing an Islamic headscarf to University lectures. The case was 
determined in terms of Article 2 of  Protocol 1497 and Article 9(2) of the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)498, which states, 
similarly to Article 18(3) of the ICCPR, that:  
 
“Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only 
to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection 
of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.” 
 
The applicant in this case was a 24 year old499 Muslim female who considered it her religious 
duty to wear the Islamic headscarf. She was denied access to a lecture on the basis that a 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
              (i) [t]o establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in 
matters of religion and belief at the national and international levels.”  
493  The court in Prince at para 38, set out the content of the right and affirmed that the right to freedom of 
religion entailed: “(a) the right to entertain the religious beliefs that one chooses to entertain; (b) the right to 
announce one’s religious beliefs publicly and without fear of reprisal; and (c) the right to manifest such 
beliefs by worship and practice….”;Discussed further in Chapter 6.  
494  Article 18(3).  
495    Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98 2004 Eur. Ct. H. R. 299 (June 29, 2004) (“Sahin”); Discussed in 
Lerner Religion, Secular Beliefs and Human Rights: 25 years after the 1981 (2006) 183-199; Discussed in 
Steiner (n3) 625-633.  
496    Para 157.  
497         Article 2 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR states: “[n]o person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise 
of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of 
parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical 
convictions.” 
498   Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Explanatory Report 
(Council Europe Press 1994). 
499   Reference to age indicates that the case involved an adult, therefore children’s rights were not a concern.  
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university circular had forbidden admission of students who wore the headscarf to lectures.500 
The court held that there was “no violation of the first sentence of article 2 of Protocol 1”501  
and furthermore that the state headscarf ban did not overstep the “limits imposed by the 
organizational requirements of State education”,502 that the prohibition was “amenable to 
judicial review in the administrative courts”503 and it was “justified in principle and 
proportionate to the aims pursued and, therefore, could be regarded as “necessary in a 
democratic society.”504 The decision was partly based on the fact that the restriction pursued 
the legitimate aims of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and to maintain public 
order.505   
 
Brems notes that had the case involved a child, the decision would have been contrary to 
Article 14(1) of the CRC, which protects the right of the child to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion,506 especially since the CRC has taken an alternate stance on the 
wearing of headscarves by schoolgirls.507 In commenting on the French law which prohibits 
the wearing of religious symbols in public schools (Laicité),508 the CRC Committee stated:  
                                                          
500      Saxena “The French Headscarf Law and the Right to Manifest Religious Belief” (2007) 1 61;Turkey is 
predominantly a Muslim country, however, the State sought in terms of a proclamation of the Republic on 
October 29, 1923, to create a religion-free zone in which all citizens were regarded as equal, without 
distinction on the grounds of religion or denomination. See Abolition of the Caliphate on Mar. 3, 1923, the 
repeal of the Constitutional provision declaring Islam the religion of the State on Apr. 10, 1928; 
Consequently, Turkey passed the Dress Regulation Act, imposing a ban on wearing religious attire in places 
other than places of worship or at religious ceremonies, regardless of the religion or belief concerned. In 
addition, the state closed all religious schools. Law no. 2596, Dress (Regulations) Act of Dec. 3, 1934 
(Turkey). 
501   Sahin at para 162. 
502   Para 111.  
503   Para 112.  
504   Para 113.  
505   Para 158. 
506         The CRC Committee has observed that Article 14 entails: “1) that government must respect the freedom of 
its citizens to practice their own religion and 2) that children must be aware of this right.” (as per CRC 
Committee, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Barbados, U.N. GAOR, 
Comm, on the Rts, of the Child, 21st Sess at 18, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/.15/Add.103.). See Lantier “Freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion” in Todres et al (n420)157.  
507  Brems A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Article 14, The Right to 
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion (2006) 37; CRC Committee, Concluding Observations: 
Tunisia, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/.15/Add.181, 2002, states: “The Committee is concerned about information 
brought to its attention which indicates that the exercise of the right to freedom of religion may not always 
be fully guaranteed, particularly with regard to regulations prohibiting the wearing of a headscarf by girls in 
schools.” (para 29) “The Committee recommends that the State party take all necessary measures to ensure 
the full implementation of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion” (para 30). 
508  In March 2004, the law was passed in the French Senate in terms of which all ostentatious forms of 
religious dress were forbidden in French public schools.  The “Laicité”, as it is known, is used in France to 
summarise prevailing beliefs regarding the proper relationship between religion and the French state.  
Laïcité entails the free exercise of religion where the State neither recognises nor finances any religion, in 
other words it encompasses complete secularity where the state is neutral on issues of religion, thereby 
making all religions equal before the law. Religious symbols can be construed as marks of difference and 
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“The dress code of schools may be better addressed within the public 
schools themselves, encouraging participation of children.”509 
 
In this regard, South Africa constitutionally protects religious observances/manifestations in 
public institutions.510 Public schools and universities are therefore not religion-free zones and 
are instead required to reasonably accommodate diversity.511 The case of Sahin stands in 
contrast to the landmark Constitutional Court decision of MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal 
v Navaneethum Pillay (“Pillay”),512 in which the court found that the wearing of a nose stud 
as a religious adornment would not disrupt order within a school and accordingly, ruled in 
favour of not only accommodating, but celebrating religious diversity in a school setting.513 
This is in line with the CRC Committee’s position on religious dress.  
 
Integrally connected to religious rights, are the rights to equality and the right not to be 
discriminated against on the basis of religion. Article 2 of the UDHR expresses that everyone 
is entitled to all the rights and freedoms mentioned, without distinction of any kind, for 
example race, colour, sex, language, religion or other status. Furthermore, Article 7 states that 
all are persons are equal before the law and are entitled, without any discrimination, to equal 
protection of the law.514 Also in this regard, Article 3 of the Declaration expressly states that 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
therefore obstacles to true equality as their display could lead to segregation and hostility. Disallowing their 
display in public spaces meant that all religions were treated in the same way in the public sphere. 
According to this perspective, neutrality and equality go hand in hand. A segment of the population supports 
the law in the name of secularity. However, it is important to note that some view it as masked intolerance. 
See Article 141-5-1 of Law No. 2004-228, National Code of Education, (2004); Stasi Commnission Report 
4.2.2.1, at 56 A; Weil “Lifting the Veil” 2004 22(3) French Politics, Culture and Society 141–149. Thomas 
“On Headscarves and Heterogeneity: Reflections on the French Foulard Affair” 2005 29 Dialectical 
Anthropology 373 -382; Saxena (n500) 4 -5; Gunn (n51) 441; AFP “France moves to toughen ban on 
religion in schools” at http://news.howzit.msn.com/france-moves-to-toughen-ban-on-religion-in-schools-3 
(Date accessed: 18 October 2013).  
509  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: France, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/.15/Add.240, 2004) para 26.  
510          Section 15(2).  
511   Discussed in Chapter 6. 
512   See discussion of Pillay in Chapter 6. 
513  Pillay at para 107.  
514  Sieghart comments: “The principle on non-discrimination is fundamental to the concept of human rights. 
The primary characteristic which distinguishes ‘human rights’ from other rights is their universality: 
according to the classical theory, they are said to ‘inhere’ in every human being by virtue of his humanity 
alone. It must necessarily follow that no particular feature or characteristic attaching to any individual, and 
which distinguishes him from others, can affect his entitlement to his human rights, whether in degree or in 
kind, except where the instruments specifically provide for this for a clear and cogent reason- for example, 
in restricting the right to vote for adults, or in requiring special protection for women on children. Strictly, 
therefore it should not be necessary to include non-discrimination provisions in human rights instruments, 
let alone to draw up categories of grounds on which it is illegitimate to discriminate between individuals in 
securing or respecting their entitlement to, or their exercise or enjoyment of, the universal human rights.” 
See Sieghart The International Law of Human Rights (1983) 75.  
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discrimination on the basis of religion or belief is an offence against human dignity. These 
provisions impact on issues relating to discrimination on the basis of religion and religious 
favouritism in schools. 
 
Furthermore, Article 26 of the ICCPR states that all people are equal before the law and are 
entitled to equal protection of the law, which requires that there be no discrimination on any 
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion or other status. With regard to the term 
“discrimination” in the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee has commented that: 
 
“the term ‘discrimination’ as used in the Covenant should be 
understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or 
preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or 
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and 
freedoms.”515  
 
However, the CRC Committee has also noted that: “the enjoyment of rights and freedoms on 
an equal footing ... does not mean identical treatment in every instance.”516 For example, 
religious exemptions may be granted to persons of a particular faith based on sincerely held 
beliefs, whereas others who are not of that faith, will have to comply with the laws/rules as 
they stand.517  
 
Primarily, the Declaration requires that all states take effective measures to prevent and 
eliminate discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief.518 In this regard discrimination is 
defined as any “distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on religion or belief and 
having as its purpose or as its effect nullification or impairment of the recognition.”519 
Moreover, the ICCPR also includes a prohibition against the incitement of hatred against 
others on the basis of religion.520 The Constitution expressly mentions advocacy of hatred 
                                                          
515  See General Comment No. 18, in “United Nations Compilation of General Comments” p. 135 para 7. 
516  p. 135-36 para 8; CRC General comment no. 5 (2003), General measures of implementation of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, CRC/GC/2003/5 para 12 states: “It should be emphasized that the 
application of the non-discrimination principle of equal access to rights does not mean identical treatment.” 
517          Pillay para 103.  
518     Article 4.  
519     Article 2.  
520     Article 20.  
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based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion as a specific exclusion to the constitutional right to 
freedom of expression.521 
 
Furthermore, the Constitution encapsulates the above international principles by guaranteeing 
the right to equality of everyone before the law and the right to equal protection and benefit of 
the law.522  The Constitution likewise prohibits unfair discrimination, directly or indirectly, by 
the State, as well as by any other person, based on race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital 
status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, 
belief, culture, language, birth, or other similar grounds.523 It is noteworthy that the 
Constitution encapsulates a wider set of grounds for discrimination than any of the 
instruments discussed in this section.  
 
Correspondingly, South Africa has also enacted the Equality Act to give further content and 
meaning to the Constitution’s equality clause. The Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998524 and 
the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995525 serve the same purpose in the context of employment. 
The Equality Act states that one of its objectives is “to facilitate further compliance with 
international law obligations including treaty obligations in terms of, amongst others, the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.”526 The Act states that 
persons charged with interpreting its provisions “may be mindful of international law 
particularly the two Conventions just mentioned, as well as comparable foreign law.”527 
 
                                                          
521    Section 16(2)(c). 
522    Section 9(1).  
523   Section 9(3).  
524  Section 5 states: “Elimination of unfair discrimination.--Every employer must take steps to promote equal 
opportunity in the workplace by eliminating unfair discrimination in any employment policy or practice.” 
Section 6 states: “Prohibition of unfair discrimination.--(1)  No person may unfairly discriminate, directly or 
indirectly, against an employee, in any employment policy or practice, on one or more grounds, including 
race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, family responsibility, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV status, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, language and 
birth.” 
525   Section 187(1)(f) states: “A dismissal is automatically unfair if the employer, in dismissing the employee, 
acts contrary to section 5 or, if the reason for the dismissal is- that the employer unfairly discriminated 
against an employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to race, 
gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
political opinion, culture, language, marital status or family responsibility.” 
526    Section 2(h); See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted 
and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 
December 1979, entry into force 3 September 1981, in accordance with article 27(1). 
527    Section 3(2)(c). 
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Relevant to both freedom of religion and education rights, Article 18 (4) of the ICCPR 
requires that States “undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, 
legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity 
with their own convictions.”  This principle is also affirmed by Article 5(1) of the Declaration 
according to which: “The parents or, as the case may be, the legal guardians of the child have 
the right to organise the life within the family in accordance with their religion or belief and 
bearing in mind the moral education in which they believe the child should be brought up”.   
 
In this regard the Human Rights Committee commented:  
 
“The Committee is of the view that article 18(4) permits public school 
instruction in subjects such as the general history of religions and ethics 
if it is given in a neutral and objective way. The liberty of parents or 
legal guardians to ensure that their children receive a religious and 
moral education in conformity with their own convictions, set forth in 
article 18(4), is related to the guarantees of the freedom to teach a 
religion or belief stated in article 18(1). The Committee notes that 
public education that includes instruction in a particular religion or 
belief is inconsistent with article 18(4) unless provision is made for 
non-discriminatory exemptions or alternatives that would accommodate 
the wishes of parents and guardians.”528  
 
In this regard, Professor Amor states that: “[p]rovision of religious education, provided it is 
neutral and objective, can make a real contribution to the prevention of intolerance and 
discrimination by helping pupils realize their own individual and communal cultural identity 
and provide ethical guidance.” However, he has advised that: “…whenever education in the 
field of religion and conviction is part of the curriculum in state and/or private schools, 
provisions should be envisaged for it to be optional, at least in terms of allowing for a 
conscientious right of withdrawal to be exercised by the parents, guardians or mature 
pupils.”529 This is a key issue for discussion in this thesis.  
                                                          
528   HRC, General Comment 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion (Art 18) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (30 July 1993) para 6; The HRC has commented further, that “where parents or 
guardians object to religious instruction for their children at school; it is not incompatible with  Article18 
(4) of the ICCPR, for domestic legislation to require that instruction should instead be given in the study of 
the history of religions and ethics, provided that this is done in  a neutral and objective way and shows due 
respect to the convictions of the parents who do not believe in a religion.” See Hartikainen v. Finland 
(40/1978) (R.9/40), ICCPR, A/36/40 (9 April 1981) 147 at paras. 10.4 and 10.5.  
529  Amor “The role of religious education in the pursuit of tolerance and non-discrimination”, Study prepared 
under the guidance of Professor Abdelfattah Amor, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human 
Rights on the question of religious intolerance, International Consultative Conference on School Education 
in relation with Freedom of Religion and Belief, Tolerance and Non-discrimination (Madrid, 23-25 
November 2001). 
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Also important is Article 5 of the Declaration, which deals comprehensively with the religious 
rights of children and their parents, particularly with regard to religious rights within an 
educational setting. Article 5 includes the right of parents or legal guardians to raise the 
child530 in accordance with their religion or belief;531 the right of the child to education in 
religion or belief, in accordance with the wishes of parents532  with the best interests of the 
child being the guiding principle;533 the right of a child not to be compelled to receive 
education against the wishes of his or her parent; the right of the child to protection from 
discrimination on the grounds of religion; the right of the child’s views on religion to be taken 
into account when the child is not under the care of parents or legal guardians and the right of 
the state to limit practices injurious to child’s development or health.534   
 
Furthermore, Article 5(2) of the Declaration coincides with Article 14(2) of the CRC which 
requires States to “respect the rights and duties of the parents and, when applicable, legal 
guardians, to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner 
consistent with the evolving capacities of the child.”535 This recognises the rights of parents to 
direct a child’s religious upbringing until the child is sufficiently mature to exercise their own 
religious rights in terms of Article 14(1) of the CRC. Similarly to Article 14 of the CRC, 
Article 9 of the ACRWC states that States Parties shall respect the right of the child to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion536 and, in addition, shall respect the rights and 
duties of the parents to provide direction to the child in this regard, subject to national laws 
                                                          
530  Tahzib points out that the Declaration does not define who is considered to be a child under Article 5. See 
Tahzib (n359) 175.  
531          Article 5(1).  
532   Lerner notes that the drafting of Article 5 “created controversy, a fact hardly surprising, considering the 
close relationship between religion, education the role of parents, and the aspiration of all religions and 
ideologies to influence the mind of the child at all stages of the formative process.” See Lerner Group 
Rights and discrimination in International Law (1991) 87.   
533  Article 5(2); Lerner notes further that: “the Declaration does not attempt to resolve the many questions 
likely to arise in the case of clash between the wishes of parents and, or legal guardians, and the best 
interests of the child. This is a delicate matter likely to create difficulties, particularly in the case of 
totalitarian or ideological states, where an officially adopted philosophy might become a major 
consideration on the determination of the best interests of the child. In general, limitations on parental 
authority regarding rights related to religion or belief have been a frequent cause of conflict, often requiring 
adjudication.” (footnote omitted). See Lerner (n532) 87.    
534         See Chapters 4 and 6. 
535  Article 14(2); Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Heiner Bielefeldt 
(December 2010) para 25. See Study prepared under the guidance of Abdelfattah Amor (n529) 55-56; In 
relation to Article 14, the CRC Committee “emphasizes that the human rights of children cannot be realized 
independently from the human rights of their parents, or in isolation from society at large.” See CRC 
Committee, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Iran (Islamic Republic 
of), U.N. GAOR, Comm, on the Rts, of the Child, 24th Sess at 35, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/.15/Add.123.). 
536         Article 9 (1).  
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and policies.537 Contrastingly, South Africa does not mention the rights of the parent in its 
constitutional provisions on children’s rights538 or educational rights.539 The state does, 
however, generally defer to the viewpoint and decisions of parents in these matters.540   
 
Giving further content to the rights encompassed in Article 14 of the CRC (discussed above), 
is Article 30, which recognises the rights of children who are ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities or of indigenous origin, to be afforded the right, in community with other members 
of a group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use 
their own language. This corresponds with Article 27 of the ICCPR.541 Furthermore, in terms 
of the CRC children are conferred the right to participate freely in cultural life and States 
Parties are called upon to encourage the provision of appropriate and equal opportunities for 
cultural activity.542  
 
Importantly, special protection for the unique situation of the African child is evident in the 
obligation on States Parties to the ACRWC to discourage any custom, tradition, cultural or 
religious practice contrary to the provisions of the Charter,543 which includes those which 
affect the welfare and dignity of the child and those which discriminate against the child on 
the basis of sex or other status.544 This provision deals with aspects identified as lacunae in 
the CRC.545 For example, cultural practices, such as virginity testing and female circumcision 
foster the image of girls as sexual objects, thereby encouraging their subordinate status. Issues 
such as these are not addressed at all in the CRC.546 In addition, the ACRWC mirrors Article 
31 of the CRC by conferring on children the right to participate freely in cultural life.547 
                                                          
537        Article 9 (3).  
538    Section 28.  
539         Section 29.  
540  Discussed in Chapter 4. 
541    See below. 
542        Article 31.  
543    Article 1(3). See also Article 21.  
544   Article 21; Kaime “The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the cultural legitimacy of Children’s 
Rights in Africa: Some Reflections” 2005 5(2) African Human Rights Law Journal 221 227-228. Although 
no practice is specifically mentioned, it is presumed that female genital mutilation is included, as well other 
practices which threaten the health (and life) of children. See Gose (n406) 52.  
545   Viljoen (n376) 211. 
546   206.  
547   Article 12; Also at regional level, Article 11 of the SADC Protocol on Culture, Information and Sport sets 
out the objectives of member states with regards to the issue of culture which include: ensuring that culture 
plays a vital role in the economic development of the SADC and evaluation of all SADC projects and 
programmes; developing institutions of cultural heritage such as libraries, museums and archives and 
promoting indigenous languages as part of the promotion of cultural identity. Article 13 of the Protocol is 
aimed towards the preservation and promotion of the Region’s cultural heritage. Part of the promotion of 
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Evidently, the ACRWC increases the level of protection afforded to African children in a 
number of ways.548   
 
In addition to protecting freedom of religion, the UDHR states that everyone has the right to 
participate in the cultural life of their community.549 Correspondingly, the Constitution 
contains separate clauses protecting cultural, religious and linguistic groups. This is as a result 
of the cultural, religious and linguistic (and other) divisions that existed in the apartheid era 
where the minority population group monopolised political power.550 The Constitution gives 
cultural, religious, and linguistic communities the right “to enjoy their culture, practise their 
religion and use their language,”551 and “to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and 
linguistic associations.”552 These rights are important in protecting members of religious, 
cultural and linguistic communities who fear being dominated by larger or more powerful 
groups. Sections 30553 and 31 of the Constitution are specifically aimed at minority 
protection. They are express declarations of the equal worth of various cultural and other 
groups in South Africa, whose community practices and associations must be treated with 
reverence.554 Importantly, the Constitutional Court recognises that cultural groups555 are by 
definition, a combination of religion, language, geographical origin, ethnicity and artistic 
tradition;556 thereby making provisions with regard to culture, language and ethnicity, relevant 
to the topic at hand.  
                                                                                                                                                                                            
culture includes the organisation of art and cultural festivals which pursue the ideals of regional integration. 
The SADC Member States signed a Protocol in 14 August 2001 with the objective of strengthening and 
consolidating historical, social and cultural affinities and relations within the Region (see Preamble).  South 
Africa ratified this Protocol in 2005 and has thereby formally agreed to its provisions. The Protocol entered 
into force on 7 January 2006. It focuses on harmonising policies on culture by SADC Member States. See 
http://www.communitymedia.org.za/alt-media-resources/132-legislation-and-regulation (Date accessed: 14 
December 2011). Also, Article 12 of the SADC Protocol on Culture, Information and Sport deals with 
language policy formulation and it requires that Member States: “formulate and implement language 
policies that will aim at promoting indigenous languages for national socio-economic development”; 
“institute and put into practical effect policy measures that will aim at encouraging the learning and wider 
use of the official languages of Member States”;  and “promote the use of indigenous languages as medium 
of instruction.” 
548   Davel (n420) 282. 
549         Article 27; See Stamatopolou (n352) 199-200.  
550         De Waal &Currie (n18) 470. 
551    Section 31 (1)(a).  
552    Section 31 (1)(b).  
553  Section 30 entrenches the right to language and culture in the following terms: “Everyone has the right to 
use the language and to participate in the cultural life of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may 
do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill rights.” 
554   Pillay at para 151; Amoah and Bennet argue that religious rights are often treated as more important than 
cultural rights and that African traditional beliefs are often treated as incidences of African culture and 
thereby devalued. See Amoah and Bennet (n107) 1-2.  
555   See discussion on the relationship between religion and culture in Chapter 6.  
556  Pillay at para 50.  
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Similarly to Article 30 of the CRC, Article 27 of the ICCPR, protects members of ethnic, 
religious, or linguistic minorities from being denied the enjoyment of their own culture557 or 
the practice of their own religion, or use their own language.558 Dr. Francesco Capotorti, who 
was appointed Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention 
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, provided probably the most widely quoted 
definition on what constitutes a minority, namely: “a group which is numerically inferior to 
the rest of the population of a State and in a non-dominant position, whose members possess 
ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the rest of the 
population and who, if only implicitly, maintain a sense of solidarity, directed towards 
preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.”559  
 
Significantly, Article 27 was the first international provision dealing specifically with rights 
for ethnic, religious and linguistic groups that was capable of, and intended for, universal 
application. However, Article 27 has been criticised, firstly, for being too timid in that it 
protects “persons belonging to minorities”560 and not to minorities as such, and therefore is 
more individualistic than group orientated. Secondly, it is stated in the negative, that is, “shall 
not be denied”, as opposed to “shall be provided”, meaning that minorities do not have right 
to demand that the state should adopt positive measures to protect their cultural rights.561 This 
could be construed as “nervousness in handling minorities’ issues”.562    
 
                                                          
557  General Comment No. 23 states: “With regard to the exercise of the cultural rights protected under Article 
27, the Committee observes that culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life 
associated with the use of land resources, especially in the case of indigenous peoples. That right may 
include such traditional activities as fishing or hunting and the right to live in reserves protected by law. The 
enjoyment of those rights may require positive legal measures of protection and measures to ensure the 
effective participation of members of minority communities in decisions which affect them”. See “United 
Nations Compilation of General Comments” p. 149.   
558         Article 27; It has been noted in international case law that “measures whose impact amounts to a denial of 
the right are incompatible with the obligations under article 27.” However, “measures that have a certain 
limited impact on the way of life and the livelihood of persons belonging to a minority will not necessarily 
amount to a denial of the rights under article 27.” See Communication No. 671/1995, J. E. Länsman et al. v. 
Finland (Views adopted on 30 October 1996), in UN doc. GAOR, A/52/40 (II), p. 203, para. 10.3. 
559    Capotorti Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.78.XIV.1 (1979); See Castellino International Law and 
Self-Determination: The Interplay of the Politics of Territorial Possession with Formulations of Post-
Colonial National Identity (2000) 56.  
560  Gauteng Education at para 60; See also Currie “Minority Rights: Language, Education and Culture” in 
Chaskalson et al (n801) at 35-2 to 35-3.  
561      Gauteng Education at para 60; See Thornberry “Is there a Phoenix in the Ashes? - International Law and 
Minority Rights” 1980 Texas International Law Journal 433 and 447.  
562     Gauteng Education at para 60.  
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Despite the above criticisms of the ICCPR, the very inclusion of a provision dealing 
specifically with rights for ethnic, religious and linguistic groups, is laudable.563 This 
provision inspired the drafting of a Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities564 which encompasses a “right [of 
national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities] to enjoy their own culture, to profess 
and practise their own religion, and to use their own language, in private and in public, freely 
and without interference or any form of discrimination.”565  
 
 
6   CONCLUSION  
 
To conclude, South Africa has ratified numerous Conventions, Protocols and Charters dealing 
with children’s rights, education rights and freedom of religion; all of which are relevant to 
the issue of religion in schools and all of which impact directly or indirectly on the protection 
of these relevant rights at municipal level.  
 
As mentioned, the most significant of all the major international instruments is by far is the 
UDHR, which recognises a broad spectrum of rights relating to religion in schools and 
constitutes the primary inspiration for the contents of the South African Constitution. The 
ICERD is also significant in that its ratification marked South Africa’s commitment to 
preventing discrimination on the basis of race which is interlinked with religion and culture.  
 
In addition, the ICCPR expands on the protection of children’s rights and religious freedom 
afforded by the UDHR and creates not only a moral but a legal obligation on member States 
to promote these rights. The Declaration gives more concrete content to the general provisions 
of the UDHR and the ICCPR. It also may serve as a valuable guide for the uniform 
interpretation and application of the various international statements on religious freedom in 
future.  
 
                                                          
563      These issues were addressed extensively in the South African Constitutional Court case of Gauteng 
Education.  
564      Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 
G.A. Res. 47/135, (Dec. 18, 1992).  
565    Article 2.1.  
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The adoption of the CRC resulted in human rights standards pertaining to children rights 
being encompassed into a single legal instrument.566 By ratifying it, South Africa has bound 
itself to taking measures to protect children. As the next Chapter illustrates, its provisions 
have served as a standard for the development of children’s rights within the South African 
Constitution.567 The Children’s Act, South Africa’s primary legislation on children’s rights, 
which was enacted to supplement the children’s rights568 conferred by the South African Bill 
of Rights,569 makes specific mention of the importance of the CRC in its preamble. The CRC 
has established legally binding principles and international standards for states to meet in 
domestic legislation. Importantly, South Africa has incorporated the “best interests of the 
child” standard into its Constitution as well as into its child protection legislation, meaning 
that the best interests of the child are paramount in all matters pertaining to children.570  
 
The ACRWC is central to the topic at hand in that it amounts to the collective recognition of 
the education rights and religious rights of African children in particular and establishes a 
legal framework for their protection at regional level.571 It confirms and strengthens the global 
standards in the CRC. Although the Charter has not been incorporated into South African law 
by national legislation, it is still applicable in terms of section 233 of the Constitution, as 
discussed above. South Africa has also adopted numerous laws and other measures to give 
effect to the provisions of the Charter and its provisions have been referred to by the 
Constitutional Court.572 This indicates that the South African legal system is beginning to 
mirror the protection of rights as provided for in the Charter. 
 
To sum up, South Africa has adopted specific constitutional provisions regarding the status of 
international law in South African law.573 In doing so, South Africa has made a commitment 
to honour their provisions and give effect to them.574 The influence of these international 
instruments is illustrated in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, which outlines and assesses the current South 
African law on children’s rights; education rights and freedom of religion respectively. In 
                                                          
566    Lloyd (n310) 30.   
567    Section 28.  
568        Section 28.  
569         Discussed in Chapter 4.  
570  Discussed in Chapter 4.  
571    Lloyd (n310) 15.  
572    Bhe at para 53-55. 
573    Maluwa (n307) 52.  
574  Follentine, A response by the Department of Social Services on “Sexual Exploitation of Children” 16 
October 2001 3; Also, as mentioned above, South Africa has indicated its intention to ratify the ICESCR.  
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addition specific provisions of these international instruments form part of the discussion and 
analysis of some of the major problem areas pertaining to religion in schools.575   
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
575  See Chapter 7.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 
 
“The idea of children’s rights, then, may be a beacon guiding the 
way to the future- but it is also illuminating how many adults 
neglect their responsibilities towards children and how many 
children are too often the victims of the ugliest and most 
shameful activities.”576 
 
1   INTRODUCTION  
 
Since the exercise of rights in a school setting concerns children in particular, it is submitted 
that children’s rights are vitally important to the discussion of the issues pertaining to religion 
in schools. Children’s rights are specifically protected in section 28 of the Constitution. 
Particularly important is the provision that in all matters concerning the child, the best 
interests of the child are of paramount importance.577  
 
Aside from these specific children’s rights, children are also entitled to other rights in the Bill 
of Rights, such as the right to dignity;578 the right to equality;579 the right to basic 
education;580 freedom of religion;581 freedom of expression582 and freedom of association.583 
With the exception of a few fundamental rights which are expressly not applicable to children 
due to their youth and stage in human development (for example the right to vote is restricted 
to “every adult citizen”),584 children are entitled to the same protection under the Bill of 
                                                          
576     Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary General, September 2011.  
577  Section 28(2) of the Constitution.  
578  Section 10 of the Constitution.  
579  Section 9 of the Constitution.  
580  Section 29(1); Discussed in Chapter 5.   
581  Section 15 of the Constitution; Discussed in Chapter 6.   
582  Section 16 of the Constitution; Discussed in Chapter 6.   
583  Section 18 of the Constitution; Discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.  
584  Section 19(3) of the Constitution.  
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Rights as their adult counterparts.585 As is elaborated upon below, these rights can be utilised 
by children in asserting their own individual autonomy, depending on their age/maturity. 
These rights must be interpreted in line with the constitutional values of dignity, equality and 
freedom.586  
 
This Chapter discusses children’s rights, as protected by section 28 of the Constitution and the 
applicable provisions of the Children’s Act. It also discusses the best interests of the child 
principle and the relevant case law dealing with its application. Included in the discussion on 
the best interests of the child, is the consideration of the child’s views in matters pertaining to 
the child. Furthermore, this Chapter discusses the rights to dignity and equality- rights which 
are inherently connected to children’s rights. Other rights587 pertaining to children are more 
relevant to the topics discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis and are therefore not 
discussed in this Chapter. 
 
Overall, this Chapter forms the theoretical foundation for the recommendations (contained in 
Chapter 7) on the role that children’s rights should play when it comes to education 
legislation, policies and actions taken by school authorities on issues pertaining to religion in 
schools.588   
 
2    RELEVANT CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN SECTION 28(1) 
 
2.1  PROTECTION AND SUPPORT OF CHILDREN 
 
During the years of colonial rule and apartheid many children endured profound suffering 
due to unequal education systems, religious discrimination and language disputes in education 
(amongst other reasons).589 Accordingly, the Bill of Rights, affords special protection to 
children in the form of children’s rights in section 28 of the Constitution,590 a section which 
                                                          
585  De Waal & Currie (n18) 456.  
586  Section 39(1) of the Constitution.  
587  Namely, the right to basic education; freedom of religion; freedom of expression and freedom of 
association.  
588  Discussed in Chapter 7.  
589  Discussed in Chapter 2.  
590  Section 28 states as follows:  
“(1) Every child has the right- 
  (a) to a name and a nationality from birth; 
  (b) to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when 
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Devenish refers to as a “mini charter of rights”591 for children. A child is defined in this 
section as a person under the age of 18 years.592 In addition, the Children’s Act supplements 
the children’s rights afforded by section 28.593 
 
According to section 28, children’s rights, include: the right of all children “to be protected 
from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation”594 and the right not to be required or 
permitted to perform work that interferes with the “child’s well-being, education, physical or 
mental health or spiritual, moral or social development.”595 These provisions further 
supplement the child’s rights to bodily and psychological integrity,596 dignity, equality and 
freedom and security of the person,597enshrined in the Bill of Rights. They place a duty on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
      removed from the family environment; 
  (c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services; 
  (d) to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation; 
  (e) to be protected from exploitative labour practices; 
  (f) not to be required or permitted to perform work or provide services that- 
  (i) are inappropriate for a person of that child's age; or 
  (ii)place at risk the child's well-being, education, physical or mental 
     health or spiritual, moral or social development; 
  (g) not to be detained except as a measure of last resort, in which case, in 
addition to the rights a child enjoys under sections 12 and 35, the child 
may be detained only for the shortest appropriate period of time, and has 
the right to be- 
  (i) kept separately from detained persons over the age of 18 years; and 
  (ii) treated in a manner, and kept in conditions, that take account of the 
      child's age; 
  (h) to have a legal practitioner assigned to the child by the state, and at state 
     expense, in civil proceedings affecting the child, if substantial injustice 
     would otherwise result; and 
  (i) not to be used directly in armed conflict, and to be protected in times of 
     armed conflict. 
  (2) A child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter 
     concerning the child.” 
591   Devenish (n52) 140.  
592  Section 28(3). This provision coincides with Article 1 of the CRC.  
593          Section 8 of the Children’s Act.  
594  Section 28(1)(d).  
595  Section 28(f)(ii); Correspondingly, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 prohibits children 
under the age of 15 from working, and prohibits those between the ages of 15 and 18 from performing 
unsuitable work, meaning work that places their well-being, education, physical or mental health, or 
spiritual, moral or social development at risk.  
596  Section 12(2) of the Constitution.  
597          Section 12 of the Bill of Right states that:  
             “(1) Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes 
               The right- 
(a) not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause; 
(b) not to be detained without trial; 
(c) to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources; 
(d) not to be tortured in any way; and 
(e) not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way. 
    (2) Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes 
         the right- 
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state and private persons to protect the safety and well-being of all children. In addition the 
Children’s Act lists as one its objectives, the protection of children from “discrimination, 
exploitation and any other physical, emotional or moral harm or hazards.”598 Accordingly, 
there is a duty on schools (including private schools)599 to protect learners’ safety, well-being 
and development600 so that the educational obligations of the institution can be fulfilled.  
 
Correspondingly, section 24 of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to an 
environment that is not detrimental to their health or well-being. This right protects learners 
from being exposed to a harmful environment at school.601 In order to implement this, section 
8 of the Schools Act requires School Governing Bodies (SGB’s) to develop codes of conduct 
for learners which include policies relating to safety and school discipline.602 Prinsloo notes 
that:   
 “A safe school may be seen as one that is free of danger and where 
there is an absence of possible harm; a place in which all learners may 
learn without fear of ridicule, intimidation, harassment, humiliation or 
violence.”603  
 
In this regard, developmental harm to a child has been defined as: “harm that occurs due to 
events or conditions that prevent or inhibit children from achieving their maximum physical, 
social or academic potential.”604 This may include psychological harm605 caused by 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
(a) to make decisions concerning reproduction; 
(b) to security in and control over their body; and 
                 (c) not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without their 
informed consent.” 
598  Section 2(f).  
599  Section 8(2) of the Constitution. 
600  Section 32 of the Children’s Act states that: “(1) A person who has no parental responsibilities and rights in 
respect of a child but who voluntarily cares for the child either indefinitely, temporarily or partially, 
including a care-giver who otherwise has no parental responsibilities and rights in respect of a child, must, 
whilst the child is in that person’s care- (a) safeguard the child’s health, well-being and development”; 
Section 10 of the Schools Act prohibits corporal punishment in schools.  
601  Eberlein ‘Incidents and Accidents’: Implementing the safety regulations prescribed by the South African 
Schools Act (2009) 11; Smith The role of school discipline in combatting violence in schools in the East 
London region (2010) 35; de Waal “Legal accountability for public school discipline— fact or fiction?” 
2011 18 SAJE 175 175.  
602  Bray “Codes of conduct in public schools: a legal perspective” 2005 25(3) SAJE 133 133. 
603  Prinsloo “Sexual harassment and violence in South African schools” 2006 26(2) SAJE 305 312; Section 
4(1) of the Regulations for Safety Measures at Public Schools proclaim all schools to be “dangerous object 
free zones.”  
604  See Gale et al “The safe school, integrating the school reform agenda to prevent disruption and violence at 
school” in Conoley and Goldstein (eds) School violence intervention, a practical handbook (2ed) (2004). 
Quoted in Smith (n601) 19.  
605  Section 7(1)(k) of the Children’s Act includes that “the need to protect the child from any physical or 
psychological harm” as a factor in determining the best interests of the child.  
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intimidation, exclusion from peer groups606 and discrimination, whether it be racial, classist or 
homophobic.607 The psychological harm to a child is a factor that must be considered in 
determining the best interests of the child.608 One could argue that religious pressure or 
coercion to conform to the majority’s beliefs or the stigma of being singled out as being 
“different” in an insensitive or degrading manner; could be included as development harm.  
 
Also connected to the protection of children, section 28(1)(c) entitles every child to the right 
to “basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services.” This provision 
supplements the socio-economic rights provided for in sections 26 and 27 of the Constitution. 
Whereas sections 26(1) and 27(1) are both qualified by the statement “within its available 
resources”, meaning that the state must achieve the progressive realisation of the particular 
rights; section 28(1)(c) prima facie is not subject to any qualification. However, the case of 
Grootboom, confirmed that section 28(1)(c) does not impose on the state an obligation to 
provide shelter on demand to children and through them, to their parents. Ultimately, this 
means that the primary responsibility to provide support for children rests with their parents 
and only alternatively on the state.609  This case emphasised that children need to be protected 
from becoming “stepping stones …for their parents instead of being valued for who they 
are.”610  
 
2.2  PERSONAL AUTONOMY OF THE CHILD VERSUS THE DUTY OF CARE 
 
Although a child has individual rights and personal autonomy (subject to age/maturity) from 
rights, such as freedom of religion, cultural rights,  freedom of expression and the right to 
privacy;611 the Constitution recognises that children have a relationship of dependence with 
their parents.612 Parents have the responsibility of making decisions on behalf of children until 
such time as the child is of a certain age or is sufficiently mature to do so themselves.613 The 
                                                          
606         Shariff “Keeping schools out of court: Legally defensible models of Leadership” 2004 68(3) The 
Educational Forum 222 223; See Niewenhuis (ed) Growing Human Rights and Values in Education (2007) 
217-218.   
607  Shariff (n606) 224.  
608  Section 7(1)k).  
609  Bekink “Striking a balance between parental religious freedom” in Lodrup & Modvar (eds) Family Life and 
Human Rights (2002) 67; Davel (ed) Introduction to Child Law in SA (2000) 173. 
610  Grootboom at para 71. 
611  De Waal & Currie (n18) 457. 
612  Robinson (n237) 11; De Waal & Currie (n18) 26.  
613  Article 5 of the CRC recognises the right of parents to provide appropriate direction and guidance in the 
exercise by the child of the rights, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child.  
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relationship a child has with his or her parents is a relationship of responsibility, where the 
parental rights and duties exist to the benefit of the child.614  
 
For example, parents (or guardians) are given the authority to conclude juristic acts on behalf 
of minor children, such as contracting on their behalf or assisting them with contracts.615 
Some authors refer to this authority as an implied “agency” between the parent and child.616 
Importantly, however, the contract law emphasises that a parent must “proceed in this matter 
with particular caution”617 in order to ensure that the minor is not prejudiced618 by actions 
taken on their behalf. Ultimately, the High Court, as upper guardian of all minors, has the 
power to protect the interests of the minor child, by replacing any consent given by a parent 
with its own.619 It is for this reason, for example, that the contract law would render 
unenforceable a contract in terms of which the vital interests of a minor are traded for money 
by a parent620 and that a guardian is forbidden in law to purchase a ward’s property.621  
 
Although the Constitution does not expressly confer on parents the constitutional right of 
parental authority over their children,622 the reference to “care” in section 28(1)(b) 
acknowledges the particularly vulnerable position of children due to their lack of maturity and 
experience. Parental, family or alternative care assists the child to overcome this 
vulnerability.623 In this regard, Smith notes that schools and educators have a duty of care 
towards all learners since they act in loco parentis, that is, they assume the position of a 
                                                          
614  Bekink (n609) 10; Bridge Family Law towards the Millennium: Essays for PM Bromley (1997) 295-297; 
Hogget Parents & children: The Law of Parental Responsibility (1987) 3. 
615  Section 18(3)(b) of Children’s Act  states that: “a parent or other person who acts as guardian of a child 
must assist or represent the child in administrative, contractual and other legal matters”; In terms of the 
common law, minors under the age of seven have no capacity to conclude contracts. The law confers upon 
their parent or guardian the right to concludes contracts on their behalf. Whereas, minors between the ages 
of seven and eighteen have limited capacity- they must be assisted by or obtain consent from their parent or 
guardian. See Nagel Commercial Law (2006) 66- 67. 
616  Havenga et al (eds) General Principles of Commercial Law (2010) 301; Visser et al argues that this is not 
agency in the true sense but representation without a mandate- the authority for which is implied by the law. 
See Visser et al (eds) Gibson: South African Mercantile and Company Law (1997) 209. 
617  See Grotius (translated) quoted in Visser et al (n616) 23.  
618  23. 
619  Christie The Law of Contract (2001) 267.  
620  Shepstone v Shepstone 1974 2 SA 462 (N) at 464H-465A; Referred to in Kerr The Principles of the Law of 
Contract (1998) 178.   
621  Pothier Obligations: A Treatise on the Law of Obligations, or Contacts (1907) para 43. Quoted in Kerr The 
Law of Agency (2006) 54-55.    
622  Article 18 of the CRC states that parents or legal guardians have the primary responsibility for the 
upbringing and development of the child.  
623  Section 18 of the Children’s Act states that: “The parental responsibilities and rights that a person may have 
in respect of a child, include the responsibility and the right- (a) to care for the child; (b) to maintain contact 
with the child.” 
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responsible parent over their learners.624 This would include not only looking after the safety 
and (physical and psychological) well-being of learners, but also maintaining school 
discipline.625 De Waal and Currie contend that the teachers of a child are “care-givers”, who 
although having no parental rights and responsibilities towards the child as such, must 
safeguard the child’s health, well-being and development.626  
 
It is clear that the interest of children in maintaining a degree of personal autonomy should be 
seen within the context of the relationship of dependence that exists between a child and his 
or her parents or care-givers.627 However, it is also apparent that the older the child becomes, 
the more difficult it is to limit the child’s personal autonomy,628 since the duty to care for the 
child exists by virtue of the child’s age and lack of maturity.629  
 
In fact, there are circumstances where the law has granted minor children the capacity to act 
independently, for example, in terms of section 129(3) of the Children’s Act, a child over the 
age of 12 may consent to surgical operations if he/she: a) has “sufficient maturity630 and has 
the mental capacity to understand the benefits, risks, social and other implications of the 
surgical operation”; and (b) is assisted by a parent or guardian. Provisions such as these 
recognise the state’s respect for the evolving capacities of children as they age/mature.631 It 
                                                          
624  Smith (n601) 34; Govender Balancing the Educator’s Rights to Fair Labour Practices and to Strike with the 
Right to Education (2011) 16; Law and Parents “What in loco parentis means: The duty to care” 
http://www.lawandparents.co.uk/what-in-loco-parentis-means-you.html (Date accessed: 18 November 
2010). 
625  Prinsloo (n603) 312; Maithufi “Children, young persons and the law” in Robinson (ed) The law of children 
and young persons in South Africa (1997)  260-261.  
626  De Waal & Currie (n18) 614, as referred to in Venter “Xhosa male initiation: an evaluation of children’s 
human rights” 2011 12(2) Child Abuse Research: A South African Journal 87 95.  
627  Bekink “‘Child Divorce’: a Break from Parental Responsibilities and Rights due to the Traditional Socio-
Cultural Practices and Beliefs of the Parents” 2012 15(1) PER 178 184. 
628  Bekink states: “[A]s a child grows older and the duty of care and support diminishes, justification for such 
intrusion will become progressively more difficult to prove as the child’s right to self-determination 
increases.” See Bekink (n627)185. 
629  De Waal & Currie (n18) 457. 
630   The importance of sufficient maturity was recognised in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health 
Authority (1986 1 AC 112, 1985 3 All ER 402). The court quoted from R v D, 1984 AC 778, 1984 2 All ER 
449, as follows: ‘‘In the case of a very young child, it would not have the understanding or the intelligence 
to give its consent. In the case of an older child, however, it must I think be a question of fact for a jury 
whether the child concerned has sufficient understanding and intelligence to give its consent.” Discussed in 
Elliston The Best Interests of the Child in Healthcare (2007) 78-85.  
631  Strode et al “Child consent in South African law: Implications for researchers, service providers and policy-
makers” 2010 100(4) S Afr Med J 247 247; Alderson comments that “evolving capacities” can be 
interpreted in an emancipating way to mean that “as children gradually become more competent and 
independent there is a ‘dwindling’ need for adult control.” See Alderson Young Children’s Rights: 
Exploring Beliefs, Principles and Practices (2008) 86.    
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also recognises that in some instances children are capable of “acting autonomously and in 
their own best interests.”632  
 
A further example of the state curbing parental authority in order to protect the safety and 
well-being of children, is found in section 12 of the Children’s Act which states that: “Every 
child has the right not to be subjected to social, cultural and religious practices which are 
detrimental to his or her well-being.”633 This gives children the right to refuse to participate in 
the potentially detrimental religious/cultural practices634 customarily enforced upon them by 
their parents or communities. This provision places the state’s concern for the well-being of 
children above the religious and cultural rights of parents. It also gives domestic effect to 
Article 21 of the ACRWC.635  
 
In general, the state does defer to the methods utilised by parents636 in fulfilment of their 
duties towards their children, that is, unless state interference is required to protect the 
child.637 For example, in the case of Christian Education, the court found that the consent of 
                                                          
632  Bentley “Can there be any universal children’s rights?” 2005 9(1) International Journal of Human Rights 
119; In the High Court case of Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health  2005 1 SA 512 (T), the 
court upheld the constitutionality of legislation which allowed minors to consent to abortions without 
parental consent. The court stated (at para 56) that: “[T]he Act serves the best interest of the pregnant girl 
child (section 28(2)) because it is flexible to recognise and accommodate the individual position of a girl 
child based on her intellectual, psychological and emotional make up and actual majority. It cannot be in the 
interest of the pregnant minor girl to adopt a rigid age-based approach that takes no account, little or 
inadequate account of her individual peculiarities.”  
633  Discussed in Le Roux Harmful Traditional Practices, (Male Circumstances and Virginity Testing of Girls) 
and the Legal Rights of Children (2006); In terms of 7(1)(e)(ii) of the Children’s Act, a factor in 
determining the best interests of the child includes the child’s culture and traditions. This was confirmed in 
Ryland v Edros 1997 (2) SA 690 (C): 707G, 1997 (1) BCLR 77 (C) at 90F-G, wherein the court found that 
“it is quite inimical to all the values of the new South Africa for one group to impose its values on another.”  
This implied that “the best interests of the child” requires taking into account the cultural and religious 
circumstances of each child. However, in Bhe at paras 234 and 235 the court noted that: “respect for our 
diversity and the right of communities to live and be governed by indigenous law must be balanced against 
the need to protect the vulnerable members of the family.” This implies that religious and cultural rules 
should be respected without compromising the best interests of the child.  
634  The Children’s Act lists marriage below the minimum age set by law, virginity testing, male circumcision 
and female genital mutilation as potentially harmful practices in section 12; This provision coincides with 
Article 24(3) of the CRC and Articles 1(3) and 21(1) of the ACRWC.  See discussion in Sloth-Nielsen “A 
foreskin too far? Religious, ‘medical’ and customary circumcision and the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 in the 
context of HIV/Aids” 2012 16 Law, Democracy and Development 69.  
635  Article 21(1) requires that: “States Parties to the present Charter shall take all appropriate measures to 
eliminate harmful social and cultural practices affecting the welfare, dignity, normal growth and 
development of the child.” 
636  Article 5 of the CRC requires that States Parties respect the rights, duties and responsibilities of parents to 
provide guidance and direction to their children.  
637  This is in accordance with international law. In referring to Articles 14(2) and 18(1) of the CRC, which 
recognise the rights of parents to guide their children, Moyo states that: “These provisions confer on parents 
considerable autonomy to educate, direct and guide their children as they see fit and in the absence of child 
abuse, the state should refrain from interfering with family autonomy and privacy.” See Moyo 
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the parent does not override the state’s concern for the safety and well-being of children.638 
Similarly, in the case of Hay v B,639 the court held that parents may not withhold consent to 
medical treatment solely on religious grounds where a medical emergency and the child’s best 
interests require that consent to treatment be given.640 This case coincided with the Canadian 
Supreme Court case of B(R) v Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto,641 in which the 
court ordered the temporary removal of a baby from its Jehovah’s Witness parents in order for 
the child to receive a life-saving blood transfusion.642  
 
These cases indicate that the ultimate responsibility for the protection of children rests with 
the state (with the High Court as upper guardian).643 This means that the rights of parents to 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
“Reconceptualising the ‘paramountcy principle’: Beyond the individualistic construction of the best 
interests of the child” 2012 12 African Human Rights Law Journal 142 157.  
638   See S v Williams and Others 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC); 1995 (7) BCLR 861 (CC) para 52 (“Williams”); The 
issue of whether corporal punishment in schools is in itself degrading was touched upon but not decided by 
the court in Williams. Holding that judicially ordered corporal punishment of juveniles was in conflict with 
the Bill of Rights, Langa J stated that “the issue of corporal punishment [in] schools [was] by no means free 
of controversy” and that “the practice [had] inevitably come in for strong criticism”. In his view, the 
“culture of authority which legitimate[d] the use of violence [was] inconsistent with the values for which the 
Constitution stands.” (para 52); This opinion coincides with other foreign judgements, for example, in Ex 
parte Attorney-General, Namibia: In re Corporal Punishment by Organs of State 1991 (3) SA 76 (NmSC), 
the court had to decide whether the use of corporal punishment in government schools was contrary to 
article 8 of the Namibian Constitution. Becker CJ stated: “that once one has arrived at the conclusion that 
corporal punishment per se is impairing the dignity of the recipient or subjects him to degrading treatment 
or even to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment, it does not on principle matter to what extent such 
corporal punishment is made subject to restrictions and limiting parameters, even of a substantial kind — 
even if very moderately applied and subject to very strict controls, the fact remains that any type of corporal 
punishment results in some impairment of dignity and degrading treatment.” (para 97C-E);  Also, in the 
dissenting judgement of the European Commission of Human Rights case of Campbell and Cosans v United 
Kingdom (1980) 3 E.H.R.R. 531 para 531 at 556.  Mr Klecker stated: “Corporal punishment amounts to a 
total lack of respect for the human being; it therefore cannot depend on the age of the human being . . . The 
sum total of adverse effects, whether actual or potential, produced by corporal punishment on the mental 
and moral development of a child is enough, as I see it, to describe it as degrading within the meaning of 
Article 3 of the Convention.”  
639  2003 3 SA 492 (W). 
640  See Malherbe & Govindjee “A question of blood: Constitutional perspectives on decision-making about 
medical treatment of children of Jehovah’s Witnesses” 2010 74 THRHR 61 -73; See also the UK case of Re 
O (A Minor) (Medical Treatment) (1993) 2 FLR 149; Re R (A Minor) (Blood Transfusion) (1993) 2 FLR 
757. 
641  (1995) 122 DLR (4th) 1 (SCC); See also The Queen v RJ and DA Moorhead, TO 11974 High Court of New 
Zealand Auckland registry 2002 (unreported), in which Seventh Day Adventist parents, who observed strict 
dietary rules in the home, were convicted of manslaughter for (despite doctors warnings) refusing medical 
treatment to their child who died of broncho-pneumonia associated with anaemia and brain damage caused 
by a vitamin B-12 deficiency.    
642  This is in accordance with Article 6(2) of CRC which states that: “States Parties shall ensure to the 
maximum extent possible the survival and development of the child.” 
643  In Centre for Child Law v MEC for Education, Gauteng 2008 1 SA 223 (T) 229G, in relation to  section 
28(1)(b) of the Constitution, the court held that: “[t]he duty to provide care and social services to children 
removed from the family environment rests upon the State. The government must provide appropriate 
facilities and meet the children’s basic needs. The duty cannot be restricted to pleading, on behalf of 
children, with private interests to furnish it with resources.” Couzens comments that the same can be said to 
apply in the context of the right to basic education in section 29(1)(a). See Couzens “Procurement 
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control the religious upbringing and decision-making with respect to their children may be 
limited by the state if necessary to protect children from harm.644 Ultimately, the state must 
oversee the well-being of children whether they are in the care of their parents or not.645 The 
state will restrain parental rights/consent where these rights undermine the legitimate interest 
of the state in protecting children or where these rights are seen to undermine the best 
interests of the child concerned.646  
 
This standpoint coincides with comparable North American jurisprudence. For example, in 
the United States Supreme Court decision of Prince v Massachusetts,647 Rutledge J stated:  
 
“And neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond 
limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well-being, 
the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by 
requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s 
labor [sic] and in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified 
merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child’s 
course of conduct on religion or conscience. Thus, he cannot claim 
freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for 
himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely 
does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to 
communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death . . . [T]he 
state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and 
authority in things affecting the child’s welfare; and that this 
includes, to some extent, matters of conscience and religious 
conviction.” 648
 
 
 
Furthermore, in the Canadian case of P v S,649  L’Heureux-Dube J pointed out:  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
adjudication and the rights of children: Freedom Stationary (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Education, Eastern Cape 
2011 JOL 26927 (E)” 2012 15(1) PER 392 406. 
644  Bekink (n607)67.  
645  Venter (n626) 93.  
646  Moyo The relevance of culture and religion to the understanding of children’s rights in South Africa (2007) 
70.  
647   321 US 158 (1944); See discussion in Hamilton Family Law and Religion (1995) 150.   
648   Paras 166-8; See Malherbe & Govindjee (n640); Contrastingly, in another United States example, 
Wisconsin v Yoder 406 US205 (1972), Burger CJ held that Amish parents could not be compelled to keep 
their children in school beyond the elementary level if they object to doing so on religious grounds – but the 
question was asked in the dissenting judgment as to whether the best interests of Amish children would be 
served by such a decision by denying them to access to basic secondary education. This decision can be 
criticised for putting the religious convictions of parents above the best interests of the child. See discussion 
in Freedman “Protecting religious beliefs and religious practices under s 14 (1) of the Interim Constitution: 
What can we learn from the American Constitution?”1996 THRHR 667 671 and Carpenter “Beyond Belief - 
Religious Freedom under the South African and American Constitutions” 1995 3 THRHR 684 689. 
649   108 DLR (4th) 287.  
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“[I]n ruling on a child’s best interests, a court is not putting religion on 
trial nor its exercise by a parent for himself or herself, but is merely 
examining the way in which the exercise of a given religion by a 
parent throughout his or her right to access affects the child’s best 
interests.”650 
 
Parental authority is often said to ground the legitimacy of parental attempts to transmit 
particular religious values to their children.651 The Constitutional Court has noted that:  
 
“[p]arents have a general interest in living their lives in a community 
setting according to their religious beliefs, and a more specific interest 
in directing the education of their children.”652 
 
Parents are generally permitted raise their children in accordance with their own religious or 
other beliefs. However, this must be done in a manner that is consistent with best interests of 
the child. In this regard, De Waal and Currie point out that the state has a strong interest in 
ensuring that parents do not further their own religious beliefs “through their children”, in a 
manner that is inconsistent with the rights and best interests of the child.653  
 
This was illustrated in the case of Kotze v Kotze,654 in which the court was presented with a 
divorce custody settlement between the parents of a three year-old boy. The settlement 
agreement entailed that the minor child would be educated in and would fully participate in 
the activities of the Apostolic Church. The court refused to make the clause a part of the 
divorce order, holding that the clause was unenforceable and not in the best interests of the 
child in the context of his religious655 and associational rights.656 The court found that the 
                                                          
650  Para 317.  
651  Macleod “Conceptions of Parental Autonomy” in Banhaim (ed) Parents and Children (2008) 95.  
652       Christian Education at para 15. 
653  De Waal & Currie (n18) 457; In the Danish case Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen & Pedersen v Denmark, Comm 
Rep, 1 E.H.R.R. 737 (Application no. 5095/71; 5920/72; 5926/72), 7 December 1976, the European Human 
Rights Court found that the inclusion of compulsory sex education into the school curriculum, did not 
constitute a failure to respect parent’s convictions on the matter.   
654  2003 (3) SA 628 (T). 
655  A child acquires religious rights through section 15 of the Constitution and Article 14 of the CRC.   
656  Quoting from Girdwood v Girdwood (1995 4 SA 698 (C)), the court in Kotze v Kotze held that: “as upper 
guardian of all dependent and minor children, this court has an inalienable right and authority to establish 
what is in the best interest of children and to make corresponding orders to ensure that such interests are 
effectively served and safeguarded. No agreement between parties can encroach on this authority.” (para 
630H I). 
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clause restricted the freedom of choice of the child and placed him in “constraints from which 
he might never be freed.”657  
 
This case recognised that by a certain age/level of maturity- the child may have his or her own 
opinion about religion that may run contrary to that of his or her parents. In other words, once 
a child a capable of making a decision about his or her religious beliefs, it is the child’s 
decision alone.658 The court in Kotze v Kotze held that indoctrination and forced observance 
of religious activities takes away a child’s freedom of choice and is detrimental to his or her 
development.659 Furthermore, the court rejected the argument that it is essential or at least 
useful to ensure that a child attends a church or participates in religious activities at a young 
age so that he/she can understand what the religion entails, until such time as he/she is mature 
enough to exercise his or her own “freedom of choice”.660 
 
This case has been criticised for not giving sufficient recognition to the rights of the parents 
regarding the religious upbringing of their children661 and for not taking sufficient cognisance 
of the child’s age.662 However, these criticisms aside, two important points can be derived 
from this discussion, namely that: 1) the best interests of the child is a crucial factor in 
decisions relating to the religious upbringing of a child and 2) freedom of choice when it 
                                                          
657  Paras 631-632; Feinberg quotes Jean-Jacques Rousseau who advised that “children must be allowed to grow 
up free of religion instruction until they were able to decide moral issues on their own terms.” See Feinberg 
Religious Schools and Education for Democratic Citizenry (2006) 125.  
658  Schäfer Child Law in South Africa: Domestic and International Perspectives (2011) 161.  
659  The court stated: “If a child is forced, be it by order of the parents, or by order of Court, to partake fully in 
stipulated religious activities, it does not have the right to his full development, a right which is implicit in 
the Constitution, and which is expressly referred to in the Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Intolerance and of Discrimination based on Religious Belief, which is part of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, of which the State is a signatory.” (para 631E G). Discussed in 
Robinson “Children and the Right to Freedom of Religion: Kotze v Kotze 2003 3 SA 628 (T)” 2004 1 TSAR 
203. Also discussed in Moyo (n646) 62. 
660  The court stated at para 631E G: “there is a fallacy in this argument. It fails to appreciate fully the nature of 
the human being within the framework of religious dogma on it. Indoctrination (in the neutral sense) and the 
slavish adherence to certain oft repeated canons that seem to be generally accepted by one’s peers as the 
only truth often not only negates, but essentially destroys a person’s freedom of choice, inasmuch as it is 
extremely difficult to free oneself from these bonds, even if one has the intellectual and emotional capacity 
to do so at a later stage.” 
661  Article 14(2) of the CRC states: “States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents and, when 
applicable, legal guardians, to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right…” and Article 
5(1) of the Declaration states: “The parents or, as the case may be, the legal guardians of the child have the 
right to organize the life within the family in accordance with their religion or belief and bearing in mind the 
moral education in which they believe the child should be brought up.”  
662  Robison argues that a child’s own religious rights should not be recognised at three years old. See 
discussion in Robinson (n659) 206-207. 
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comes to the practice of religion, is essential to each (sufficiently mature) person’s 
development.663  
 
Nonetheless, the clash between the authority of parents and the individual rights and best 
interest of the child, continues to be a controversial issue which requires frequent 
adjudication.664  
 
3  BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: SECTION 28(2)  
 
3.1  MEANING OF THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
 
This section deals with two key issues, namely: 1) the meaning of the best interests of the 
child and 2) the factors to be considered in determining the best interests of the child.    
 
It is arguable that “the standard of the best interests of the child is the universal principle 
guiding the adjudication of all matters concerning the welfare of the child.”665 Significantly, 
section 28(2) of the Constitution emphasises that the best interests of the child is the 
paramount concern in every matter relating to the child. This would include matters relating to 
education rights and the exercise of religious freedom in school. Correspondingly, section 
6(2)(a) of the Children’s Act requires that the best interests of the child be respected, 
protected, promoted and fulfilled in all proceedings, actions or decisions in matters 
concerning a child. In addition, section 9 of the Children’s Act echoes this sentiment by 
stating that in all matters relating to the protection and well-being of children, the best 
interests of the child is paramount. It is important to take note that the best interests of the 
learner is only mentioned in the context of disciplinary hearings in the Schools Act666 and is 
                                                          
663  This concept of freedom of choice and the limitation of freedom of choice is raised again in the discussion 
on compulsory religion education in Chapter 7; Alderson comments that: “Freedom of religion is often seen 
in liberal democracies as freedom to choose preferred religion and, for children, the right not to follow their 
parent’s religion.”  See Alderson (n631) 103.    
664  Lerner (n534) 87.    
665  See Breen The Standard of the Best Interests of the Child: A Western Tradition in International and 
Comparative Law (2002) 1.  
666  Section 8(5) mentions “safeguarding the interests of the learner and any other party involved in disciplinary 
proceedings.” Other than that, section 20(1) of the Schools Act states: “the governing body of a public 
school must- (a) promote the best interests of the school and strive to ensure its development through the 
provision of quality education for all learners at the school.” 
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not mentioned at all in the National Policy on Religion in Education – the primary policy 
relating to religion in schools.667  
 
The best interests of the child standard developed from the common law rule that the best 
interests of the child must prevail in family disputes over custody.668 As a result, the principle 
has been applied primarily in cases relating to child custody. However, since the 
constitutionalisation of the principle, its application has been extended to all areas of law 
which affect children, including religious and educational matters (illustrated below). In the 
case of Minister of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick and Others,669 the 
Constitutional Court stated that:  
 
“Section 28(2) requires that a child’s best interests have 
paramount importance in every matter concerning the child. The 
plain meaning of the words clearly indicates that the reach of s 
28(2) cannot be limited to the rights enumerated in s 28(1) and 
28(2) must be interpreted to extend beyond those provisions.”670 
 
This case emphasised that the application of the principle extends beyond the rights contained 
in section 28 of the Constitution.   
 
The “best interests” principle has not been given exhaustive content in either South African 
law or in international or foreign law.671 It is an indeterminate concept, meaning that it has no 
specific definition.672  According to Heaton:  
 
                                                          
667  This issue is dealt with in Chapter 7.  
668  Malherbe (n457) 267; Fletcher v Fletcher 1948 (1) SA 130(A).  
669  2000 (3) SA 422 (CC); 2000 (7) BCLR 713 (CC). 
670  Para 17; Bekink & Bekink state: “With the emphasis on ‘every matter’, one can conclude that the standard 
of the best interest of the child is not only applicable to traditional family law matters, but to all legal 
matters concerning children.” See Bekink & Bekink “Defining the standard of the best interest of the child: 
Modern South African perspectives” 2004 1 De Jure 21 22. 
671  Minister of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick CCT 08/00; 2000 3 SA 422 (CC); 2000 7 
BCLR 713 (CC) at para 18. 
672  Parker “The Best Interests of the Child – Principles and Problems” in Alston (ed) The Best Interests of the 
Child: Reconciling Culture  and Human Rights (1994) 26; Elliston writes that the meaning is unspecified 
since setting out all possible considerations would be a “Herculean task”. See Elliston (n630)10; Visser 
“Some ideas on the ‘Best interests of the Child’ Principle in the context of Public Schooling” 2007 (70) 
THRHR 459 459. See criticisms of this indeterminate nature in Schäfer (n658)159; de Waal et al states: 
“Although the Constitution has been widely applauded for pledging to uphold the paramount importance of 
the best interests of the child (s 28(2)), it is still a controversial topic, because it has not yet provided a 
reliable and determinate standard. In the absence thereof, educators need to explore all avenues opened up 
by the Constitution (and the Schools Act) to consolidate a firm foundation for accountable education.” See 
de Waal et al “An education law analysis of “the learner’s best interests” 2001 19(4) Perspectives in 
Education 151 152.  
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“it is impossible and undesirable to try to give a comprehensive 
definition of what should be understood under the concept ‘best 
interest of the child’, because the concept cannot have a  fixed 
meaning and content that are valid for all communities and all 
circumstances.”673   
 
To answer what would be in the best interests of the child: 
 
“all options must be known…all possible outcomes of each 
option must be known…the probabilities of each outcome 
occurring must be known and …the value attached to each 
outcome must be known.” 674 
 
Correspondingly, in the case of S v M,675  the Constitutional Court held that when determining 
the best interest of a child, courts must focus on each individual child and examine “the real 
life situation of the particular child involved.”676 This means that the unique circumstances of 
each individual child should be considered. To apply a fixed meaning or formula for the sake 
of certainty, regardless of the circumstances, would in fact be contrary to the best interests of 
the child concerned.677  
 
Since the best interest of the child principle is not constitutionally defined, its application is 
dependent upon judicial interpretation, meaning that what is in a child’s best interest, is 
obviously a question of fact that must be determined according to the circumstances of each 
case.678  It requires an individual, contextualised assessment of all the factors in relation to 
each child concerned.679  
 
Significantly, in the case of McCall v McCall (“McCall”),680 the court formulated a 
comprehensive list of criteria to determine which custody arrangements would best serve the 
interests of the child concerned.681 Although the factors in McCall were specific to custody 
                                                          
673          Heaton “Some general remarks on the concept ‘best interests of the child’” 1990 53 THRHR 95 98.   
674  95.   
675  [2007] ZACC 18; 2008 3 SA 232 (CC). 
676  Para 24.   
677  Para 24.  
678  Barrie “The Best Interests of the Child: Lessons from the First Decade of the New Millennium” 2011 1 
TSAR 126 126. 
679  Heaton “An individualised, contextualised and child-centred determination of the child’s best interests, and 
the implications of such an approach in the South African context” 2009 34(2) Journal for Juridical Science 
1 15. 
680  1994 3 SA 201 (C).  
681  In paras 204 1/J- 205G the court set out the criteria as follows:  
“(a) the love, affection and other emotional ties which exist between parent and child, 
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cases, the list provided guidance to courts682 as to what factors should be considered in 
determining the best interests of the child in other cases.  Subsequent to McCall, the courts 
were provided with a list of factors developed for and included in the Children’s Act,683 which 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
and the parent’s compatibility with the child; 
(b) the capabilities, character and temperament of a parent, and the impact thereof 
on the child's needs and desires; 
(c) the ability of the parent to communicate with the child and the parent’s insight 
into, understanding of and sensitivity to the child's feelings; 
(d) the capacity and disposition of the parent to give the child the guidance which he 
or she requires; 
(e) the ability of the parent to provide for the basic physical needs of the child, the so-called 
creature comforts, such as food, clothing, housing and the other material 
needs - generally speaking, the provision of economic security; 
(f) the ability of the parent to provide for the educational well-being and security of 
the child, both religious and secular; 
(g) the ability of the parent to provide for the child’s emotional, psychological, cultural 
and environmental development; 
(h) the mental and physical health and moral fitness of the parent; 
(i) the stability or otherwise of the child’s existing environment, having regard to the 
desirability of maintaining the status quo; 
(j) the desirability or otherwise of keeping siblings together; 
(k) the child’s preference, if the court is satisfied that in the particular circumstances 
the child’s preference should be taken into consideration; 
(l) the desirability or otherwise of applying the doctrine of same sex matching.” 
682  Barrie states that: “King J’s criteria have been quoted extensively in custody cases and have been accepted 
by South African courts as instructive and valuable in the application of the best interests of the child 
standard.” See Barrie (n678) 126; See Bethell v Bland 1996 2 SA 194 (W) 208F-209F; Krasin v Ogle 1997 
1 All SA 557 (W) 567f-569c; Madiehe (born Ratlehogo) v Madiehe 1997 2 All SA 153 (B) 157g-158c; Ex 
parte Critchfield 1999 3 SA 132 (W) 142E-F; Meyer v Gerber 1999 2 SA 650 (O) 655H-I; Fitschen v 
Fitschen 1997 JOL 1612 (C) par 6-7, 34-37. 
683  Section 7 states:   
              “(1) Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child standard to be applied, the 
following factors must be taken into consideration where relevant, namely- 
      (a) the nature of the personal relationship between- 
      (i) the child and the parents, or any specific parent; and 
      (ii) the child and any other care-giver or person relevant in those circumstances; 
                       (b) the attitude of the parents, or any specific parent, towards- 
                             (i) the child; and 
                             (ii) the exercise of parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child; 
   (c) the capacity of the parents, or any specific parent, or of any other care-giver or person, to provide 
for the needs of the child, including emotional and intellectual needs; 
(d) the likely effect on the child of any change in the child’s circumstances, including the likely effect 
on  the child of any separation from- 
                            (i) both or either of the parents; or 40 
     (ii) any brother or sister or other child, or any other care-giver or person, with whom  the child has 
been living; 
(e) the practical difficulty and expense of a child having contact with the parents, or any specific 
parent, and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child’s right to maintain 
personal relations and direct contact with the parents, or any specific parent, on a regular basis; the 
need for the child- 
                            (i) to remain in the care of his or her parent, family and extended family; and 
                            (ii)to maintain a connection with his or her family, extended family, culture or tradition;  
                      (g) the child’s- 
                            (i) age, maturity and stage of development; 
                            (ii) gender; 
                            (iii) background; and 
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can be considered in determining the best interests of the child. This includes factors such as: 
taking into account the child’s “physical and emotional security and his or her intellectual, 
emotional, social and cultural development”684 and the “need to protect the child from any 
physical or psychological harm” that may be caused by exposing the child to maltreatment, 
abuse or degradation.685  It is evident that the application of section 7 is wider than the list 
provided in McCall. It is not limited to parents but applies equally to a care-giver or other 
relevant person in the child’s life - which could include teachers/school staff. The inclusion of 
section 7 in the Children’s Act is commendable in that it may assist in achieving consistency 
in the way in which the best interest of the child standard is applied.686 However, its impact 
on judicial decision-making, remains to be seen.687  
 
Although section 7 does not expressly suggest it,688 it can be argued that courts must consider 
all factors including, but not limited to those mentioned in section 7, when determining what 
is in the best interest of a child.689 These sentiments were expressed by Sachs J in S v M 690 
where he referred to a list of factors enumerated in section 7 of the Children’s Act and stated 
that:  
 
“[s]uch factors include, but are not limited to, the nature of the 
personal relationship between the child and the parents; the 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
     (h) the child’s physical and emotional security and his or her intellectual, emotional, social and    
cultural  development; 
                    (i)  any disability that a child may have; 
   (j)  any chronic illness from which a child may suffer; 
     (k) the need for a child to be brought up within a stable family environment and, where this is not 
possible, in an environment resembling as closely as possible a caring family environment; the need 
to protect the child from any physical or psychological harm that may be caused by- 
                              (i) subjecting the child to maltreatment, abuse, neglect, exploitation or degradation or exposing the 
child  to violence or exploitation or other harmful behaviour; or 
                           (ii) exposing the child to maltreatment, abuse, degradation, ill-treatment, 
                    (m) any family violence involving the child or a family member of the child; and 
                    (n) which action or decision would avoid or minimise further legal or 
(2) In this section “parent” includes any person who has parental responsibilities and rights in respect of a  
child.” 
684          Section 7(1)(h).  
685  Section 7(1)k); Similar ‘best interests’ checklists were introduced in other jurisdictions, such as section 1(3) 
of the English Children’s Act 1989 (UK).  
686  Songca “Evaluation of children’s rights in South African law: the dawn of an emerging approach to 
children’s rights?” 2011 XLIV CILSA 340 348.  
687  In Blumenow v Blumenow Unreported 2007/5408 (2007, W), Ngobeni v Ngobeni Unreported 39972/05 
(2008, T) and R v R Unreported 1452/2008 (2009, GNP), the court relied on the checklist set out in McCall 
v Mccall and ignored the more comprehensive list in section 7 of the Children’s Act. See Schäfer (n658) 
159.  
688  Heaton notes that a major criticism of section 7 is the fact that the list of factors is a closed list- however; it 
is unlikely that the provision will be interpreted that way.  See Heaton (n679) 4. 
689  Songca (n686) 348.  
690  Mentioned above. 
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child’s physical and emotional security; the need for a child to be 
brought up within a stable family; and the relevant characteristics 
of the child.”691  
 
As for the meaning of the phrase “paramount importance” with reference to the best interests 
of the child, South African jurisprudence reflects that this phrase does not mean that 
children’s interests are absolute692 or automatically supersede the rights of others in 
circumstances where a conflict of rights arises. According to Skelton:  
 
“[d]espite the emphatic words of “paramount importance”, 
[section 28(2)] does not serve as a trump to automatically 
override other rights, and as a right in a non-hierarchical system 
of rights, is itself capable of being limited.”693   
 
Correspondingly, in S v M, the court confirmed that although the word “paramount” is 
emphatic, it cannot be understood to mean that the interests of children must in all 
circumstances override all other considerations.694 In other words, the term “paramount” does 
not mean that all other constitutional rights may simply be disregarded, or that the best 
interests of the child may not be limited.695 This means, for example, if a child wishes to 
assert their individual religious freedom at school, a balance would need to be struck between 
the interests of the child; the interests of other learners and the interests of the state and 
school. In the case of very young children, the interests of the parents may also be a factor. It 
must be borne in mind that the educational objectives of the school, as the place where 
                                                          
691  Para 12 fn10.  
692  De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions (WLD) 2003 12 BCLR 1333 (CC) at para 55; Davel “In the 
best interests of the child: Conceptualisation and guidelines in the context of education” 2007 
Commonwealth Education Partnerships 222 223; Bonthuys “The best interests of children in the South 
African Constitution” April 2006 20(1) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 22 34.   
693  Skelton “Constitutional Protection of Children’s Rights” in Boezaart (ed) Child Law in South Africa (2009) 
280. Quoted in Couzens (n643) 406. 
694  Para 249 B–C; In Centre for Child Law v Minister of Constitutional Development CCT 98/08 [2009] ZACC 
18, para 29, Cameron J interprets the provision that the “child’s best interests are of paramount importance” 
to mean that the child’s interests are “more important than anything else.” However, Cameron J notes that a 
wide spectrum of factors is relevant in determining the best interests of the child. 
695  Minister of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick and Others 2000 (3) SA 422 (CC), 2000 (7) 
BCLR 713 (CC): para 20; Sonderup v Tondelli and Another 2001 (1) SA 1171 (CC) (also reported as LS v 
AT and Another 2001 (2) BCLR 152 (CC): para 29; S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2008 
(3) SA 232 (CC), 2007 (2) SACR 539 (CC) (also reported as M v S 2007 (12) BCLR 1312 (CC)): paras 25, 
26, 42. See also the obiter statement in De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local 
Division) and Others 2004 (1) SA 406 (CC), 2003 (2) SACR 445 (CC), 2003 (12) BCLR 1333 (CC): para 
55; See Discussion in Heaton (n679) 4.   
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children realise their right to a basic education, cannot be completely undermined in favour of 
other rights.696  
  
3.2  INTERPRETATION OF THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD IN CASE 
LAW  
 
Since the adoption of the Constitution, there have only been a few cases in which the “best 
interests of the child” principle has been applied in the context of education. These cases are 
briefly discussed below.  
 
In Laerskool Middelburg en ‘n ander v Departmentshoof: Mpumalanga Department van 
Onderwys en andere (“Laerskool Middelburg”),697 the applicant, an exclusively Afrikaans-
medium school, sought to set aside a decision to declare the school a dual-medium institution 
and in turn, admit learners who required to be taught in English. The court emphasised that 
the capacity of other schools which utilised the desired medium of instruction (English) had to 
be considered before the status of a single-medium school could be altered. However, the 
court found that the parents had selected this particular school because it had an excellent 
reputation. Therefore, on the basis of the best interest of the child principle, the court ordered 
that the learners be allowed to remain in the school and that they be taught in English.698 The 
court in Laerskool Middelburg found that the best interests of the child outweighed the rights 
of the school to maintain is language medium in this case.  
 
In the case of Western Cape Minister of Education and others v Governing Body of Mikro 
Primary School and another (“Mikro”),699 the Department of Education attempted to persuade 
the school to change its language policy from a single-medium (Afrikaans) school into a 
parallel medium school, where English learners could receive instruction in English. The 
school refused to do so, but eventually received a directive from the Head of the Provincial 
Education Department, instructing the school principal to admit certain learners, and to have 
them be taught in English.  The Supreme Court of Appeal ordered the removal of learners 
from Mikro Primary and the placement of the learners at another suitable school, taking into 
                                                          
696  The school’s duty to limit religious freedom is discussed in Chapter 6.  
697   (2002) 4 All SA 745 (T); See discussion in Arendse “The Obligation to Provide Free Basic Education in 
South Africa: an International Law Perspective” 2011 14(6) PER 97 108.  
698          At 754-756.  
699   (2005) 3 All SA 436 (SCA). 
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account the best interests of the children.700 The divergent outcomes of Laerskool Middelburg 
and Mikro illustrates that the best course of action to take in order to serve the best interests of 
the child is different in each case.  
 
More recently, the Constitutional Court delivered a landmark judgment pertaining to 
children’s rights in the context of education, in the case of MEC for Education in Gauteng 
Province v Governing Body of Rivonia Primary School (“Rivonia”).701 In this case, the Head 
of the Gauteng Department of Education (HoD) instructed the school principal to enroll a 
Grade 1 learner in the school, after the learner had been told by the school that the school was 
already full.  The SGB and the school argued that the HoD’s instruction was unlawful in that 
it violated the SGB’s right to determine the school’s admissions policy.702  In the High Court 
it was held that SGBs do not have the unqualified power to determine admission policies or 
the maximum capacity at state schools.703 The final say rests with the provincial education 
department.704 This serves as a safeguard for the HoD to address any systemic imbalances in 
the admission process in Gauteng schools, thereby ensuring that provision is made for 
unplaced learners in the schools that are best placed to admit them.705  
 
The school contended that it had utilised private funding to ensure that its learner-to-class 
ratio was kept low in order to guarantee a certain quality of education for its learners. In this 
regard, the High Court held that the Constitution does not allow for the interests of a few 
learners to supersede the right of all other learners in the area to receive a basic education.706 
                                                          
700          Para 48.  
701  CCT 135-12 (“Rivonia”). 
702   As per section 5(5) of the Schools Act. A key issue was the school is predominantly a white school with the 
lowest number of students per class in the area. See Sapa “School loses admission case” 7 December 2011 
at http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/school-loses-admission-case-1.1194250 (Date accessed: 1 March 
2012); Guy “Joburg school loses admission case” 7 December 2011 at 
http://www.citizen.co.za/citizen/content/en/citizen/localnews?oid=245072&sn=Detail&pid=146842&Jobur
g-school-loses-admission-case (Date accessed: 1 March 2012).  
703  Governing Body of Rivonia Primary School v MEC for Education: Gauteng Province Case 11/08340 at para 
78.  
704   Para 80. In 2010, the HOD distributed the Circular (Circular 21 was issued in terms  of  section  5(7)  of  the  
Act  and  Regulation  2(1)  of  the  Admission Regulations  promulgated  by  General  Notice  No.  4138 of 
2001 under the Gauteng School Education Act No. 6 of 1995) regulating the admissions to public schools in 
Gauteng, Regulation  13(1)(a) of which provides  that  if  a principal refuses  to  admit  a  learner  to  a  
school,  he  or  she must provide  reasons  in writing  for his or her decision  to  the HoD and  the parent and  
the  HOD  must  either  confirm  or  set  aside  the  decision  made  by  the principal before there  is  a  need  
for  the  MEC  to  consider  an  appeal  against  a  refusal  of admission (para 49).  
705   Para 49.  
706   Para 72. The High Court stated that: “although  all  schools  are  now  open  to all  races,  the effects of  
apartheid’s  racially  exclusive  zoning and forced  removals still meant that  the  majority  of  formerly  
white  schools  remain  disproportionately white, while the majority of black schools are still predominantly 
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Furthermore, it is government’s responsibility to intervene and ensure an equitable 
distribution of learners across all schools.707 The High Court therefore made a decision based 
on the best interests of all learners.708 This decision was, however, overturned on by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal - with less emphasis on the best interest of the child principle.709  
 
Significantly, the Constitutional Court found that the Supreme Court of Appeal had “erred in 
finding that the Gauteng HoD could only exercise ... power ‘in accordance with the [school’s 
admission] policy.’”710 The court held that although the SGB may determine capacity as part 
of its admissions policy, “the scheme of the Schools Act in relation to admissions indicates 
that the Department maintains ultimate control over the implementation of admission 
decisions.”711  
 
In its judgment, the Constitutional Court placed significant emphasis on the best interests of 
the child principle. It emphasised that the duty on the state and SGB’s “to cooperate and 
attempt to reach an amicable solution is intimately connected to the best interests of the 
child.”712 In this regard, the court stated:  
 
“The question we face as a society is not whether, but how, to 
address this problem of uneven access to education. There are 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
black. Moreover, traditionally “white” schools have systemically lower learner-to-class ratios than “black 
schools.” (paras 70-71). See also City Council of Pretoria  v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363; 1998  (3) BCLR 257 
(CC) at para 32 in which the  court stated that: “The  effect  of  apartheid  laws  was  that  race  and  
geography  were inextricably linked.”     
707  Para 74; Section 7 (2) of the Constitution; See Bato  Star  Fishing  (Pty)  Ltd  v  Minister  of Environment 
Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004  (4) SA 490  (CC) at para 74: “In  this  fundamental  way,  our  
Constitution  differs  from  other constitutions which  assume  that  all  are  equal  and  in  so  doing  simply 
entrench  existing  inequalities. Our  Constitution  recognises  that decades  of  systematic  racial  
discrimination  entrenched  by  the apartheid legal order cannot be eliminated without positive action being 
taken to achieve that result. We are required to do more than that. The  effects  of  discrimination  may  
continue  indefinitely  unless  there  is  a commitment to end it.” 
708  See also Bannatyne v Bannatyne and Another 2003 (2) SA 363 (CC); 2003 (2) BCLR 111, in which the 
court stated that the best interest of the child should override in the enforcement of a maintenance order.  
709  Governing Body of the Rivonia Primary School and Another v MEC for Education: Gauteng Province and 
Others Case (161/12) [2012] ZASCA 194; 2013 (1) SA 632 (SCA); [2013] 1 All SA 633 (SCA) (30 
November 2012). The SCA held that in terms of s 5(5) read with s 5A of the South African Schools Act 84 
of 1996, the SGB of a public school has authority to determine its admission policy, including the capacity 
of the school (para 37). The SGB must apply that policy rationally and reasonably (para 40). Although the 
court briefly mentioned the importance of a school upholding the best interests of the child principle, it held 
that that there was no indication that the school has set its capacity unreasonably or irrationally (para 7).   
710  Rivonia at para 57; John “Rivonia primary admission case: Education dept has final say” at 
http://mg.co.za/article/2013-10-03-concourt-rules-in-favour-of-department-in-rivonia-primary-admissions-
case (Date accessed: 4 October 2013). 
711  Para 52; Phakathi “Province has final say on school admissions, says Constitutional Court” at 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/education/2013/10/03/province-has-final-say-on-school-admissions-says-
constitutional-court (Date accessed: 4 October 2013).  
712  Para 77. 
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various stakeholders, a diversity of interests and competing visions. 
Tensions are inevitable. But disagreement is not a bad thing. It is 
how we manage those competing interests and the spectrum of views 
that is pivotal to developing a way forward. The Constitution 
provides us with a reference point ‒ the best interests of our children. 
The trouble begins when we lose sight of that reference point. When 
we become more absorbed in staking out the power to have the final 
say, rather than in fostering partnerships to meet the educational 
needs of children.”713  
 
This decision will have significant impact on the education of thousands of South African 
learners. 
 
Lastly, in the case of Freedom Stationery (Pty) Ltd v The Member of the Executive Council 
for Education, Eastern Cape (“Freedom Stationery”),714 the Centre for Child Law was 
admitted as amicus curiae to represent the rights of children affected by an irregular tender 
process which involved the supply of textbooks to Eastern Cape schools. The court 
considered children’s rights, including children’s education rights in deciding whether or not 
to grant an interim interdict in favour of the applicants. Couzens comments that this case is a 
clear indication that children’s constitutional rights may shape the rights and duties of the 
state and the bidders in the tender process.715  
 
The amicus argued that the interests of the learners had to be considered in balancing the 
rights of the parties in the case and furthermore, that the best interests of the children 
involved, should be the paramount concern.716 This argument entailed that right to education 
(as a children’s right) should outweigh the rights of the applicant to just administrative action. 
The court rejected this argument,717 but nevertheless, acknowledged the importance of 
protecting the rights of children by holding the state accountable for their provision of 
services to schools.  Unfortunately, the court did not address the application of the best 
interests of the child principle in this case, despite it being relied upon. Had it done so, the 
jurisprudence on the principle may have been enriched.718  
 
                                                          
713  Para 2. 
714  Case No: 59/2011; [2011] ZAECELLC 1 (16 March 2011); 2011 JOL 26927 (E) (“Freedom Stationary”).  
715  Couzens (n643) 392. 
716   Freedom Stationary at para 31.  
717  Para 33.  
718  Couzens (n643) 400. 
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From the above, it is clear that the best interest of the child principle is indeterminate and its 
application is not without complications. Despite this, it is a principle that aims to protect the 
interests of children both collectively and individually and promote a child-centred approach 
in all cases involving children. In general, it creates “a framework for addressing the entire 
range of major issues affecting children”719 and may therefore be useful as a safe-guard on the 
official action taken against children in the school environment.720  
 
3.3 THE SCHOOL’S INTERESTS VERSUS THE CHILD’S INTERESTS  
 
As alluded to above, there are circumstances in which the best interests of the school may 
come into conflict with the best interests of the children within the school.721 Section 20(1)(a) 
of the Schools Act states: “the governing body of a public school must promote the best 
interests of the school.” Furthermore, in the case of Head of Department of Education: 
Mpumalanga v Hoerskool Ermelo (“Hoerskool Ermelo”),722 the Constitutional Court had to 
consider the best interests of the learners in a school setting. The court directed the SGB to 
reconsider the school language policy with due regard not only for the best interests of its 
learners and of the school but also the interests of the community in which the school is 
located.723  
 
Undoubtedly, there may be a paradox in trying to protect a learner’s interests and the 
school’s/community’s interests at the same time. This raises a concern over what measures a 
school is expected to take when an individual child’s interests conflict with their 
school/community interests in cases involving a learner’s assertion of their religious freedom 
at school. For instance, a learner child, in asserting their individual freedom of religion, may 
deliberately disobey a school’s code of conduct which has been drawn up by the SGB (as the 
                                                          
719  B v M 2006 (9) BCLR 1034 (W) at para 41.  
720  Malherbe (n457) 285; It has been suggested that “the inclusion of a general standard (‘the best interests of 
the child’) for the protection of children’s rights can become a benchmark for review of all proceedings in 
which decisions are taken regarding children. And even if, as sceptics might aver, the best interest criteria is 
simply an opportunity to pay lip service to the interests of children, it still provides a minimum guarantee 
that the interests of children cannot be ignored.” See Sloth-Nielsen “The contribution of children’s rights to 
the reconstruction of society: Some implications of the constitutionalisation of children’s rights in South 
Africa” 1996 4 International Journal on Children’s Rights 323- 342. 
721  Section 20(1) of the Schools Act is discussed in Chapter 5; Section 15 of the Constitution and reasonable 
accommodation are discussed in Chapter 6.   
722  CCT 40/09; (2009) ZACC 32; 2010 (2) SA 415 (CC); 2010 (3) BCLR 177 (CC). 
723   Para 99.  
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elected representatives of the school communities) in consultation with parents; educators and 
learners in the best interests of the school.724  
 
In the case of Pillay, the Constitutional Court found that reasonable accommodation of the 
individual learner’s religious practice (the wearing of a nose stud) was the correct approach in 
that particular case.725 Both the courts in Pillay and Antonie v Governing Body, Settlers High 
School (“Antonie”),726 ruled in favour of the learners’ individual rights and did not support 
school decisions to enforce its code of conduct, which indirectly discriminated against 
them.727 However, accommodation may not be the best approach in other cases. For example, 
it is still permissible in terms of section 20(1) of the Schools Act for a school to have policies 
in place which set rules for all learners from the majority religious perspective if that is in the 
best interests of a particular school (which may include a religious ethos).728 For example, a 
public school with a significant Christian majority can have a Christian religious ethos. This 
is permitted in order to acknowledge the religious majority and is not considered to be unfair.  
 
The following fictional scenario illustrates the point: In a predominantly Christian, South 
African public school, a Muslim female learner, insists on wearing a full burka to school in 
assertion her individual religious/cultural rights. The school has a Christian ethos to cater to 
its religious composition. The school’s code of conduct has been drawn up by the SGB (as the 
elected representatives of the school communities) in consultation with parents, educators and 
learners, in what they believed were the best interests of that particular school/community.729 
The wearing of a burka is found to be in contravention of the school’s code of conduct. The 
decision is based on the fact that the wearing of full religious garb completely undermines the 
need for a school uniform; it makes pupils difficult to identify (which is a security issue) and 
is regarded as an act of proselytism730 by the majority of the school and therefore 
“threatening” to their freedom of religion. The school had in the past made exceptions for a 
                                                          
724  In terms of section 8(1) of the Schools Act; Joubert “Education, law and leadership that promotes the best 
interests of students in South Africa” 2009 14(2) International Journal of Law & Education 10. 
725  Para 79.  
726        2002 (4) SA 738 (C) (“Antonie”). In this case, the Cape High Court adjudicated upon the issue of a learner 
wearing Rastafarian dreadlocks and a cap (that matched the prescribed school colours) to school, allegedly 
in contravention of the school’s Code of Conduct. The court ruled in favour of the learners religious 
freedom. The Code depicted a number of forbidden hair styles, but did not say anything about dreadlocks 
and yet the SGB expelled the learner after finding her guilty of serious misconduct. 
727  Para 15.  
728  See also section 15(2) of the Constitution discussed in Chapter 6.  
729  Joubert (n724)10. 
730  Meaning an attempt to “to induce someone to convert to one’s faith”. See definition at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/proselytize (Date accessed: 9 December 2012). 
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simple scarf to be worn over the head by Muslim learners, along with the school uniform. 
This was considered to be reasonable accommodation of the religious practice by the school. 
However, in this case, the learner’s application for an exemption from the code of conduct is 
denied on the basis that permitting a full burka would undermine the legitimate purpose of a 
school uniform and would take accommodation too far when considering the best interests of 
the school and community.  
 
Importantly, the case of Pillay, the Constitutional Court case which dealt with 
accommodation of religious and cultural dress, did not abolish school uniforms and did permit 
schools to prohibit religious and cultural practices which place an unreasonable burden on the 
school. In the above scenario the school’s/community’s interests and the individual learner’s 
interests, conflict. In this case, the conflict would be in order. The school would be correct in 
prohibiting the wearing of the full burka as it takes reasonable accommodation too far within 
that particular school (with a significant Christian majority).731 On the other hand, if the 
school prohibited all head coverings with no exceptions, this may be considered to be 
unreasonable.732 The degree of accommodation expected for a child’s individual rights 
depends on the nature of the religious practice and the nature of the environment concerned.  
 
The above scenario indicates that there may be circumstances in which upholding a child’s 
individual rights would undermine the order of the educational process of a school or 
undermine the rights of other learners. In this case the rights of the child may have to be 
limited. For example, a school may wish to do random drug searches in order to protect the 
safety of all learners.733 This would be considered a justifiable limitation of the child’s right to 
privacy in terms of the Regulations for Safety Measures at Public Schools (“the 
Regulations”).734  
                                                          
731  R (on the application of Begum) v Head Teacher and Governors of Denbigh High School (“Begum”) House 
of Lords [2006] UKHL 15, 2 All ER 487.  
732  Lenta states: “the school uniform is an apparently neutral institutional practice that is not directed at any 
religious group, but nevertheless has a disproportionately burdensome impact on Muslim women….To the 
extent that such individuals are deprived of schooling because their beliefs bring them into conflict with the 
uniform regulations, this would seem to constitute a denial of an equal educational opportunity. The 
accommodation [of headscarves] is reasonable and should be granted and exclusion of Muslim pupils is an 
unfair denial of an educational opportunity.” See Lenta “Muslim headscarves in the workplace and in 
schools” 2007 124(2) SALJ 296 312-313. 
733  Malherbe (n457) 269; See discussion in Terblanche & Davel “Safety measures and the rights of learners” 
2004 1 De Jure 85.  
734  GN 1040 GG 22754 of 12 October 2001. Notice in terms of section 61 of the South African Schools Act 84 
of 1996. In terms of section 4(1), schools are drug free zones. Section 4(3) allows schools to conduct drug 
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A similar clash of rights could arise from the practice of dangerous religious observances in 
the school environment. For example, a child may wish to perform animal sacrifice735 or carry 
a dangerous object such as a ceremonial knife to school for religious reasons (as was the case 
in Multani v. Commission Scolaire Marguerite_Bourgeoys and Attorney General of 
Quebec).736 If, for example, a South African, Zulu, learner applies for a religious and/or 
cultural exemption to carry a traditional weapon (such as a spear) to school, the individual 
rights of that learner would have to be weighed up against the school’s duty to protect the 
physical safety of all learners in the school. The Regulations proclaim all schools to be 
“dangerous object free zones” in the interests of protecting the safety of all learners.737 If 
religious practices such as these undermine the objectives of the Regulations, permitting them 
would take accommodation too far. Contrary to the Multani judgement mentioned above, in 
the South African context, it is submitted that objectively harmful religious practices that 
compromise the safety of the learners should not be permitted in schools.738 This is in 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
searches without a warrant.  This is also a limitation on the right to privacy as contained in section 14 of the 
Constitution.  
735   In the case of Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc v City of Hialeah 508 US 520 (1993), the US Supreme 
Court invalidated municipal laws which prohibited animal sacrifice practised by the Santeria religion. Since 
these were not neutral laws of general applicability, but deliberately targeted one religious group, the 
Supreme Court determined that they were invalid unless they served a compelling state interest. It is 
submitted that in the school context, such a practice may be considered to be too dangerous.  
736  The case of Multani v. Commission Scolaire Marguerite_Bourgeoys and Attorney General of Quebec, 
(“Multani”) 2006 SCC 6, involved a Sikh boy’s right to wear a kirpan (or ceremonial knife) to school. The 
court ruled that the schools absolute prohibition against wearing a kirpan infringes on the learners freedom 
of religion and such an infringement is not justifiable (para 15).This decision shows that the Canadian 
courts are attempting to reduce the unnecessary hardship endured by minorities by placing a duty on the 
school to make reasonable accommodation for minorities. Similarly to the judgement in Pillay, the court 
stated that a total prohibition devalues religious symbols and sends a message to students that certain 
religions are less important than others (at para 50). The school needed to protect freedom of religion by 
showing respect to minorities and therefore needed to explore a reasonable compromise. 
737  Section 4(1); Section 1(c) defines dangerous object as “any article, object or instrument which may be 
employed to cause bodily harm to a person.” 
738  Thomas mentions a case in which the controversy was resolved by allowing a child to carry a smaller 
version of kirpin that was “securely fastened into a cloth pouch” to be warn under the clothing, so as not to 
be visible. However, this solution distressed other parents, one who commented: “As a parent, is the life and 
safety of a child more important than religious freedom? I think so.” See Thomas (n51) 207-208; In the case 
of S v RB; S v DK 2010 (1) SACR 447 (NCK), the court concluded that the best interests of a child may be 
limited to protect the safety of other children; Lenta comments as follows: “Thus, while the refusal to permit 
the Sikh schoolboy to carry a kirpan represents a denial of an educational opportunity and an abridgement 
of his freedom of religion, the school has a clear interest in enforcing a ‘zero tolerance’ policy that rules out 
some students carrying dangerous weapons.” See See Lenta (n732) 316;  In a recent case in European Court 
of Human Rights, a claimant, Mrs Chaplin was switched to a desk job after she refused to take off a crucifix 
which hung round her neck. The claim was rejected on the grounds that the removal of the necklace was 
necessary to protect the health and safety of nurses and patients. See Grierson “European Court of Human 
Rights rejects Christians’ cases that their religious rights were violated by employers” at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/european-court-of-human-rights-rejects-christians-
cases-that-their-religious-rights-were-violated-by-employers 8634687 .html (Date accessed: 1 June 2013).  
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accordance with the Regulations, section 24 of the Constitution and the schools duty of care 
in terms of section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution.  
 
From the above, it is clear that in the case of conflicting interests, the courts will have to strike 
a balance between the interests of the school/community and interest of the learners in each 
particular case. The courts will have to consider the nature of the right that the child wishes to 
assert, its impact on the particular school environment and its impact on the rights of other 
learners within the environment.  
 
3.4  THE “VOICE” OF THE CHILD 
 
This section focusses on the importance of the “voice” of the child as an aspect of the best 
interests of the child. Based on this discussion, Chapter 7 illustrates the practical importance 
of children being allowed to express their own views in relation to matters such as the 
sincerity of their beliefs when applying for religious/cultural exemption in schools.  
 
Importantly, section 7(g) of the Children’s Act includes the child’s maturity and 
developmental stage as a factor in determining the best interests of the child.  In addition, 
section 10 of the Children’s Act provides every child “of such an age, maturity and stage of 
development” with a separate, self-standing right to participate in any proceedings regarding 
that child.739 In this regard, the Children’s Act recognises that children are human beings and 
individuals and as such have a right to express their views in matters that affect them.740 This 
would include having regard for the views of the child on matters pertaining to religion in 
schools or the contents of a school’s code of conduct. As Alderson states: 
 
                                                          
739  See Centre for Child Law “The Best Interest of the Child” at http://www.roylaw.co.za/home/article/the-
best-interest-of-the-child/pageid/children (Date accessed: 1 October 2012); Jamieson states that in 
accordance with international and regional law, the South African Constitution and South African 
legislation: “Children are entitled to participate in decisions and dialogues that affect them as individuals, 
and as a group…This includes everything from dialogue with professionals about children’s own care, 
treatment or education, to discussions about policy development and budget allocation.” See Jamieson 
“Children’s rights to participate in social dialogue” 2010/ 2011 South African Child Gauge 22 22.  
740  Songca (n686) 344; van Vollenhoven et al “Freedom of expression and the survival of democracy: has the 
death knell sounded for democracy in South African Schools?” 2006 40 Journal of Education 120 120; The 
precursor to the inclusion of section 10 in the Children’s Act, was Van Reenen J’s views expressed in 
Fitschen v Fitschen 1997 JOL 1612 (C). Van Reenen J recognised that in addition to the factors listed in the 
McCall, South African courts would in the future be compelled to give more weight to the recognition of 
the views of the children who are old enough to form informed opinions.  
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 “To consult children, respects them, and thereby sets examples 
which help them respect themselves and other people, as part 
of the duty of care which adults and children have towards 
others….Adults can give more effective care when they use 
information from children.”741 
 
As mentioned above, in McCall v McCall,742 the courts criteria for upholding the best 
interests of the child include “the child’s preference, if the court is satisfied that in the 
particular circumstances the child’s preference should be taken into consideration.”743 One 
way of implementing the best interests of the child principle is by reference to what the child 
would choose for him or herself in a specified hypothetical situation.744 Schäfer, however, 
asserts that a decision-maker cannot merely defer to the child’s wishes. The best interests of 
the child may require something other than what the child wants. However, section 10 of the 
Children’s Act ensures that a decision-maker cannot disregard the child’s wishes or presume 
to know what they are: the child’s views must be “ascertained” and “considered” as part of 
the assessment of what is in the best interests of the child.745  
 
In addition, section 31(1) of the Children’s Act mentions giving “due consideration to any 
views and wishes expressed by the child, bearing in mind the child’s age, maturity and stage 
of development” in certain matters affecting children. This principle is also articulated in 
Article 12 of the CRC and Article 4(2) ACRWC, as discussed in Chapter 3. In fact, child 
participation under the CRC is considered to be one of the four pillars of the CRC and is 
regarded as giving the CRC its “soul”.746  
 
Importantly, case law indicates that South African courts are inclined to take into account the 
maturity rather than the age of the child when determining the weight that should be given to 
the views of the child.747 For example, in the case of Meyer v Gerber,748 the court found that 
the 15 year old boy in question was emotionally and intellectually mature enough to make an 
                                                          
741  Alderson (n631) 141.    
742          1994 3 SA 201 (C).  
743  Paras 204 1/J- 205G.  
744  Archard Children, Family and the State (2003) 43.  
745  Schäfer (n658) 166; Jamieson writes: “In short, everyone who works with children has a responsibility to 
respect children’s right to participate, and anyone – including parents – making decisions or taking actions 
that affect children has a duty to listen to their views and consider these seriously.” See Jamieson (n739) 29.  
746  Sloth-Nielsen (n367) 401. 
747  See Märtens v Märtens 1991 4 SA 287 (T); McCall v McCall; Greenshields v Wyllie 1989 (4) SA 898 (W), 
Mathews v Mathews 1983 (4) SA 136 (SE), Germani v Herf 1975 (4) SA 887 (A). 
748  1999 3 SA 550 (O).  
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intelligent decision and that due weight should be given to his opinion. In De Groot v De 
Groot,749 the court was unwilling to give considerable weight to the views of young teenagers 
on the basis that they were immaturely formed.750  
  
In the case of Pillay, the school751 contended that since the learner did not testify on her own 
behalf it was impossible to determine if discrimination had in fact occurred and, even if it was 
found that there was discrimination, such discrimination could not be said to be unfair.752 The 
court held that:  
 
“It is always desirable, and may sometimes be vital, to hear from the 
person whose religion or culture is at issue. That is often no less true 
when the belief in question is that of a child. Legal matters involving 
children often exclude the children and the matter is left to adults to 
argue and decide on their behalf.”753 
 
This case indicated that the expression of the child’s own viewpoint, although not decisive, 
was indeed desirable. However, the court found that the failure of the learner to testify was 
not fatal to her case, since the truthfulness of her parent’s testimony was not in question in 
this case.754  
 
Furthermore, in Christian Education, a separate, but important issue raised by Sachs J at the 
end of the judgment, was the absence of the “voice” of the learners concerned.755 He stated 
that:  
“actual experiences and opinions would not necessarily have been 
decisive, but they would have enriched the dialogue, and the factual 
experiential foundations for the balancing exercise in this difficult 
matter would have been more secure.”756 
 
According to Sachs J, the learners concerned were placed in a position of conflict. On the one 
hand, they themselves may be adherents to the faith and participants within their religious 
communities and therefore wished to enjoy religious freedom in that regard (with corporal 
punishment being a part of that). On the other hand, they are the recipients of corporal 
                                                          
749   Unreported 3690/09 (2010, ECP).  
750  Para 15. 
751  Referring to Durban Girls High School.  
752  Pillay at para 55.  
753  Para 56.  
754  Para 57.  
755   Christian Education at para 53. 
756   Para 53.  
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punishment, which may be humiliating to them when administered in an institutional setting, 
and therefore they may want protection from corporal punishment in terms sections 10, 12 
and 28 of the Constitution.757 He found it unfortunate that a curator ad litem had not been 
appointed to represent the interests of children in this case.758   
 
Importantly, section 28 of the Constitution ensures that children have the right to legal 
representation in civil proceedings affecting them, “if substantial injustice” would otherwise 
result.759 In this regard, the Children’s Act provides children with the right to access to court, 
which entails the right to bring and be assisted in bringing matters to court in order to enforce 
their rights.760 This allows for the child’s voice to be expressed through a legal representative. 
This was illustrated in the case of Rosen v Havenga,761 wherein the High Court raised the 
question as to whether a child whose parents were divorcing should not be afforded separate 
legal representation.  In this regard, the court referred directly to Article 12 of the CRC, which 
provides for giving due weight to the views of a child in accordance with the age and maturity 
of the child.762 As a result, a legal representative was appointed. This case exemplifies that the 
child’s voice and interests are directly protected in legal proceedings related to a child.763  
Also, in Soller NO v G and Another,764 the court found that where a substantial injustice 
would otherwise result, a child may be given a voice and “such voice is exercised through the 
legal practitioner”765 The judge also relayed that in the course of advocating the client’s 
                                                          
757  Para 15.  
758  See discussion in du Plessis “Religious Freedom and Equality as celebration of difference: a significant 
development in recent South African Constitutional case-law” 2009 12(4) PER 10 29; See Sloth-Nielsen & 
Mezmur “Exploring the domestication of the CRC in South African jurisprudence” (2002-2006). du Plessis 
states that “this judicial afterthought [by Sachs J] modestly challenged a deep-seated belief (and prejudice), 
namely that (even) in weighty matters concerning their upbringing and education, children should be seen 
and not heard.” See du Plessis “Affirmation and celebration of the ‘religious Other’ in South Africa’s 
constitutional jurisprudence on religious and related rights: Memorial constitutionalism in action?” 2008 (8) 
African Human Rights Law Journal 376 406.  
759  Section 28(1)(h); Discussed in Sloth- Nielsen (n759) 495.  
760  Section 14; See section 34 of the Constitution: Access to Courts.     
761   2006 4 All SA 199 (C). 
762  The CRC Committee has observed that national age limits for hearing children is not in accordance with the 
CRC, when they exclude children below a certain age from the formal right to be heard. The right cannot be 
dependent on age alone. See discussion in Kronborg & Svendsen “Children’s Right to be Heard: the 
Interplay between Human Rights and National Law” in Lodrup & Modvar (eds) Family Life and Human 
Rights (2002) 411.  
763  Skelton “A special assignment: interpreting the right to legal representation in terms of section 28(1)(h) of 
the Constitution of South Africa”, Paper presented at the Miller Du Toit/University of the Western Cape 
Family Law Conference, Cape Town (1-2 April 2004). 
764  2003 (5) SA 430 (WLD). 
765   Paras 437J – 438A. 
 
 
123 
views, the legal representative should provide “adult insight into those wishes” and “apply 
legal knowledge and expertise to the child’s perspective.”766  
 
In other cases, the courts have mentioned the principal method  in which children’s interests 
can be represented outside of direct legal representation, namely through the appointment of 
curators ad litem. For example, in Centre for Child Law and Another v Minister of Home 
Affairs and others,767 an advocate appointed by the court to represent unaccompanied migrant 
children, investigated the children’s situation, reported on the admission of children to the 
repatriation centre768 and applied for the appointment of legal representatives for the children 
to “present and argue the wishes and desires of the child.”769 
 
Some authors suggest that it would be an infringement of children’s rights to view the child as 
having no iudicium (judgement) and therefore withholding their right to freedom of 
expression.770 It is submitted that learners should be seen as human beings with dignity, and 
therefore their opinions should be considered in matters that concern them.771 For example, 
learners’ opinions on matters such as the code of conduct, including rules on religious and 
cultural dress and other forms of expression, could be useful to schools. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, the CRC Committee is in favour of involving children in the decision making in 
cases relating to religious/cultural dress at schools.772 
  
4  A CHILD’S RIGHT TO DIGNITY AND EQUALITY773  
 
4.1   DIGNITY  
 
In countries with a “lamentable history”774 of discrimination and injustice, the right to human 
dignity is of the utmost importance;775 especially with regards to children, who are 
                                                          
766   At 438E-F; Other cases on child participation and representation include: Christian Lawyers South Africa v 
Minister of Health 2004 (10) BCLR 1086 (T); Ford v Ford 2004 (2) All SA 396 (W); Reardon v Mauvis 
Case No 5493/02 and Fitschen v Fitschen 1997 JOL 1612 (C).  
767   2005 (6) SA 50 (T). 
768   Para 23.  
769  In terms of section 28(1)(h).  
770   See van Vollenhoven et al (n740) 120-121.  
771  121.   
772  CRC Committee, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: France, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/.15/Add.240, 2004) para 26.  
773  Aside from dignity and equality, children are entitled to other rights which are more relevant to the 
discussions in Chapters 5 and 6.  
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particularly vulnerable to human rights violations. Aside from being reflected as one of the 
founding values of values of the Constitution,776 section 10 of the Constitution states that 
everyone has the right to have his or her dignity respected and protected. The right requires 
that all people must be treated in a manner befitting human beings that is, not a humiliating or 
degrading manner.777 Correspondingly, the Children’s Act, states that in all actions and 
decisions affecting the child,778 the inherent dignity of the child, must be respected.779  
 
The Constitutional Court has confirmed that human dignity is a core constitutional right and 
the foundation of many other rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights.780 The place of dignity in 
the hierarchy of rights was recognised in S v Makwanyane, wherein Chaskalson P stated:  
 
“The rights to life and dignity are the most important of all human 
rights, and the source of all other personal rights in the Bill of 
Rights. By committing ourselves to a society founded on the 
recognition of human rights we are required to value these tow 
rights above all others.”781 
 
Importantly, respect for human dignity entails recognising that all persons are able to make 
individual choices.782 The right to dignity includes an individual’s “entitlement to respect for 
the unique set of ends that the individual pursues.”783 In the case of Pillay, the Constitutional 
Court affirmed that religious and cultural practices are considered to be included in these 
unique sets of ends. In the case of Christian Education, the court emphasised the integral link 
between religious beliefs and an individual’s sense of identity and dignity. According to the 
court, the right to believe or not to believe, to practice or not practice is inherent to one’s 
identity and therefore one’s dignity.784 The court stated: 
 
“The right to believe or not to believe, and to act according to his or 
her beliefs or non-beliefs, is one of the key ingredients of any 
person’s dignity….Religious belief has the capacity to awake 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
774  Devenish (n64) 79. 
775  Devenish (n52) 62.  
776  Discussed in Chapter 1.  
777  Devenish (n64) 84.  
778  See discussion in Chapter 7. 
779  Section 6(2)(b).  
780  S v Makwanyane at para 328.  
781   Para 144.  
782  De Waal & Currie (n18) 231. 
783  Pillay at para 64. 
784   Christian Education at para 36.  
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concepts of self-worth and human dignity which form the 
cornerstone of human rights…” 785 
 
The inevitable connection between dignity and religion was also emphasised in the case of 
Prince v President of the Law Society, Cape of Good Hope and Others (“Prince”),786 in which 
Sachs J stated that human dignity is one of the core constitutional values and is central in the 
limitations analysis.787 Ngcobo J stated in the minority judgement:  
 
“There can be no doubt that the existence of the law which 
effectively punishes the practice of the Rastafari religion 
degrades and devalues the followers of the Rastafari religion in 
our society. It is a palpable invasion of their dignity. It strikes at 
the very core of their human dignity. It says that their religion is 
not worthy of protection. The impact of the limitation is 
profound indeed.”788  
 
The effect is that an adherent must make the impossible choice between his or her faith and 
the law,789 which in effect impairs the dignity of the adherent.   
 
Contrastingly, as much as religion is inter-linked with dignity, in some instances, the right to 
dignity may conflict with religious beliefs. For example, the case of Christian Education 
emphasised the importance of considering dignity as an aspect of children’s rights. In the 
proportionality analysis, the court found that the purpose of the blanket ban on corporal 
punishment is to protect learners from physical and emotional abuse and in turn its symbolic 
effect would be to promote respect for the dignity and physical and emotional integrity of all 
children.  
 
The state believed that disciplinary problems could be dealt with in a new, more progressive 
method that did not compromise the dignity of the child.790 Furthermore, the court found that 
it is the responsibility of the state to ensure that education in all schools is conducted in 
                                                          
785   Para 36.  
786  In this case the relevant legislation criminalised the use of cannabis by the Rastafari regardless of where, 
how and why it is used, with no distinction made between the bona fide Rastafari who use cannabis for 
religious purposes and any other drug user. As a result, Rastafari risk being arrested, prosecuted and 
convicted for possession or use of cannabis and Rastafarians are tantamount to criminals who are made to 
endure the stigma of this label. 
787  Para 50.  
788  Para 51.  
789   Para 44.  
790   Christian Education at para 50. 
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accordance with the constitutional values, with dignity being the paramount concern.791 In the 
end, the Constitutional Court in Christian Education recognised that the dignity and well-
being of children could not be compromised for the sake of the religious tenet in question and 
furthermore, that freedom of religion could not override the best interests of the child in this 
case.792  
 
The dignity argument could therefore work in two ways, one being that dignity and religion 
are intertwined and the other that a religious practice may conflict with the right to dignity. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that a child’s right to dignity is an important consideration in matters 
pertaining religion in schools.  The importance of a child’s right to dignity must be borne in 
mind throughout the discussion in Chapters 5 and 6. Furthermore, the practical manner in 
which a child’s dignity rights may be respected during religious exemption procedures at 
school, is illustrated in Chapter 7.   
 
4.2   EQUALITY 
 
Integrally connected to the right to human dignity is the right to equality. 793 Section 9 of the 
Constitution, also known as the “equality clause”, encompasses both the right to equality 
before the law and the protection against unfair discrimination. De Waal and Currie note that 
the equality clause is particularly useful for children since it presumes that discrimination on 
the basis of age is unfair. In other words, there must be good reason not to afford children the 
same rights and privileges as adults.794 Feinberg interprets the importance of the right to 
equality as follows:  
 
                                                          
791   Para 12.  
792  Para 41; See also para 35 at which the court stated that: “The underlying problem in any open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom in which conscientious and religious 
freedom has to be regarded with appropriate seriousness, is how far such democracy can and must go in 
allowing members of religious communities to define for themselves which laws they will obey and which 
not. Such a society can cohere only if all its participants accept that certain basic norms and standards are 
binding. Accordingly, believers cannot claim an automatic right to be exempted by their beliefs from the 
laws of the land.”     
793  See (n74) above.  
794  De Waal & Currie (n18) 456.  
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“Having rights enables us to ‘stand our ground as human 
beings’, look others in the eye, and feel that we are 
fundamentally equal to everybody else.”795  
 
Importantly, section 9 of the Constitution states that: “everyone is equal before the law and 
has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.”796 It guarantees the full and equal 
enjoyment of all other rights.797 This implies that in principle, all learners can claim equal 
rights and equal opportunities before the law, including education laws and policies.798   
 
On this note, a distinction must be made between formal equality and substantive equality. 
Whereas formal equality requires sameness of treatment, substantive equality does not require 
that all persons be treated identically at all times.799 Equality, in the substantive sense, may 
require that in certain circumstances people be treated differently, taking into account their 
social and economic conditions. In certain circumstances, distinctions may need to be drawn 
between individuals or groups to accommodate their special needs such as their age, religion 
or culture.800 For example, formal equality would require that all children be educated 
according to the same curriculum. Substantive equality requires that children with disabilities 
(for example, sight impairment), be educated in a manner which caters for their specific 
needs. It is clear that equality is not simply a matter of likeness, but a “matter of 
difference.”801 For this reason, section 9 of the Constitution must be read as being grounded 
on a substantive concept of equality.802  
 
Significantly, section 9 prohibits unfair discrimination by the state803 and any person,804 
whether directly or indirectly,805 on numerous grounds, including age, religion and culture.806 
                                                          
795  Feinberg “The nature and value of rights” in Feinberg Rights, justice, and the bounds of liberty: Essays in 
social philosophy (1990) 151; Also referred to in van der Ven et al Is there God in Human Rights? The 
complex relationship between Human Rights and Religion: A South African case (2004) 270-271.  
796  Section 9(1).  
797  Section 9(2).  
798          Eberlein (n601) 13; The value of equality is emphasised in the Manifesto on Values, Education and 
Democracy (2001),  a document which aims flesh out certain South African ideals in the educational arena.   
799  In the case of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality & Another v Minister of Justice & Others 
1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) at para 61, the court stated: “treating people identically can sometimes result in 
inequality.” See also Lee Equality, Dignity and Same-sex marriage: A Rights Disagreement in Democratic 
Society (2010) 82.  
800  This is discussed further in Chapter 6 with reference to the Pillay case. 
801  Kentridge “Equality” in Chaskalson et al (eds) The Constitutional law of South Africa (1996) 14-3. 
802  De Waal & Currie (n18) 200- 201.  
803  Section 9(3).  
804  Section 9(4).  
805  Direct discrimination occurs when a person is treated less favourably simply on the ground of his or her 
race, sex, or other distinguishing feature, or on the basis of characteristics particular to that group, for 
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The purpose of the prohibition is to ensure that individuals are not disadvantaged on the basis 
of certain characteristics that make them different from other individuals.807 The protection of 
children from discrimination is also included as a general principle in section 6 of the 
Children’s Act.808 
 
In order to understand the purpose and effect of the equality clause, it is necessary to make a 
distinction between the concepts of differentiation, discrimination and unfair discrimination. 
Discrimination is a form of differentiation; but unlike “mere differentiation”,809 
discrimination is differentiation on illegitimate grounds.810 The reference to unfair 
discrimination in section 9 denotes that there may be circumstances in which discrimination is 
fair.  This means that people may be treated differently based on legitimate reasons. This 
would be the case, for example where the discrimination has a “worthy and important societal 
goal”811such as legitimate affirmative action 812 or the establishment of private schools which 
cater to specific religious or cultural needs.813 In this case, the impact of the discrimination on 
the complaint (and others in the same situation) may not be considered to be unfair.  
 
In President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo,814 the Constitutional Court stated:  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
example, their race or religion. Indirect discrimination occurs when a seemingly neutral criteria adversely 
affects a disproportionate number of people from a specific group, and cannot be justified.  See Devenish 
(n64) 46. See Dupper et al (eds) Essential Employment Discrimination Law (2004) 37-38. Discussed further 
in Chapter 6.  
806  Section 9(3) states that: “The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on 
one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth”. Section 9(4) 
states that: “No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair 
discrimination.”; Importantly, the case of S v Lawrence 1997 4 SA 1176 (CC), dealt with the issue of 
religious favouritism by the state and expounded on the meaning of discrimination on the basis of religion. 
Furthermore, the landmark case of Pillay raised vital questions about the nature of discrimination as well as 
the protection afforded to the cultural rights and religious freedom of schoolchildren in the public school 
setting. The discussion of these cases in Chapter 6 illustrates the practical difficulties in treating all religions 
equally in a public setting.  
807  Bilchitz “The Tension between Freedom of Religion and Equality in Liberal Constitutionalism” August 
2001 Focus: The Journal of the Helen Suzman Foundation 13.  
808  Section 6(2)(d).  
809  “Mere differentiation” does not deny anyone equal protection and benefit before the law, nor does it amount 
to unequal treatment under the law. It has a rational connection to a legitimate government purpose.  
810          De Waal & Currie (n18) 456. 
811  See City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363; 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC).   
812  Devenish (n640) 45; See section 9(2) of the Constitution and section 2 of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 
1998.   
813  See section 29(3) of the Constitution. This right enhances the rights of religious and cultural communities. 
See discussion in Chapter 5.  
814  1997 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
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“We need, therefore, to develop a concept of unfair discrimination 
which recognises that although a society which affords each human 
being equal treatment on the basis of equal worth and freedom is our 
goal, we cannot achieve that goal by insisting upon identical treatment 
in all circumstances before that goal is achieved. Each case, therefore, 
will require a careful and thorough understanding of the impact of the 
discriminatory action upon the particular people concerned to 
determine whether its overall impact is one which furthers the 
constitutional goal of equality or not. A classification which is unfair 
in one context may not necessarily be unfair in a different context.”815 
 
Unfair discrimination, on the other hand, has an unfair impact on its victims.816 Unfair 
discrimination means “treating people differently in a way which impairs their fundamental 
dignity as human beings, who are inherently equal in dignity.”817 In this regard, Cornell notes 
that the key to equality is that people must be treated as of equal worth rather than treated 
equally in the simplistic sense. Essentially, dignity lies at the heart of what distinguishes 
unfair discrimination from differentiation.818   
 
The Children’s Act supplements section 9(3) of the Constitution, by stating that in all actions 
and decisions relating to a child, the child must be protected from unfair discrimination on 
any ground.819 It is important to note that the grounds listed in section 9(3) are by no means 
inclusive of all forms of discrimination.820 Differentiation based on grounds analogous to 
those expressly listed in section 9(3), will also constitute discrimination.821  However, 
whereas differentiation on one of the listed grounds is presumed to be unfair;822 there is no 
such presumption with respect to analogous grounds. In the case of analogous grounds, the 
applicant must show that the law or conduct in question is “based on attributes or 
characteristics which have the potential to impair the fundamental dignity of persons as 
human beings, or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner.”823 Importantly, 
the stages of enquiry to establish unfair discrimination in terms of section 9 were explained 
                                                          
815  Para 41.  
816  De Waal & Currie (n18) 456. 
817  Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) para 31; See the stages for enquiry into violation of the 
equality clause in Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC); 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC) para 53.   
818  Cornell “Bridging the Span towards justice: Laurie Ackerman and the ongoing Archetectonic of Dignity 
jurisprudence” in Barnard-Naudé et al (eds) Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order: the 
Critical Jurisprudence if Laurie Ackerman (2008) 35-36.   
819  Section 6(2)(d).  
820  Prinsloo v Van der Linde at paras 27 & 28; Harksen v Lane NO at para 47.   
821  De Waal & Currie (n18) 210. 
822  Section 9(5) of the Constitution states: “Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection 
(3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.” 
823  Harksen v Lane NO at para 46.   
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fully in Harksen v Lane NO.824  A discussion on unfair discrimination on the basis of religion 
specifically, is contained in Chapter 6.  
 
Aside from section 9, the right to equality is given further content by the the Equality Act. In 
fact, the Equality Act restates and expands on the contents of section 9 of the Constitution.825 
Importantly, the Equality Act recognises the existence of systemic discrimination and 
inequality brought about by colonialism and apartheid and the need to eliminate such 
discrimination.826  
 
Section 1 of the Equality Act defines “discrimination” as: 
 
  “any act or omission, including a policy, law, rule, practice, condition or 
situation which directly or indirectly— 
(a) imposes burdens, obligations or disadvantage on; or 
                     (b) withholds benefits, opportunities or advantages from, any person on 
one or more of the prohibited grounds.”827 
 
According to section 1, the discrimination may be direct or indirect.828 An example of direct 
discrimination on the basis of religion would be a public school with a Christian ethos 
refusing to admit Muslim learners. An example of indirect discrimination on the basis of 
religion would be the same public school prohibiting all head-coverings as part of the school 
dress code, with no option for religious exemptions based on sincere beliefs. This indirectly 
                                                          
824  Para 53. The reference to section 8 of the interim Constitution is the equivalent of section 9 of the 
Constitution. The court held as follows:  
              “(a) Does the provision differentiate between people or categories of people? If so, does the differentiation 
bear a rational connection to a legitimate government purpose? If it does not then there is a violation of 
section 8(1). Even if it does bear a rational connection, it might nevertheless amount to discrimination. b) 
Does the differentiation amount to unfair discrimination? This requires a two stage analysis: 
(b)(i) Firstly, does the differentiation amount to “discrimination”? If it is on a specified ground, then 
discrimination will have been established. If it is not on a specified ground, then whether or not there is 
discrimination will depend upon whether, objectively, the ground is based on attributes and characteristics 
which have the potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of persons as human beings or to affect 
them adversely in a comparably serious manner. 
 (b)(ii) If the differentiation amounts to “discrimination”, does it amount to “unfair discrimination”? If it has 
been found to have been on a specified ground, then unfairness will be presumed. If on an unspecified 
ground, unfairness will have to be established by the complainant. The test of unfairness focuses primarily 
on the impact of the discrimination on the complainant and others in his or her situation. 
If, at the end of this stage of the enquiry, the differentiation is found not to be unfair, then there will be no 
violation of section 8(2). (c) If the discrimination is found to be unfair then a determination will have to be 
made as to whether the provision can be justified under the limitations clause.”  
825  Section 6.  
826           Section 4(2)(a) and (b).  
827  Section1.  
828  Section 1 of the Equality Act; Take note of the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination made 
in n805 above. This matter is discussed in Chapter 6.  
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impacts upon Muslim female learners who are required to wear headscarves as part of their 
religion. 
 
The prohibited grounds provided in the definitions section are “race, gender, sex, pregnancy, 
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, 
conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.”829 This is not a closed list and the section 
includes additional criteria for identifying further grounds.830 
 
Most importantly, the Equality Act prohibits the state or any person831 from unfairly 
discriminating against another person on the basis of religion. Also, the Act places the duty of 
promoting equality on the state and private persons.832 Since public schools fall within the 
definition of “state”,833 public schools are required to admit learners and serve their 
educational requirements without unfairly discriminating against them in any way.834 The 
situation with private schools is more complicated and is addressed separately.835  
 
Significantly, section 13(2)(a)836 of the Equality Act goes further than section 9(5)837 of the 
Constitution by presuming discrimination on listed or other grounds838  to be unfair. In other 
words, the respondent will always bear the burden of proving unfairness. 839  In this regard, 
section 14 of the Equality Act sets out the factors that need to be taken into account in the 
determination of unfairness.840  Consequently, any burden imposed on or right unfairly 
                                                          
829  Section 1; In the labour law context, unfair discrimination is dealt with in section 6(1) of the Employment 
Equity Act.   
830   Subsection 1(1)(xxii)(b). 
831  Section 5 states that the Act binds the State and all persons.  
832  Section 24.  
833   Section 1.  
834  Section 5(1) of the Schools Act.  
835  See discussion in Chapter 5.  
836   Section 13(2)(a) reads: 
“If the discrimination did take place— 
(a) on a ground in paragraph (a) of the definition of ‘prohibited grounds’, then it is 
unfair, unless the respondent proves that the discrimination is fair.” 
837   Section 9(5) reads: “Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it 
is established that the discrimination is fair.” 
838  Section 1 (xxii) defines “prohibited grounds” as “(a) race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or 
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture. language and 
birth; or (b) any other ground where discrimination based on that other ground— (i) causes or perpetuates 
systemic disadvantage, (ii) undermines human dignity; or (iii) adversely affects the equal enjoyment of a 
person’s rights and freedoms in a serious manner that is comparable to discrimination on a ground in 
paragraph (a).” 
839   De Waal & Currie (n18) 227. 
840  Section 14 of the Equality Act reads as follows: 
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withheld from a learner based on religion (whether directly or indirectly), that causes harm to 
such learner, constitutes discrimination in terms of the Act, may be submitted to the scrutiny 
of the Equality Court.841 
 
An integral principle utilised in cases involving religious practices is that of “reasonable 
accommodation”.842 Section 14(3)(i)(ii) of the Equality Act states that in determining the 
fairness of the discrimination in question, whether an institution has taken reasonable steps to 
accommodate diversity or not, is an issue that needs to be considered.843  What this means in 
relation to the topic at hand is that schools844 are required take positive measures and perhaps 
even incur added hardship or expense in order to allow all learners within its sphere to 
participate and enjoy all their rights equally. This ensures that learners are not marginalised 
for not conforming to the norm/majoritarian belief or practice.845  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
“(1) It is not unfair discrimination to take measures designed to protect or advance persons or categories of 
persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination or the members of such groups or categories of persons. 
                 (2) In determining whether the respondent has proved that the discrimination is fair, the following must be 
taken into account: 
     (a) the context; 
     (b) the factors referred to in subsection (3); 
                     (c) whether the discrimination reasonably and justifiably differentiates between persons according to 
objectively determinable criteria, intrinsic to the activity concerned. 
 (3) The factors referred to in subsection (2)(b) include the following: 
     (a) Whether the discrimination impairs or is likely to impair human dignity; 
     (b) the impact or likely impact of the discrimination on the complainant; 
     (c)the position of the complainant in society and whether he or she suffers from patterns of disadvantage 
or belongs to a group that suffers from such patterns of disadvantage; 
     (d)the nature and extent of the discrimination; 
     (e)whether the discrimination is systemic in nature; 
     (f) whether the discrimination has a legitimate purpose; 
     (g) whether and to what extent the discrimination achieves its purpose; 
     (h) whether there are less restrictive and less disadvantageous means  to achieve the purpose; 
                   (i)whether and to what extent the respondent has taken such steps as being reasonable in the 
circumstances to— 
                        (i) address the disadvantage which arises from or is related to one or more of the prohibited   grounds; 
or 
        (ii) accommodate diversity.” 
The fairness test under the Equality Act involves an even wider range of factors than are relevant to the test 
of fairness than section 9 of the Constitution.   
841  Section 16.  
842  Benson “Taking Pluralism and Liberalism Seriously: The Need to Re-understand Faith, Beliefs, Religion 
and Diversity in the Public Sphere” 25 at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2014147 (Date accessed: 24 June 2012); 
Lenta “Cultural and religious accommodations to school uniform regulations: case comments” 2008 1 
Constitutional Court Review 259; This principle of reasonable accommodation was also alluded to in 
Christian Education, where the court held that while believers could not claim an automatic right to be 
exempted from the laws of the land based on religious beliefs, the state should, where reasonably possible, 
avoid putting believers in the painful position of either being true to their faith or respectful of the law. 
843   Mentioned in Pillay at para 72.  
844  This thesis argues that this includes private schools. See Chapter 7. 
845   Pillay at para 72. 
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The concept of reasonable accommodation is also mentioned in the Equality Act which states 
that the denial of access to opportunities or “failing to take steps to reasonably accommodate 
the needs” of people on the basis of race,846 gender847 or disability,848 will amount to unfair 
discrimination.849 According to the Equality Act, the state has a duty to “develop codes of 
practice . . . in order to promote equality, and develop guidelines, including codes in respect 
of reasonable accommodation.”850 To rephrase, the Act allows the court to order that a group 
or class of persons be reasonably accommodated. Essentially, the principle of reasonable 
accommodation is appropriate in cases that involve a rule that is neutral on the face of it and 
is intended to serve a legitimate purpose, but still has a marginalising effect on certain people.  
 
In light of South Africa’s history of religious discrimination in schools, the importance of a 
child’s right to equality in the context of education and matters pertaining to religion; cannot 
be overemphasised. This discussion on equality must be borne in mind throughout the 
remainder of the thesis. 
 
5  CONCLUSION 
 
Chapter 2 illustrated that most of the historical development of religion in schools, took place 
without consideration for children’s rights.  In contrast, the discussion in this Chapter 
indicates that the rights of children, particularly in the context of education, have improved 
significantly. The Constitution affords special protection to children in the form of children’s 
rights in section 28. By including a section specifically dedicated to children’s rights in the 
Bill of Rights, the state has recognised that children are particularly vulnerable to human 
rights violations and require special protection and care.851  
 
Aside from the specific children’s rights, children also receive protection in terms of freedom 
and security of the person;852 the right to bodily and psychological integrity;853 the right to 
                                                          
846   Section 7(e). 
847  Section 8(h). 
848   Section 9(c). 
849  Pillay at para 72; In Police and Prison Rights Union (POPCRU) and Others v Department of Correctional 
Services and Another, Case 544/2007 (“POPCRU”) at para 186, the applicants raised the “reasonable 
accommodation” principle, namely that failing to take steps to reasonably accommodate them on the basis 
of religion or culture, would amount to unfair discrimination. 
850   Section 25(1)(c)(iii). 
851  Section 28(1)(b); Section 28(1)(d). 
852          Section 12(1).  
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dignity854 and the right to an environment that is not detrimental to their health or well-
being.855 These rights place a duty on the state and private persons (more particularly, 
schools) to protect the safety and well-being of all children. This Chapter revealed that 
schools and educators have a duty of care towards all learners since they assume the position 
of a responsible parent over their learners.856 This would include safeguarding the learners’ 
health, well-being and development and protecting them from all forms of developmental 
harm; including psychological harm caused by, for example, the insensitive handling of 
religious exemption procedures. This thesis illustrates how this can be achieved on a practical 
level in the school environment.857  
 
Importantly, section 28(2) of the Constitution emphasises that the best interests of the child 
are of paramount importance in all matters concerning children. Since the 
constitutionalisation of the principle, its application has been extended to all areas of the law, 
including cases involving education rights and the religious upbringing of children. Despite 
its indeterminate nature and complications in its application, its mere existence in the 
Constitution puts children’s rights on at least an equal standing with other rights and 
considerations, in matters where they might otherwise have be neglected.858 All in all, it 
promotes a child-centred approach in all matters concerning children.859  
 
The Constitution recognises that children have a relationship of dependence with their 
parents.860 Parents are responsible for making decisions on behalf of children until such time 
as they reach a certain age or sufficient maturity level to do so themselves.861 As a result, the 
state does generally defer to the choices made by parents862  with respect to their children. 
However, this Chapter emphasised that the ultimate responsibility for the protection and well-
                                                                                                                                                                                            
853  Section 12(2) of the Constitution.  
854  Section 10.  
855  Section 24.  
856  Smith (n 601) 34; Govender (n624) 16; Law and Parents (n624). 
857  See Chapter  7.   
858   Cantwell “The impact of the CRC on the concept of ‘best interests of the child’”, Workshop on the best 
interests of the child, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, 8 September 2004; Bekink & Bekink refer to the best 
interest of the child principle as the “golden thread that runs through the whole fabric of the South African 
law relating to children.” See Bekink & Bekink (n670) 21.  
859  Illustrated in Chapter 7.  
860  Robinson (n237) 11; De Waal & Currie (n18) 26.  
861  Article 5 of the CRC recognises the right of parents to provide appropriate direction and guidance in the 
exercise by the child of the rights, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child. See 
Chapter 3. 
862  Article 5 of the CRC requires that States Parties respect the rights, duties of responsibilities of parents to 
provide guidance and direction to their children.  
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being of children rests with the state. It is the duty of the state to restrain parental rights 
(including those relating to the education or the religious upbringing of children) where these 
rights are seen to undermine a legitimate interest of the state or the best interests of the 
child.863 This point is of particular relevance to the forthcoming discussion on the freedom of 
religion of children in private schools.864  
 
Despite their dependence on adults, children acquire a degree of personal autonomy 
(dependant on age/maturity) through other rights such as freedom of religion. This Chapter 
recognised that the older the child becomes, the more difficult it is to restrain the child’s 
personal autonomy.865 In other words, once a child a capable of making a decision about his 
or her religious beliefs, that child may wish to assert their own religious freedom.866 In this 
regard, the law reflects that the (sufficiently mature) child’s viewpoint in matters that relate to 
him or her is an important consideration in determining their best interests.867 This means that 
the parental authority over a child’s religious upbringing may conflict with a sufficiently 
mature child’s individual religious freedom.868 Also, this Chapter illustrated that a child’s 
individual religious freedom may conflict with the best interests of the school/community of 
which the child is a part. In these circumstances a balance would need to be struck between 
the interests of the child; the interests of other learners and the interests of the state869 and in 
the case of very young children- the interests of the parents.  
 
Significantly, section 9 of the Constitution guarantees everyone the right to equal protection 
and benefit of the law.870 This means that, in principle, learners are entitled to equal rights and 
equal opportunities in terms of education laws and policies. Furthermore, the Constitution and 
the Equality Act prohibit the state or any person (including a private school) from unfairly 
discriminating against another person on the basis of religion. Importantly, the Equality Act 
states that in determining the fairness of the discrimination in question, it needs to be 
considered whether an institution (school) has taken reasonable steps to accommodate 
                                                          
863  Moyo (n646) 70.  
864    See Chapter 7.  
865  Bekink (n627) 185. 
866  Schäfer (n658) 161.  
867  McCall v McCall at paras 204 1/J- 205G; Article 10 of the Children’s Act and Article 12 of the CRC. 
868  This point is pertinant to the discussion on freedom of religion of children in private schools contained in 
Chapter 7.  
869  The interests of the state in matters pertaining to religion is particulary relevant to the issue of teaching 
religion in public schools- dealt with in Chapter 7. 
870  Section 9(1).  
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diversity or not.871  This practical application of this principle in the school environment is 
discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
871   Section 14(3)(i)(ii); Mentioned in Pillay at para 72.  
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CHAPTER 5 
EDUCATION RIGHTS  
 
 “Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to 
change the world.”872 
 
1   INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this Chapter is to discuss the impact of education rights on issues pertaining to 
religion in schools.873  The Chapter focusses on section 29 of the Constitution;874 as well as 
the inter-related constitutional right of freedom of association. Also, this Chapter discusses 
the education legislation which gives effect to these constitutional provisions, namely the 
Schools Act. 
 
In addition to the abovementioned legislation, this Chapter also contains a discussion on the 
National Policy on Religion and Education,875 a policy which provides the framework within 
which schools must operate with regards to religion. Furthermore, this Chapter outlines the 
contents of the Bill of Responsibilities for the Youth of South Africa, a document which aims 
to transform constitutional human rights into a practical set of personal responsibilities for 
South African youth but which impacts upon their freedom of religion at school. 
 
 
                                                          
872  Taken from a speech delivered by Mr Nelson Mandela at the University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg, South Africa on 16 July 2003.  
873  Venter recognises the link between education and religion. He states: “There is a direct link between the 
propagation of religions and education. Despite the fact that faith is a matter of intensely personal 
conviction, religious practices inevitably have communal and public dimensions, whereby society is directly 
involved.” See Venter “Religion in the classroom: Comparative Observations” 2012 27(2) SAPL 433 433. 
874  Discussed in detail in van der Vyver “Constitutional Protection of the Right to Education” 2012 27(2) 
SAPR/PL 326 331-338.  
875  National Policy on Religion and Education, as approved by the Council of Education Ministers on 4th 
August 2003. 
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2   CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON EDUCATION  
 
2.1  THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION  
 
Education is undoubtedly the primary tool to ensure the “safeguarding, protection and 
transference of a society’s constitutional values.”876 Devenish sums up the importance of 
education in human rights culture, as follows:  
  
“Education is essential as far as human rights are concerned, since it 
liberates people from the bondage of ignorance, superstition and 
fear. It gives to them dignity and self-confidence and is a basic 
human right, on which the realisation of many other rights depend. It 
is for this reason that the right to education is extensively recognised 
in both international law and in national constitutions.”877  
 
The South African Constitution guarantees everyone the right to “basic education” in section 
29(1)(a).878 The right of a parent or guardian in respect of the education of his or her child is 
not expressly mentioned.879 According to the The White Paper on Education and Training, 
the term “basic education” is a flexible concept which must be defined so as to meet the 
“learning needs appropriate to the age and experience of the learner, whether child, youth or 
adult.”880 In other words it is not a static concept and must evolve with the improving 
                                                          
876  Dlamini “Culture, Education and Religion” in Van Wyk et al (eds) Rights and Constitutionalism: the New 
South African Legal Order (1994) 578.  
877  Devenish A Commentary on the South African Constitution (1998) 153; the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, General Comment no 13 para 1 states: “Education is both a human right in itself and an 
indispensable means of realizing other human rights”;Van der Merwe also recognises the link between 
education and a sense of self-worth. She states: “In the South African context, basic education could refer to 
a standard of education that empowers people to break out of the poverty cycle and compete effectively in 
the labour market; enables people to understand and enjoy their new-found democratic values, rights and 
freedoms; encourages people to participate in and protect the fledgling democratic system, and enhances 
their feeling of self-worth as human beings.” See Van der Merwe “How ‘basic’ is basic education as 
enshrined in section 29 of the Constitution of South Africa?” 2012 27(2) SAPR/PL 365-378.  
878   According to section 29(1), this includes basic adult education; The White Paper on Education defines 
“basic” education as “compulsory” schooling-pre-school through ninth grade-and “further” education as 
“post-compulsory” education-tenth grade and beyond. See Department of Education (S. Afr.), White Paper 
on Education and Training, General Notice 196 of 15 March 1995, Parliament of the Republic of South 
Africa, at Ch. 5, paras. 14, 60. Referred to in Berger “The Right to education under the South African 
Constitution” College of Law, Faculty Publications, Paper 26, p623 at 
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/lawfacpub/26 (Date: 14 September 2012); See discussion on the right to 
basic education and comparative examples in Churr A Child’s Right to Basic Education: A Comparative 
Study (2012). 
879  Section 4(a) of the National Education Policy Act 27 of 1996 requires national polices on education to 
respect “the right of a parent or guardian in respect of the education of his or her child.”  
880          Ch. 7 para 4.  
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educational standards and capacities in the country.881 Importantly, the right to equal access to 
education is implicit in section 9 of the Constitution (the equality clause),882 which applies to 
all educational institutions.883 Equal access to education does not entail total equality, but 
rather equal opportunity in accordance with each person’s ability and potential.884   
 
In addition, the right to “further education” is provided for in section 29(1)(b). However, it is 
qualified by internal modifiers which stipulate that: “[t]he state must take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realisation” of the right.  It must be noted that unlike the textual formulation of section 
29(1)(b), section 29(1)(a) is not subject to any qualification.885  This alludes to the right to 
basic education as being a positive right requiring “direct realisation”;886 whereas the right to 
further education is largely dependent on the availability of financial and other state 
resources.887  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, in the case of Grootboom, the Constitutional Court rejected the 
notion of minimum core obligations with regard to socio-economic rights888 such as the right 
to education. The court held that such rights can only be “negatively protected from improper 
invasion.”889 However, the Constitutional Court has since confirmed that the right to basic 
education is “immediately realisable” and not subject to progressive realisation in the case of 
                                                          
881  Cheadle (n 315) 296.  
882  Boezaart states: “The right to equality goes far beyond equal treatment before the law and non-
discrimination. It includes equal access, equal resources and equal opportunities.” See Boezaart “A 
constitutional perspective on the rights of children with disabilities in an educational context” 2012 27 
SAPR/PL 454 459. This is particularly relevant to the discussion on freedom of religion of children in 
private schools in Chapter 7.  
883  Devenish (n877) 153; Section 8 of the Constitution provides that: “(1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, 
and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state. (2) A provision of the Bill of 
Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the 
nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.” This means that the Constitution applies 
not only to legislation, but also to rules and conduct carried out by the state or private institutions. 
884  Malherbe (n457) 272.   
885  Isaacs “Realising the Right to Education in South Africa: Lessons from the United States” 2010 26(2) 
SAJHR 356 380.  
886  Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication Under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 244; 
Couzens (n643) 398.  
887  Malherbe (n457) 275-276.  
888          Grootboom at para 98; See also Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No.2) 2002 (5) SA 721 
(CC) and Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC); Discussed in Mbazira 
(n450) 7; Discussed in Taiwo The Implementation of the Right to Education in South Africa and Nigeria 
(2011) 12-13.  
889  Grootboom at para 23.  
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Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School & Others v Essay N.O. and Others.890 
The court held that:  
 
“It is important… to understand the nature of the right to ‘a basic 
education’ under section 29(1)(a). Unlike some of the other socio-
economic rights, this right is immediately realisable. There is no internal 
limitation requiring that the right be ‘progressively realised’ within 
‘available resources’ subject to ‘reasonable legislative measures’. The 
right to a basic education in section 29(1)(a) may be limited only in terms 
of a law of general application which is ‘reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom’. This right is therefore distinct from the right to ‘further 
education’ provided for in section 29(1)(b). The state is, in terms of that 
right, obliged, through reasonable measures, to make further education 
‘progressively available and accessible.’”891  
 
Also, in the case of Ex parte Gauteng Provincial Legislature: In re Dispute Concerning the 
Constitutionality of Certain Provisions of the Gauteng School Education Bill of 1995 
(“Gauteng Education”), the court held that: 
 
“[The right to basic education]892creates a positive right that basic 
education be provided for every person and not merely a negative right 
that such person should not be obstructed in pursuing his or her basic 
education.”893  
 
According to the court, the state is obligated to do more than not impair access to the 
enjoyment of the right; it has a constitutional duty to take positive steps to ensure that basic 
education is provided.894  
 
In the recent High Court case of Freedom Stationery the court acknowledged that “[t]he 
protection of access to education is of prime importance with regard to the public interest.”895 
In this case, the court admonished the Department of Education for the lack of stationery, 
transport and food in many Eastern Cape schools896 and thereby implied that the state’s 
obligations towards education encompass more than just providing the physical infrastructure 
                                                          
890  2011 (7) BCLR 651 (CC); BCLR 446 (CC); McConnachie and McConnachie argue that the s 29(1)(a) right 
to a basic education affords an unqualified right to adequate school facilities. See McConnachie & 
McConnachie “Concretising the right to a basic education” 2012 123(3) SALJ 554.  
891          Para 37.  
892  As per section 32(a) of the interim Constitution (equivalent of section 29(a) of the Constitution).  
893  Para 9; Referred to in Cheadle (n315) 535.  
894  Arendse (n697) 108-115.  
895  Freedom Stationery at para 33.  
896  Para 34.  
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for schools and qualified teachers. The court recognised that the state’s obligations may also 
include providing stationery to school children in need in order to facilitate their access to 
education.897 Although this case did not expand on the nature and scope of the right, it did 
contribute “towards crystallising the legal content of the right to basic education provided for 
in section 29(1)(a).”898  
 
Most recently, in the case of Rivonia, the Constitutional Court made an express link between 
state’s obligation to protect and fulfil the right to a basic education899 and the best interests of 
the child. In this regard, the court stated:  
 
“[i]n disputes between school governing bodies and national or 
provincial government, cooperation is the required general norm. 
Such cooperation is rooted in the shared goal of ensuring that the 
best interests of learners are furthered and the right to a basic 
education is realised.”900  
 
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court is yet to pronounce on the nature and scope of the right 
to basic education.901 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, some may argue that basic education should include religious 
instruction.902 However, others believe that the right of a parent to have their child’s education 
conform to their religious beliefs should include the right not to have the child exposed to 
other religions at school.903 Although the duty of the state to provide religious education is not 
expressly mentioned in the Constitution, the provision of religious education by the state is 
neither promoted nor forbidden.904 The provisions on religion in the Schools Act and the 
                                                          
897  Couzens (n643) 398.  
898  398. 
899  See Rivonia at para 83 which states: “The school in question is a public school which falls under the 
administration of the applicants who are all organs of state. These applicants have a constitutional obligation 
to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.’ But this duty is also imposed on the 
school concerned and its governing body because they too are organs of state. One of the rights they are all 
obliged to protect and fulfil is the little girl’s right to a basic education which she wanted to realise.” 
900  Rivonia at para 69. 
901  Daniel & Greytak (n236) 350.  
902  Religious instruction, meaning instruction in a particular faith that is devotional in nature. The distinction 
between religious instruction and religion education is made in Chapter 1 and in the discussion of the 
National Policy on Religion and Education below.   
903  See Artcile 14(2) of the CRC and Article 5 of the Declaration; See the Wittmann case; In a first White Paper 
on Education (Department of Education, 1995), a parent’s right to choose the religious basis of their 
children’s education was recognised.  
904  See Van der Schyff (n34).  
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National Policy on Religion and Education, represents the state’s attempt at addressing this 
issue.  
 
2.2  THE RIGHT TO INSTRUCTION IN THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE OF CHOICE905  
 
Section 29(2) of the Constitution provides that:  
 
“Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or 
languages of their choice in public educational institutions where that 
education is reasonably practicable. In order to ensure the effective access 
to, and implementation of, this right, the state must consider all reasonable 
educational alternatives, including single medium institutions, taking into 
account- 
 
(a) equity; 
(b) practicability; and 
(c) the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws and 
practices.”906 
 
The issue of the determination of school language policies in South Africa is particularly 
sensitive, because it may lead to schools being polarised along a racial lines.907 In recent 
years, the courts have had numerous opportunities to interpret section 29(2). Although these 
cases relate to language issues and not religion, they are nevertheless relevant to the topic at 
hand, in that they contain important principles regarding equality rights and best interests of 
children in the school setting. They illustrate how the best interests of the child principle can 
and should be applied in matters of education, particularly with regard to religion in schools. 
In addition, language rights are inevitably intertwined with culture908 since one’s mother 
tongue is the principal means through which culture is attained.909  
 
In the case of Mikro, the Supreme Court of Appeal interpreted section 29(2) to mean that 
everyone has the right to be educated in an official language of his or her choice at a public 
school provided by the state, if reasonably practicable, but not the right to be so instructed at 
                                                          
905  The link between language issues and religion is explained in Chapter 2.  
906  This section is restated in section V(c) (2) of the Norms and Standards Regarding Language Policy, GN 
1701 in GG 18546 of 1997-12-19, Promulgated by the Minister of Education in terms of s 6(1) of the South 
African Schools Act 84 of 1996. Section 5 A(3) of South African Schools Act the directs SGB’s to have 
regard to the Norms and Standards when determining a language policy. 
907  See Chapter 2.  
908  The link between religion and culture is explained in Chapter 1 and elaborated on in Chapter 6. 
909  See Van Wyk (n876) 581. 
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each and every public educational institution.910 This means that the right is subject to the 
qualification of what is “reasonably practicable” for the state to provide. The learners at 
Mikro Primary School did not have a constitutional right to demand instruction in English at 
that particular Afrikaans-medium school.911 Therefore, the court ordered the placement of 
learners into another suitable school, taking into account the best interests of the children.912 
 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court was faced with the task of interpreting section 29(2) in 
light of the tussle over a language policy in the case of Hoerskool Ermelo in 2009.913  In this 
case, the dispute arose from the school’s language policy, which stipulated Afrikaans as the 
only medium of instruction.914 In 2006, the Department of Education, Mpumalanga, 
approached the school requesting that it admit 27 grade 8 learners who could not be 
accommodated at any of the English medium schools in Ermelo because they were already 
full to capacity. Initially the school refused to admit the learners.915  In 2007, the SGB 
instructed the principal to admit learners provided that they submit to tuition in Afrikaans.916  
 
It was the Department’s view that the school had surplus classroom capacity to accommodate 
the learners and had acted unreasonably in refusing to alter its language policy to admit the 
stranded learners.917 The Head of Department (HoD) proceeded to withdraw the function of 
the SGB to determine the school’s language policy with immediate effect and to appoint an 
interim committee to establish a new, parallel (dual) medium language policy for the 
school.918 The Constitutional Court was called upon to answer the question of whether the 
HoD may lawfully revoke the function of the governing body of a public school to determine 
its language policy and confer the function on an interim committee appointed by him. And, if 
so, whether the interim committee so appointed, in turn, lawfully determined a new language 
policy for the school.919 The court ordered that the learners who were enrolled at the school 
since 25 January 2007 in terms of a parallel medium language policy were to continue to be 
                                                          
910   Mikro at para 31; Msaule “The Right to Receive Education in One’s Language of Choice: A Fundamental 
but Contentious Right” 2010 2 STELL LR 239 248. 
911  Bray “Macro issues of Mikro Primary School” 2007 10(1) PER 7 9; Smit (n11) 229-230.   
912          Mikro at para 48.  
913   Statistically, there were approximately 15 classrooms available to accommodate new grade 8 learners even 
if they did not agree to be taught in Afrikaans (para 17).  
914          Hoerskool Ermelo at para 1. 
915  Para 12. 
916   Para 17.  
917  Para 20.  
918  Para 2.  
919  Para 1.  
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taught and allowed to write examinations in English until the completion of their school 
careers.920 Significantly, the court found that while the power to determine an admission 
policy vests in the first instance in SGB’s, that power must “be  understood within  the  
broader constitutional  scheme  to  make  education  progressively  available  and  accessible  
to everyone.”921   
 
In this case the court stressed the importance of considering the historical context of the 
language issue by stating: 
 
“[t]he case arises in the context of continuing deep inequality in our 
educational system, a painful legacy of our apartheid history. The 
school system in Ermelo illustrates the disparities sharply. The learners 
per class ratios in Ermelo reveal startling disparities which point to a 
vast difference of resources and of the quality of education. It is trite 
that education is the engine of any society. And therefore, an unequal 
access to education entrenches historical inequity as it perpetuates 
socioeconomic disadvantage.”922 
 
The key issue was the scarcity of classroom places for English speaking learners in Ermelo 
that was likely to endure.923  As a result, the SGB was directed to reconsider the school 
language policy with due regard not only for the best interests of its learners and the school 
but also the interests of the community in which the school is located.924  
 
The judgement in Hoerskool Ermelo reaffirmed the right to receive education in the official 
language of one’s choice in a public educational institution where it is reasonably practical, 
taking into consideration all reasonable educational alternatives, including single medium 
institutions but also taking into account what is equitable, practicable and addresses South 
Africa’s past racially discriminatory laws and practices925 and, importantly, taking into 
account the best interests of the children and the community926 concerned. The right of single 
medium schools is still recognised but must be exercised “with regard to the rights of learners 
who might be deprived of the right to education due to a single medium policy when the 
                                                          
920  Para 95. 
921   Para 61. See Rivonia case discussed in Chapter 4. 
922  Para 2.  
923  Para 100.  
924  Para 99.  
925   Para 42.  
926   See discussion in Chapter 4.  
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language policy is determined.”927 The right of children to equal access to education 
(regardless of their language) was the primary concern.  
 
On a similar note, the court in Seodin Primary School and Others v MEC of Education, 
Northern Cape and Others,928 held as follows:  
 
“[i]t would be a sad day in the South African historical annals that 
hundreds of children remained illiterate or dropped out of school because 
they were excluded from under-utilized schools purportedly to protect 
and preserve the status of certain schools as single-medium Afrikaans 
schools.”929 
 
Importantly, the case highlighted the right of SGB’s to determine the language policies of 
their schools provided that there is no discrimination in admission policy on account of 
language. This case recognised that the equality rights of the leaners superseded the language 
rights of the school.  
 
Overall, South African case law indicates that the right to equality and children’s rights, more 
specifically, the best interest of the child principle, are vital considerations in the 
interpretation of learners’ educational rights.  
 
2.3  THE RIGHT TO ESTABLISH PRIVATE SCHOOLS 
 
Section 29(3) of the Constitution allows for the establishment of private schools that cater for 
the particular needs of cultural, linguistic or religious groups.930 Practically speaking, private 
schools are necessary, given that the state cannot bear the responsibility for the education of 
all children in the country.931 Therefore, it must be emphasised that the existence of private 
schools contributes to the realisation of the right to education in South Africa.932 Section 
29(3) provides that:  
                                                          
927  Msaule (n910) 248. 
928  In Seodin Primary School and Others v MEC of Education, Northern Cape and Others 2006 (4) BCLR 542 
(N).  
929          Para 56 D-F. 
930   De Waal & Currie (n18) 484-485.   
931   Adhar & Leigh (n26) 258.  
932  Taiwo (n888) 299; See more positive aspects of private schools in Henning The Case for Private Schools 
(1993) 12-13; Despite this, private schools are often criticised for being elitist and privileged schools that 
perpetuate discrimination. Zungu, for example, refers to private schools as “elite-producing factories.” 
Ashley observes further that: “[p]rivate schools still have a white ethos, and our children, if unguided are 
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“Everyone has the right to establish and maintain, at their own expense, 
independent educational institutions that-  
  (a) do not discriminate on the basis of race;  
  (b) are registered with the state; and 
  (c) maintain standards that are not inferior to standards at comparable 
public educational institutions.”   
 
The Constitution’s inclusion of the right to establish private schools is in accordance with 
international law933 as well as Constitutions934 and prominent case law935 from other 
jurisdictions. 
 
Importantly, section 29(3) of the Constitution enhances the rights of cultural and linguistic 
communities envisaged in sections 30936 and 31 of the Constitution. Section 31 guarantees 
persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community, the right “to enjoy their 
culture, practise their religion and use their language; and to form, join and maintain cultural, 
religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society.”937 In this regard, De 
Waal and Currie assert that the cultural rights envisaged in sections 30 and 31 of the 
Constitution would not be possible without the right to learn about and teach about those 
cultures.938 Section 29(3) allows religious/cultural/linguistic groups to transmit their 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
sure to adopt the dominant culture- western capitalistic, white, elitist.” See discussion in Ashley Ideologies 
and Schooling in South Africa (1989) 54.  
933  Article 26(3) of the UDHR and Article 13 of the ICESCR discussed in Chapter 3; Article 2 of the First 
Protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights.   
934  Article 20 (1) of the Constitution of Cyprus (1960); Section 76 of the Danish Constitution (1953); Article 
7(4) of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany; Article 16 (8) of the Greek Constitution (1975).  
935  In the watershed United States Supreme Court case of Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925), 
the court upheld the rights of parents to have their children privately educated; Wisconsin v Yoder 406 US 
205 (1972), 214 confirmed the Pierce decision by stating: “Providing public schools ranks at the very apex 
of the function of a State. Yet even this paramount responsibility was, in Pierce, made to yield to the right of 
parents to provide an equivalent education in a privately operated system…As that case suggests, the values 
of parental direction of the religious upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative 
years have a high place in our society.” 
936  Section 30 states: “Everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of their 
choice, but no one exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill 
of Rights.” 
937  A United Nations Development Report stated: “Cultural liberty is a vital part of human development 
because being able to choose one’s identity- who one is- without losing the respect of others or being 
excluded from other choices is important in leading a full life. People want freedom to practice their religion 
openly, to speak their language, to celebrate their ethnicity or religious heritage without fear or ridicule or 
punishment or diminished opportunity. People want the freedom to participate in society without having to 
slip off their chosen cultural moorings.” See Human Development Report 2004, “Cultural Liberty in 
Today’s Diverse World”, published for the United Nations Development Programme. 
938  De Waal & Currie (n18) 484-485; In the Minority Schools in Albania Case 1935 PCIJ (Ser A/B) No 64, 20, 
the court found that minorities wish to preserve their “racial peculiarities, their traditions and their national 
characteristics” and they are entitled to establish their own schools to be able to do so.  
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religion/culture/language from generation to generation,939 through the school system.940 In 
this regard, Henning expresses that private schools: 
 
 “often reflect the desire of individuals or groups to express freedom 
and are the intangible expression in bricks and mortar of intangible 
values, beliefs and attitudes that groups hold in common.”941  
 
These are powerful reasons in favour of private schools enjoying constitutional protection.  
 
It is important to note that section 29(3)(a) is very careful to prohibit admission criteria for 
schools that are based solely on race.942 Practically speaking, this means that an African 
learner wishing to attend a school teaching in German cannot be denied access to the school 
on the basis that she is an African. However, he or she must be willing to be instructed in the 
school’s medium of instruction (German). This provision ensures that private schools are not 
utilised to continue racial segregation. However, this specific exclusion of discrimination on 
the basis of race envisages that private schools may discriminate on the basis of language, 
religion943 and culture (amongst others).944 In this regard, De Waal and Currie note that the 
specific prohibition against racial discrimination in section 29(3)(a), rests on the assumption 
that a degree of discrimination on other grounds may be necessary in order to exercise the 
right. For example, a school may wish to admit only members of a particular gender or only 
pupils of a certain religious group and the discrimination may, in these circumstances, not be 
deemed unfair945 or unreasonable.946  
 
Nevertheless, as a secondary issue, Witbooi asserts that the existence of private schools 
indirectly contributes to class and racial inequality despite the prohibition on discrimination 
against racial discrimination in section 29(3)(a). He comments as follows: 
                                                          
939  See positive aspects of private schools in Minority Schools in Albania Case 1935 PCIJ (Ser A/B) No 64, 20.  
940  Van Wyk (n876) 581. 
941  Henning (n932) 21.  
942   The rationale behind this, is that apartheid resulted in the denial of equal treatment to black people on the 
basis of race. In Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at paras 5 and 7, the Constitutional 
Court has stated that: [f]rom the outset the country maintained a colonial heritage of racial discrimination: in 
most of the country the franchise was reserved for white males and a rigid system of economic and social 
segregation was enforced.” The court stated that: “[r]ace was the basic, all-pervading and inescapable 
criterion for participation by a person in all aspects of political, economic and social life.”  
943    There is a belief that many private religious schools are continuing the legacy of religious education started 
by European settlers (as discussed in Chapter 2). See Adhar & Leigh (n26) 257. 
944   Devenish states that independent schools are not obliged to treat religions equally. See Devenish (n52) 92.  
945  Unfair discrimination is dealt in the discussion on the right to equality in Chapter 4.  
946  De Waal & Currie (n18) 486; Devenish (n52) 154.  
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 “[O]nly a few blacks can afford to send their children to private 
schools. Private schools in South Africa are a symbol of elitism, 
supported by the rich parents and those companies who benefit from 
the skills of those who have received the education which may 
benefit them.”947  
 
This raises the point that was reflected in Chapter 2, that there is an inevitable link between 
race, religion, language and culture. This means that the establishment of schools based on 
religious/cultural/linguistic criteria may indirectly discriminate on the basis of race.948  
 
This point was recognised in the case of Gauteng Education, where the petitioners were 
Afrikaners who wanted their children to be educated exclusively in Afrikaans and in 
accordance with a Christian value system that required religious classes as part of the 
curriculum.  They contended that the relevant Bill949 violated their constitutional rights by 
abolishing language competency tests in school admissions procedures,950 limiting a school’s 
ability to establish its own religious policy, and severing government funding of religious 
schools.951  They argued that section 32(c)952 of the interim Constitution (equivalent of section 
                                                          
947   Ashley (n932) 54; Akoojee notes that although class differentiation has in many respects replaced racial 
discrimination, it is still racially defined. See Akoojee Private Further Education and Training In South 
Africa: The Changing Landscape (2005) 4. 
948  See Hoërskool Ermelo. 
949  The Bill was passed and duly enacted as the School Education Act of 1995.  
950   Section 19 of the Bill provided as follows: 
      “Language and discrimination 
 19 (1) Language competence testing shall not be used as an admission requirement to a public school. 
                                                (2) Learners at public schools shall be encouraged to make use of the range of official languages. 
                      (3) No learner at a public school or a private school which receives a subsidy in terms of section 69 
shall be punished for expressing himself or herself in a language which is not a language of learning 
of the school concerned.” 
951    Section 21 and section 22 of the Bill read as follows: 
               “21  (1) The religious policy of a public school shall be made by the governing body of the school 
concerned after consultation with the department, and subject to the approval of the Member of the 
Executive Council. 
                      (2)  The religious policy of a public school shall be developed within the framework of the following 
principles: 
                                      (a)   The education process should aim at the development of a national, democratic culture of 
respect for our country’s diverse cultural and religious traditions. 
                                (b)  Freedom of conscience and of religion shall be respected at all public schools. 
                     (3)  If, at any time, the Member of the Executive Council has reason to believe that the religious policy 
of a public school does not comply with the principles set out in subsection (2) or the requirements 
of the Constitution, the Member of the Executive Council may, after consultation with the 
governing body of the school concerned, direct that the religious policy of the school shall be 
reformulated in accordance with subsections (1) and (2). 
                      (4)   The provisions of section 18(4) to (8) shall apply mutatis mutandis to a directive issued by the 
Member of the Executive Council under subsection (3) and in such application any reference to 
language policy shall be construed as a reference to religious policy.” 
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29(3) of the Constitution) created a positive obligation on the state to establish educational 
institutions based on a common culture, language, or religion provided there was no 
discrimination on the basis of race.  This argument did not take into account the link between 
language and race and the fact that the use of language competency tests could amount to 
indirect discrimination on the basis of race.953 Indirect discrimination amounts to using 
seemingly neutral criteria to disguise the perpetuation of discriminatory practices.954       
 
The Constitutional Court held that the right to establish independent schools is a defensive 
right, requiring the state not to interfere with the establishment of such schools. Importantly, 
the court held that the state cannot be required to provide schools which cater to particular 
linguistic, cultural, or religious needs. In other words, the state is required tolerate the 
establishment of private/religious educational institutions without actively participating in the 
said establishment.955 Ultimately, the court decided held that the state cannot be expected to 
pay the costs of a school that admits students based upon competency in Afrikaans and that 
requires Christian education as part of its curriculum.956   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
              “22     (1) No person employed at any public school shall attempt to indoctrinate learners into any 
particular belief or religion. 
                         (2)   No person employed at any public school or private school shall in the course of his or her 
employment denigrate any religion. 
                         (3)   (a)  (i)  Every learner at a public school, or at a private school which receives a subsidy in 
terms of section 69, shall have the right not to attend religious education classes and 
religious practices at that school. 
                                           (ii)   In this regard the department shall respect the rights and duties of parents to provide 
direction to their children in the exercise of their rights as learners, in a manner 
consistent with the evolving capacity of the children concerned. 
                                                                           (b)    The right conferred by paragraph (a) on a learner at a private school which receives a 
subsidy in terms of section 69, may be limited where such limitation is necessary to 
preserve the religious character of the private school concerned. 
                                                                          (c)       Except as is provided for in paragraph (b) no person employed at a public school, or 
at a private school which receives a subsidy in terms of section 69, shall in any way 
discourage a learner from choosing not to attend religious education classes or religious 
practices at that school. 
                          (4)         No person employed at a public school shall be obliged or in any way unduly influenced to 
participate in any of the religious education classes or religious practices at that school.” 
See Gauteng Education at paras 3 -5.  
952  Section 32(c) reads: “Every person shall have the right... to establish, where practicable, educational 
institutions based on a common culture, language or religion, provided that there shall be no discrimination 
on the ground of race.” 
953  In relation to section 29(3)(a) of the Constitution, Van der Vyver states: “Application of the Non-
Discrimination Clause could be complicated. Putative egalitarianism may develop under the guise of all 
kinds of ostensibly race-neutral admission tests and cunning entry requirements. There are, in a word, more 
ways than one to kill the cat.” See van der Vyver (n874) 327. 
954  Discussed in Chapter 4; See more on indirect discrimination in Chapter 6.  
955   Gauteng Education at paras 7-9; See du Plessis (n52) 439.  
956   See Blake & Litchfield (n273) 515. 
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Significantly, the right in section 29(3) entails that a private school may choose its own 
religious ethos. Moreover, the right has been interpreted to include the right to require 
religious conformity from (or otherwise exclude) non-adherent learners. This issue was dealt 
with in the case of Wittmann. In this case, the applicant, a parent of a minor child who had 
been admitted as a pupil in a German-medium private school, sought an order declaring the 
compulsory attendance of religious instruction classes and school assembly/prayers to be 
unconstitutional, on the basis that it infringed upon freedom of religion.957 In addition, the 
applicant sought an order granting her the right to have the minor child excused from 
attendance of the religious instruction classes and the school assembly/prayers.  
 
The court held that there had been no violation of freedom of religion as the school was not a 
state-aided institution958 and therefore not bound to the Bill of Rights in the interim 
Constitution.959 Importantly, the court held that the learner’s right to freedom of religion had 
been waived by the applicant when she agreed to submit to the school’s constitution and rules 
upon admission. This decision indicated that the waiver of the freedom of religion (for the 
limited duration of one’s membership at an institution and within the limits of the institution’s 
rules), was not contrary to the provisions of the Constitution in the case of private schools. 
The court held that even if the German school was a state-aided institution, the right of non-
attendance in section 14(2) of the interim Constitution could validly be waived and that is 
what the applicant had done when she voluntarily submitted to the school’s constitution and 
rules. 
 
                                                          
957   This case was decided under section 14 of the interim Constitution which states:  
                   “(1) Every person shall have the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion, which 
shall include academic freedom in institutions of higher learning.  
               (2) Without derogating from the generality of subsection (1), religious observances may be conducted at 
state or state-aided institutions under rules established by an appropriate authority for that purpose, 
provided that such religious observances are conducted on an equitable basis and attendance at them is 
free and voluntary.  
             (3) Nothing in this Chapter shall preclude legislation recognising   
                   (a) a system of personal and family law adhered to by persons professing a particular religion; and  
                   (b) the validity of marriages concluded under a system of religious law subject to specified procedures.”   
958   In Wittmann at paras 78-79, the court held that in section 14(2) of the interim Constitution, state-aided 
institutions must in the context of education be read as referring to a state-aided school, a phrase which has 
a special meaning, namely, what was colloquially known as the model C school. The German school 
certainly was not such, as it was a private school. The court therefore held that the conditions in section 
14(2) of the transitional Constitution, the similarly worded precursor to section 15(2), do not apply to a 
private school subsidised by the state to the extent of R1.5 million per year, since such a school is not a 
state-aided institution.  
959  The interim Constitution was held to have vertical effect only (except for the diffusive effect of its 
principles); See Du Plessis and Another v De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) n1;The Constitution now 
provides in section 8(2) that it also has horizontal effect. 
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This case denotes that the right to maintain private institutions based on religion, culture or 
language, includes the right to require conformity or to exclude non-adherents from those 
institutions. 960 The freedom of religion of the “outsider” is limited to their right not to join. In 
other words, “outsiders” cannot join on their own terms and once they have joined cannot 
impose their own terms.961  In effect, this means that private schools may exclude legitimately 
non-adherents who refuse to conform to the religious character of the school and need not 
treat all religions equitably.962 The conflict lies in the fact that permitting the establishment of 
private school with a particular religious ethos, defends the right of that community (or 
religious group) to continue to perpetuate its way of life (which is a positive for that 
community); however, it does not provide for equal opportunity for those who are not part of 
that community (religion).963  
 
In this regard, Devenish comments that although provision is made for the horizontal 
application of the Bill of Rights, it is uncertain to which extent certain rights964 apply between 
private persons inter se and legal entities. He raises the question of whether it should be 
permissible for a completely private religious school to refuse admission to persons of other 
faiths or atheists or agnostics. He concludes that, ultimately, this is a question for the 
Constitutional Court to decide.965  
 
In any event, in practice, the problem with the current position is that non-adherent children 
can be compelled to attend religious instruction and religious observances contrary to their 
faith and can be restricted from manifesting their own beliefs, with no possibility of 
accommodation by the school. This situation impacts upon, not only the freedom of religion 
of the children concerned; but also their equality rights, children’s rights, dignity and best 
interests.  Also, it must be questioned whether this interpretation is in accordance with 
constitutional values.  As a result, the core issue to be determined is the constitutionality of 
the waiver of the freedom of religion of a child in order to attend a private school. 
                                                          
960  See discussion in Chapter 7.  
961  Wittmann at para 91.  
962   De Waal & Currie (n18) 308.  
963  Adhar & Leigh (n26) 257.  
964  Such as section 15 and the right to freedom of expression in section 16 of the Constitution.  
965        Devenish (n52) 95;  On 30 July 2012, the Alberton Magistrates’ Court, sitting as an Equality Court, upheld 
the rights of a lesbian couple who had lodged a complaint that they were not allowed to publicly celebrate 
their civil union at Sha-Mani, a privately-owned functions venue and conference centre in Alberton. The 
outcome of this case emphasised that the Constitution prohibits unfair discrimination not only by the state, 
but also by private organisations, such as Sha-Mani. See University of Pretoria, Faculty of law “Equality 
Court affirms lesbian couple’s rights” (Press Release) 31 July 2012.  
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Importantly, section 31(2) contains an express qualification, stating that cultural and linguistic 
rights may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights. 
In this regard, De Waal and Currie note that the Constitution must be interpreted as respecting 
cultural associations (in this case schools) and practices for as long as they are in accordance 
with the Constitution’s individual fundamental rights. The court in Christian Education 
commented on this qualification as follows:  
 
“Section 31(2) ensures that the concept of rights of members of 
communities that associate on the basis of language, culture and 
religion, cannot be used to shield practices which offend the Bill of 
Rights. These explicit qualifications may be seen as serving a double 
purpose. The first is to prevent protected associational rights of 
members of communities from being used to ‘privatise’ 
constitutionally offensive group practices and thereby immunise them 
from external legislative regulation or judicial control. This would be 
particularly important in relation to practices previously associated 
with the abuse of the notion of pluralism to achieve exclusivity, 
privilege and domination. The second relates to oppressive features of 
internal relationships primarily within the communities concerned, 
where section 8, which regulates the horizontal application of the Bill 
of Rights, might be specially relevant.”966 
  
Significantly, section 31(2) ensures that the rights of members of religious and cultural 
communities cannot be used to shield practices which are contrary to the Bill of Rights, more 
particularly the best interests of the child and the right to equality. Precisely the same 
argument could be made with respect to the right contained in section 29(3). While the 
Constitution supports group rights, it places them in the context of other rights which 
guarantee individuals rights and freedoms.967 This thesis argues that the state cannot simply 
preserve all the rights of private schools without considering the impact of this right on the 
other fundamental rights of the children concerned.968  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
966  Para 26.  
967  De Waal & Currie (n18) 481- 483.  
968  See Chapter 7.  
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2.4  FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
 
Closely connected to education rights, freedom of religion and cultural and linguistic rights is 
the right to freedom of association.969 The right to freedom of association is one of the 
cornerstones of a democratic society in that there is:  
 
“the need to associate in order to realise fully one’s humanity- to 
interact-, … make common purpose and enjoy life with other persons 
sharing one’s culture, personal, political or economic interests [and] 
the necessity to a functioning democracy of such a freedom, for a 
proper and coherent expression and interplay of collective 
interests.”970 
 
Freedom of association includes establishing, joining, dissolving, leaving or participating in 
the activities of an association, including a religious association,971 as well as the right not to 
join an association.972 It has been contended that freedom of association is an extension of 
individual freedom and for that reason the right to associate or not associate, should be 
equally revered and protected as individual freedom.973 This right is supplemented by the 
right to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations.974 The 
importance of freedom of association is that it enables individuals to “create and maintain 
intimate relationships of love and friendship” and is “increasingly essential as a means of 
engaging in charity, commerce, industry, education, health care, residential life [and] religious 
practice.”975 
 
Nevertheless, associational rights raise concerns in the law, in particular that they may 
conflict with the right to equality (as alluded to in the discussion on private schools above).  
For instance, religious associations may adopt rules for association that result in unfair 
                                                          
969    Section 18; du Plessis (n334) 166.   
970  Cheadle (n315) 247. 
971    Taylor v Kurtsaag NO 2005 (7) BCLR 706 (W); 2005 (1) SA 362 (W); According to du Plessis: Freedom of 
association includes anti- and non-religious groups that will qualify in a similar way for protection. See du 
Plessis “Grondwetlike Beskerming vir Godsdiensregte as Groepregte in Suid-Afrika” 2002 43 NGTT 216.   
972       De Waal “Association” in Van Wyk (n876) 258.  
973    Emerson “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression” 1964 74(1) Yale Law Journal 4.  
974   Section 31(1)(b) of the Constitution. Discussed in Chapter 6.  
975       Gutmann “Freedom of Association: An Introductory Essay” in Gutmann (ed) Freedom of Association 
(1998) 3-4. Quoted in Lenta “Taking Diversity Seriously: Religious Associations and Work-Related 
Discrimination”2009 126(4) SALJ 827 832. 
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discrimination against individuals on one of the prohibited grounds. Then it becomes a 
question of whose freedom should take precedence, the individual’s or the association’s.976  
 
For example, in the case of Strydom v Nederduitse Gereformeerde Gemeente Moreleta Park 
(“Strydom”),977  Mr Strydom was appointed by a Church to teach music to the learners as an 
independent contractor. Thereafter it was discovered by the Church that he was involved in a 
same-sex relationship, of which the Church vehemently disapproved. He was, as a result, 
dismissed from his employment. He then proceeded to take the case to the Equality Court, 
which concluded that the dismissal amounted to unfair discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation. In this decision, Basson J quoted the Constitutional judgment of Minister of 
Education v Syfrets Trust Ltd,978 which held that  equality is “not merely a fundamental right; 
it is a core value of the Constitution” that “goes to the bedrock of our Constitutional 
architecture.”979 
 
The decision in Strydom indicates that the equality clause in the Constitution and the Equality 
Act may restrict the autonomy of a religious association to regulate its internal matters if it 
engages in unfair discrimination on one of the prohibited grounds.  
 
In response to the finding in Strydom, Lenta argues that religious associations are also 
protected by freedom of religion and therefore the state cannot require that they conduct 
themselves in a manner that is inconsistent with their “settled religious convictions and 
practices.”980  He contends further that: “[t]o disallow a church from discriminating impairs 
the ability of the religious community of which it forms a key part to transmit its core 
beliefs…and may also impair the ability of a church to maintain the religious ethos of its 
academy, which includes the exemplification of these beliefs in its practice.”981  
                                                          
976   Bilchitz (n807) 15  
977          2009 (4) SA 510 (T) (“Strydom”).  
978          2006 (4) SA 25 (CC).  
979          Strydom at paras 8 and 10.  
980   Lenta (n975) 833. 
981    853; See also Lenta argues that: “the balancing of the important interests of religious believers and victims 
of discrimination respectively should, if carried out correctly, result in religious associations sometimes 
being permitted to engage in employment discrimination on grounds such as sexual orientation – that is, in 
respect of positions sufficiently close to the doctrinal core of the religion concerned.” See Lenta “In defence 
of the right of religious associations to discriminate: a reply to Bilchitz and De Freitas” 2013 29(2) SAJHR 
429 430; Woolman concurs with this opinion by referring to case law, namely Taylor v Kurstag, and 
Wittmann, both of which recognised the right of a religious institutions “to have one’s life shaped in a 
manner that does not readily permit the alteration of either belief or act and that to be a member of a liberal 
society is to live in a state committed to not so readily dictating the ends of its citizens.” See Woolman 
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Contrastingly, Bilchitz argues in favour of equality and against non-discrimination, over 
religious associational rights. He asserts that allowing the private religious domain to continue 
discriminatory practices under the guise of religion, will ultimately undermine the new order 
envisaged by the Constitution.982 Rautenbauch also asserts that when considering South 
Africa’s political history, it is doubtful that freedom of association can be relied on to sanction 
“private apartheid”.983 Furthermore, a discussion paper prepared by the Human Rights 
Commission contends that there is a hierarchy of rights and: 
 
“According to this hierarchy, the rights to human dignity and equality are 
superior to others. Therefore, when these core rights collide with other 
rights such as the right to freedom of association, the right to dignity and 
equality must prevail.”984 
 
 
Generally, the state’s interference into the internal affairs of an association will depend 
largely on the nature of the association, the impact it has on the public985 and the nature of 
right being infringed. For example, religion-based private schools may require a greater 
degree of interference by the state that other religious institutions, since they carry out a 
public function of facilitating the right to education.986  
 
A further issue to be considered is whether or not learners should be permitted to form 
religious associations within schools and, if so, if their associational activities should be 
permitted during school hours or only after hours.987 At present, although religious instruction 
may not form part of the formal school programme any longer, schools are encouraged to 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
“Association” in De Waal & Currie (n18) 442; Also see opinions on this issue in De Freitas “Freedom of 
association as a foundational right: religious associations and Strydom v Nederduitse Gereformeerde 
Gemeente, Moreleta Park” 2012 28(2) SAJHR 258-272.    
982    Bilchitz “Should religious associations be allowed to discriminate? at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1874683 (Date accessed: 2 July 2012); See Bilchitz and 
De Freitas “Introduction: The Right to Freedom of Religion in South Africa and Related Challenges” 2012 
28(2) SAJHR 141 144; Bilchitz argues that the right of private associations to discriminate is repugnant 
when considering South Africa’s history and the values enshrined in the Constitution. See Bilchitz “Why 
courts should not Sanction Unfair Discrimination in the private sphere: a reply” 2012 28(2) SAJHR 296 297. 
983    Rautenbach et al “Culture (and Religion) in Constitutional Adjudication, Revised paper delivered at the 5th 
Colloquium on Constitution and Law, Johannesburg 16 November 2002; Devenish (n64) 61. 
984   Discussion paper on Voluntary Associations prepared by SAHRC staff 7, p 18, as quoted from a report 
compiled by the Human Rights Commission, 2006 Report: “Public Inquiry Exclusionary Policies of 
Voluntary Associations: Constitutional Considerations, available at http://www.sahrc.org.za. 
985    van Coller “Religious Institutions and Fundamental Rights: Applicability, Interaction and Limitations” 
Second ICLARS Conference, Santiago de Chile (8 September  2011) 18. 
986  Discussed further in Chapter 7.  
987   Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy (2001) states that:  “According to the Constitution, schools 
may be made available for religious observance so long as it is outside of school hours.” See p 7.  
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allow their facilities to be used for religious activities, provided it does not interrupt the core 
educational activities of the school. This could include permitting “voluntary gatherings and 
meetings of religious associations during break times.”988  It states furthermore that:   
 
“In accordance with the Constitution, the South African Schools Act, 
and rules made by the appropriate authorities, the Governing Bodies 
of public schools may make their facilities available for religious 
observances, in the context of free and voluntary association, and 
provided that facilities are made available on an equitable basis.” 
 
If learners assert their associational rights within schools, it raises numerous and complex 
concerns for schools. For one, the school will have to ensure that it treats all religious 
associations equally and does not privilege one above the other, regardless of popularity. For 
example, most schools would more readily accept the application by learners to form a 
Christian Bible club, as opposed to an association not as mainstream, such as a Wiccan989 
club. Also, schools would have to provide equal opportunity for non-religious clubs990 which 
assert other rights, as it does for religious clubs. For example, if students wanted to establish a 
Gay-straight alliance club, it would have to be accepted as readily as religious clubs. 
However, if, for example, students wanted to establish a shooting club, – this would not give 
effect to a constitutional right and may undermine school safety and therefore need not be 
accepted by schools.  
 
Furthermore, if religious associations carry out activities during school hours, the school 
would have to ensure that these associations operate within rules which respect the equality 
and freedom of religion of all learners a within the environment.991 Also, the core beliefs of 
different associations may be contradictory to each other and rules would have to be 
established for all associations to co-exist in a way that is respectful to all others. It is 
imperative that there be no room for members to pressurise non-members into joining the 
group. There is concern that religious associations, in promoting themselves at school, may 
                                                          
988      National Policy on Religion and Education at para 55. 
989       Wicca is a belief system based on ancient Witchcraft traditions. See The Celtic Connection “What is Wicca, 
Witchcraft and Paganism?” at http://wicca.com/celtic/wicca/wicca.htm (Date accessed: 7 January 2012).  
990        Section 15(1) of the Constitution protects freedom of religion and “beliefs” that are not religious. This is 
elaborated on in Chapter 6.  
991    The Guidelines for the consideration of Governing Bodies in adopting a Code of Conduct for Learners, GN 
776 GG 18900 of 15 May 1998, lists non-discrimination, equality, respect and dignity as learners’ rights. 
See para 4.2 and 4.3. The right to freedom of association is not specifically dealt with.  
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attempt to proselytise992 others, which may be seen as harassment993 or coercion to join. This 
may negatively impact on children’s rights and the educational activities of the school.    
 
Closely linked to the right of association, is the right of assembly, demonstration picket and 
petition.994 This right is crucial to addressing the feelings of powerlessness and isolation 
endured by minority groups who feel that their demands are not being given adequate 
consideration by the state.995 During the apartheid era, the NP government passed several 
laws aimed at the restriction of assemblies and gatherings. These laws endowed the specified 
authorities with the power to prohibit assemblies and public gatherings on various grounds, 
most of which were political and ideological.996 The Sharpeville massacre of 1960 was an 
example of a gross violation of the right to assemble during the apartheid era. Therefore, it 
follows that sections 17 and 18 of the Constitution are of paramount importance in the new 
South African legal order.  
 
However, as important as these rights are, the Guidelines for the consideration of Governing 
Bodies in adopting a Code of Conduct for Learners997 emphasises that that where any form of 
expression leads to “the material and substantive disruption in school operations, activities or 
the rights of others” the expression can be limited, as the disruption of school activities is 
unacceptable. The ability of a school to function without disruption is crucial to education; 
therefore a restriction on disruptive assemblies, demonstrations or other forms of expression 
                                                          
992   Meaning “to induce someone to convert to one’s faith”. See definition at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/proselytize (Date accessed: 9 December 2012). For the first international case on 
proselytism, see Kokkinakis v Greece 14307/88, [1993] 17 EHRR 397, [1993] ECHR 20.    
993   The Guidelines for the consideration of Governing Bodies in adopting a Code of Conduct for Learners lists 
the “absence of harassment” as a right within the school environment. See para 4.6. 
994   Section 17 of the Constitution; Beatty v Gillbanks (1882) 9 QBD 308, a Ghanaian case the Salvation Army 
was stopped from marching because of fears that it would incite a disorderly, loosely organised ‘skeleton 
army’, to acts of violence against it. The court observed that the Salvation Army had gathered “for a 
purpose which cannot be said to be otherwise than lawful and laudable, or at all events cannot be called 
unlawful”, and noting that what disturbances there had been, or might be, were, or would be caused by, “a 
body of persons opposed to the religious views of … the Salvation Army.” The court held that to disallow 
the procession amounted to saying “that a man may be punished for acting lawfully if he knows that his so 
doing may induce another man to act unlawfully a proposition without any authority whatever to support 
it.” 
995          Stone & Vrancken “Assembly, Demonstration, Picket and Petition” in Govindjee & Vrancken (eds) 
Introduction to Human Rights Law 127. 
996   Among such legislation were the Internal Security Act of 1982 (previously Suppression of Communism Act 
of 1950) and the other laws included the Criminal Law Amendment Act 8 of 1953, the Riotous Assemblies 
Act 17 of 1956,  the emergency regulations issued under the Public Safety Act  3 of 1954  and the General 
Law Further Amendment Act 92 of 1970. See Article 19: The Global Campaign for Free Expression 
“Freedom of Association and Assembly Unions, NGOs and Political Freedom in Sub-Saharan Africa” 
(March 2001) 63.  
997      Para 4.5.1.  
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by religious associations at school, are a reasonable and justifiable limitation of freedom of 
religion.998  
 
3  EDUCATION LEGISLATION: THE SOUTH AFRICAN SCHOOLS 
ACT 
Education in South Africa is a matter of concurrent national and provincial legislative 
competence. Although each of the nine provinces has passed laws dealing with public 
schooling, national legislation on education in schools and relevant constitutional provisions 
exist to ensure that a national standard is maintained.999 This makes it easier to determine 
what is expected from schools and to ensure that schools do not violate the right to freedom of 
religion. 
The primary purpose of the Schools Act is to give effect to the constitutional right to 
education.1000 The Preamble of the Schools Act encapsulates the enormity of the challenges 
that the state has faced in redressing the inequality which existed in the South African school 
system in the past. It recognises that schools would for a long time be a hub of intense debate 
regarding issues such as religious diversity, language differences and racial integration. The 
Preamble recognises the need for a national system of schools which redresses the injustices 
                                                          
998  Discussed further in Chapter 6. This principle was illustrated in the case of Pillay at para 107, in which the 
court acknowledged that the exercise of religious rights may clash with a school’s responsibility to maintain 
order and discipline. As a result, the court held that a school may limit religious practices that place an 
unreasonable burden on or disrupts school activities.  See Lenta (n842) 290. 
999   Dickinson & van Vollenhoven (n14) 12; Also see the National Education Policy Act 27 of 1996 (“NEPA”), 
which provides for the determination of National policies in education. It establishes a system whereby the 
Minister of Education, in conjunction with the provincial departments, sets the political agenda and the 
national norms and standards for education planning, provision, governance, monitoring and evaluation. 
The provincial departments are given the task of implementing education policy and programmes that are in 
line with the national goals. According to the NEPA, the said policy must advance and protect the 
fundamental rights of every person guaranteed in Chapter 3 of the Constitution (now Chapter 2), and in 
terms of international conventions ratified by  Parliament,  and in particular - according to Section 4(a): The 
right of every person to be protected against unfair discrimination within or by an educational institution on 
any ground whatsoever; The right of a parent or guardian in respect of the education of his or her child; The 
right of every child in respect of his or her education; The right of every student to be instructed in the 
language of his or her choice where this is reasonably practicable; The right of every person to the freedoms 
of conscience, religion, thought, belief, opinion, expression and association within education institutions 
based on a common language, culture or religion, as long as there is no discrimination on the ground of 
race; The right of every person to use the language and participate in the cultural life of his or her choice 
within an educational institution. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development “Reviews 
on National Policies for Education: South Africa” (2008). 
1000  See Rivonia at para 35.  
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of the past; combats racism, unfair discrimination and intolerance and protects diverse 
cultures and languages.1001   
 
Importantly, section 3 of the Schools Act places an obligation on parents to assure their 
child’s attendance of school.1002 Essentially, the governance of every public school rests in the 
hands of the SGB.1003 The SGB is a democratically elected body comprising of all the 
stakeholders within the school, which include the principal, educators, parents, learners and 
other members of the staff.1004 The Act recognises that parents and the community are the best 
position to determine the needs of each particular school.1005 Section 18 of the Schools Act 
provides that SGBs must function in accordance with a written constitution which must 
comply with certain minimum requirements determined by provincial MECs for Education in 
the Provincial Gazettes.  
 
In relation to religion, section 7 of the Schools Act states that religious observances may be 
conducted at a public school under rules issued by the SGB if such observances are conducted 
on an equitable basis and attendance by learners and members of staff remains free and 
voluntary. This reiterates the principles set out in section 15 of the Constitution.  
 
In addition, the Schools Act makes provision for the adoption of codes of conduct by schools 
which would contain rules relating to religious observances and religious/cultural dress. 
Section 8(1) of the Act provides that:  
 
“(1) Subject to any applicable provincial law, a governing body of a public 
school must adopt a code of conduct for the learners after consultation 
with the learners, parents and educators of the school. 
      (2) A code of conduct referred to in subsection (1) must be aimed at 
establishing a disciplined and purposeful school environment, 
dedicated to the improvement and maintenance of the quality of the 
learning process.” 
 
                                                          
1001  Joubert & Prinsloo Education Law: A practical guide for educators (1997) 19.  
1002  Section 3(1) states that: “every parent must cause every learner for whom he or she is responsible to attend a 
school from the first school day of the year in which such learner reaches the age of seven years until the 
last school day of the year in which such learner reaches the age of fifteen years or the ninth grade.” 
1003   Section 16.  
1004   Section 23.  
1005  Department of Education 1997b Understanding the South African Schools Act, Pretoria: Department of 
Education. 
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This section illustrates the importance of the involvement of school-children and their parents 
in the establishment of school rules- but with due regard for the educational goals of the 
school.  
 
Furthermore, section 8(3) of the South African Schools Act authorises the Minister to enact 
guidelines for the “consideration” of schools. Some regulations are mandatory but most – 
including those relating to religion and culture– are merely suggestive, making use of the 
word “should”. The sections on religious and cultural diversity aim to “assist” schools in 
establishing a uniform policy. However, all that is required from an SGB is that it considers 
the guidelines when adopting a new code of conduct.  Ultimately, the guidelines issued by the 
Minister are therefore non-binding.1006  
 
A major concern with regards to the Schools Act is that section 20(1) provides that it is an 
SGB’s function to promote the “best interests of the school”. The Act, however, makes no 
express mention of the best interests of the learner child.1007 Section 8(5) mentions 
“safeguarding the interests of the learner and any other party involved in disciplinary 
proceedings.” This is a short-coming in the Act which overlooks the interests of children in 
proceedings other than disciplinary proceedings, such as religious/cultural exemption 
procedures, for example.1008 
 
Furthermore, section 20(1) of the Schools Act states that one of the functions of a SGB of a 
public school is to develop the mission statement,1009 and a code of conduct for the school, 
which would include the rules regarding the role of religion within that school or specifying a 
religious ethos which best suits the school concerned. In theory, allowing a SGB to determine 
the rules should mean that the rules are made with due sensitivity to the religious composition 
of each school. However, in practice, the situation may be very different. In this regard, 
Kumar observes: 
 
                                                          
1006  Pillay at para 34. For example, see Guidelines for the consideration of Governing Bodies in adopting a 
Code of Conduct for Learners. 
1007  Section 8(5) mentions “safeguarding the interests of the learner and any other party involved in disciplinary 
proceedings.” 
1008  This is addressed in Chapter 7.  
1009  Section 5(3) states that: “No learner may be refused admission to a public school on the grounds that his or 
her parent does not subscribe to the mission statement of the school.” This places the rights of the child to 
receive an education ahead of any lack of agreement between the parent and school.   
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 “While all of the education is mostly secular education, the claiming of a 
particular religious ethos for a school simply to ensure a particular 
religious education in that school can result in a situation where state law 
could get into a tricky situation regarding religion. In other words, 
constitutional provisions could be used for purposes of ensuring religious 
status for a school. Since all schools in South Africa receive some form 
of state subsidy, is it constitutionally right to create a school subsidised 
by the state and yet allow a particular religion to be its ethos?”1010 
 
After all, many South African are still in the process of transitioning from separate race 
schools to multi-racial/multi-faith schools1011 and the SGB, which holds the power and 
influence over a school’s stance on religion, may still consist mainly of members of the 
majority faith and their decisions may be biased and therefore infringe upon the rights of 
historically marginalised religious groups.1012 As a result, it can be argued that section 20(1) 
defers too much power to SGB’s. However, it can be counter-argued that the objectives of the 
state in allowing public schools to choose a religious ethos which best suits each schools is to 
acknowledge and show due respect for the religious majority within a school- which is a 
legitimate objective on the part of the state. After all, the rights of the religious majority 
cannot be completely overlooked for the sake of protection of minority rights.  
Importantly, the Schools Act also provides for the establishment of private schools provided 
that the education at these schools, are not inferior to public schools and their admission 
policies do not discriminate on the basis of race.1013 This echoes the requirements in section 
29(3) of the Constitution. Although private schools are generally maintained at the owner’s 
expense, in terms of the Schools Act, nothing precludes the state from subsidising a private 
educational institution.1014 Significantly, section 48(2) of Schools Act states that a state 
subsidy may be granted to independent schools out of funds appropriated by the provincial 
legislature for that purpose.  Inevitably, the use of public funding for private purposes is a 
controversial issue. Many believe that the state should only provide funding to secular public 
                                                          
1010  Kumar (n52) 281.  
1011         Pillay at para 174. 
1012  Rousseau points out that: “if your school’s character is explicitly defined as Christian, you have no option to 
disassociate yourself on a formal level, except by leaving the school. If there are no other schools in your 
area, or that are suitable for whatever reason, then you are compelled to study at a school that is Christian in 
character, despite the fact that public schools are not permitted to take on or practice the character of any 
particular religion.” See Rousseau “Religious education in South African schools” at 
Synapseshttp://synapses.co.za/religious-education-south-african-schools/ (Date accessed: 9 July 2013).  
1013   Section 46 (3).  
1014   National Norms and Standards for School Funding, GN 2362, GG 19347 of 12 October 1998, provides 
uniform national norms on private schools subsidies.   
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schools that are open to all children.1015 It submitted that the state must ensure that allocation 
of subsidies do not give unfair preferential treatment to particular religious groups.1016 Failure 
to do so would infringe the equality clause of the Constitution.  
By and large the Schools Act is the legislation dedicated to giving effect to the constitutional 
provisions pertaining to education rights. However, as is elaborated on in Chapter 7, there is 
room for improvement in the Act in the area of upholding children’s rights.  
4    NATIONAL POLICY ON RELIGION AND EDUCATION 
 
4.1   INTRODUCTION  
 
In addition to the abovementioned legislation, South Africa has adopted a National Policy on 
Religion and Education (the National Policy) which introduced compulsory “religion 
education”1017 in schools and follows the lead of the Constitution and the Schools Act by 
providing a broad framework within which schools will adopt their own approaches on 
religious observances/expression that best fits each school.1018 Furthermore, the National 
Policy does not prescribe rules but offers a structure within which schools can adopt policies 
on religious observances/expression while being well informed of their rights and 
responsibilities regarding religion in schools.1019 
  
The National Policy is applicable to all public schools. Importantly, it reconfirms the 
constitutional provision that citizens have the right to establish private schools, including 
religious schools that are independently funded, which avoid racial discrimination and 
maintain standards that are at least equal to that of public schools.1020  
 
4.2   BACKGROUND TO THE NATIONAL POLICY  
 
The January 1999 report from the Ministerial Committee for Religious Education, delivered 
during Dr. Sibusiso Bengu’s term as Minister of Education, stated that SGBs could determine 
                                                          
1015   Ashley (n932) 55.  
1016  Adhar  & Leigh (n26) 257. 
1017  Explained in Chapter 1 and in the discussion of the National Policy’s provisions below. 
1018  Asmal “Minister’s Foreword” in the National Policy. 
1019  Para 2.  
1020         Para 16.  
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the type of religious education to be offered in their schools, provided that it was consistent 
with the Constitution. The Bengu policy therefore allowed for provision of religious 
education from one religious perspective if the SGB saw fit.1021  
 
A new position emerged in June 1999 when the then newly appointed Minister of Education, 
Kader Asmal, took issue with the fact that religious education was being offered from a 
Christian perspective only.1022 He aspired to create and implement a policy which required 
schools to “reflect a South African identity in their culture, ethos, sport and teaching 
philosophy and practice.”1023 He believed that religious education should involve a 
comparative study of all religions. In his opinion, this would assist towards creating a South 
African society that reflects “unity without uniformity and diversity without divisiveness.”1024  
 
In fact, the new National Policy was a result of years of research and consultation. As it went 
through the process, there was an emerging consensus between participants as to the place of 
religion in education. Minister Asmal consulted with numerous other Ministers and religious 
leaders of the different religions and obtained support from many of them for the new Policy. 
The results made it clear that imposing religious practices on learners was 
unconstitutional.1025  
 
The state considered four possible models of education when drawing up the National Policy:  
 
 A theocratic model where the state aligns itself with a particular religion and imposes 
that religion in public institutions. The state recognised that this would be 
inappropriate in a multi-faith country;  
 A repressionist model, which requires the state to suppress religion and eliminate it 
from public life.  The state recognised that the majority of South Africans are 
religiously active and that showing hostility towards religion would result in 
tremendous outrage from the public.  
 The seperationist model recognises that a modern secular state could be established 
that is neither religious nor anti-religious, but instead is impartial to all religions and 
                                                          
1021  Dickinson & van Vollenhoven (n14) 15.  
1022  15.  
1023         Pretorius “Asmal plans a lesson for the rainbow classroom” 9 January 2000 Sunday Times 2. 
1024   The National Policy.  
1025  The National Policy paras 6, 7 and 12.  
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worldviews. In other words, the religious and secular spheres of society are kept 
completely separate, as in the United States of America and France. The state 
recognised that this model is difficult to implement and not desirable in South Africa, 
a country in which the state is committed to engaging religious institutions and 
recognises their value in improving the quality of life of South Africans; and  
 A co-operative model which creates separate spheres for religion and the state but still 
leaves room for interaction between the two. It protects religious freedom, protects 
citizens from discrimination based on religion, protects citizens from religious 
coercion and encourages dialogue between religious institutions and the state.1026 
 
Resultantly, the state proposed a co-operative model which encompasses both constitutional 
separation and mutual recognition, a model which it believed was best for both religion and 
education.  In terms of this model, the state was required to be impartial about religion, to 
neither advance nor inhibit a particular religion, but to recognise the equal value of all 
religions and secular worldviews.1027 Most importantly, the new model emphasised that 
religious indoctrination had no place in schools.1028  
 
Minister Asmal’s views on religion were also were reflected in the Manifesto on Values, 
Education and Democracy (“the Manifesto”), published in August 2001.1029 Importantly, this 
document asserts that the state is not responsible for the religious upbringing of a child, but 
rather for providing knowledge about religion, morality, values and the diversity of 
religions.1030  
 
 
                                                          
1026   Para 3; Sachs expresses positivity about the co-operative model as being the best option in the South 
African context. See Sachs “Religion, Education and Constitutional Law” 1993, Institute for Comparative 
Religion in South Africa 171-172.  
1027   Para 4; See de Waal et al “Furthering national values through religion in public school education: 
Comparing the United States, Australia and South Africa” 2010: Special Issue Journal for Juridical Science 
45 60-61.   
1028      Joubert “Godsdiens-gekarring” 12 Junie 2001 Die Beeld 1.  
1029   On the issue of values, the Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy (“the Manifesto”), highlights 
ten key constitutional values namely: nationhood: democracy, social justice and equity, equality, non-
racism, non-sexism, Ubuntu (human dignity) and an open society, accountability/ responsibility, the rule of 
law, respect, and reconciliation; Furthermore, the Manifesto goes on to identify 16 strategies that are 
appropriate to embedding these values in education. The strategies include: 1) talking in the classroom 
about a culture of human rights; 2) making arts and culture part of the curriculum; 3) putting history back 
into the curriculum and introducing religion education into schools.  
             1030     Dickinson & van Vollenhoven (n14) 16. 
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4.3   PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL POLICY 
From the outset, it is necessary to point out that the National Policy makes a distinction 
between “religion education” and “religious instruction”.1031  Religion education has non-
devotional, educational aims and objectives for teaching and learning about different 
religions.1032 In other words, it aims for religion to be taught from a neutral or academic 
standpoint without giving preference to one religion. Religious instruction, on the other hand, 
provides instruction in a particular religion with a view to promoting adherence thereto.1033 It 
is therefore devotional in its objective.1034 According to the National Policy, whereas religion 
education has a place in schools, religious education does not. Importantly, the National 
Policy correctly emphasises that “[c]onfessional or sectarian forms of religious instruction in 
public schools are inappropriate” in a religiously diverse society.1035  
 
According the National Policy, permitting religion education in schools caters to the reality of 
religious plurality in South Africa, while still respecting a religiously active South Africa.1036 
Evidently, the state believes that it is the responsibility of public schools to educate learners 
about religion. In terms of the National Policy, the public school is charged with the task of 
instilling in learners with “the knowledge about religion and morality and values and the 
diversity of religions.”1037 In this way learners are made aware of the common values that all 
religions uphold, including service to others, tolerance, increasing understanding and reducing 
prejudice. In addition, they will learn to accept, interact and engage with others of different 
                                                          
1031      As mentioned in Chapter 1 and emphasised again in Chapter 6; See more on this distinction in Kruger 
“Models of Religious Education: Personal correspondence to the editor” in Challenge (May 1997) 5.  
1032      National Policy para 17.  
1033      See definition section of the National Policy. The Manifesto also makes a distinction between religious 
education and religion education (See para 44). According to the Manifesto, religious education delves into 
the spiritual aspects of one particular religion, a matter which is better dealt with in the home environment, 
and religion education involves a study of all forms of religion from an academic or historical standpoint, 
which has a place in the school curriculum. 
1034      Para 23.  
1035       Para 22. 
1036  Para 7;  In order to achieve this, the Department of Education is guided by the following principles: 1)The 
relationship between religion and education must be in line with the constitutional values of citizenship, 
human rights, equality, freedom from discrimination, and freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief, 
and opinion; 2) Public institutions are responsible for teaching about religion and religions but not for 
religious education which should be provided at home and within the religious community; 3) Religion 
education should create an informed community unified in its diversity and  4) Religion education must be 
facilitated by trained professionals who make use of credible learning materials and utilising objective 
assessment criteria. See National Policy para 8. 
1037       Para 16. 
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faiths, and have an informed understanding about the traditions of others, while at the same 
time adhering to their own faith and traditions.1038  
 
Religion education forms part of the compulsory school curriculum as part of the Life 
Orientation Learning Area, under the focus area: Social Development from Grade R to 9,1039 
and under Learning Outcome 2: Citizenship Education from Grade 10 to 12.1040 In addition, a 
separate subject of Religious Studies is offered as an optional, specialised and examinable 
subject form Grade 10-12.1041 The objectives of the state in including religion in the school 
curriculum are indeed praiseworthy. The National Policy envisions a society in which young 
people grow up to be knowledgeable and respectful of each other’s religions.   
 
Significantly, the National Policy recognises South Africa’s cultural and religious diversity as 
a national asset. It emphasises the need to celebrate diversity as a national resource as is 
encouraged by the South African coat or arms which states: !Ke E:/Xarra //ke (Unity in 
Diversity). This is stated as one of the National Policy’s primary goals.1042 This provision 
reflects the belief of the state that religion education can contribute to promoting respect for 
diversity and creating progressive values for the future. This is particularly important in light 
of South Africa’s history of suppression of religious diversity and favouritism of one faith 
above others. The importance of celebrating diversity was also emphasised by the 
Constitutional Court in recent cases involving discrimination, namely Pillay1043 and 
Fourie.1044 
 
Moreover, the objective of celebrating diversity is also reflected in the inclusion of culture1045 
in the public school curriculum and the promotion of multi-lingualism in the state’s policy on 
language in public schools.1046 The Arts and Culture learning area encompasses learning 
about various aspects of different cultures.1047   Similarly to the objectives of National Policy, 
                                                          
1038        Para 19.  
1039  Para 32; See National Curriculum Statement for Grades R-9 (Schools) 2002.    
1040  Education Rights Project (n280) 10.  
1041  National Policy para 33; Dreyer (n283) 44.   
1042  Para 10.  
1043  Pillay at para 107. 
1044  Fourie at para 60.  
1045  The connection between religion and culture is explained in Chapter 1 and discussed in detail in Chapter 6.  
1046  The relevance of this point is addressed in detail in Chapter 7.  
1047  The Arts and Culture learning area includes: reflecting on cultural practices and arts activities participating 
and collaborating in Arts and Culture activities, expressing and communicating through various art forms. 
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its inclusion in the curriculum “provides a way for the values of equality, non-racism, non-
sexism, ubuntu, openness, reconciliation and respect to be instilled in young people.”1048 
Furthermore, the current language policy1049 aims to promote multi-lingualism1050 by 
compelling learners to learn at least one additional language that is not their mother-
tongue.1051 In fact, as early as next year the language policy may include the compulsory 
learning of an African language, owing to the “changing profile of learner population”  and in 
order to “promote multilingualism” and foster “social cohesion”.1052 For practical and social 
reasons, it is to the benefit of South African learners to be proficient in more than one 
language1053 and to learn about and understand diverse cultures.1054 The corresponding goals 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
See Department of Education, Republic of South Africa: National Curriculum Statement Assessment 
Guidelines for General Education and Training (Intermediate and Senior Phases) Arts and Culture 4. 
1048  See the Manifesto (Executive Summary). 
1049  Language in Education Policy in terms of Section 3(4)(m) of the National Education Policy Act, 1996, 
Government Notice (No. 383, Vol. 17797) on language policy in (school) education of 14 July 1997 
(“Language Policy”). 
1050  The Preamble of the Language Policy “recognises that our cultural diversity is a valuable national asset and 
hence is tasked, amongst other things, to promote multilingualism, the development of the official 
languages, and respect for all languages used in the country.”  
1051  Section 6 of the Language Policy states: “All learners shall offer at least one approved language as a subject 
in Grade 1 and Grade 2. From Grade 3 (Std 1) onwards, all learners shall offer their language of learning 
and teaching and at least one additional approved language as subjects. From Grade 10 to Grade 12 two 
languages must be passed, one on first language level, and the other on at least second language level. At 
least one of these languages must be an official language.” Wright states: “South Africa’s excellent LIEP is 
one of additive multilingualism…When they finish school, learners should be proficient in their home 
language and in a second language, as well as having a sound knowledge of an additional language.” Wright 
“Implications of the National Language Policy in the South African Classroom” (Research paper).  
1052  Jones states: “An African language - including Afrikaans - will be compulsory for all pupils until matric, 
according to a new policy which could be implemented at all schools from as early as next year.” See Jones 
“African languages to be compulsory for all pupils” at http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/african-
languages-to-be-compulsory-for-all-pupils-1.1531279#.Udu77HYaLIU (Date accessed: 9 July 2013); This 
is in line with Article 12 of the SADC Protocol on Culture, Information and Sport mentioned in n547 above  
1053  Meersman states: “The fact is the vast majority of South Africans are not first-language English speakers. 
Not understanding an African language excludes oneself from most people.” “Language is the new 
apartheid, says Dowling. If you are only Xhosa-speaking you have this additional hurdle to get a job or 
promotion. Poverty and language are linked.” “But the real benefit is that you feel you can belong in places 
you never really did before.” See Meersman “Why learn an African language?” at 
http://www.thoughtleader.co.za/brentmeersman/2013/05/24/why-learn-an-african-language/(Date accessed: 
9 July 2013); It has been stated that: “Learning a new language offers many new career opportunities as 
well as other advantages which are often ignored. Among the less obvious benefits is the change in 
perspective one will gain from seeing the world through different eyes. Every language expresses ideas in 
its own particular manner, giving us the ability to see things from another angle and thus allowing us to gain 
new insights of ourselves, our native culture and the world around us.” See Anon “The Advantages of being 
multilingual” at http://www.themagicalfrog.com/themagicalfrog-com/_img/pdf/Advantages-of-being-
Multilingual.pdf (Date accessed: 15 July 2013).  
1054  Levy states: “The key to the future lies in helping the next generation to respect and embrace diversity 
rather than fear and reject differences.” See Levy “Culture in the Classroom” 1997 Early Childhood News 
28 33 or http://www.earlychildhoodnews.com/earlychildhood/article_view.aspx?ArticleID=141 (Date 
accessed: 15 July 2013); Browne states that the inclusion of the Arts and Culture learning area will 
“contribute towards the establishment of a shared national heritage and identity that will prepare them for 
life, living and lifelong learning.” Through Learning outcome 3 the “learner will develop sensitivity towards 
fellow learners, also to those from other cultures.”  See Browne The Implementation of the Arts and Culture 
Learning Area in Previously Disadvantaged Primary Schools in the Nelson Mandela Bay Area: Teacher 
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of the curriculum on religion, culture and language reflects a holistic approach by the state to 
“celebrate diversity” in all aspects in the school environment.1055  
Aside from its provision on religion education, the National Policy recognises instances in the 
past where schools and other public institutions have discriminated on the grounds of 
religious belief. It expresses the sentiment that, most often, learners of minority faiths were 
subjected to religious observances of the majority-followed Christian faith. Therefore, the 
core provision of the National Policy is that South African schools can no longer impose 
religious practices on schoolchildren.1056 This is in accordance with section 15(2) of the 
Constitution and section 9(2) of the Constitution.  
In this regard, the National Policy addresses the issue of the school assembly which has for a 
long time been viewed as an occasion for religious observance.1057 It emphasises that “where 
religious observance is organised as an official part of the school day, it must accommodate 
and reflect the multi-religious nature of the country”1058 in an appropriate manner.1059 This 
may include allowing learners to excuse themselves on grounds of religion or conscience and 
making equitable arrangements for them in this period.1060 The multi-religious nature of a 
school can be acknowledged, for example, by rotating opportunities for observances by all 
religions in a way that proportionately resembles all the religions in the schools; or by reading 
from religious texts from various faiths; or using a universal prayer or moment of silence.1061 
The National Policy also emphasises that where learners are separated for the purposes of 
religious observances, the school must consider the impact of peer pressure on children and 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Experiences (2011) 24 24-25. Lutz and Kuhlman state that: “The ‘rest of the world’ is pluralistic and 
diverse with many ethnic, religious, and cultural traditions. It is that tapestry of diversity that we choose to 
value as we help students recognize and respect people who differ from themselves and/or appreciate their 
many similarities. Learning about other cultures and ethnicities is one way to combat prejudice. As children 
learn about new cultures and fit their experiences with their new learning, they can appreciate all people’s 
uniqueness and similarities and not rely on racial and ethnic generalizations.” Lutz & Kuhlman “Arts and 
Young Children: Learning About Culture through Dance in Kindergarten Classrooms” 2000 28(1) Early 
Childhood Education Journal 35 35.  
1055  This is an important point to bear in mind in relation to the discussion on teaching religion in public schools 
addressed in Chapter 7.  
1056  National Policy para 12. 
1057  Prinsloo A Critical Evaluation on the South African Policy on Religion and Education (2003) 276.  
1058  National Policy para 61.  
1059  Para 62 states that “appropriate means may include the following: 1) The separation of learners according to 
religion, where the observance takes place outside of the context of a school assembly, and with equitably 
supported opportunities for observance by all faiths, and appropriate use of the time for those holding 
secular or humanist beliefs; 2) Rotation of opportunities for observance, in proportion to the representation 
of different religions in the school; 3) Selected readings from various texts emanating from different 
religions; 4) The use of a universal prayer; or  5)A period of silence.”  
1060   Para 63.  
1061   Para 62.  
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the negative impact on those who are identified as “different”.1062 In addition, the National 
Policy encourages respect and accommodation for religious dress, religious holidays and 
religious dietary requirements by schools.1063 
 
In light of the above, it must be acknowledged that the National Policy is laudable in 
principle. Nevertheless, it is not without its problems.1064  Despite its worthy objectives, it 
must be questioned whether or not compulsory religion education is in accordance with the 
religious freedom of school-children and their parents. Furthermore, it is questionable 
whether religion (in any format) can be taught from a completely “neutral” perspective at all.  
It is important to note that neither SGB’s nor parents have any input in the curriculum content 
so as to ensure the “neutrality” of the information.1065 A further concern with this approach is 
that if education about different religions is permitted, there is still a danger of abuse of 
authority by teachers who may continue to indoctrinate learners with particular religious 
beliefs.1066 This key issue is discussed and analysed in Chapter 7. 
 
5   THE BILL OF RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE YOUTH OF SOUTH 
AFRICA 
Also connected to the state’s aim of instilling values in school children is the introduction of 
the Bill of Responsibilities for the Youth of South Africa (the Bill), launched by the 
Department of Education in March 2008. The Bill was drafted in collaboration with 
LeadSA1067 and the National Religious Leaders Forum (NRLF).1068 The contents of the Bill 
are purportedly based on the Bill of Rights1069 with the aim of transforming the 
constitutionally given human rights into a practical set of personal responsibilities for South 
                                                          
1062         Para 62.  
1063  Para 59 states that: “an observance which may be ongoing, and entail other dimensions such as dress, prayer 
times and diets, which must be respected and accommodated in a manner agreed upon by the school and the 
relevant faith authorities.”  
1064  See Chapter 7. 
1065   Prinsloo (n1057) 349-350.  
1066         Adhar & Leigh (n26) 245.  
1067   Lead SA is a Primedia Broadcasting and Independent Newspapers initiative that encourages South Africans 
to seek to “do the right thing”  through various projects. It was launched in August 2010. See Lead SA 
“Lead SA Projects” at http://leadsa.co.za/?page_id=7281 (Date accessed: 7 January 2010).  
1068        Goldberg “Chief Rabbi powers Bill of Responsibilities” 27 Jul- 3 Aug 2007 SA Jewish Report 4. 
1069         See Preamble.  
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African youth. The Bill is meant to be displayed on the classroom wall in every classroom in 
the country and its contents taught as part of the Life Orientation syllabus.1070 
The objective of the Bill is to generate a culture of responsibility that begins at school level 
and then filters into the rest of society.1071 The Bill states:  
 
“South Africa is a diverse nation, and equality does not mean 
uniformity, or that we are all the same. Our country’s motto: !KE E: 
/XARRA //KE, meaning “Diverse people unite”, calls on all of us to 
build a common sense of belonging and national pride, celebrating the 
very diversity which makes us who we are. It also calls on us to 
extend our friendship and warmth to all nations and all the peoples of 
the world in our endeavour to build a better world.”1072 
 
It must be noted that section 15(1) of the Constitution protects not only freedom of religion 
but also “conscience”, “thought”, “belief” and “opinion”.1073 Importantly , the Bill states that 
the right to freedom of conscience1074 requires the youth to not only allow others to choose 
and practice the religion of their choice, to hold their own beliefs and opinions and express 
them, but also to “respect the beliefs and opinions of others”, even when in strong 
disagreement with those beliefs and opinions.1075 According to the Bill, this is a requirement 
of democracy.  
 
The concept of creating a Bill which emphasises the youth’s responsibilities towards others 
and attempts to cultivate respect for diversity, is indeed praiseworthy; however, since it’s 
unveiling, the Bill has been subject to criticism for presenting religion and religious leaders as 
the moral authorities in society and for being too religious1076 and paternalistic by 
indoctrinating the youth with conservative values.1077  
                                                          
1070    Goldberg (n1068) 4. 
1071    4.  
1072    The same sentiments of celebrating diversity were expressed by the Constitutional Court Pillay at para 107 
and is contained in the National Policy (discussed above).  
1073         These concepts are defined in the discussion on section 15 in Chapter 6.  
1074   According to De Waal and Currie, conscience relates to moral judgement. See De Waal & Currie (n18) 290; 
Morality and religion are inextricably related. See Devlin The Enforcement of Morals (1965) 4. 
1075         See the Bill. 
1076   Chief Rabbi, Warren Goldstein, an executive member of the NRLF, has stated that the idea for a Bill of 
Responsibilities is “very much based on Judaism”... “The Torah speaks in the language of tomorrow. The 
significance of the bill for South Africa in the 21st century is to transform the society into a better one, the 
country into a better place, its thrust comes from the Torah itself and to remind us that ‘G-d’s wisdom is for 
all time.’” See Goldberg (n1068) 4; Ebrahim Bham, an executive member of the NRLF stated that: “for a 
Muslim, [the] responsibilities outlined in the Bill constitute religious duty.” Also it has been reported that 
the launch of the Bill in Cape Town, was opened by a teacher saying “I greet you all in the name of the 
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Initially, in the provisions dealing with equality, the Bill stated that the right to equality places 
a responsibility on everyone not to discriminate unfairly against anyone else “on the basis of 
race, gender, religion, national, - ethnic- or social origin, disability, culture, language, status 
or appearance.”1078 This section omitted many of the important and progressive grounds upon 
which discrimination is forbidden in section 9 of the Constitution and the Equality Act, 
namely: gender, sex, marriage, pregnancy, colour, disability, conscience, belief and sexual 
orientation. The omission of sexual orientation was particularly disturbing considering the 
discrimination endured by gay, lesbian and transgendered youth in the school 
environment.1079 This served as a primary example of how the Bill, a purportedly secular 
document, promoted particular conservative beliefs. On a positive note, this provision in the 
Bill has been amended to include all the grounds contained in section 9 of the Constitution, 
including sexual orientation.  
However, a few other problem areas still persist. For example, the right to family and parental 
care places a duty on the youth to honour and respect their parents, to help them, to be kind 
and loyal to all family members and to “recognise that love means long-term commitment, 
and the responsibility to establish strong and loving families.”1080 This provision is 
particularly bizarre.  It reflects a conservative view of the meaning of love and family. It is 
submitted that it is not the duty of the state to dictate the meaning of love to its citizens. 
Furthermore, it is not for the state to decide what constitutes a “strong, loving” family.  An 
individual may not have any inclination to establish a family at all- that is a matter of personal 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Lord, our Saviour Jesus Christ.” See Rousseau “Bill of Responsibilities for the Youth of South Africa” at 
http://synapses.co.za/bill-responsibilities-youth-south-africa/ (Date accessed: 20 November 2011). 
1077    Bilchitz “Indoctrination in the Name of the Constitution: the Bill of Responsibilities” at 
http://www.saifac.org.za/docs/2008/publ_outreach/Bill%20of%20Responsibilities.pdf (Date accessed: 19 
February 2011). 
1078   See the Bill.  
   1079  Bilchitz (n1077); In this regard De vos writes: “Given the fact that gay, lesbian and transgender youth are 
particularly vulnerable as they are still coming to terms with their sexuality — a sexuality they are often told 
by parents, by their religious leaders, by teachers and by fellow learners are perverted and sinful — it is an 
outrage that this document deliberately skirts the issue. Gay, lesbian and transgender youth are often 
relentlessly taunted and bullied by peers — which in extreme cases lead to suicide — yet this document 
suggests that it is perfectly acceptable to discriminate against them.” See De Vos “What a load of dangerous 
nonsense” at http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/category/freedom-of-religion/ (Date accessed: 10 June 
2011). 
1080   See the Bill.  
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choice depending on each person’s freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and 
opinion.1081   
Moreover, the Bill places a limitation on free expression in that it requires that the youth “not 
tell or spread lies, and to ensure others are not insulted or have their feelings hurt.”1082 It is 
questionable whether this limitation is reasonable and justifiable or not.  It limits the youths’ 
right to exercise their constitutional right to freedom of expression (which is the 
implementation of freedom of religion, thought and belief) without fear of insulting or hurting 
the feelings of others. This stipulation goes far beyond the specific exclusions on freedom of 
expression contained in section 16 of the Constitution.1083  The concern is that it requires that 
the youth be passive and obedient and withhold expression of any controversial opinions.1084  
 
Overall, the Bill, with its conservative religious undercurrent, is construed by some as 
religious indoctrination and contrary to the Constitution. The National Policy, discussed 
above, which is also said to flow “directly from … Constitutional values”, expresses that 
public schools “may not violate the religious freedom of pupils and teachers by imposing 
religious uniformity.”1085 However, the Bill, in certain respects, runs contrary to this. As a 
result, there have been calls for a re-drafting of the Bill to truly reflect the values of all South 
Africans.1086 Until then, there is concern that the Bill will continue to impact upon learners’ 
freedom of religion in South African schools by continuing to influence them towards 
adopting a particular conservative brand of beliefs.   
 
6  CONCLUSION  
 
The South African Constitution guarantees everyone the immediately realisable and equally 
accessible right to “basic education”.1087 Significantly, the Constitutional Court has made an 
                                                          
1081  As protected by section 15 of the Constitution, elaborated on in Chapter 6.  
1082         See the Bill.   
1083   Section 16(2) of the Constitution states that freedom of expression does not extend to- 
             “(a) propaganda for war; 
              (b) incitement of imminent violence; or 
              (c) advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and 
that constitutes incitement to cause harm.” 
1084   De Vos (n1079). 
1085   National Policy para 63; See Rousseau (n1076). 
  1086   Bilchitz (n1077).  
1087  Section 29(1). 
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express link between the best interests of the child principle and the duties of the state to fulfil 
the right to basic education1088 and address the problem of unequal access to education.1089  
  
Furthermore, section 29(2) of the Constitution provides for the right to receive education in 
the official language of one’s choice where reasonably practicable. Overall, in the 
interpretation of section 29(2), South African case law has indicated that in the interests of 
equalising access to education, the equality rights of children may supersede the language 
rights of schools. Since the issues regarding language, race and religion are inevitably 
intertwined, much of the principles extracted from the case law pertaining to language rights, 
are applicable to matters concerning religion.1090 
 
Importantly, section 20(1) of the Schools Act allows SGB’s to develop the rules regarding the 
role of religion within schools in a way which serves the best interests of each school. This 
means that the school can establish a religious ethos and create rules which acknowledge the 
majority faith. However, schools have to ensure that in doing so, that they do not unfairly 
discriminate against children who do not belong to the chosen faith. Regrettably, the Schools 
Act emphasises the importance of protecting the interests of the schools but does not make 
mention of the best interests of the child principle.1091 Neither is this principle mentioned in 
the National Policy. This impact of this on children’s rights in the context of religion in 
schools is addressed later on this thesis.1092 
 
Importantly, the state has attempted to address the legal issues pertaining to the teaching of 
religion in public schools through the provisions of the National Policy, which provides for 
non-devotional religion education as part of the school curriculum. The National Policy aims 
to eliminate sectarian religious education that caters only to majority beliefs. Instead, it 
introduces compulsory religion education into the curriculum, which involves an academic 
study of different religions. The aim is to teach religious tolerance and foster an 
understanding between faiths at school level. Although this is a seemingly positive change 
towards respecting religious diversity, it must be questioned whether compulsory religion 
education is in accordance with freedom of religion. Also it must be questioned whether a 
                                                          
1088  Rivonia at para 69. 
1089  Rivonia at para 2.  
1090  Mentioned in Chapter 2; Illustrated in discussion on freedom of religion of children in private schools in 
Chapter 7.  
1091  See Chapter 7.  
1092  See Chapter 7. 
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subject as personal as religion can be taught in a neutral/objective perspective. It is submitted 
that the problem lies both in the content of the subject and the manner in which the subject is 
taught. This is a key area of concern that requires further analysis in this thesis.1093  
 
Also, integrally linked to education rights are associational rights. The Constitution 
guarantees everyone the rights to freedom of association. However, it also ensures protection 
from unfair discrimination through the equality clause. There is concern that associational 
rights exercised within schools may conflict with other rights such as children’s rights, 
freedom of religion and the right to equality. As is illustrated, the tussle between these 
competing rights is particularly problematic in religion-based private schools.1094   
 
From the perspective of religion, the establishment of private schools remains an area of 
concern. On one hand the right to establish private schools enhances religious and cultural 
rights; but on the other hand, it does not afford the equal opportunity to learners who are not 
of the chosen faith to assert their religious freedom at school. The interpretation of section 
29(3) in Wittmann, allows private schools to require religious conformity by way of a waiver 
of the freedom of religion of the non-adherent child. This thesis questions whether this 
interpretation is in accordance with the values reflected in the Constitution.1095  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
1093  See Chapter 7.  
1094  See Chapter 7. 
1095  See Chapter 7.  
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CHAPTER 6 
FREEDOM OF RELIGION  
 
“Only the individual can think, and thereby create new values 
for society, nay, even set up new moral standards to which the 
life of the community conforms. ... The ideals which have 
lighted my way, and time after time have given me new courage 
to face life cheerfully, have been Kindness, Beauty and 
Truth.”1096 
 
1   INTRODUCTION  
 
The purpose of this Chapter is to outline and assess the current South African law pertaining 
to freedom of religion, the basis of which is section 15 of the Constitution.  This Chapter 
explores the constitutional provisions relating to freedom of religion, as well as the 
connection between religion, culture and freedom of expression.1097  
 
The Chapter discusses freedom of religion in accordance with the following themes: 1) the 
protection of religion in the Constitution 2) the nature of freedom of religion; 3) the waiver of 
freedom of religion; 4) unfair discrimination on the basis of religion; 5) the relationship 
between religion and culture; 6) Determining centrality and sincerity in cases involving 
religion and culture; 7) the relationship between religion and freedom of expression; 8) a 
school’s duty to limit freedom of religion and 9) reasonable accommodation of religious 
practices in schools. Lastly, this Chapter contains a discussion on the South African Charter 
of Religious Rights and Freedoms – which aims to enhance the religious rights in section 15. 
 
The discussion herein must be considered in light of South Africa’s international obligations 
with regards to freedom of religion and within the context of South Africa’s history on 
                                                          
1096  Albert Einstein, 1954.  
1097  The rights to dignity; equality and freedom of association have already been discussed in previous Chapters 
and therefore need not be discussed separately in this Chapter; however, must be borne in mind throughout 
this Chapter. 
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religion in schools; also bearing in mind the children’s rights issues and educational issues 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively.  
 
2    FREEDOM OF RELIGION   
 
2.1   THE PROTECTION OF RELIGION IN THE CONSTITUTION 
 
Importantly, the Constitution guarantees everyone the right to freedom of religion, which 
includes the right to hold religious beliefs; to announce one’s religious beliefs publicly and 
the right to manifest such beliefs.1098 Section 15 of the Bill of Rights states that:  
   
        “(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, 
thought, belief and opinion.  
(2) Religious observances may be conducted at state or state-aided 
institutions, provided that: 
          (a) those observances follow rules made by the appropriate 
public authorities;  
          (b) they are conducted on an equitable basis; and 
          (c) attendance at them is free and voluntary.” 
 
Although this thesis has primarily focussed on the term “religion”, section 15(1) of the 
Constitution protects not only religion but also “conscience”, “thought”, “belief” and 
“opinion”. The term religion is not an easy term to define. The dictionary meaning of religion 
is an “action or conduct indicating belief in, obedience to, and reverence for a god, gods, or 
similar superhuman power; the performance of religious rites or observances.”1099 John Witte 
offers a broad definition, namely that religion:  
 
“embraces all beliefs and actions that concern the ultimate origin, 
meaning, and purpose of life, of existence. It involves the responses 
of the human heart, soul, mind, conscience, intuition, and reason to 
revelation, to transcendent values, to fundamental questions.”1100  
 
                                                          
1098  Prince at para 38.  
1099  Oxford English dictionary 
athttp://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/161944p://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/1619
44 (Date accessed: 2 April 2013).  
1100  Witte God’s joust, God’s justice – Law and religion in the Western tradition (2006) 100-101; Witte also 
offers a narrower definition that religion embraces “a creed, a cult, a code of conduct, and a confessional 
community”. Quoted in Venter (n873) 434. 
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It is clear by these definitions that religion is not founded “solely upon reason, but primarily 
upon belief.”1101 The inclusion of religion in the same clause as belief and conscience, both of 
which relate to an individual’s state of mind; emphasises that religion is understood as a set of 
beliefs that an individual may hold regardless of others. It is understood to be individualistic 
and personal.1102 Included in religious freedom is the right to reject religious beliefs; meaning 
that belief systems that are not religious, are equally protected alongside religion. 
 
The term “belief” in section 15 refers to beliefs that are not centred on a God or deity, such as, 
rationalism or free thought.1103 Van der Schyff notes that it covers other secular belief systems 
that are not religious, for example, atheism,1104 agnosticism secular humanism.1105 In the case 
of Wittmann, Van Dijkhorst J held that: “[Religion] cannot include the concepts of atheism or 
agnosticism which are the very antithesis of religion.”1106 
 
The term “conscience” denotes moral judgement.1107 Van der Vyver comments that freedom 
of conscience is far wider than religion or belief, since it includes both persuasions that are 
religious and those that are not.1108 However, he notes that “thought” is the widest of the 
concepts included in section 15.1109 “Thought” encompasses all application of human 
reason.1110  It is clear that section 15(1) covers this wide range of views of learners at schools, 
including religious, philosophical and political views.1111 
 
                                                          
1101  436. 
1102  Pillay at para 143.   
1103  De Waal & Currie (n18) 290; Murdoch (for the Council of European Human Rights) states that: “the belief 
must ‘attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance’; and secondly, the belief itself 
must be one which may be considered as compatible with respect for human dignity. In other words, the 
belief must relate to a ‘weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behavior’ and also be such as to be 
deemed worthy of protection in European democratic society.” See Murdoch Protecting the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion under the European Convention on Human Rights: Council of 
Europe Human Rights Handbooks (2012) 16; See discussion in Campbell and Cosans v. the United 
Kingdom [1982] ECHR 1 (25 February 1982) §36. 
1104  Atheism is defined as “the position that affirms the non-existence of God. It proposes positive disbelief 
rather than mere suspension of belief.” See Rowe “Atheism” in Routledge (ed) Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy 1998.  
1105  Van der Schyff (n34) 61-62; See Farlam “The ambit of the right to freedom of religion: a commentary on S 
v Solberg” 1998 14 SAJHR 298 308 fn 20; De Waal and Currie concur that atheism would be included 
under belief or conscience. See De Waal & Currie (n18) 290.  
1106   Para 449. See full quote in Chapter 3.  
1107  De Waal & Currie (n18) 290. 
1108  Van der Vyver “Suspension, derogation and de facto deprivation of fundamental rights in Bophuthatswana 
1994 THRHR 257 267; Van der Schyff (n34) 61-62.  
1109  Van der Vyver (n1108) 265. 
1110  De Waal & Currie (n18) 290. 
1111   Naidu “The right to freedom of thought and religion and to freedom of expression and opinion” 1987 Obiter 
59 62. 
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Section 15(2) deals with the right to conduct “religious” observances. Ultimately, section 
15(2) places a responsibility on the state to create conditions for the exercise of religious 
freedom within schools and other state-aided institutions,1112 without favouring any particular 
religion.1113 This does not require that schools make provision for prayers from every 
denomination represented in the pupil body; but it does allow for prayers that are considered 
to be most appropriate for a particular school,1114 to be conducted in an equitable manner and 
in a manner that does not amount to direct or indirect coercion of those learners from other 
faiths.1115  
 
In this regard, a distinction must be drawn between religious instruction, religion education 
and religious observance.  Religious observance refers to individual or collective scripture 
reading, prayers, moments of silence for personal devotion or meditation and, possibly, the 
exhibition of symbols.1116 On the other hand, religious instruction refers to the teaching of 
specific religious beliefs. Religion education refers to the teaching about different religions 
and worldviews from an academic perspective. Whereas the right to conduct religious 
observances in school is expressly protected by the Constitution, the right to receive religious 
instruction or religion education are not.1117 Significantly, in terms of section 15(2), religious 
observances are required to be free and voluntary.  A good indicator of this is way in which 
the school treats the non-participants.1118 This element of freedom of choice to participate in 
religious observances is an essential component to freedom of religion.   
 
2.2   THE NATURE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION  
 
The nature of the right to freedom of religion has been interpreted on numerous occasions by 
the Constitutional Court. In S v Lawrence (“Lawrence”),1119 Chaskalson P relied on the 
                                                          
1112  A state-aided institutions is neither public (as in state-controlled) nor private; rather, it lies somewhere in 
between. De Waal and Currie define state aided institution as “not public, but funded by the state to an 
appreciable extent and subject to extensive state regulation.” The term “state- aided institution” includes 
more than schools; it includes, for example, other educational institutions; state hospitals and state prisons. 
See De Waal & Currie (n18) 303. Van der Schyff observes that the institutions connection to the state is 
more relevant than the function of the institution itself. See Van der Schyff (n34) 66.  
   1113     Dickinson & van Vollenhoven (n14) 12. 
1114  See also section 20(1) of the Schools Act.  
1115  Devenish (n52) 92.  
1116   Foster et al (n34); Van der Schyff The Right to Freedom of Religion in South Africa (2001) 151; See Human 
Rights Committee General Comment No. 22 (n482).    
1117  Dickinson & van Vollenhoven (n14) 16. 
1118  Addressed in Chapter 7.  
1119  1997 4 SA 1176 (CC) (“Lawrence”). 
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definition of freedom of religion proposed by Supreme Court of Canada Canadian case 
resting on similar facts, namely R v Big M Drug Mart (“Big M Drug Mart”); which offered a 
comprehensive summary of the components of freedom of religion. In his judgement, 
Dickson CJC stated as follows:  
 
 “The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to 
entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to 
declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or 
reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and 
practice or by teaching and dissemination.”1120
         
 
However, Dickson CJC went on to say freedom of religion means more than this; it also 
implies an absence of coercion or constraint, meaning that freedom of religion may be 
impaired by measures that force people to act or refrain from acting in a manner contrary to 
their religious beliefs.1121 The dissenting judgement offered a much wider definition, infusing 
freedom of religion with an equality aspect, not just the requirement of voluntariness.1122 The 
argument in favour of recognising the equality aspect in freedom of religion is that it prevents 
the state from privileging one faith over others (discussed below).1123 This case indicated a 
division in the Constitutional Court on the very nature of freedom of religion.     
 
In defining the nature of the right of freedom of religion in the case of Christian Education 
the court deferred to the meaning utilised by Chaskalson in Lawrence; meaning that religious 
freedom would only be infringed if the appellant could show that there had been coercion or 
constraint on the part of the state.1124 In this case there was no dissent to the use of this 
definition, unlike in Lawrence, where five of the nine judges disagreed with Chaskalson P’s 
view on the extent of the right.1125 A notable difference in Christian Education was that the 
                                                          
1120  (1985) 13 CRR 64 (“Big M Drug Mart”) at para 97; Lawrence at para 92.  
1121  Lawrence at para 92.  
1122  O’Regan J, in the minority judgement of Lawrence, argued that freedom of religion requires more of the 
legislature that it to refrain from coercion but also requires “fairness and even-handedness in relation to 
diverse religions is a necessary component of freedom of religion.” See Lawrence at para 128; According to 
O’Regan J, the requirement of equity demanded that the state act even-handedly in relation to different 
religions. This does not, in her opinion demand a commitment to a complete secularism or complete 
neutrality. However, for religious observances at national level, the effect of the requirement is to demand 
that such observances should not favour one religion to the exclusion of others. See Lawrence at paras 121-
122; Rautenbach concurs that: “The scope of section 15(1) is twofold, namely firstly to demand the freedom 
to practise one’s religion without interference from the state and secondly to demand religious equality.” 
See Rautenbach et al (n983) 8.    
1123  Cheadle (n315) 209.  
1124  Para 104.  
1125  Smith “Freedom of Religion in the Constitutional Court” 2001 118 SALJ 2-3.  
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court gave due respect to the significance of religious freedom and related rights and 
recognised the connection between religion and dignity. According to the court, religious and 
cultural rights affirm the right of people to be “who they are without being forced to 
subordinate themselves to the cultural and religious norms of others”1126 or in other words the 
“right to be different”.1127 Also, the court focussed on the substance of freedom of religion as 
a constitutional right as depicted in the following statement:  
 
“Yet freedom of religion goes beyond protecting the inviolability of the 
individual conscience. For many believers, their relationship with God or 
creation is central to all their activities. It concerns their capacity to relate 
in an intensely meaningful fashion to their sense of themselves, their 
community and their universe. For millions in all walks of life, religion 
provides support and nurture and a framework for individual and social 
stability and growth. Religious belief has the capacity to awake concepts 
of self-worth and human dignity which form the cornerstone of human 
rights.”1128   
 
It should be noted that in Christian Education, with the claimants being part of a powerful 
mainstream religion and not a minority, the court showed much more sensitivity and 
understanding1129 in dealing with religious sentiments than in Lawrence.   
 
In the case of Prince, the court set out the content of the right as including: “(a) the right to 
entertain the religious beliefs that one chooses to entertain; (b) the right to announce one’s 
religious beliefs publicly and without fear of reprisal; and (c) the right to manifest such 
beliefs….”1130  Furthermore, the court expressed its approval of the definition utilised in Big 
M Drug Mart (quoted above) and once again recognised that implicit in freedom of religion, 
is the absence of coercion or constraint. 1131 It is clear from the above that the Constitutional 
Court has consistently relied on the definition of freedom of religion as the requiring the 
absence of coercion or constraint on religious beliefs. 
 
                                                          
1126   Christian Education at para 24 
1127  Para 24; Kroeze “God’s Kingdom in Law’s Republic: Religious Freedom in South African Constitutional 
Jurisprudence” 2003 19(3) SAJHR 469 478; In Prince, the minority came to the conclusion that there was a 
duty on the courts to guarantee the Rastafari a reasonable means within which to exercise their religious 
rights (para 163). The minority made the decision to safeguard the “right to be different” (para 170). 
1128  Christian Education at para 36.  
1129   du Plessis (n758) 29. 
1130  Prince at para 38.  
1131  Para 38.  
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Furthermore, all the above-mentioned cases recognised that freedom of religion is not 
absolute; it may be limited if the limitation is “reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.”1132 Such limitation may 
be justified by a legitimate state interest such as protecting public safety or protecting the 
rights of others. This means that constitutional case law has consistently confirmed that 
freedom of religion exercised within schools may include the right to believe; the right to 
announce and manifest those beliefs and the “right to be different.” However, it is clear that 
the right to announce and manifest those beliefs may be subject to limitations by school 
rules.1133  
 
2.3  THE WAIVER OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION1134 
 
 
The term “waiver” is used when a person agrees not to exercise a right in future.1135 The 
important questions that need to be answered are: can a fundamental human right, more 
particularly freedom of religion, be waived and if so, to what extent? The issue of waivers is 
an “underdeveloped and confusing area” of constitutional law,1136 partly due to the fact that 
there is no constitutional provision dealing with waivers of rights in this or any other 
jurisdiction.1137 In addition, there are no definitive answers to these questions in constitutional 
jurisprudence.  
 
De Waal and Currie assert that waivers are in certain circumstances constitutionally 
permissible. In principle, freedom rights such as freedom of religion may be waived if the 
person does so freely, without duress or misapprehension.1138 The nature and purpose of the 
fundamental right in question are factors that need to be considered when determining the 
constitutionality of the waiver. For example, the rights to life and dignity, due to their nature, 
are inalienable and cannot be waived. Whereas rights with positive and negative 
                                                          
1132   Section 33 of the interim Constitution or Section 36 of the Constitution.  
1133  See discussion below on a school’s duty to limit freedom of religion.  
1134  The discussion of waivers of rights in general is beyond the scope of this thesis. This discussion is limited to 
what is relevant to waivers of freedom of religion in private schools.  
1135  De Waal & Currie (n18) 43. 
1136  Woolman “Category Mistakes and the Waiver of Constitutional Rights: a Response to Deeksha Bhana on 
Barkhuizen” 2008 125 SALJ 10 12. 
1137  Woolman (n1136) 12. 
1138  De Waal & Currie (n18) 43; See S v Gasa 1998 (1) SACR 446 (D); In the case of S v Pienaar 2000 (7) 
BCLR 800 (NC) at para 6, it was stressed that the person’s choice to waive a right must be informed and 
considered. 
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dimensions1139- such as freedom of religion, can in certain circumstances be waived.1140 
Contrastingly, there is legal authority which doubts whether a waiver of constitutional rights 
is enforceable.1141 In S v Shaba1142 the court held that a person can choose in a particular 
instance not to exercise a right for good reason but cannot completely abandon such right. It is 
therefore impermissible to waive a fundamental right by virtue of the principles applicable to 
waiver found in the contract law.1143  
 
Overall, there is very little jurisprudence on the issue of waivers of religious rights other than 
the interpretation in Wittmann.1144 Another case dealing with this issue is Garden Cities Inc 
Association v Northpine Islamic Society (“Garden Cities”),1145 in which the High Court 
upheld an agreement by which the respondent waived the right to practice his religion in a 
particular way. This case, however, dealt with a waiver of one aspect of a religious practice 
(the sound amplification) and not the complete waiver of a person’s right to freedom of 
religion (the right to practise Islam). Unfortunately, the case did not expand on the 
requirements that need to be met for a waiver of rights to be constitutionally permissible.  
 
On the other hand, it is clear that a person can waive a right conferred by the terms of a 
contract (as opposed to the waivers of a rights conferred by law).1146 There is, however, a 
strong presumption against waiver in the contract law;1147 meaning that it must be clearly 
proved that the person who is alleged to have waived his or her right, knew what the right 
                                                          
1139  That is, rights which can be exercised by acting or refraining from acting.  
1140  De Waal & Currie (n18) 42-44. 
1141  Devenish (n64) 551; Woolman states that: a “waiver of constitutional rights should never be tolerated.” “Let 
me put the argument that follows in its simplest form: (1) In a regime of rights in which the Constitution is 
the supreme law, the only real question is whether the Constitution permits certain kinds of action or 
proscribes certain kinds of action. (2) Once a court determines what the Constitution allows or does not 
allow, there is no longer any question of waiver: you either have a right to do something (and can then, for 
instance, contract in that space) or you don’t (and then no action, such as a contract, may take place).” See 
Woolman (n1136) 13. 
1142  (1998) 2 BCLR 220 (T).  
1143  Devenish (n64) 551. 
1144  Discussed in Chapter 5.   
1145  1999 (2) SA 268 (C) (“Garden Cities”). In this case the respondent had bought land on which to build a 
mosque but had agreed not to use sound amplification equipment for the call to prayer. He acted to the 
contrary and was interdicted by the High Court. He argued that the Constitution did not permit the waiver of 
a fundamental aspect of one’s faith. The Court did not address this difficult issue, but held that since the 
amplification of the call to prayer was not a fundamental tenet of Islam, the agreement did not infringe upon 
the respondent’s religious freedom and could therefore be upheld. 
1146  Ware writes: “One can alienate one’s rights in two ways: in exchange for consideration or in the absence of 
consideration. To put it another way, one can trade away one’s rights, or one can give away one’s rights. In 
some legal contexts, such as contract law, the term “waiver” is often used to refer only to giving away one’s 
rights.” See Ware “Arbitration clauses, jury-waiver clauses and other contractual waivers of constitutional 
rights” 2004 Law & Contemporary Problems 167 169. 
1147  Christie (n619) 511. 
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was1148 and had the intention to waive it.1149 Visser notes that the agreement to waive may be 
implied, but the courts will not lightly infer the abandonment of a right.1150 Importantly, the 
contract law emphasises that the law will not recognise a waiver of rights which is contrary to 
public policy.1151  In the case of Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukus,1152 Smalberger JA stated that:  
 
“The interests of the community or the public are therefore of 
paramount importance in relation to the concept of public policy. 
Agreements which are clearly inimical to the interests of the 
community, whether they are contrary to law or morality, or run counter 
to social or economic expedience, will accordingly, on the grounds of 
public policy, not be enforced.”1153  
 
The learned scholar Aquilius defines a contract against public policy as “one stipulating 
performance which is not per se illegal or immoral but which the courts, on grounds of 
expedience, will not enforce, because performance will detrimentally affect the interest of the 
community.”1154 More simply put, Ngcobo J in the case of Barkhuizen v Napier 
(“Barkhuizen”)1155 defined public policy as “the legal convictions of the community; it 
                                                          
1148  512-513; Gordan v AA Mutual Insurance Assn Ltd 1988 SA 398 (W); Visser et al (n616) 12; Bhana makes 
a distinction between direct and indirect waivers as follows: “a contractual restriction is direct when a 
contract purports deliberately to restrict a particular facet of a party’s religious practice. In other words, the 
party agreeing expressly to a particular restriction is likely to have applied his or her mind to the 
implications of such agreement, for his or her right to freedom of religion.” For example, the waiver in the 
case of Garden Cities. “In contrast, a contractual restriction is indirect when a contract, although seemingly 
neutral, has the (inadvertent) effect purportedly of impinging on a party’s right to freedom of religion. In 
other words, the party agreeing to such a restriction is not likely to have applied his or her mind to the 
precise implications of such agreement, for his or her right to freedom of religion.” An example of such a 
contractual restriction is found in the case of Pillay discussed below. Bhana  urges the court to bare this in 
mind when deciding whether or not to uphold a waiver.  Bhana Constitutionalising Contract Law: Ideology, 
Judicial Method and Contractual Autonomy (2012) 202-203. 
1149  The requirements expounded in Ex parte Sussens 1941 TPD 15 20, were as follows: “The necessity of full 
knowledge of the law in the case of waiver follows from the principle that waiver is a form of contract, in 
which one party is taken deliberately to have surrendered his rights: there must be proof of an intention so to 
surrender, which can only exist where there is knowledge both of the facts and the legal consequences 
thereof.”;  In Hepner v Roodepoort- Mariasburg Town Council 1962 4 SA 772 (A), the court held that: 
“The onus is on the appellant to show that the respondent, with full knowledge of his rights, decided to 
abandon it, whether expressly or by conduct plainly inconsistent with an intention to enforce it.” 
1150  Visser et al (n616) 12.   
1151  Christie (n619) 210, 398-399.  
1152  (149/87) [1988] ZASCA 94; [1989] 1 All SA 347 (A) (19 September 1988) (“Sasfin”). 
1153  Sasfin at para 8-9; In Magna Alloys and Research SA (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A), Rabie CJ held 
that restraints of trade were prima facie valid and enforceable unless they are contrary to public policy;   
Van der Merwe observes that public policy relates to the goals of society on an abstract level, whereas 
public interest is the more concrete expression of the values and norms of society which are realised when 
policy is implemented. However, this distinction is not absolute.  Public policy and public interest influence 
and shape each other, therefore the terms are sometimes used interchangeably. See Van der Merwe et al 
Contract General Principles (2003) 177.  
1154  Aquilius “Immorality and Illegality in Contract” 1941 58 SALJ 337 346. 
1155  (CCT72/05) [2007] ZACC 5; 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC); 2007 (7) BCLR 691 (CC) (4 April 2007) 
(“Barhuizen”). 
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represents those values that are held most dear by the society.”1156 In this case the 
Constitutional Court confirmed that what is contrary to public policy must now be determined 
by the values that underlie the Constitution, meaning that a term that is inimical to 
constitutional values is contrary to public policy and therefore unenforceable.1157 This 
reconfirmed the statement made by Cameron JA in the Supreme Court of Appeal case of 
Brisley v Drotsky1158 that: “In its modern guise, public policy is now rooted in our 
Constitution and the fundamental values it enshrines.”1159 It is submitted that the protection of 
the best interests of minor children forms part of the values system of South African 
society.1160 As a result certain restrictions must be placed on a parent’s right to contract on 
behalf a child (based on public policy) to ensure the protection of the interests of the minor 
child.1161  
 
Nevertheless, determining whether or not an agreement is contrary to public policy does 
require a balancing of competing values.1162 It must be recognised that upholding the sanctity 
of a contract (pacta servanda sunt) is one of the values. It is the underlying principle in 
contract law which needs to be protected as far as possible.1163 In Sasfin, Smalberger JA 
stated that no court should shy away from its duty to declare a contract contrary to public 
policy when the occasion demands it. However, he warned that this power should be 
exercised with caution and “only in the clearest of cases”, so as not to cause uncertainty as to 
the validity of contracts. Furthermore, courts must be careful not to declare that a contract is 
contrary to public policy merely because (some of) its terms offend an individual’s sense of 
propriety and fairness. In this regard Smalberger referred to the words of Lord Atkin: “the 
doctrine [of public policy] should only be invoked in clear cases in which the harm to the 
public is substantially incontestable, and does not depend upon the idiosyncratic inferences of 
a few judicial minds.”1164 This principle was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Napier v Barkhuizen.1165  
                                                          
1156  Para 28.  
1157  Para 29; Nevertheless the impact of the Constitution on the enforceability of contracts continues to be 
controversial. 
1158  2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA). 
1159  Para 91; Discussed in Bhana (n1148) 3-4. 
1160  Now affirmed by section 28 (2) of the Constitution.  
1161  See example in Chapter 2 at paragraph 2.2.   
1162  Bredenkamp v Standard Bank (599/09) [2010] ZASCA 75 (27 May 2010) at para 38.  
1163  See Brisley v Drotsky.  
1164  Sasfin at para 12; Quote taken from Fender v St John-Mildmay (1938) AC 1 at 12; the judgement in Sasfin 
was reinforced in Botha (now Griessel v Finanscredit (Pty) Ltd 1989 3 SA 773 A 782I-783C; In Morrison v 
Anglo Deep Gold Mines Ltd 1905 TS 775 779 at paras 784-785, Innes CJ stated: “Now it is a general 
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It is clear from the above that public policy generally favours freedom of contract1166 (or in 
this case the freedom to waive). In general, parties should comply with contractual obligations 
(waivers) that were made freely and voluntarily. However, freedom of contract cannot be 
unlimited. The validity of all law, including waivers, depends on their consistency with the 
values that underlie the Constitution. The application of the principle pacta sunt servanda is, 
therefore, “subject to constitutional control”.1167 All in all, the crux of the matter is that even 
in cases where a waiver of rights is legally permissible, it may be unenforceable in that it is 
inconsistent with the provisions of or values of the Constitution. A waiver cannot make 
otherwise unconstitutional laws or conduct valid.1168  
 
On a practical level, there have been instances, where a parent signs a code of conduct in 
order for their child to be admitted to a school and then subsequently allows the child to dress 
or adorn themselves in defiance of the code, based on religious or cultural rights. The decision 
in Pillay indicated that the contractual undertaking by a parent (on behalf of the learner child) 
to avoid certain forms of religious/cultural expression, did not protect the decision of the 
school (based on the code of conduct) from constitutional scrutiny and review. Subsequent to 
her consent to the code of conduct, the parent had the right to question whether the decision 
by the school/the rule in the code of conduct was discriminatory or not.  
 
2.4     UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RELIGION1169 
 
In light of the historical context of religion in schools, a pressing issue in South African 
schools is that of unfair discrimination on the basis of religion; or alternatively religious 
favouritism of one faith over others. According to Freedman, the right to religious freedom 
can operate both as a religious right and as an equality right. The liberty aspect entails the 
right to entertain any religious beliefs one chooses with the absence of coercion or constraint 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
principle that a man contracting without duress, without fraud, and understanding what he does, may freely 
waive any of his rights. There are certain exceptions to that rule, and certainly the law will not recognise 
any arrangement which is contrary to public policy.”  This must be exercised cautiously. Mason J stated: 
“For this arrangement to succeed on the ground of public policy it must be shown that the arrangement 
necessarily contravenes or tends to induce contravention of some fundamental principle of justice…or that it 
is necessarily to the prejudice of the interests of the public.”  
1165  2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA); 2006 (9) BCLR 1011 (SCA) at para 13.  
1166  See Christie (n619) 400, for a summary of the effects of Sasfin and Botha. 
1167  Barkhiuzen at para 13.  
1168  De Waal & Currie (n18) 42. 
1169  The right to equality and the Equality Act are discussed in Chapter 4.  
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by the state. The equality aspect involves freedom from government practices which favour 
one religion over another.1170 This coincides with sentiments expressed by O’Regan J in the 
case of Lawrence (discussed above).   
 
Lawrence is the primary Constitutional Court case which dealt with unfair discrimination on 
the basis of religion and religious favouritism by the state. As will be seen, although this case 
does not pertain to schools, its principles illustrate some important points applicable to issues 
pertaining to religion in schools. The appellants in this case contended that Liquor Act’s 
prohibition on the sale of alcohol on particular “closed days” (namely, Sundays, Good Friday 
and Christmas), showed that the legislation had a religious purpose,1171 one which favoured 
Christianity above other belief systems. It was argued that the provision “coerced individuals 
to affirm or acquiesce in a specific practice solely for a sectarian Christian purpose”,1172 and 
therefore infringed upon the freedom of religion of those persons who do not hold such 
beliefs.  
 
Importantly, the appellant’s contended that the history of the legislation confirmed that closed 
days were introduced to serve a religious purpose. At the inception of the interim Constitution 
on 27 April 1994, the restrictive provisions of the Liquor Act applied not only to Sundays, but 
to all public holidays of a religious nature, which at the time included Good Friday,1173 
Ascension Day,1174 the Day of the Vow1175 and Christmas Day,1176 all significant holy days of 
                                                          
1170  Freedman “The right to religious liberty, the right to religious equality and section 15(1) of the South 
African Constitution” 2000 STELL LR 99 100; As Black J stated in Engel v Vitale, 370 US 421 (1962) at 
para 431: “When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular 
religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing 
officially approved religion is plain.” In this case the US Supreme Court held unconstitutional a New York 
practice recommending the reading of a non-denominational prayer in state schools. The prayer read as 
follows: “Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, 
our parents, our teachers and our Country.” 
1171  Kroeze (n1127) 475. See reference to the Act in n273 above.  
1172  Lawrence at para 85. 
1173        The Friday before Easter, which is a Christian holy day commemorating the resurrection of Christ. 
1174   The day commemorating Christ’s visible ascent from earth.  
1175        “The Day of the Vow (Afrikaans: Geloftedag or Dingaansdag) is the name of a religious public holiday in 
South Africa until 1994, when it was renamed the Day of Reconciliation. According to an Afrikaner 
tradition, the Day of the Vow traces its origin as an annual religious holiday to the Battle of Blood River on 
16 December 1838. The besieged Voortrekkers took a public vow (or covenant) together before the battle, 
led by either Andries Pretorius or Sarel Cilliers. In return for God’s help in obtaining victory, they promised 
to build a church. Participants also vowed that they and their descendants would keep the day as a holy 
Sabbath.” See Anon “Lessons from the Day of the Vow at http://faithandheritage.com/2011/01/lessons-
from-the-day-of-the-vow/ (Date accessed: 23 June 2012). Anon “Day of Reconciliation” at http://www.sa-
venues.com/events/southafrica/day-of-reconciliation/ (Date accessed: 23 June 2012).  
1176   The anniversary of the birth of Christ.  
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the Christian faith.1177 If the selection of these particular days had a religious objective then 
this was sufficient to constitute an infringement of freedom of religion.1178  
 
As mentioned, the court in Lawrence made reference to a Canadian case, Big M Drug Mart, 
which concerned the provisions of the Canadian Lord’s Day Act. The Act prohibited any 
work or commercial activity on the Lord’s Day, namely Sunday. The name of the Act made it 
apparent that the purpose of the Act was religious in nature, namely to compel the observance 
of the Christian Sabbath.1179  In this case, the court stated that: 
 
“A finding that the Lord’s Day Act has a secular purpose is, on the 
authorities, simply not possible. Its religious purpose, in compelling 
sabbatical observance, has been long-established and consistently 
maintained by the courts of this country.”1180 
 
Therefore there was no difficulty for the court in Big M Drug Mart in holding that a law 
which compels the observance of the Christian Sabbath by those who did not hold the belief, 
infringed upon their religious freedom.1181 The court illustrated with the following example:  
 
“If I am a Jew or a Sabbatarian or a Muslim, the practice of my 
religion at least implies my right to work on a Sunday if I wish. . . . 
any law purely religious in purpose, which denies me that right, must 
surely infringe my religious freedom.”1182 
 
Similarly, in Lawrence, Chaskalson P, admitted that constraints on freedom of religion could 
be imposed in subtle ways and that selecting days which are significant within Christianity to 
serve a legislative purpose might be construed as giving preferential treatment to Christianity, 
leaving observers of other religions to feel slighted. Despite this, he failed to see how the 
Liquor Act compelled observance to Christianity.1183 He agreed with the contentions of the 
respondent and found the connection between the purpose of the Liquor Act and Christianity 
to be “too tenuous”. 1184 The appeal was therefore on this basis.1185  
 
                                                          
1177   See Wulfsohn “Separation of Church and state in South African law II” 1964 SALJ 226 226. 
1178   Lawrence at para 86. 
1179  Para 88. 
1180  Para 87; Big M Drug Mart at para 93.  
1181  Lawrence at para 89. 
1182   Big M Drug Mart at para 99. 
1183  Lawrence at para 90. 
1184  Para 105. 
1185  Para 108.  
 
 
188 
According to Chaskalson P, there may be circumstances in which endorsement of religion by 
the state would contravene freedom of religion. This would be the case if such endorsement 
has the effect of coercing persons to observe the practices of a particular religion, or of 
placing constraints on them with regard to observing their own religion. Whether direct or 
indirect, coercion must be established to give rise to a claim of infringement of freedom of 
religion. The onus was on the appellant to show that there had been such coercion or 
constraint. In Chaskalson P’s opinion, this had not been established.1186  
 
In a concurring judgement, Sachs J, did not agree with the observation of Chaskalson P, that 
coercion, whether direct or indirect, had to be established in order to find that freedom of 
religion had been violated. He found that the provisions on “closed days” endorsed Christian 
values and made them binding on the whole nation and this did not coincide with the values 
expressed in the Constitution.1187 According to Sachs J, the objective of section 14 (the 
freedom of religion clause in the interim Constitution) is “to keep the state away from 
favouring or disfavouring any particular world-view, so that even if politicians as politicians 
need not be neutral on these questions, legislators as legislative drafters, must.”1188 Even if 
there is no compulsion to observe a religious practice, the effect of the relevant provision is 
still to “divide the nation into insiders who belong, and outsiders who are tolerated.”  
 
Nevertheless, Only O’Regan J, in the minority judgement rejected the majority’s finding that 
the legislature’s purpose in enacting the definition of “closed day” was a secular one.1189 
According to O’Regan J, even if it were, the question in each case will not be the question of 
purpose alone, but one of whether the general purpose and effect of the provision constitutes 
an infringement of freedom of religion.1190 Consequently, O’Regan J (in utilising her wider 
definition of freedom of religion) submitted that the majority judgment showed “religious 
favouritism”.1191 It appears that the majority looked for coercion to observe Christian holidays 
without considering the subtle message that the choice of Sunday as a “closed-day” sends a 
message to minority religious groups and non-believers that could cause them to feel 
marginalised and offended. The majority in Lawrence failed to consider the indirect impact 
that the seemingly neutral provisions of the law had on minority religions. Also, the majority 
                                                          
1186  Para 104.  
1187  Para 179.  
1188  Para  160.  
1189  This was based on a wider definition of freedom of religion as discussed above.  
1190  Para 127. 
1191   Para 171. 
 
 
189 
in Lawrence failed to take cognisance of the history of religious favouritism1192 in any 
meaningful way.  
 
Contrastingly, Sachs J outlined particular examples of where the legislature expressed a clear 
preference for Christianity in the past.1193 Prior to 1994, there were a number of statutory 
provisions with a religious foundation that depicted a Christian bias.1194 For example, the 
Publications Act 42 of 1974 caused the entire censorship system to succumb to the principles 
of Christian morality.1195
 
In addition, education in public schools for white children was based 
on Christian National Education and education in black schools had to have a Christian 
character.1196 Furthermore, the crime of blasphemy applied to the slandering of the God 
acknowledged by Christianity only.1197  Christianity was associated with what was considered 
to be “civilized peoples”1198 and Christian values were very often utilised in the interpretation 
and development of the law.1199 Moreover, the apartheid state required observance of certain 
aspects of Christianity and did not recognise marriages of other faiths. This disregard for the 
sanctity of Customary, Hindu and Muslim marriages has been the cause of much ill-feeling 
within those communities.1200  
 
                                                          
1192  See Chapter 2.  
1193  Lawrence at para 149. 
1194  Paras 149 and 151; See Chapter 2.  
1195  Para 149; See Van der Westhuizen “Freedom of Expression” in Van Wyk (n876) 264 at 282: “[South 
Africans] have been subjected to a system of censorship which was intended to impose the Calvinist 
morality of a small ruling establishment on the entire population.”   
1196         Para 149-151. 
1197  See Van der Vyver in Joubert & Scott (n242) 197; See case examples in Wulfsohn (n51) 93-96.   
1198  Seedat’s Executors v The Master (Natal) 1917 AD 302 at 307 (per Innes CJ); See also Ismail v Ismail 1983 
(1) SA 1006 (A) at 1026.  
1199  Lawrence at para 151. 
1200  In Narayan (ed) The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi: Satyagraha in South Africa (1928) at 377-8, M K 
Gandhi refers to the judgment in the Cape Supreme Court setting aside the practice of forty years, which  
     “. . . thus nullified in South Africa at a stroke of the pen all marriages celebrated according to the Hindu, 
Musalman and Zoroastrian rites. The many married Indian women in South Africa in terms of this 
judgement ceased to rank as the wives of their husbands and were degraded to the rank of concubines, while 
their progeny were deprived of their right to inherit the parents’ property. This was an insufferable situation 
for women no less than men, and the Indians in South Africa were deeply agitated.”  
 The shock to Indian women was so great that for the first time they joined in the Satyagraha campaign. 
Gandhi continued (at 388):  
 “It was an absolute pure sacrifice that was offered by these sisters, who were innocent of legal 
technicalities, and many of whom had no idea of country, their patriotism being based only upon faith. 
Some of them were illiterate and could not read the papers. But they knew that a mortal blow was being 
aimed at the Indians’ honour, and their going to jail was a cry of agony and prayer offered from the bottom 
of their heart, and was in fact the purest of all sacrifices.” Quoted in Lawrence at fn34. 
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In a similar case to Lawrence, namely, Gold Circle (Pty) Ltd and Another v Premier, 
Kwazulu-Natal;1201 it was contended that section 4(3) of the Regulation of Racing and Betting 
Ordinance 28 of 1957 (KZN), which prohibited the holding of horse races on “closed days”, 
namely Sundays, Good Friday, Ascension Day and Christmas Day, had the effect of 
promoting the principles of Christianity by recognising these Christian days of worship as 
worthy of being given special treatment. It was contended that Christians benefit by having 
their religious days recognised1202 and fostered and in turn, non-Christians are deprived of 
secular activities such as racing on closed days.1203 Despite discussing and applying the 
principles utilised in Lawrence, the court found that non-Christians are unfairly discriminated 
against under s 9(3) of the Constitution in that they are receiving neither the equal protection 
nor the equal benefit of the law.1204 In this regard, Southwood AJ stated:  
 
 “I am not considering Sunday alone, but the whole of s 4(3) which 
mentions Sunday, Good Friday, Ascension Day and Christmas Day 
together, and then treats them in the same way. Also, I am not 
considering the supplying of wine, but the carrying on of the whole 
business of horse racing meetings in KwaZulu-Natal on the closed 
days. It seems to me that the purpose of prohibiting horse racing on 
the closed days is to promote the precepts of Christianity. It is sought 
to promote them by recognising these Christian days of worship as 
worthy of being given special treatment and by eliminating, on the 
closed days, the secular attractions of horse race meetings so that 
those attractions do not compete with the behaviour and worship 
expected of Christians on those days. While s 4(3) seeks to promote 
these precepts, it does not seek to do so by compulsion, but by 
removing competing attractions. Although s 4(3)'s purpose is aimed 
at Christians, its effects are visited on Christians and non-Christians 
alike.”1205 
 
Accordingly, the court found that section 4(3) offended against the right to freedom of 
religion and was therefore constitutionally invalid on two counts. Although only a High Court 
judgment, this case recognised the existence of the symbolic effect of indirect discrimination 
                                                          
1201   2005 (4) SA 402 (D) (“Gold Circle”).  
1202  Gold Circle at p 406: “Christians observe the closed days, Sundays, to rest from secular pursuits and to 
worship; the others to commemorate various events of special significance in their religion, and to worship. 
People in other religions, agnostics and atheists do not recognise the days as having any special 
significance.”   
1203  p 414. 
1204  It is important to take note that Gold Circle was interpreted according to the Constitution and not the interim 
Constitution as in Lawrence. As the court points out, there is a significant difference between section 8 of 
the interim Constitution and section 9 of the Constitution, namely change from the “equal protection of the 
law” in ss (1) of section 8, to which every person is entitled, to the “equal protection and benefit of the law'” 
in ss (1) of section 9. See Gold Circle at p 414.  
1205  Gold Circle at p 412.  
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in the form of religious favouritism and that discrimination may exist even in the absence of 
coercion to conform.1206 Much the same as the Liquor Act and Racing and Betting Ordinance 
(and other laws influenced by Christianity), a school’s code of conduct may appear to be 
neutral on the face of it, but in effect enforces mainstream/majoritarian beliefs, behaviours 
and forms of dress. Chapter 2 illustrated how Christianity has influenced and shaped laws and 
policy on education and noted that remnants of its influence continue to persist in schools1207- 
often through codes of conduct.   
 
For example, in the case of Pillay, the primary issue was indirect discrimination on the basis 
of religion. In this case, a (South Indian, Tamil, Hindu) learner made an application for an 
exemption from the school’s code of conduct to enable her to wear a nose-stud,1208 based on 
religious and cultural grounds.1209  The school’s refusal to grant the exemption resulted in a 
claim of unfair discrimination on the basis of religion and/or culture. In this case, the court 
noted that the provisions of the code may appear to be neutral but actually enforce 
mainstream and historically privileged forms of adornment at the expense of minority and 
historically excluded forms. The ground of discrimination is still religion or culture as the 
code has a disparate impact on some religions and cultures.1210 This means that there was an 
                                                          
1206  The existence of indirect discrimination was also acknowledged in Gauteng Education; See du Plessis (n52) 
439; See Blake & Litchfield (n273) 515; See also Matukane and others v Laerskool Potgietersrus (1996) 1 
All SA 468 (T). 
1207  See du Plessis (n53).  
1208         See significance of the nose stud in Pillay at paras 7 and 11.   
1209  The connection between and difference between religion and culture is pointed out in Chapter 1 and is 
discussed further below. The expert witness in the case of Pillay conceded that it was difficult to distinguish 
between Hindu culture and Hindu religion and described the situation as a “universal dilemma of all 
cultures and religions”. See Pillay at para 13.  
1210   Pillay at para 44; In the similar, Labour Court case of POPCRU, the applicants sought an order declaring 
that the dismissal of a group of Rastafarian workers was automatically unfair as contemplated by section 
187(1) (f) of the Labour Relations Act and/or that their dismissal amounted to unfair discrimination on the 
basis of their religion and culture, in terms of section 6 of the Employment Equity Act no 55 of 1998. The 
dismissal arose as a result of the refusal of the workers to cut their dreadlocks in accordance with the Dress 
Code. Paragraph 5.1 of the Dress Code stated that: “the hair may not be longer than the collar of the shirt 
when folded down or cover more than half of the ear. The fringe may not hang in the eyes. The hair may not 
be dyed other than the natural colour, including ‘Rasta man hairstyle, for men.’” The second, fifth and sixth 
applicants contended that they wore dreadlocks for religious reasons as they were Rastafarians.  The third 
and fourth applicants stated that they had worn dreadlocks for cultural reasons. In addition, the applicants 
sought an order declaring that the Dress Code with reference to a failure or refusal to cut dreadlocks to be 
unconstitutional (at para 1). The respondents opposed the claim by contending that reason for the dismissal 
had nothing to do with unfair discrimination, but rather because the workers had failed to comply with the 
Dress Code (at para 2). In addition, the respondents contended that the Dress Code applied equally to all, 
regardless of their religion or culture, and did not have a disparate impact on any member or class of 
members, on the grounds of religion or culture, therefore the claim under the Employment Equity Act had 
to fail. The court found that the dismissal of each of the five applicants on the basis of gender was 
automatically unfair (at para 239). The Department of Correctional Services appealed the Labour Court 
judgment. The appeal was dismissed by the Labour Appeal Court. See Department of Correctional Services 
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undue burden placed on learners of certain religions and cultures, who were prohibited from 
expressing themselves fully. This case illustrated the importance of cases involving religion 
and cultural rights being considered in light of their historical context.1211 It appears that the 
courts’ interpretation of unfair discrimination on the basis of religion has evolved since the 
Lawrence judgment to truly recognise the impact of indirect discrimination that seemingly 
neutral provisions of the law, may have on (minority) religions. 
 
Also, the court in Pillay pointed out that neither the Equality Act nor the Constitution required 
identical treatment,1212 just equal concern and equal respect.1213 This coincides with the CRC 
Committee General Comment No 5 (2003) which states: “It should be emphasized that the 
application of the non-discrimination principle of equal access to rights does not mean 
identical treatment.” This means that a learner may be granted an exemption for a sincerely 
held religious belief and other learners within the school, who have to conform to the code of 
conduct as is, cannot claim that this is unfair. 
 
The case of Christian Education coincided with this principle in Pillay, by way of the 
following extract: 
 
“It is true that to single out a member of a religious community for 
disadvantageous treatment would, on the face of it, constitute unfair 
discrimination against that community. The contrary, however, does not 
hold. To grant respect to sincerely held religious views of a community 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
and Another v Police and Prison Civil Rights Union (POPCRU) and Others (CA 6/2010) [2011] ZALAC 
21; (2011) 32 ILJ 2629 (LAC) (27 September 2011). See Sapa “Popcru welcomes dreadlock ruling” 28 
September 2011 at http://m.news24.com/news24/Tags/Companies/popcru (Date accessed: 13 June 2012). 
The subsequent appeal to the SCA was also dismissed. See Department of Correctional Services & another 
v POPCRU & others (107/12) [2013] ZASCA 40 (28 March 2013); See De Vos “Why Rastafarians can’t be 
fired for wearing dreadlocks” at http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/category/freedom-of-religion/ (Date 
accessed: 18 October 2013).  
1211  In the High Court decision of Navaneethum Pillay v KwaZulu-Natal MEC of Education and Others 2006 
(10) BCLR 1237 (N) at para 17, the court noted that the learner was part of a group that had endured 
systematic inequality in the past and that the school’s argument that its rule prohibiting the wearing of 
jewellery was a general one applicable to every learner, only prolonged that discrimination. The High Court 
highlighted the past and present marginalisation of Hindus and Indians in South Africa. It held that the 
school’s insistence upon uniformity or similar treatment only served to uphold structures of discrimination; 
The dissenting judges in Prince placed the claim for a religious exemption within an historical context.  In 
fact, the High Court decision of Prince, the court emphasised the importance of contextualising the 
balancing exercise required by section 36 of the Constitution (paras 151-152).     
1212     Para 103.  
1213   This coincides with Fourie at paras 60, 95 and 112; City Council of Pretoria  v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363; 
1998  (3) BCLR 257 (CC) at paras 81 (Langa DP) and 130 (Sachs J); President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Another v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC); 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) at para 41; Prinsloo v Van der 
Linde and Another at para 32; For the link between equality and respect, see Frankfurt “Equality and 
Respect” 1997 64(1) Social Research 3-15.  
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and make an exception from a general law to accommodate them, would 
not be unfair to anyone else who did not hold those views.”1214 
 
Significantly, Pillay recognised how seemingly neutral rules can place an undue burden on 
certain religions and culture, thereby discriminating against them. It also affirmed that 
sometimes fairness requires that people or different religions be treated differently.1215   
 
On a practical level in a school context, direct discrimination on the basis of religion may 
occur, for example, where a teacher uses religion education lessons or the Bill of 
Responsibility for the Youth of South Africa1216 to indoctrinate learners in a particular set of 
beliefs. It may also occur when schools compel learners to participate in religious observances 
against their will or when a public school excludes admission to non-adherents of a particular 
faith.1217 But, usually religious discrimination is far more subtle than this.  
 
For example, when teaching about religions, even the most subtle comments, facial 
expressions and tone of voice of a teacher can indicate disregard for a particular religion- 
which in turn may influence learners in their thinking about that religion.1218 Furthermore, 
when it comes to school prayers, if the school prayers are voluntary and learners are allowed 
to opt-out based on religious freedom; it may seem that there is no unfair discrimination. 
However, if the singling out process is handled in an insensitive or degrading manner, this 
situation could amount to indirect coercion, in that it places pressure on learners to participate 
in the observances of the favoured religion.1219 An exemption process which does not take 
cognisance of the child’s dignity and best interests, in effect highlights the religious difference 
                                                          
1214  Christian Education at para 42.  
1215  In both National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v. Minister of Justice and Others, 
1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) and National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v. Minister 
of Home Affairs and Others, 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC), the Court made it clear that equality does not mean that 
differences are to be eliminated, but that equality demands respect for and tolerance of diversity and that 
unfair discrimination must be understood in the context of the experiences of those primarily affected.   
1216   Discussed in Chapter 5.  
1217         Private schools are dealt with in Chapters 5 and 7.  
1218  Summers & Waddington (n115) 201-202.  
1219   Even though South Africa does not have an establishment clause, this pronouncement in Lawrence should 
be considered in the light of the U.S Supreme Court’s decision in Engel v. Vitale (1962), which held that 
schools could not require recitation of a denominationally neutral prayer, even though students who did not 
wish to participate could remain silent or excuse themselves from the room. The court believed that when 
the state endorses or gives financial support to one religion, it indirectly coerces minorities to conform to the 
“accepted” religion. Although the state may allow religious observances, they must be conducted on an 
equitable basis; The case of Abington School Dist v Schemp 374 (1963) 203, extended the decision in Engel 
v Vitale beyond officially composed prayers to Bible readings and the Lord’s prayer.  
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of the learner instead of protecting the learner from (indirect) religious discrimination. This 
opinion was recognised in the case of Wittmann in which the court stated:  
 
“It is clear that the dangers of coercion involved in the holding of 
religious exercises in a schoolroom differ qualitatively from those 
presented by the use of similar exercises or affirmations in ceremonies 
attended by adults. Even as to children, however, the duty laid upon 
government in connection with religious exercises in the public 
schools is that of refraining from so structuring the school 
environment as to put any kind of pressure on a child to 
participate…”1220  
 
As a result, some schools may opt for allowing for moments of silence in assemblies rather 
than the reading of religious prayers (despite the school being attended by a religious 
majority) – not because there is a is a legal imperative for such a decision, but because the 
SGB deems it to be (morally speaking) the “right thing to do” in the interests of all learners 
and staff.  
 
There has not been a Constitutional Court case directly relating to the issue of opting out in a 
public school setting as yet, however, a prominent Canadian case that illustrates this point 
serves as comparative example. The landmark decisions of Zylerberg v Sudbury Board of 
Education (“Zylerberg”),1221 essentially brought to an end the notion that Ontario school-
children should be brought up with a “good Christian education.”1222 In the Zylerberg case, 
Philip Zylerberg, a Jewish parent, along with other parents (all non-Christians and atheists) 
believed that the process of applying for exemption was a form of coercion to conform to the 
“accepted” religion and therefore a violation of the Canadian Charter.1223 The Sudbury Board 
of Education and the Government of Ontario relied on the argument that section 28 served a 
legitimate purpose of instilling important moral values in school-children and that any 
interference with religious freedom was slight. The Court of Appeal found that section 28(1) 
of the Regulation infringed section 2(a) of the Charter. The court found that the infringement 
of minority rights was not insubstantial and did not impair the rights of the minorities “as little 
as possible.”1224 The court stated that the exemption process in this particular case, 
                                                          
1220   Paras 61-62.  
1221   (1988), 65 O.R. (2d) 641 (Ont. C.A.). 
1222   Dickinson & van Vollenhoven (n14) 5. 
1223      5. 
1224   As required by an important part of the legal test for applying section 1 of the Charter; See R v Oakes, 
[1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). 
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stigmatised minority students who would be required to single themselves out as being 
different.1225  
 
2.5 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGION AND CULTURE 
 
Although, religious and cultural rights are profoundly interconnected,1226 the Constitution 
recognises that culture is not the same as religion. Whereas religious belief is individualistic 
and need not be shared by others, culture, on the other hand, relates to traditions and beliefs 
developed by a community. Culture is “a particular way of life of an identifiable group of 
people.”1227  Bennet describes culture as encompassing “a people’s entire store of knowledge 
and artefacts, especially the languages, systems of belief, and laws that give social groups 
their unique characters.”1228 This means that individuals acquire their sense of cultural 
identity from a group with whom they share a common identity, a shared religion, a shared 
language or a shared history.1229   
 
Belonging to a community means more than merely associating with it; it includes taking part 
in community practices and traditions and manifesting that community’s culture.1230 De Waal 
and Currie reason: 
 
“The right of a member of a cultural or linguistic community cannot 
meaningfully be exercised alone. Enjoyment of culture and use of 
language presupposes the existence of a community of individuals with 
similar rights. . . . Therefore an individual right of enjoyment of culture 
assumes the existence of a community that sustains a particular 
culture.”1231 
 
For this reason, section 31 contains a specific right that members of a religious community 
have the right to enjoy their culture or practice their religion with other members of their 
community. Importantly, the protection of culture in the Constitution is extended to all 
                                                          
1225  Dickinson & Dolmage “Education, religion and the courts in Ontario” 1996 21(4) Canadian Journal of 
Education 363 369.  The manner in which religious exemption processes are handled in schools is a key 
issue that is addressed in detail in Chapter 7. 
1226  This was recognised in the case of Pillay at para 13.  
1227  Currie (n561) 35.19. 
1228  Bennet Human Rights and African Customary Law under the South African Constitution (1999) 23-24. 
1229  Pillay at para 144; See also Rautenbach et al (n983) 5-6.  
1230  Para 53. 
1231  De Waal & Currie (n18) 623-624.  
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cultures regardless of popularity.1232 Section 31 protects both the right of the group to enjoy 
their culture and religion and the right of the individual to participate in the cultural or 
religious group of his or her choice.1233 It provides as follows:    
 
                      “(1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic 
community may not be denied the right, with other members 
of that community - 
                         (a) to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their 
language; and  
                         (b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic 
associations and other organs of civil society.”  
 
The reason for the inclusion of religion in section 31 of the Constitution is that a where a 
group of people are of the same religion, the group may also share associative practices.  
 
It should also be noted here – as alluded to above1234 – that the right to freedom of religion 
and the right to culture overlap to a certain extent.1235 For example, in the case Pillay, it was 
unclear whether the wearing of the nose stud by young females is a Hindu religious 
requirement or an Indian cultural practice.1236 The court decided that wearing a nose stud 
amounted to a voluntary expression of South Indian Tamil Hindu culture, a culture that is 
closely entwined with Hindu religion. The court therefore concluded that the nose stud had 
both religious and cultural significance.1237   
 
The court in Pillay found that religious and cultural practices are of equal importance. It is 
more about what the practice means to a person than how it is classified. Any pre-
determination of the importance of a practice will often be based on a flawed, imperfect 
categorisation of the practice that will fail to accommodate those who do not conform to the 
norm.1238 The court found it was  imperative to make the point that cultural convictions or 
practices may be as important to those who hold them as religious beliefs are to those who 
                                                          
1232  Pillay at para 54. 
1233  Currie (n561) 35.13-35.14. 
1234  Also explained in Chapter 1.  
1235   Pillay at para 47.  
1236   Govindjee “Of nose studs, beards and issues of discrimination - Pillay v KwaZulu-Natal MEC of Education” 
2006 10 BCLR 1237 (N) Dlamini v Green Four Security: 2006 11 BLLR 1074 (LC) case” 2007 Obiter 
357 365. 
1237   Pillay at para 60.  
1238  Para 91.  
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find deeper meaning in a higher power rather than in a community of people.1239 A cultural 
practice may hold deeper meaning to an individual than it does to others within that culture.  
 
The court noted that even though cultures are associative, the cultural practices and beliefs of 
each individual may differ, and people find their cultural identity in different places, but the 
importance of that identity remains. A single culture cannot be said to be unified.  Cultural 
groups are not static- they are ever-changing and evolving.1240 The Constitution protects every 
voice within a culture, not just the most powerful voice.1241 This means that people within one 
culture may carry out different cultural practices or may carry out the same cultural practice 
differently.   
 
In deciding whether the nose stud was a religious or cultural practice or both, the court in 
Pillay stated that “the temptation to force [grounds of discrimination] into neatly self-
contained categories should be resisted.”1242 In summary, religion and culture are different 
concepts that influence people’s lives in very different ways; however, as previously noted, 
the lines between religion and culture are flexible. Religious belief influences and forms 
cultural practices and cultural practices often attain religious significance.1243 It is therefore 
possible for practices to be both religious and cultural.1244 Importantly, Pillay also emphasised 
that culture is as intertwined with an individual’s dignity and identity as religion is; 1245 and 
therefore cultural practices are to be equally respected as religious practices. 
 
 
 2.6  DETERMINING CENTRALITY AND SINCERITY IN CASES INVOLVING 
RELIGION AND CULTURE  
 
When deciding whether or not to grant a religious exemption based on the right to religious 
freedom, South African courts use at least three criteria: 1) requiring the claimant to prove 
that the prohibited practice is central to his/her religion; 2) identifying the sincerity of the 
                                                          
1239  Para 53.  
1240  Para 152.  
1241   Sections 7(1), 9 (1), 30 and 31 of the Constitution.   
1242   Para 60; quote taken from Harksen v Lane NO and Others at para 49. 
1243  Pillay at para 60.  
1244  Paras 47 and 60.  
1245  Paras 62 and 64.  
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claimant’s belief and 3) interpreting the practice contextually to determine if the Constitution 
excludes it from protection.1246  
 
In Prince, the majority noted that a crucial aspect of the enquiry into the infringement of 
religious freedom is the centrality of the practice in question.1247 Contrastingly, Ngcobo J, in 
the minority judgement, held that the court should not be concerned with the question of 
centrality. Religion, as he put it, is a matter of faith and belief. A religious practice may strike 
someone outside the faith as bizarre or illogical, but the practice nevertheless deserves 
constitutional protection. He stressed that humans should be free to believe in what they 
cannot prove. For this reason, he felt it undesirable for courts to discuss whether a particular 
practice is central to a religion unless there is a genuine dispute as to the centrality of the 
practice.1248  
 
In the case of Pillay, which involved a practice that was both religious and cultural, the court 
found that the centrality of the practice is a core concern in deciding what would be 
considered reasonable accommodation of the practice concerned. This entails that those 
persons who appear to adhere to religious or cultural practices, but are willing to forego it if 
needs be, cannot expect the same accommodation as a person whose identity would be 
seriously undermined if they are not allowed to adhere to their belief.1249 
 
Importantly, however, the court in Pillay questioned whether an objective enquiry can be 
made into the centrality of the practice to a particular religion or culture. Such an enquiry 
would mean substituting the adherent’s belief on the meaning of the practice with the court’s 
belief. The court in Pillay, held that if the a practice is central to a particular learners faith, it 
is not for the court to tell that learner that she is wrong because the court cannot possibly 
relate to her religion or culture in the same way as she does.1250   
                                                          
1246  de Waal,  Mestry & Russo “Religious And Cultural Dress at School: A Comparative Perspective” 2011 
14(6) PER 70; De Waal & Currie (n18) 341-342; See Lenta’s list of questions that need to be posed to 
establish which claimants should be entitled to religious exemptions (supposing there is such a right) in 
Lenta “Is there a right to religious exemptions?” 2012 129(2) SALJ 303 328-329. 
1247   Prince at paras 41- 43; Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 1999 (4) SA 1092 (SE); 
1999 (9) BCLR 951 (SE) 11001-1101 A; Pillay at para 67.  
1248  Prince at para 42.  
1249  Pillay at para 86.  
1250  Para 87; In the Labour Court case of POPCRU, the applicants submitted that the court should not be 
concerned with the validity or correctness of the Rastafarian faith or beliefs but only with their sincerity. 
They referred to the case of United States v Bellard 322 US 78 (1944), wherein the court stated: “Men may 
believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. 
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Importantly, in Pillay, the court emphasised that the colonialist approach to customary law 
was to attempt to force a set of rules and practices into a neat box of coherency and unity.  
This fossilises the law instead of viewing it as “living customary law”1251 – law that is 
evolving. The courts must accept that “[t]radition is not cast in stone, it changes and people in 
the end begin to ascribe a meaning to it that probably is different from what you and I may 
think it to be.”1252 Ultimately, centrality of belief can only be judged with sole reference to 
how important the belief or practice is to the claimant’s religious or cultural identity. The 
centrality of the practice to the remainder of the community can be used as evidence, but only 
to assist in establishing subjective centrality.   
 
Similarly in the Labour Appeal Court case of Department of Correctional Services and 
Another v Police and Prison Civil Rights Union (POPCRU) and Others, the court stated:  
 
“There is also no dispute between the parties that the wearing of 
dreadlocks is a central tenet of Rastafarianism and is a form of personal 
adornment resorted to by some who follow the spiritual traditions of 
Xhosa culture. Courts, in any event, are not usually concerned with the 
centrality or rationality of beliefs and practices when determining 
questions of equality or religious and cultural freedom. The authenticity 
of a party’s belief or adherence is of limited relevance. Provided the 
assertion of belief is sincere and made in good faith, the court will not 
embark on an inquiry into the belief or practice to judge its validity in 
terms of either rationality or the prevailing orthodoxy. Equality and 
freedom of religion and culture protect the subjective belief of an 
individual provided it is sincerely held…”1253 
 
On the issue of sincerity, in Pillay, when the learner was first asked to remove the nose stud, 
she agreed to do so- but this could have been out of fear or uncertainty of what would happen 
should she go against the authority of the school’s headmistress. Thereafter, she continuously 
defied the will of the school by not removing the nose stud in order to uphold her beliefs, and 
in doing so endured ill-treatment from peers and prefects, coupled with media exposure about 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Religious experiences which are as real as life to some, may be incomprehensible to others, yet the fact that 
they be beyond the ken of mortals does not mean that they can be made suspect before the law.” See paras 
86 – 87. 
1251   See Bhe at para 87.  
1252   Stated by Professor Rehana Vally, an anthropologist at Pretoria University in Van Rooyen “Principal turns a 
beady eye on boy’s tradition” Sunday Times (31 January 2009) at 
http://www.thetimes.co.za/PrintEdition/News/Article (Date accessed: 10 February 2009). 
1253  (CA 6/2010) [2011] ZALAC 21; (2011) 32 ILJ 2629 (LAC) (27 September 2011) at para 26. 
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the case.1254 This led the court to conclude that the wearing of the nose stud was a sincerely 
held religious and cultural belief to the learner herself.1255 Also, the court found that once 
religious and cultural significance has been proven, the mainstream popularity of a religious 
or cultural practice should no longer be relevant.1256 
 
Significantly, the court in Pillay, had to decide on whether or not the Equality Act and the 
Constitution applied to voluntary religious and cultural practices, an issue which had never 
before arisen before a South African court. The mandate on a person to adhere to a practice is 
relevant because many people will feel that voluntary practices are not central to their 
religious or cultural identity. However, the court observed that there will also be those who 
feel a practice is central to their identity even though it is voluntary. They too deserve 
protection.1257 The court’s opinion was that the question of whether a practice was mandatory 
or voluntary is irrelevant in deciding if the practice deserves protection. 
 
The reason for protecting mandatory practices is traditionally because it presents the believer 
with ‘Hobson’s choice’, either observe your faith or comply with the law (as was the case in 
the Prince).  However, there is more to protecting religious and cultural rights than protecting 
adherents from hard choices - their beliefs are central to their identity, human dignity and 
equality.1258 Voluntary practices are as much a part of, and equally important to identity and 
dignity as mandatory practices. While some cultures may have obligatory rules which act as 
conditions for membership of the culture, others have no authoritative body or text that 
determines the rules to be followed by that culture. Each member will then choose the 
practices that he or she feels is necessary to express being part of that culture.1259 This means 
that cultural practices may differ from family to family and there may be different 
interpretations as to the importance and correctness of the practice- but all are equally worthy 
of protection.  
 
                                                          
1254  Broughton “Schoolgirl’s nose stud gets legal go-ahead” Pretoria News 6 July 2006; Broughton “Durban 
nose-stud saga continues” Pretoria News 27 July 2006; Rondganger “Nose stud case back in court” The 
Mercury 21 February 2007 at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-148757013.html (Date accessed: 11 
November 2010). 
1255  Pillay at para 58.  
1256   Para 106. 
1257  Para 88.  
1258   Para 62.  
1259  Para 66.  
 
 
201 
All is all, the principle arising out of Pillay is that when considering whether or not to grant 
the religious or cultural exemption, a school must consider all the relevant factors but the 
ultimate question is: How central is the practice to that particular learner’s religious or 
cultural identity?1260 Unquestionably, religious and cultural rights are not absolute. Even the 
most central aspects of a religion and culture can be limited for the greater good, but the more 
significant to a person’s identity it is, the more justification is needed for the limitation.1261  
   
2.7 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGION AND FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION  
 
Section 16 of the Constitution guarantees everyone the right to freedom of expression.1262 The 
term “expression” encompasses more than just speech. It includes amongst others, activities 
such as drawings, painting, sculpting, dancing, the publication of photographs, as well as 
symbolic acts such as the burning of a flag and physical gestures. Freedom of expression also 
includes outward expressions such as (religious and cultural) dress, adornments and 
hairstyles.1263  De Waal and Currie view every act by which a person attempts to express 
some emotion, belief or grievance” as being constitutionally protected under section 16.1264 
Importantly, the connection of freedom of expression to religion and culture has been 
articulated as follows:  
 
“[I]t is only in a society in which individuals freely exercise the 
right to their own cultural and religious practices…that qualifies as 
a democratic society in which freedom of expression is exercised to 
the fullest.”1265   
 
                                                          
1260  Para 88. 
1261  Para 95.  See discussion on limitations below.  
1262  Section 16 (1) states that:  “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes- 
   (a) freedom of the press and other media; 
   (b) freedom to receive or impart information or ideas; 
              (c) freedom of artistic creativity; and 
              (d) academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.”  
This provision coincides with Article 13 of the CRC which states: “The child shall have the right to freedom 
of expression.” 
1263  In the case of Pillay, the respondent’s case was primarily based on equality, but also made claims on the 
basis of freedom of expression and freedom of religion. See para 28. 
1264  De waal & Currie (n18) 311. See discussion in van Vollenhoven et al (n740) 119 121. 
1265  Burns Communications Law (2009) 115. 
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The importance of freedom of expression was recognised by the Constitutional Court in South 
African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence1266  in which O’ Regan J stated: “The 
Constitution recognises that individuals in our society need to be able to hear, form and 
express opinions and views freely on a wide range of matters.”  Furthermore, the South 
African judiciary has acknowledged that freedom of expression is the freedom upon which all 
other freedoms are dependent.1267 It fact, it has been said that: “[f]reedom of expression 
constitutes the implementation of the individual freedom of thought.”1268 The correlation 
between expression and religious rights was recognised by the Constitutional Court in Case 
and Another v Minister of Safety and Security and Others: Curtis v Minister of Safety and 
Security,1269 when Mokgoro J stated that freedom of expression must not be viewed in 
isolation but seen… 
 
“…as part of a web of mutually supporting rights enumerated in the 
Constitution, including the right to ‘freedom of conscience, religion, 
thought, belief and opinion’, the right to privacy and the right to 
dignity. Ultimately, all of these rights together may be conceived as 
underpinning an entitlement to participate in an ongoing process of 
communication interaction that is of both instrumental and intrinsic 
value.”1270 
 
The application of section 15 of the Constitution means that an adherent to a religion has the 
right to express him/herself regarding that religion and to practice their religion.1271 Religious 
expression in the form of clothing and adornments indicate not only an individual’s 
distinctive personality, but also an association with a collective identity. In many cases, where 
one’s choice of attire conforms to what the majority perceives as acceptable, it goes 
unnoticed. However, when attire draws significant attention, it is generally because the attire 
signifies the wearer’s assertion of difference. The issue of religious dress or display of 
religious symbols in schools most often involves the claims of minorities wishing to assert 
their religious/cultural identity. The response of the law to the exercise of the right to be 
different, tests the limits of liberalism and tolerance in many democracies.1272  
 
                                                          
1266         1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC); 1999 (4) SA 469 (CC). 
1267        Mandela v Falati 1994 (4) BCLR (W); 1995 (1) SA 251 (W).  
1268    Naidu (n1111) 68.  
1269         1996 (3) SA 617 (CC).  
1270    Para 27; See also S v Makwanyane at para 675.  
1271       Burns Communications Law (2009) 103- 104.  .  
1272   Ross (n4) 4. 
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These days, schools are faced with the challenge of dealing with the conflict between 
religious and cultural expression and the maintenance of a school dress code. It can be said 
that learners who are required to wear school uniforms or adhere to a dress code are limited in 
terms of this form of expression.1273 Arguments in favour of school uniforms suggest that 
school uniforms promote discipline and advance academic performance and that religious 
expression may be a threat to the order within a school.1274 Others believe that this argument 
is invalid and note that there are many well-functioning schools that do not require 
uniforms.1275 In fact, Alston et al have put forward that restrictions on dress have no 
justification and constitute an invasion of a learner’s right to individuality, dignity and 
expression.1276 In this regard, Wellman asserts that the rationale behind a limitation on dress 
should only be twofold: namely, to prevent learners from dressing in a way that provokes 
immoral behaviour and to prevent learners from deliberately offending others.1277 
Alternatively, there is the belief that any person who is offended by the manifestations of 
another’s religious beliefs, should have no right to supress those beliefs.1278  
 
Currently, the establishment of school dress codes rests with the SGB of each school.1279 
However, the Guidelines for the consideration of Governing Bodies in adopting a Code of 
Conduct for Learners lists freedom of expression as a learner right and lists the “right to 
wear” and “clothing selection” as an aspect of freedom of expression.1280 Alston et al argue 
that this impliedly places certain restrictions on the rights of SGB’s to determine a school’s 
dress code.1281 However, SGB’s are only required to consider these guidelines when adopting 
a new code of conduct; they are not bound by them.1282  
 
Prohibiting all forms of religious dress and symbols impedes religious and cultural rights as 
well as freedom of expression.1283 Therefore, some schools have opted to adopt measures to 
                                                          
1273   Alston et al “The Constitutional Right to Freedom of Expression: How enforceable are school dress code? 
2003 23(3) SAJE 163 163; For a learners’ understanding of freedom of expression in schools, see Van 
Vollenhoven Learners’ Understanding of their Right to Freedom of Expression in South Africa (2005).   
1274   Adhar & Leigh (n26) 374.  
1275   Alston et al (n1273) 166.  
1276   163.  
1277   Wellman Real Rights (1995) 93; One could add to this the inability to compete financially in the race to 
wear fashionable clothes. These pressures to “fit in” may be as problematical as “religious” pressures.   
1278   Adhar & Leigh (n26) 243.  
1279         20 (1) (d) of the Schools Act 84 of 1996. 
1280         Para 4.5.1; See full reference in n991 above.   
1281   Alston et al (1273) 165. 
1282  Pillay at para 34.  
1283  Van der Schyff  (n34) 145.  
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respect the diversity of all learners and allow all religious dress and symbols as long as their 
use is based upon sincerely held beliefs. This standpoint is based on the fact that true 
pluralism is defined as allowing people to express their differences. Indeed, this could be a 
way of embracing the diversity of a ‘rainbow’ nation; however, it raises practical problems 
for schools.  
 
The practical implications of permitting religious expression in schools may be chaotic. It 
may be that a religious observance is viewed as a threat to good order within the school. This 
leaves an adherent in a position to choose between their faith and school rules.  In some cases 
these rules are subtle, seemingly neutral rules that apply to all,1284 but have the effect of 
discriminating against some on the basis of religion.1285  Schools are faced with the dilemma 
of sustaining cultural and religious sensitivity whilst maintaining order, discipline and respect 
towards all learners in the environment.1286 As a result, schools to need to establish rules and 
processes to reasonably accommodate religious and cultural expressions in a manner which 
makes learners of all religions and cultures feel that they are equally worthy and respected,1287 
while at the same time ensuring that its educational objectives are achieved. 
 
2.8    A SCHOOL’S DUTY TO LIMIT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
 
It is widely accepted that freedom should end where harm is caused to others.1288 According 
to John Stuart Mill: “[t]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”1289 Professor 
Denise Meyerson takes this argument further and suggests that rights should only be limited 
when the reason is to prevent “neutral harm”.1290 Legitimate reasons for limiting freedom 
would be “public” reasons1291 and not sectarian ones. “Public” reasons can be construed as 
“presently accepted general beliefs and reasoning found in common sense, and methods and 
conclusions of science when these are not controversial.”1292 These reasons may offend 
adherents of a particular religion – be it Christianity or another religion- but they can be 
                                                          
1284  See discussion on indirect discrimination in Chapter 4 and above in this Chapter. 
1285  Prince at para 172.   
1286  Discussed further in para 2.8 below. 
1287   In this regard, see Van Rooyen (n1252). 
1288   Smith (n1125) 8. 
1289   Mill “On Liberty” in On Liberty and The Subjection of Women (1996) 13.  
1290   See Meyerson Rights Limited: Freedom of Expression, Religion and the South African Constitution (1997).  
1291   Rawls Political Liberalism (1993) 212ff.  
1292   224.  
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accepted as reasonable because they are neutral and do not conform to one particular 
worldview.1293  
 
As previously mentioned, freedom of religion protects not only the right to adopt religious 
beliefs, but also to manifest those beliefs.1294 The right to adopt religious beliefs is absolute 
but the right to manifest those beliefs in public is not1295 for the reason that such 
manifestations may have a negative effect on, or be harmful to, the public. Therefore 
government may limit manifestation of religious practices by enacting regulations that aim to 
protect society. The limitation analysis must strike a balance between the individual’s 
fundamental right to religious freedom and the state’s responsibility to regulate conduct in the 
interests of society.1296 The courts have had the responsibility of conducting this balancing 
exercise on numerous occasions.  
 
For example, in Lawrence (discussed above), the majority of the court believed that the 
Liquor Act served a legitimate purpose in diminishing the consequences of alcohol abuse and 
that Sunday was chosen as the day of rest simply out of convenience.1297 The legitimate 
government purpose was regarded as paramount to public safety and superseded any claims 
for infringement of religious rights. However, the minority judgment noted that most 
Christian denominations considered it central to their faith that Sunday be observed as the day 
of rest. In addition, both Good Friday and Christmas day, which have direct foundations in 
Christianity, were days which have been recognised as public holidays in South Africa. The 
inevitable conclusion therefore would be that these particular days were selected as closed 
days because of their significance in Christianity. If the purpose of the provisions of the 
Liquor Act was to limit alcohol consumption on secular days of rest, then why were only 
these particular public holidays selected? Had all public holidays been included, the provision 
could be considered neutral.1298  The effect of selecting only days that have significance in 
Christianity is that the state had thereby endorsed Christianity and chose to enforce Christian 
                                                          
1293   Smith (n1125) 8. For example, corporal punishment being disallowed in schools- although it may amount to 
a Christian religious tenet or children being prohibited from carrying dangerous weapons to school, 
although these weapons may be expressions of religion/culture. These examples are discussed below.  
1294  Section 15 of the Constitution.   
1295   Freedman (n37) 135. 
1296   135.   
1297  Lawrence at para 95. 
1298  Para 159.  
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morals. The “closed day” provision is a remnant from a time where almost all business 
activities were prohibited on Sundays for religious reasons.1299   
 
Although part of the objective of the provision may be a secular, one cannot deny that the 
selection of religiously-based days as “closed days” was intended to acknowledge and adhere 
to the sentiments of those Christians who require special observance of these days.  Indeed, 
Sundays have become the common day of rest, but it is as a result of a pattern that has been 
established over the years by legislation that conformed to Christian norms and morals. The 
court exercised its duty to limit religious rights in a manner which continued to enforce 
majoritarian norms- a reason that was not purely neutral. It must be noted, however, that 
Lawrence was the Constitutional Court’s first judgement relating to discrimination on the 
basis of religion and the court’s approach in dealing with minority religions with due 
sensitivity has evolved since then.1300  
 
Years later, in Christian Education, the Constitutional Court found that section 10 of the 
Schools Act did limit the appellant’s freedom of religion, but that the infringement was 
justified owing to the harm and indignity caused by corporal punishment in schools.1301 The 
court concluded that the Christian practice of corporal punishment, (even in a Christian 
private school) could not survive- as it conflicted with other rights and values within the 
Constitution.1302 The granting of an exemption would result in the entire purpose of the 
provision being undermined. In this case, Sachs J approved of Meyerson’s approach 
(discussed above)1303 and found corporal punishment in schools to be a neutral harm. This 
judgment did not “suppose the correctness of any sectarian view”1304 and the limitation of 
rights did not reflect any “doctrinal bias”,1305 nor was it an attempt to elevate one particular 
                                                          
1299  Paras 125 and 126.  
1300  Currently South African provinces differ on Sunday liquor laws. Whereas Gauteng contemplates a complete 
ban in terms of the Gauteng Liquor Bill 2013, Kwa-Zulu Natal’s Liquor Licensing Act No 6 of 2010 
permits the sale of alcohol on Sundays. See Lancaster “Provinces differ on Sunday liquor law” found at 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/provinces-differ-on-sunday-liquor-law1.1485377#.UZeBd3YaLIU 
(Date Accessed: 12 May 2013); The Democratic Alliance is reconsidering the by-law which bans on alcohol 
sales on Sundays in Cape Town, which comes into effect on 20 May 2013. See Phakhathi “DA rethinks 
Sunday liquor ban, seeks to amend by-law” found at http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/retail/2013/03/28/da-
rethinks-sunday-liquor-ban-seeks-to-amend-by-law (Date accessed: 18 May 2013).  
1301   Christian Education at para 49-50; Also see the UK House of Lords case of R (Williamson) v Secretary of 
State for Education and Employment 2005 2 AC 246 (HL). 
1302   Para 52.  
1303   Para 33-35.  
1304   Smith “Freedom of Religion: The Right to Manifest our Beliefs” 2002 119 SALJ 690 690. 
1305   Christian Education at para 690 
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world view over others.1306 The state, in this case was not motivated by sectarian concerns but 
more a neutral desire to protect all children in all schools from harm.1307  
 
In the case of Prince, the appellant was a Rastafarian, who challenged the constitutionality of 
the prohibition on the use of cannabis in that it did not make an exemption for religious use 
thereby encroaching on his right to freedom of religion1308 in terms of section 15 of the 1996 
Constitution. The appellant claimed that the use of cannabis was central to his religion, 
Rastafarianism.1309 Simply put, the appellant contended that the impugned provisions went 
too far,1310 in other words that the legitimate government purpose served by the prohibition 
could be achieved by less restrictive means. Based on the evidence submitted, the majority of 
the Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal. The court found that the legislation did indeed 
infringe upon the freedom of religion of the Rastafari,1311 but that the limitation was 
justifiable1312 in that it forms part of a worldwide attempt to curb the distribution and use of 
cannabis1313 and it coincided with South Africa’s international obligations.1314 Once again, 
the state’s concern for public safety and order (a neutral harm) reigned supreme.1315  
 
As mentioned, the case of Pillay, dealt with the constitutionality of not granting religious and 
cultural exemptions to school uniforms. The court separated its inquiry into the constitutive 
parts of this section: Is there a legitimate purpose for the refusal? Does the limitation achieve 
the purpose? Are less restrictive means available to achieve the purpose?1316 In the court’s 
opinion, granting religious and cultural exemptions do not undermine the purpose and value 
                                                          
1306    Para 690.  
1307   Para 699; The court noted at para 51, that parents could still apply corporeal punishment in private and 
thereby fulfill what they see as their religious responsibility. 
1308   Prince at para 4. 
1309   Paras 1 and 43.  
1310   Para 4.  
1311  Para 97.  
1312  Para 131; Van der Schyff (n97) 132-133. 
1313   Para 140; See arguments against the Prince judgment in Lenta “Religious Liberty and Cultural 
Accommodation” 2005 122(2) SALJ 352 375-376.   
1314  South Africa has ratified the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 as amended by Protocol (1), 1972, 
and has signed, with reservations, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971), entry into force 16 
August 1976, in accordance with article 26(1) and the Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances (1988), entry into force 11 November 1990, in accordance with article 29(1).      
1315  On the contrary, US Supreme Court decision, of Gonzalez, Attorney General et al v O Centro Espírita 
Beneficente União Do Vegetal et al No 04-1084 (2006), members of the Christian Spiritists church, wished 
to import hoasca, a tea containing a federally proscribed hallucinogen, for religious use. The Court 
dismissed the government’s argument that it had a compelling interest in the uniform application of the law 
to the extent that no exemption could be granted to accommodate the religious use of hoasca. The Court 
held that the government’s failure to grant an exemption to the claimants was inconsistent with their 
religious freedom.  
1316  Pillay at para 97.  
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of school uniforms. There was no evidence presented to show that an exemption would 
adversely affect discipline in the school.1317 The court did not believe that refusing the 
exemption achieved the intended purpose. For that reason, the court in Pillay believed that the 
school could maintain control by establishing strict procedural requirements for an exemption 
process in order to discourage frivolous requests.1318 
 
In Pillay, any arguments in favour of public order and uniformity fell way to the 
responsibility on institutions to accommodate claims of religious/cultural expression. This 
was mainly because the religious practice is question was not objectively harmful to other 
learners or the school, unlike the religious practice in Christian Education. Generally, it 
seems that the Constitutional Court is inclined to limit manifestations of religion that are 
harmful to the public, where the reasoning behind the limitation is neutral and reasonable and 
not motivated by sectarian concerns. This means that any person who is offended by the 
manifestations of another’s religious beliefs, that are objectively non-threatening, has no right 
to supress those beliefs.1319  
 
2.9    REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICES 
 
The most prominent case on reasonable accommodation of religious practices within schools 
is the case of Pillay. The court in Pillay held that a society which values dignity, equality, and 
freedom must require people to take positive action to accommodate diversity.1320 According 
to the court, positive action might be as simple as granting and regulating an exemption from 
a code of conduct or it may require that the rules or practices be changed or even that 
monetary loss be incurred by institutions. Whether that meant the school in question should 
have permitted the religious practice in question depended on the significance of the practice 
to learner and the hardship that would be endured by the school in permitting the learner to 
conduct to it.1321 
 
The question is how far must a school go to accommodate those who are different? In this 
regard the court in Pillay, employed the term “undue hardship”, which has been used as the 
                                                          
1317  Para 101.  
1318   Para 176.  
1319   Adhar & Leigh (n26) 243.  
1320  Pillay at para 75. 
1321  Para 79.  
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test for reasonable accommodation in both the United States and Canada.1322 The United 
States Supreme Court held that employers need only incur “a de minimis cost” in 
accommodating religion,1323 while the Canadian Supreme Court held that “more than mere 
negligible effort is required to satisfy the duty to accommodate.”1324 The Canadian approach 
is more in line with the spirit, values and principles of the Constitution. However, what is 
reasonable depends on the facts of each case.1325  
 
In Pillay, the court recognised the need for deference to experts, including school authorities, 
who are well-qualified and knowledgeable to make decisions and agreed that it must give due 
weight to their decisions depending on the logic of such decisions.  But the question before 
the court was whether or the right to equality had been violated which means determining 
what obligation there was on the School to accommodate diversity reasonably. The court held 
that these are questions that the courts are best qualified to answer. It is a constitutional duty 
that cannot be replaced by any school authority’s view of fairness.1326   
 
                                                          
1322  This test was also utilised by the SCA in Department of Correctional Services & another v POPCRU & 
others (107/12) [2013] ZASCA 40 (28 March 2013). The court stated at para 25: “Therefore, it was not 
established that short hair, not worn in dreadlocks, was an inherent requirement of their jobs. A policy is not 
justified if it restricts a practice of religious belief – and by necessary extension, a cultural belief – that does 
not affect an employee’s ability to perform his duties, nor jeopardise the safety of the public or other 
employees, nor cause undue hardship to the employer in a practical sense. No rational connection was 
established between purported purpose of the discrimination and the measure taken. Neither was it shown 
that the department would suffer an unreasonable burden if it had exempted the respondents. The appeal 
must, therefore, fail.” 
1323  Trans World Airlines Inc v Hardison 432 US 63 (1977) at 84.  
1324   Central Okanagan School District No 23 v Renaud [1992] 2 SCR 970 at 984a; In Sherbert v Verner 374 US 
398 (1963), the applicant was a Seventh-day Adventist who was dismissed from her employment for 
refusing to work on a Saturday, the Sabbath day of her faith. She contested a statute that denied 
unemployment benefits to anyone who was available to work but refused to accept work, on the basis that it 
violated her freedom of religion. The Supreme Court held that the government could burden the free 
exercise of religion only if it was protecting a “compelling interest” by the least intrusive means possible 
(paras 406-409). In weighing up the state’s interest against the impact on religion, the court decided that the 
religious exemption must be upheld. Similarly, in Wisconsin v Yoder 406 US 205 (1972),  a case with even 
more drastic consequences than Sherbert, members the Old Order Amish were convicted under state 
criminal law for not sending their children to public school beyond the eighth grade. Formal education 
beyond the eighth grade is strictly forbidden for Amish faith, therefore the Order challenged the law on the 
basis that it violated their freedom of religion. The court held that it could not enforce the criminal statute 
against the Amish because this would compel them “to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental 
tenets of their religious belief” (para 208). This case reconfirmed the “compelling interest” test and it 
ensured that the faithful were not put in a position to choose between their religion and the law. The 
“compelling interest” test was abolished with respect to “free exercise” claims at the time of Employment 
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith 494 US 872 at 917 (1990). However, the 
judgement in Smith invoked tremendous criticism, therefore the compelling test was restored in 1993 by 
way of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. See Freedman (n648) 671-673.  
1325  Pillay at para 76.  
1326  Para 81.  
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The court noted that consultation and public participation on local decisions, such as drawing 
up a code of conduct or refusing to grant an exemption, was indeed valuable and helped 
promote democracy.1327 However, this did not protect the decision of the school based on the 
code of conduct from constitutional scrutiny and review. It must be borne in mind that local 
decisions may infringe on the rights of historically marginalised groups because power and 
influence is not distributed equally within the community. Democracy and consultation are 
important but nevertheless must be scrutinised by the courts.1328  
 
The court in Pillay, also found that asking the learner to go to another school, which would 
permit the religious/cultural practice in question, would marginalise the religions and cultures 
that do not fit into the confines of the code of conduct and this would be contrary to the values 
of the Constitution.1329  The court noted, however, that there may be cases where the 
availability of another school would be a relevant consideration in finding reasonable 
accommodation1330 but did not elaborated on the circumstances in which this would be 
appropriate.  
 
The ultimate question required by reasonable accommodation is whether allowing the 
particular religious practices imposes too great a burden on the school.1331  
 
In the particular circumstances of the learner in Pillay, the court concluded as follows: The 
discrimination had a serious impact on learner and the legitimate purpose of school uniforms 
was not undermined by the nose stud. Allowing the nose stud did not place an undue burden 
on the school. Therefore, reasonable accommodation would be achieved by allowing the 
learner to wear the nose stud. The court therefore confirmed the High Court’s finding of 
                                                          
1327  Para 82. 
1328   Para 83; For example in Doctors for Life International (DFL) v The Speaker of the National Assembly and 
others CCT 12/05, the constitutionality of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Act was 
challenged by DFL on the basis that National Council of Provinces did not comply with its constitutional 
obligation to facilitate public involvement in the passing of the Bill. As Ngcobo J stated in this case: “the 
law is based on the will of the people” (at para 142). The concern is that if the religious majority is anti-
abortion then upholding the “will of the people” will suppress the voices of minorities. How will the rights 
and beliefs of the marginalised be protected if the court places them at the mercy of public will? These 
sentiments are expressed in Bohler-Muller “Judicial Deference and the Deferral of Justice in Regard to 
Same-sex Marriages and in Public Consultation” 2007 40 De Jure 90 111. 
1329   See Fourie at para 60 in which the court stated: “The test of tolerance is not how one finds space for people 
with whom, and practices with which, one feels comfortable, but how one accommodates the expression of 
what is discomfiting.” 
1330  Pillay at para 92.  
1331  Para 95.  
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unfair discrimination.1332 In other words, if the discrimination against the learner outweighs 
the burden on the school, the practice should be accommodated.  
 
The school in Pillay argued that celebrating diversity could lead to a “parade of horribles”1333 
or a “slippery slope scenario” where learners could come to school in dreadlocks, body 
piercing tattoos, loincloths many other undesirable adornments. On this point, the court stated 
that if such practices were sincerely held religious and/or cultural practices- then so be it. If 
learners were too afraid to express themselves in the past, they should no longer be afraid.1334 
The court found that the possibility of abuse by the insincere should not adversely affect the 
rights of the sincere. According to the court, diversity needs to be celebrated, not feared. This 
is what the Constitution envisages. The court stated further that: “[t]he display of religion and 
culture in public is not a ‘parade of horribles’ but a ‘pageant of diversity.’”1335 This stance in 
Pillay, was extremely wide, going far beyond mere accommodation but requiring celebration 
of diversity. With Pillay being a Constitutional Court case, it has set a precedent for South 
African court cases with regards to the generous accommodation of religious/cultural rights, 
which may have far-reaching consequences in future. The impact of Pillay on private schools 
is yet to be seen. 
 
The decision in Pillay coincided with Fourie in which the court held that:  
 
“[t]he acknowledgment and acceptance of difference is particularly 
important in our country where for centuries group membership 
based on supposed biological characteristics such as skin colour 
has been the express basis of advantage and disadvantage. South 
Africans come in all shapes and sizes. The development of an 
active rather than a purely formal sense of enjoying a common 
citizenship depends on recognising and accepting people with all 
their differences, as they are. The Constitution thus acknowledges 
the variability of human beings (genetic and socio-cultural), affirms 
the right to be different, and celebrates the diversity of the 
nation.”1336 
 
                                                          
1332   Para 112.  
1333   This term was used by O’Connor J in Oregon v Smith 494 US 872 (1990) at 902 to describe the list of 
extreme examples of possible religious exemptions which they used to justify their decision that neutral 
rules would not violate the First Amendment. 
1334   Pillay at para 107; See also the case of Antonie discussed in n726.  
1335  Para 107.  
1336  Para 60.  
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Moreover, this same sentiment is expressed as an objective of the state in the National Policy, 
which is articulated as follows: “As a democratic society with a diverse population of 
different cultures, languages and religions we are duty bound to ensure that through our 
diversity we develop a unity of purpose and spirit that recognises and celebrates our 
diversity.”1337 
 
The question is whether Pillay goes too far in accommodating diversity and whether it will 
lead to disruption of order in schools.1338 On this note, the court found that if accommodation 
placed an unreasonable burden on a school, the school would then be justified in not granting 
it.1339 The court limited its wide stance on accommodation to some extent with this statement. 
However, the court went on to say that merely wanting to preserve uniformity will not be a 
sufficient reason to refuse an exemption. Also, the court noted that some observances may be 
so inconspicuous that they do not require departure from the ordinary uniform and may never 
become an issue. Each case will be different and will raise different concerns.1340 
 
Significantly, Pillay set out the factors that a school would have to consider in making a 
decision on whether or not to grant an exemption.1341 The Pillay case indicated that one way 
                                                          
1337  See the Minister’s forward. This was discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.  
1338  Both Pillay and Multani contrast with the United Kingdom case of Begum in which the House of Lords, the 
country’s highest court, ruled unanimously in favour of a school in the case of a Muslim schoolchild who 
had been denied access to school when she insisted on wearing a full length jilbab to school. According to 
the court, the claimant’s right was not infringed because there was nothing to stop her from going to school 
where her religion did not require a jilbab or where she was allowed to wear one. Other Muslim learners 
wore the shalweer kameeze (an outfit consisting of loose trousers, a tunic and a headscarf) without any issue 
being raised. Others simply wore the hijab (a simple scarf) with the school uniform, and some chose not to 
cover their heads at all. The court believed that the learner’s request to wear the jilbab took accommodation 
too far (at note 62). The parent’s in Begum had selected that school knowing full well the requirements of 
the school’s dress code. The court believed the school’s decision was justified under Article 9 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights by the school’s need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 
The court concluded that the school had not only gone out if its way to respect “Muslim beliefs but did so in 
an inclusive, unthreatening…way” (at paras 14-15). See Ross (n4) 31. In the subsequent case of Playfoot (a 
minor), R (on the application of) v Millais School [2007] EWHC 1698 (Admin) (16 July 2007), the High 
Court refused to grant an exemption to permit a female pupil to wear an abstinence ring as part of her 
Christian virtues. The court rejected the claim primarily on the grounds that the practice was not a religious 
requirement, unlike other practices that the school had accommodated, such as the wearing of headscarves. 
1339  Pillay at para 107.  
1340  Para 114.  
1341  Namely, the cultural or religious significance of the practice on which the application for an exemption is 
based; the meaning of that practice to the learner concerned; whether the cultural or religious practice is 
mandatory or voluntary; whether the relevant cultural or religious community considers it to be a practice 
which usually warrants exemption from school rules; the extent of the exemption required (in other words 
how far should the school rules be deviated from?) and  the effect of granting the exemption on the 
achievement of a “disciplined and purposeful school environment, dedicated to the improvement and 
maintenance of the quality of the learning process.” See Pillay at para 178. The quoted text is taken from 
section 8(2) of Schools Act.  
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to accommodate pluralism in one institution is to have wide consultations to establish rules 
for the institution. This will make the content more acceptable and also legitimate. However, 
as explained earlier, some schools are still in a process of transitioning from separate race 
schools to multi-racial schools and where social dynamics have caused the race division to be 
maintained, schools with changing demographic profiles need to repeat the consultation 
process at regular intervals in order to include the opinions of new faces.1342  This is the only 
way to ensure that school rules evolve and are more sensitive to minority faiths and cultures.   
 
Furthermore, where a school sets a code of conduct that could possibly encroach on freedom 
of religion and/or cultural rights, it must establish a fair procedure for granting exemptions. 
The procedure must allow learners1343 and their parents to explain their reasons for wanting 
the exemption, that is, why the practice is significant to them. This affords respect to those 
seeking an exemption to have the opportunity to be heard and it affords respect to the school 
to be consulted before a school rule is deviated from.1344  
 
Importantly, the Pillay judgement did not abolish school uniforms. It only required that 
schools make exemptions for sincere religious and cultural beliefs and practices, with it being 
clear that religion and culture sometimes overlap and that each is as important as the other. 
There is concern that a myriad of applications for exemptions will negate the need for school 
uniforms. In other words, too many exceptions to a general rule, negates the need for a 
general rule. However, the decision in Pillay confirmed that the exemption is more important 
that the rule1345 and implied that a numerous of applications for exemptions is, in the court’s 
opinion, highly unlikely.  
 
Significantly, the court made it clear that some practices may bring a real possibility of 
disruption and threaten academic standards or discipline, which may justify refusing an 
exemption.1346 Pillay indicates (in line with Christian Education and Prince) that some 
religious practices may be too dangerous/threatening for a school to permit.1347 The nose-stud 
was clearly non-threatening. However, Lenta comments that the Constitutional Court would 
                                                          
1342  Pillay at para 174.  
1343  This is in line with section 10 of the Children’s Act, which contains child participation rights.   
1344   Pillay at para 176. See Chapter 7. 
1345  Para 114.  
1346  See examples in the discussion of “best interests of the child versus best interests of the school” and the case 
of Multani in Chapter 4.  
1347  This is in accordance with sections sections 20(1)(b), 20(1)(d) and 24 of the Constitution.  
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be highly unlikely to grant an exemption for a traditional weapon (as in the case of Multani), 
for example, considering the difference in the social contexts of South Africa and Canada, 
South African being a more prevalently violent country.1348  
 
Overall it seems that schools will be required to accommodate religious/cultural practices for 
as long as the practice does not impose an unreasonable burden on the school or does not 
constitute a danger (determined objectively and neutrally) to other learners in the 
environment. The outcome will depend on the circumstances of each case.  
 
3      SOUTH AFRICAN CHARTER OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS AND   
FREEDOMS 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, section 234 of the South African Constitution provides for the 
adoption of national Charters of Rights in order to “deepen the culture of democracy 
established by the Constitution.”1349 The Constitution envisages, in other words, that the 
rights in the Constitution may be extended, supplemented, and given content by way of such 
additional charters.  
 
The South African government has made use of section 234 of the Constitution for the first 
time with the signing of the South African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms (The 
Charter), signed by every major religious group in South African as well as representatives of 
leading South African Constitutional Commissions1350 on 21 October 2010.1351 The Charter 
states that: “the recognition and effective protection of the rights of religious communities and 
institutions will contribute to a spirit of mutual respect and tolerance among the people of 
South Africa.”1352 
 
The pertinent question is: why is there a need for a Charter when religious rights are already 
articulated in section 15 of the Constitution? It has been submitted that the court’s utilisation 
                                                          
1348    Lenta (n842) 288 in which Lenta refers to Altbeker A country at war with itself: South Africa’s crisis of 
crime (2007) 12. 
1349         Section 234 of the Constitution. 
1350  Including the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Culture, Religious and 
Linguistic Communities. 
1351   Benson (n327) 128. 
1352   See Preamble.  
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of section 15 as it stands, will give further content to the right on a case by case basis which is 
a “piecemeal process”,1353 over which religious organisations have no control. The Charter on 
the other hand, would flesh out the rights conferred in section 15 and provide a guide (binding 
if enacted into law) both to legislators and to courts and tribunals on the interpretation of 
freedom of religion1354 within South Africa and internationally.1355  
 
The Charter drafting process consisted of significant consultations with major religious 
organisations, consideration of their comments by the Continuity Committee1356 and 
numerous amendments to the Draft in response to these comments.1357 The effect of this has 
been that formally or informally, the Charter has acquired the support of most religious 
communities and institutions in South Africa.1358 The Charter was signed publicly on 21 
October 2010, followed by a meeting of the signatories that established a South African 
Council for the Protection and Promotion of Religious Rights and Freedoms in terms of 
Section 185(1)(c) of the Constitution and other relevant provisions of the Promotion and 
Protection of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities Act 19 of 2002.1359 After the 
signing, a representative Continuity Committee was elected to advocate the further progress 
of the Charter.1360  
 
The most significant provision in the Charter, with specific reference to the issue of religion 
in schools, is the very detailed Article 7, which contains the right of every person to be 
educated, to educate and to have their children educated in accordance with their religious or 
philosophical convictions.1361 Importantly, the addition of the words “philosophical 
convictions” incorporates respect for belief systems that are not religious.  
 
                                                          
1353  Malherbe “The Background and Contents of the Proposed South African Charter of Religious Rights and 
Freedoms” 2011 Brigham Young University Law Review 613 622. 
1354  Benson (n327) 126 and 129.     
1355   For a comparison of developments in Canada, see Benson “The Freedom of Conscience and Religion in 
Canada: Challenges and Opportunities” 2007 21(1) Emory International Law Review 111. 
1356  Continuity Committee of the South African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms and South African 
Council for Protection and Promotion of Religious Rights and Freedoms, 2010, consisting of eight people, 
specifically created to facilitate the drafting process.  
1357  Benson (n327) 127.  
1358         Malherbe (n1353) 628.  
1359  Benson (n327) 128.     
1360  This Committee will oversee the establishment of a council to consider any further comments and 
amendments from institutions and communities that have endorsed the Charter and it will approach the 
government with an objective to creating a final document and request that it be enacted into law in terms of 
section 234 of the Constitution. See Malherbe (n1353) 628. 
1361  This coincides with Article 18(4) of the ICCPR and Article 5(2) of the Declaration.  
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 Article 7 states furthermore that:  
 
        7.1. [t]he state, which includes any public school, has the duty to respect this right 
and to inform and consult with parents on these matters. Parents may withdraw 
their children from school activities or programs inconsistent with their religious 
or philosophical convictions. This inclusion of the rights of the parent is 
noteworthy. South Africa does not mention the rights of the parent in its 
constitutional provisions on children’s rights or educational rights as it does in 
the Charter.1362 This indicates that religious communities expect parents to be 
consulted on religious matters relating to their children and to be given the 
opportunity to withdraw their children from activities that might conflict with 
their beliefs. Take note that this provision is particularly pertinent to the 
discussion on compulsory religion education, discussed in Chapter 7.          
        7.2. [e]very educational institution may adopt a particular religious or other ethos, as 
long as it is observed in an equitable, free, voluntary and non-discriminatory 
way, and with due regard to the rights of minorities. The preference for a 
particular religious ethos does not constitute discrimination in breach of the 
Constitution with respect to religious education. This provision aims to 
acknowledge the religious majority at the institution concerned.  
         7.3. [e]very private educational institution established on the basis of a particular 
religion, philosophy or faith may impart its religious or other convictions to all 
children enrolled in that institution, and may refuse to promote, teach or practice 
any religious or other conviction other than its own. Children (or their parents) 
who do not subscribe to the religious or other convictions practised in that 
institution, waive their right to insist not to participate in the religious activities 
of the institution. 
 
Other significant rights and freedoms stipulated in the Charter may be summarised as follows:  
 
                                                          
1362  Section 29 of the Constitution.  
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1. The right to believe according to their own religious or philosophical convictions, and 
to choose which faith, worldview, religion, or religious institution to subscribe to, 
affiliate with or belong to.1363 
2. The right not to be forced to believe, what to believe or not to believe, or to act against 
their convictions.1364 
3.   The right not to be forced to act against their convictions.1365 
4.  The right to the impartiality and protection of the state in respect of religion with the 
stipulation that the state may not promote, favour or prejudice a particular faith, 
religion or conviction, and may not indoctrinate anyone in respect of religion. 
Furthermore, no person may be unfairly discriminated against on the ground of their 
religion.1366  
5.   The right to the private or public, and individual or joint, observance or exercise of 
their religious beliefs, which may include but are not limited to reading and discussion 
of sacred texts, confession, proclamation, worship, prayer, witness, order, attire, 
appearance, diet, customs, rituals and pilgrimages, and the observance of religious and  
 other sacred days of rest, festivals and ceremonies.1367 This is subject to the duty of 
reasonable accommodation1368 and the need to provide essential services.1369   
                                                          
1363     Article 1.  
1364    Article 2.  
1365       Article 2; Article 2 of the Charter states furthermore:  
                  “2.1.Every person has the right to change their faith, religion, convictions or religious institution, or to form 
a new religious community or religious institution. 
  2.2. Every person has the right to have their religious beliefs reasonably accommodated. 
     2.3.Every person may on the ground of their religious or other convictions refuse to (a) participate or 
indirectly assist in or refer for certain activities, such as of a military or educational nature, or (b) 
perform certain duties or deliver certain services, including medical or related (including 
pharmaceutical) services or procedures. 
                2.4.Every person has the right to have their religious or other convictions taken into account in receiving or 
withholding of medical treatment. 
     2.5. Every person has the right not to be subjected to any form of force or indoctrination that may cause 
the destruction of their religion, beliefs or worldview.” 
1366      Article 3. 
1367      Article 4; Article 4 of the Charter states furthermore:  
      “4.1. Every person has the right to private access to sacred places and burial sites relevant to their religious 
or other convictions. Such access, and the preservation of such places and sites, must be regulated 
within the law and with due regard for property rights. 
                                            4.2. Persons of the same conviction have the right to associate with one another, form, join and maintain 
religious and other associations, institutions and denominations, organise religious meetings and other 
collective activities, and establish and maintain places of religious practice, the sanctity of which shall 
be respected. 
               4.3. Every person has the right to communicate nationally and internationally with individuals and 
institutions on religious and other matters, and to travel, visit, meet and enter into relationships or 
association with them. 
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    6. The right of every person, religious community or religious institution to maintain 
traditions and systems of religious, personal, matrimonial and family law that are 
consistent with the Constitution.1370 
    7. The right to freedom of expression in respect of religion which includes the right to 
religious dignity, that is, the right not to be victimised or slandered on the ground of 
their faith, religion, convictions or religious actions. The advocacy of hatred that is 
based on religion, and that constitutes incitement to imminent violence or to cause 
physical harm, is prohibited.1371 
    8.   The right of every person to receive and provide religious education, training and 
instruction on a voluntary basis.1372 
9. The right of religious institutions to jurisdictional independence to (a) determine its 
own confessions, doctrines and ordinances, (b) decide for itself in all matters regarding 
its doctrines and ordinances, and (c) in compliance with the principles of tolerance, 
fairness and accountability regulate its own internal affairs. This is subject to the 
qualification that every religious institution is subject to the law of the land, and must 
justify any disagreement, or civil dissent, on the basis of its religious convictions or 
doctrines.1373   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
               4.4. Every person has the right to single-faith religious observances, expression and activities in state or 
state-aided institutions, as regulated by the relevant institution, and as long as it is conducted on an 
equitable and free and voluntary basis.” 
1368  This principle of reasonable accommodation is contained in section 14(3)(i)(ii) of the Equality Act and was 
utilised by the Constitutional Court in Pillay at para 72.  
1369         Article 4.  
1370         Article 5.  
1371        Article 6; Article 6 of the Charter states further:  
                     “6.1.Every person has the right to (a) make public statements and participate in public debate on religious 
grounds, (b) produce, publish and disseminate religious publications and other religious material, and (c) 
conduct scholarly research and related activities in accordance with their religious or other convictions. 
                   6.2. Every person has the right to share their religious convictions with others on a voluntary basis. 
                6.3. Every religious institution has the right to have access to public media and public broadcasting in 
respect of religious matters and such access must be regulated fairly.” 
1372   Article 8.  
1373   Article 9 (1); Article 9 of the Charter states further: 
              “9.2. Every religious institution is recognised and protected as an institution that functions with 
jurisdictional independence, and towards which the state, through its governing institutions, has the 
responsibility to govern justly, constructively and impartially in the interest of everybody in society. 
               9.3. The state, including the judiciary, must respect the jurisdictional independence of every religious 
institution, and may not regulate or prescribe matters of doctrine and ordinances. 
               9.4. The confidentiality of the internal affairs and communications of a religious institution must be 
respected. Specifically, the privileged nature of any religious communication that has been made with 
an expectation of confidentiality must be respected in legal proceedings. 
            9.5. Every religious institution is subject to the law of the land, and must justify any disagreement, or civil 
dissent, on the basis of its religious convictions or doctrines.” 
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Overall, the Charter provides more detailed content to the right to freedom of religion than 
any international Convention to which South Africa is party.  If passed into law, the Charter 
could serve as a guide in future cases relating to religious rights.  According to Professor Iain 
Benson,1374 the location of section 234 in the Constitution, suggests that any legislation 
passed under this provision will be afforded a kind of “super statutory”1375 or constitutional 
status. Notwithstanding this, the Charter will nevertheless be subject to the Constitution.1376 If 
there is any inconsistency between the Charter and the Constitution, the Constitution will 
prevail.  
 
One area of concern in the Charter is the right of religious institutions to maintain 
jurisdictional independence1377 is of particular concern, in that religious institutions may 
permit discrimination on one or more of the restricted grounds and justify this discrimination 
in terms of religious doctrine.1378 Another concern is the provision in Article 7(3) which 
state’s that private schools may require non-adherent children (or rather their parents) to 
“waive their right to insist not to participate in the religious activities of the institution.”  The 
impact of this on children’s rights is discussed more fully in Chapter 7.  
 
Furthermore, the protection from victimisation or ridicule afforded by Article 6 of the Charter 
has been correctly criticised for going too far, especially when read in conjunction with 
Article 2(2) which states that: “Every person has the right to have their convictions reasonably 
accommodated.” One can argue that if reasonable accommodation is interpreted as immunity 
from criticism, then those who wish to express negative sentiments with regard to religion, are 
limited in terms of their right to expression.1379 There is concern that once the state starts 
creating special protection for religious interest groups through Charters such as these, it 
cannot in principle refuse to do so for all other interests groups. Moreover, it is submitted that 
freedom of religion does not require any further protection than it already receives through the 
Constitution and the Equality Act.1380  
                                                          
1374  Professor Iain Benson was involved in the charter drafting process from the beginning and he served as one 
of eight members of the Continuity Committee that considered comments on the Charter from institutions 
and communities.   
1375   Benson (n327) 126.  
1376         Malherbe (n1353) 628. 
1377  Article 9. 
1378  The conflict between freedom of association and equality is discussed in Chapter 5.  
1379    Rousseau “The South African Charter on Religious Rights and Freedoms” at http://synapses.co.za/south-
african-charter-religious-rights-freedoms/ (Date accessed: 26 June 2012). 
1380   Discussed in Chapter 4.  
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It must be noted that the Charter is a relatively recent development and therefore academic 
opinion and analysis of its provisions is minimal. Also, the Charter has not been practically 
applied yet; therefore the significance of its impact on religious rights remains to be seen.1381  
 
4  CONCLUSION 
 
Section 15 of the Constitution protects not only religion but also “conscience”, “thought”, 
“belief” and “opinion”. This means that equally protected alongside religion are other belief 
systems, non-belief and refusals to participate in religious activities.1382 The Constitutional 
Court has held that freedom of religion includes the right to believe; to announce those 
beliefs; to manifest those beliefs1383 and the right to be different in schools.1384  Importantly, 
the Constitution does not endorse a particular religion, but instead guarantees everyone the 
rights to freedom of religion and protection from unfair discrimination1385 on the grounds of 
religion, belief and conscience 
 
The Constitutional Court has made it clear that whereas the right to adopt religious beliefs is 
absolute, the right to manifest those beliefs in public is not.1386 It certain circumstances, the 
right to freedom of religion may have to be limited in order to protect the safety and well-
being of all learners or to protect the legitimate educational goals of the state.1387 Case law 
indicates that the courts are inclined only to limit manifestations of religion that are neutrally 
harmful to others or that disrupt school activities,1388 that is - limitations that are not 
motivated by sectarian concerns. This would be reasonable and justifiable in terms of section 
36 of the Constitution.  Merely being offended by another’s manifestation of their religious 
beliefs; is insufficient reason to suppress it. 
 
                                                          
1381   A Steering Committee has been established of members and experts that will continue to raise support for 
the Charter and draft a constitution for the Council to move ahead in discussions with the government. See 
Benson (n327) 128.     
1382   De Waal & Currie (n18) 290; This point is significant to the discussions in Chapter 7. 
1383  Prince at para 38.  
1384  Christian Education at para 24. 
1385   Section 9(2). 
1386   Freedman (n37) 135. 
1387  See the discussion on teaching religion in public schools in Chapter 7.  
1388  Lenta (n842) 290. 
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The case law discussed in this Chapter indicates that the Constitutional Court has consistently 
relied on the narrow definition of freedom of religion as requiring the absence of coercion or 
constraint on religious beliefs.  However, it is submitted that freedom of religion must be 
interpreted widely so as to include its equality aspect (not just voluntariness) and to consider 
the history of the marginalisation of minority faiths. This equality aspect aims to ensure 
equality amongst religions and protects against religious coercion by the state.1389 This would 
require that the state, more particularly schools, act even-handedly in relation to different 
religions and not favour one religion to the exclusion of others.  
 
It is clear from the issues addressed in this Chapter that the practical application of the 
guarantee of equality and non-discrimination between religions, is problematic. Schools have 
the arduous task of having to strike a balance between giving due acknowledgement to the 
majority religion while at the same accommodating minority religions. In developing and 
applying codes of conduct, schools have to be mindful of subtle forms of discrimination that 
persist through seemingly neutral provisions in codes of conduct. These provisions may 
enforce mainstream beliefs and behaviours which have the effect of side-lining children who 
belong to minority religions and cultures. Many schools operate on the basis that the existence 
of a religious exemption procedure amounts to sufficient accommodation of religious 
minorities. However, this thesis argues that schools often do not consider the impact of the 
insensitive handling of religious exemption procedures on children’s rights.1390  
 
This Chapter also highlighted the inherent link between religion and culture. Although 
religion is different from culture, the two are so closely connected that they often overlap.1391 
It is therefore possible for a practice to be entirely religious or cultural or a mixture of the 
two.1392  As a result, many issues pertaining to religion in schools also involve cultural rights. 
Importantly, this Chapter emphasised that cultural practices are equally important to religious 
practices and are to be given equal respect.  
 
Furthermore, the application of the reasonable accommodation principle was generously 
interpreted in Pillay. The court held that sincerely held religious and cultural practices must 
not only be accommodated- but celebrated. This means that the preservation of uniformity is 
                                                          
1389   Lawrence at paras 103, 122 and 148.  
1390  See Chapter 7.  
1391  Pillay at paras 47 and 60.  
1392   Mentioned in Chapter 1; See Pillay at para 47. 
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insufficient reason to refuse a religious/cultural exemption. Significantly, Pillay has set a 
precedent for South African court cases which requires the generous accommodation of 
religious/cultural rights in schools. However, the court noted that if accommodation of a 
religious practice imposes an unreasonable burden on the school, the practice should be 
disallowed. The next Chapter explores the impact of the reasonable accommodation principle 
on the religious freedom of children in private schools.1393   
 
Importantly, the passing of the Charter provided a significant landmark for those who are 
concerned with constitutional development. An important element included in the Charter is 
the right of parents to be consulted regarding the religious activities of their children in 
schools1394 - a right which is not expressly recognised in the Constitution - but one that is 
evidently expected by religious communities.1395  
 
Ultimately, South Africa has made significant strides towards improving the protection 
minority religions.  Many of the changes in the law on religion in schools post – 1994 are 
positive. However, this thesis argues that there is still much room for improvement, 
particularly with regard to the recognition and application of children’s rights in matters 
pertaining to religion in schools.1396  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
1393  See Chapter 7. 
1394  Article 7.  
1395  This is pertinent to the discussion on teaching of religion in public schools in Chapter 7 
1396  See Chapter 7.  
 
 
223 
 
 
1   INTRODUCTION 
 
This Chapter addresses the major concerns pertaining to the issue of religion in schools that 
have been identified in this study. Three issues have been identified for discussion, namely: 1) 
the role of children’s rights in issues pertaining to religion in schools; 2) the religious rights of 
children in private schools and 3) the teaching of religion in public schools. The Chapter 
contains a summary of the current law on each of these issues, the problems associated with 
each of the issues, as well as recommendations for improvement.  
 
2    THE ROLE OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN ISSUES PERTAINING 
TO RELIGION IN SCHOOLS 
 
This thesis focused on the link between children’s rights, education and religious rights. The 
preceding Chapters have highlighted the fact that schools are the environment where all three 
of these rights intersect. In order to ascertain the practical role that children’s rights should 
play in religious matters in the school environment, it is first necessary to sum up the current 
law on children’s rights as applicable to the issue of religion in schools. This discussion is 
divided into three sections, namely: 1) summary of the current law on children’s rights; 2) 
problems with the current position and 3) recommendations.  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
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2.1  SUMMARY OF CURRENT LAW ON CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 
 
Importantly, the CRC requires States Parties to protect the physical, mental and spiritual well-
being of children1397 and to take measures to protect children from all forms of physical or 
mental violence.1398 These provisions have been translated into section 28(1)(d) of the 
Constitution, which protects all children from maltreatment and degradation, including all 
forms of psychological harm such as intimidation, ridicule and harassment and other forms of 
degrading treatment. Correspondingly, the Children’s Act includes “the need to protect the 
child from any physical or psychological harm” as a factor in determining the best interests of 
the child.1399 Section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution provides children with the right to parental 
and “alternative care”.1400 It was emphasised in Chapter 4 that “alternative care” includes 
schools and educators acting in loco parentis with regard to learners within the school 
environment.1401 In addition to these specific children’s rights, section 24 of the Constitution 
guarantees everyone the right to an environment that is not harmful to their health and well-
being. This would include the school environment.1402  
 
Significantly, the CRC1403 and the ACRWC1404 place an obligation on all States Parties to 
take appropriate measures to ensure that school discipline is administered in a manner 
consistent with the child’s dignity. Importantly, human dignity, equality and freedom are 
included as the founding values upon which the Constitution is based.1405 These values serve 
as guiding principles for the legislature, executive and judiciary and inform the understanding 
of all the rights in the Bill of Rights.1406 Correspondingly, section 10 of the Constitution 
protects everyone’s inherent right to dignity. This means that schools are required to protect 
the inherent dignity of every child within the school environment. Furthermore, section 10 of 
the Schools Act, prohibits the administration of corporal punishment in schools. In the case of 
Christian Education the court held that, although section 10 limited the freedom of religion of 
                                                          
1397  Article 27(1).  
1398  Article 19.  
1399  Section 7(1)k). 
1400  The rights and duties of parents towards their children are recognised in Article 5 of the CRC which states: 
“States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where applicable…” and 
Article 3(2) of the CRC which states: “States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care 
as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents….”  
1401  Smith (n601) 34. 
1402  See Chapter 4 at paragraph 2.  
1403  Article 28(2).  
1404  Article 1.  
1405  Section 1 of the Constitution.  
1406  See discussion in Chapter 1 at paragraph 3.  
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schools operating on a Christian ethos, the infringement was justified owing to the harm and 
indignity caused by corporeal punishment in schools.1407 This case emphasised that the 
constitutional duty of the state to protect the dignity and well-being of all children outweighed 
the freedom of religion of schools.  
 
Importantly, Article 13(1) of the ICESCR requires States Parties to recognise the right of 
everyone to an education.1408 The specific right of the child to education is recognised in 
Article 28(1) of the CRC. At national level, a child’s rights to basic education and further 
education are recognised in section 29(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, Article 29(1) of 
the CRC requires that the education of the child be geared towards development of respect for 
human rights and the development of the respect of a child’s cultural identity as well as his or 
her language and values.1409 Significantly, the CRC Committee has commented that Article 
29(1) necessitates that the education of a child be “child-centred” and “child –friendly”.1410  
 
Also connected to children’s rights, Article 1 of the UDHR recognises the principle that all 
people are born equal. In addition, Article 2 of the CRC requires that States Parties protect all 
children against all forms of discrimination. As mentioned above, the Constitution includes 
equality as one of its founding values.1411 Also, section 9 of the Constitution includes the right 
to equality and prohibits unfair discrimination by the state1412 and any person,1413 whether 
directly or indirectly, on various grounds, including age, religion and culture.1414 That means 
that schools must ensure that learners are not disadvantaged due to certain characteristics that 
make them different from other learners. This principle is reiterated in the Equality Act.1415 
Significantly, both Article 3 of the CRC and Article 4 of the ACRWC give recognition to the 
best interests of the child principle in all actions concerning children. Article 5 of the 
Declaration mentions the best interests of the child as a consideration in all matters 
                                                          
1407   Christian Education at paras 49-50. 
1408  As mentioned in Chapter 3, Cabinet has announced its intention to ratify the ICESCR.  
1409  Article 29(1)(c) 
1410   CRC General Comment No. 1: The Aims of Education, 17 April 2001, CRC/GC/2001/1para 2.   
1411  Mentioned in Chapter 1 at paragraph 3.  
1412  Section 9(3).  
1413  Section 9(4).  
1414  Section 9(3) states that: “The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on 
one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth”. Section 9(4) 
states that: “No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair 
discrimination.” 
1415  See sections 1(xxii)(a) and 6 of the Equality Act.  
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concerning the religious rights of children. In this regard, section 28(2) guarantees that in all 
matters relating to children, the best interests of the child are of paramount concern. The 
principle was applied in recent prominent case law involving educational matters, such as 
Laerskool Middelburg and Mikro and Rivonia. Also, the best interests principle is given 
further content in section 7 the Children’s Act. It should be noted that the Schools Act 
mentions the promotion of the best interests of the school in developing codes of conduct,1416 
but makes no mention of the protecting the best interests of the child.1417 Neither is the 
principle mentioned in the National Policy.   
 
Connected to the best interests of the child, Article 12 of the CRC and Article 4 of the 
ACRWC require that the views of a child be taken into consideration in matters affecting the 
child. In addition, the CRC includes the child’s right to be heard in judicial and administrative 
proceedings affecting the child, whether personally or through a representative.1418 Section 10 
of the Children’s Act encompasses this principle by providing for the right of participation by 
the child (of sufficient maturity) in any matter concerning that child. It requires further that 
the views expressed by the child must be given due weight.1419 In addition, section 31(1) of 
the Children’s Act requires that the views expressed by the child in certain matters affecting 
the child, be given due consideration. Notably, the case of McCall v McCall, recognised the 
“child’s preference” as a factor in determining the best interests of the child.1420  
 
Specifically related to religion, Article 14(1) of the CRC and Article 9(1) of the ACRWC 
protect the freedom of thought, conscience and religion of children. In addition, Article 18(1) 
of the ICCPR emphasises that freedom of religion includes the right to manifest beliefs 
through worship, observance and practice. In this regard, South Africa constitutionally 
protects everyone’s freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion1421 and the 
right to conduct religious observances in public institutions.1422 Furthermore, section 16 of the 
Constitution protects the right to freedom of expression, including religious and cultural 
expressions in the form of dress, adornments and hairstyles.1423 Importantly, Article 30 of the 
                                                          
1416         Section 20 (1)(a). 
1417  Other than section 8(5) which mentions protecting a learner’s interests in disciplinary procedures.  
1418         Article 12 (2).  
1419         Section 10.  
1420  McCall at paras 204 1/J- 205G.  
1421  Section 15(1).  
1422         Section 15(2).  
1423      Discussed in Chapter 6.  
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CRC and Article 12 of the ACRWC recognise the rights of children of religious or linguistic 
minorities to enjoy their own culture and to profess and practise their own religion. Cultural 
and linguistic rights are protected in sections 30 and 31 of the Constitution.   
 
2.2  PROBLEM WITH THE CURRENT POSITION 
 
In general,1424 the legal framework protecting children’s rights in relation to the topic of 
religion in schools is sufficient. The problem with the current position does not lie in the law 
itself. The problem lies in the insufficient recognition and application of children’s rights in 
matters pertaining to religion on a practical level in the school environment. In light of the 
current law expounded above, it is submitted that children’s rights have a paramount and 
practical role to play in religious exemption procedures in schools1425 However, the policy 
makers have not always made the explicit link between children’s rights and issues pertaining 
to religion in schools in order for schools to follow suit and recognise children’s rights in their 
codes of conduct and religious exemption procedures.  
 
For example, at present there is no express mention of children’s rights or the best interests of 
the child, in the National Policy. Since the National Policy provides the framework within 
which schools must create practical rules on religious issues, its inclusion of children’s rights 
could translate into practical rules in the school environment. Furthermore, there are no 
specific national guidelines on religious/cultural exemptions which create uniformity or 
consistency in the way religious exemption procedures are conducted and which recognise the 
importance of safeguarding children’s rights. The danger in not having these practical 
guidelines was illustrated in the case of Pillay (discussed below). 
 
On a practical level, in terms of section 8(1) and section 20(1) of the Schools Act, an SGB is 
allowed to develop a code of conduct and mission statement for its school.1426 This would 
include rules regarding the role of religion within that school or rules which establish a 
religious ethos for the school. In order to reasonably accommodate religious and cultural 
diversity, schools often include in their code of conduct the option to apply for 
religious/cultural exemptions. In other words, if parents do not wish for their child to 
                                                          
1424  Minor insufficiencies are pointed out below.  
1425  Illustrated below. 
1426  Section 20(1)(c) of the Schools Act.  
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participate in religious observance or want their child to display a form of religious or cultural 
expression, they can apply for their child to be exempted from the application of particular 
school rules. In the case of Pillay, the Constitutional Court compiled a set of factors that a 
school would have to consider in making a decision on whether or not to grant 
religious/cultural exemption. These factors were articulated as follows:  
  
 the cultural or religious significance of the practice on which the application for an 
exemption is based; 
  the meaning of that practice to the learner concerned; 
 whether the cultural or religious practice is mandatory or voluntary;  
 whether the relevant cultural or religious community considers it to be a practice which 
usually warrants exemption from school rules; 
 the extent of the exemption required (in other words, how far should the school rules be 
deviated from?) and   
 the effect of granting the exemption on the achievement of a “disciplined and 
purposeful school environment, dedicated to the improvement and maintenance of the 
quality of the learning process.” 1427 
 
It is evident that these factors are based on religious and cultural concerns and the interests of 
the school. However, it is submitted that a key factor was overlooked, namely: have the rights 
and best interests of the child been considered and applied throughout the exemption process?  
 
In cases such as Laerskool Middelburg, Mikro and Kotze v Kotze,1428 South African courts 
have emphasised the need to protect children’s rights, particularly the best interests of the 
child in all matters, including religious and educational matters. However, in the case of 
Pillay, which serves as the highest authority on religious/cultural exemptions in South Africa, 
children’s rights were only alluded to,1429 but not explicitly dealt with. Moreover, the best 
interests of the child principle, was not expressly mentioned.  
 
In fact, in the case of Pillay, it was mentioned that the learner suffered a great deal of 
insensitive treatment from teachers, peers and prefects after having her nose pierced. She was 
                                                          
1427   As provided for in section 8(2) of the Schools Act (discussed in Chapter 5). 
1428  Cases discussed in Chapter 4.  
1429  Pillay at para 56.  
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regularly threatened with disciplinary action.1430 She had to endure harassment and ridicule in 
order to defend her cultural and religious rights. In the process of waiting for her disciplinary 
hearing, her parent obtained an interim order restraining the school from interfering with, 
harassing, intimidating, demeaning, humiliating or discriminating against learner.1431 In 
addition, the psychological pressure and intimidation placed on the learner in Pillay, caused 
her academic grades to suffer.1432 This was not in accordance with the learner’s rights in terms 
of Articles 19 and 27(1) of the CRC and section 28(1)(d) of the Constitution, as it allowed the 
child to endure psychological harm. This should not be the case. Since the school has a duty 
of care towards the child in loco parentis, it is submitted that religious/cultural exemptions 
should be handled in a way that ensures that the child’s physical, mental1433 and academic 
well-being is not compromised or jeopardised in any way.  
 
The case of Pillay illustrated that, even in schools with an outstanding reputation for 
accommodating diversity through reasonable accommodation (as was the case with Durban 
Girls’ High School),1434 the vulnerable position of the child may not be adequately recognised 
and protected during exemption procedures. It is submitted that specific, practical, national 
guidelines on the issue, which encompass children’s rights, could serve to avoid instances 
such as these.   
 
2.3  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In accordance with the current law position discussed above, it is submitted that schools must 
consider children’s rights, particularly the best-interests-of-the-child principle as central in 
developing and implementing religious/cultural exemption procedures.1435 In other words, 
schools must adopt a child-centred approach in dealing with such matters.  
 
As a matter of compliance with a constitutional requirement, it is recommended that the 
appropriate education policy and legislation be amended so as to recognise the integral role of 
children’s rights in the matter at hand (and other education matters). It is recommended that 
                                                          
1430  Para 90.  
1431  Para 10.  
1432  Para 90. 
1433  As required by Article 27(1) of the CRC.  
1434  Pillay at para 113.  
1435  This is in accordance with Article 3 of the CRC, Article 4 of the ACRWC, Article 5 of the Declaration and 
section 28(2) of the Constitution.   
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specific provisions relating to children rights be introduced into the National Policy to the 
effect that: a) children’s rights are an integral component to dealing with issues pertaining to 
religion in education; b) the best interests of the learner are a paramount concern in all matters 
pertaining to religion in education; and c) the dignity of the learner must be respected 
throughout any process or procedure relating to religious/cultural exemptions. Once these 
amendments are made to the National Policy, the corresponding changes to the Schools Act 
will then have to follow accordingly to the effect that: a) children’s rights are an integral 
component to dealing educational matters; b) the best interests of the learner are a paramount 
concern in all educational matters; and c) the dignity of the learner must be respected 
throughout any process or procedure involving a child. The amendments to the National 
Policy would be more specific with regards to religion. These provisions will be in 
accordance with sections 10 and 28 of the Constitution.1436  
 
The inclusion of such clauses will further emphasise the state’s recognition of children’s 
rights in matters pertaining to religion in schools. This will create legal obligations for school 
administrators and SGBs on the inclusion of children’s rights in religious exemption 
processes. It is submitted that an express stance by the state in this regard will set the tone for 
the manner in which religious exemptions procedures are handled in schools. 
 
It is recommended further that “National Guidelines on Religious/cultural Exemptions” in 
schools be developed in order to set specific legal parameters within which each school can 
adopt religious/cultural exemption procedures that best suits each school. In accordance with 
the Schools Act, each school should still develop a code of conduct/policies which best suits 
its unique environment, but the rules should fall within the confines set out in the guidelines 
(discussed below). These guidelines should ensure that the current law discussed above is 
given practical effect in the daily lives of school-children, in a uniform and consistent manner. 
Without specific, practical guidelines, schools may not provide adequate and consistent 
protection for children’s rights. A few recommended guidelines are expanded on below.  
These recommendations are made bearing in mind the values upon which the Constitution is 
based, namely, human dignity, equality and freedom.  
 
                                                          
1436  Also, it is in accordance with Article 3 of the CRC, Article 4 of the ACRWC and Article 5 of the 
Declaration.  
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First of all, all schools’ codes of conduct must set out a detailed procedure for applying for 
religious/cultural exemptions. This will serve as a clear guide to learners, parents and 
educators on how to conduct themselves during a religious exemption process.1437 A detailed 
procedure will also ensure consistency and equality in the manner in which exemption 
processes are conducted. It is insufficient for codes of conduct to simply state that 
applications for religious/cultural exemptions are permitted. In the case of Pillay, the absence 
of a clear procedure resulted in a parent using undesirable methods to raise her 
religious/cultural concerns.1438 This situation left the learner child in the middle of a long-
running dispute between her parent and the school which hampered her education.1439 It is 
submitted that a clear process will minimise such disputes.1440 Moreover, in accordance with 
the CRC Committee’s interpretation of the role of education in terms of Article 29(1) of the 
CRC, it is submitted that the detailed religious exemption procedure should be child-friendly 
and child-centred.  The requirements of a child-friendly approach are illustrated by the 
recommendations below. 
 
Importantly, all school codes of conduct should contain an express prohibition against all 
forms of bullying, victimisation, harassment, intimidation, threats or pressure on a child who 
is seeking religious/cultural exemption or displaying a religious/cultural expression - whether 
it be by fellow learners, school prefects or educators. A reporting procedure to a neutral body 
(for example, an official in the department of education) must be established to address any 
contraventions of the above prohibition- which must be enforced through strict disciplinary 
measures. The aspect of neutrality in the reporting procedure is essential in protecting the 
child from further victimisation from within the school. The process is likely to involve the 
parents, the child, the school principal, the SGB and the alleged perpetrator (and their parents 
if it involves another child). This recommendation is in accordance with sections 9, 10, 24 and 
28(1)(d) of the Constitution. It is also in accordance with Articles 19 and 27(1) of the CRC. 
The implication of this recommendation for children is that they would no longer have to fear 
                                                          
1437  Pillay at para 37.  
1438  Pillay at para 108.  
1439  In fact, the learner finished school without the issue being resolved. See Pillay at para 20 which states: “The 
Department then lodged a notice purporting to withdraw from the case on the basis that the matter had 
become moot on two grounds. Firstly, Sunali would no longer be at school by the time the case was 
decided….” 
1440  Pillay at para 38.  
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victimisation for wanting to assert their religious rights.1441 It also ensures that the school 
offers a safe environment1442 for the child to flourish in.  
 
Importantly, if a child has engaged in wearing/displaying a religious symbol, teachers should 
not be allowed to physically remove or confiscate religious symbols without a proper 
exemption procedure being followed to completion. If the child has not yet applied for an 
exemption, teachers must direct the child as to the proper procedure to follow. As soon as a 
child has applied for a religious/cultural exemption, all teachers of that child must be 
informed of that fact and directed to allow the official process to be completed without 
interference. Religious symbols are often sacred and their forced removal is likely to be 
offensive to the child’s dignity. Any forced removal of religious symbols in the classroom 
would be contrary to the child’s dignity, the freedom of security of the person, their religious 
rights and their children’s rights. It would also be contrary to the principles articulated in 
Articles 27(1) and 28(2) of the CRC.  
 
Furthermore, in accordance with the child’s right to dignity in terms of section 10 of the 
Constitution, all meetings/communications relating to the religious/cultural exemption should 
be conducted in private and not discussed in the presence of other learners so as to avoid 
placing any stigma or humiliation on the child. The devastating psychological effects of 
insensitively singling out a child as being “different” were mentioned in Chapter 4. The 
protection of the child from this form of psychological harm is in accordance with section 
28(1)(d) of the Constitution and section 7(1)(k) of the Children’s Act. The implication of this 
recommendation is that it fosters a relationship of trust between the child and school 
authorities.1443  
 
In terms of the school’s duty of care towards the child1444 and Article 12(2) of the CRC, 
children should be allowed adult representation in all meetings/conversations in relation to: 
the nature of the exemption sought; the centrality of the religious/cultural practice or the 
sincerity of the child’s beliefs. In accordance with section 28(1)(d),1445 a child should not be 
confronted with these issues on their own in order avoid the child feeling intimidated by 
                                                          
1441  This will uphold Article 14(1) of the CRC, Article 9 of the ACRWC and sections 15 and 28 of the 
Constitution.  
1442  As required in 24 of the Constitution.  
1443  This recommendation is also supported by the right to privacy in section 14 of the Constitution.  
1444  See section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution and section 32 of the Children’s Act.  
1445  Section 28(1)(d) relates to the child’s right to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation.  
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school authorities. The parents of the child should receive official notification of any and all 
meetings in relation to the religious exemption sought and permitted to represent their child’s 
interests. The rationale behind this recommendation is the same as the rationale behind Article 
12(2) of the CRC and section 28(1)(h) of the Constitution - which ensure that children have 
the right to legal representation in civil proceedings affecting them, if a substantial injustice 
would otherwise result.1446 It recognises that children may lack the maturity to represent their 
own best interests adequately.  
 
Although, adult representation of the child’s interests is important, it is imperative that the 
child’s “voice”1447 be considered as an essential component in religious/cultural exemption 
process. This entails that a child of sufficient maturity should be given the opportunity to be 
heard (either personally of through the representative) in relation to the sincerity of their 
belief in the religious/cultural practice concerned. This is in accordance with Constitutional 
Court judgements. Both the case of Pillay1448 and Christian Education1449 referred to the 
importance of hearing from the person whose religious/cultural rights are at issue. 
Furthermore, this recommendation is in accordance with Article 12(2) of the CRC and section 
10 of the Children’s Act, which provides every child with the right to participate in any 
proceedings that relate to that child. This recommendation also gives due respect to the child 
as the holder of the right to freedom of religion.1450  
 
In accordance with section 10 and section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution, children who receive 
exemptions from religious observances should be given constructive activities to perform that 
are in accordance with the child’s dignity. It is imperative that activities be constructive and 
not demeaning to the child in any way. For example, a child being allowed to do reading or 
research is likely to constitute a constructive intervention but a child being forced to do chores 
such as cleaning the school kitchen, would be demeaning. The school must show due 
sensitivity to the child who is being singled out by ensuring that their dignity is respected at 
all times. Lastly, it is suggested that, in accordance with section 28(2) of the Constitution, 
Article 3 of the CRC and Article 4 of the ACRWC, that the chosen constructive activity 
                                                          
1446  Section 28(1)(h); Discussed in Sloth- Nielsen (n759) 495.  
1447  Christian Education at para 53 
1448  Pillay at para 56.  
1449  Para 53.  
1450  Section 15 of the Constitution and Article 14(1) of the CRC.  
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should be disclosed to and agreed upon by parents1451 to ensure that it is in accordance with 
the child’s best interests.   
 
It should be noted that, as much as a school is responsible for protecting the dignity of the 
child in the school environment, the co-operation of the parents of the child is needed in order 
for an exemption procedure to operate effectively. Accordingly, parents - in accordance with 
their duty of care over their children - need to abide by school rules by following the 
exemption procedures correctly. This would include approaching a school for permission for 
the religious exemption before allowing the child to initiate the practice - as opposed to 
commencing with the practice and then demanding that the school accept it after the fact.1452 
Proper conduct by parents will assist in safeguarding the interests of the child.  
 
The above discussion has illustrated that ways in which children’s rights can be given 
practical effect in religious/cultural exemption procedures. It is imperative that the role of 
children’s rights be crystallised in all processes and procedures relating to religious/cultural 
exemptions at school. It is submitted that, if a school gives practical recognition to the rights 
of the child, the child will in turn develop respect for human rights. This is one of the 
objectives of education.1453   
 
3  FREEDOM OF RELIGION OF CHILDREN IN PRIVATE 
SCHOOLS 
 
Chapter 5 alluded to the implications of the right to establish private schools on the freedom 
of religion of non-adherent children attending private schools. The issue is exceedingly 
complex, since it involves a tussle between the various interrelated rights of private schools 
(educational, associational, cultural rights and freedom of religion); and the interrelated rights 
of non-adherent learners (dignity, equality, children’s rights, educational and freedom of 
religion). This conflict of rights was highlighted in the controversial case of Wittmann. This 
discussion is divided into three sections: 1) summary of the current law pertaining to private 
                                                          
1451  The child is entitled to this “parental care” in terms of section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution. The rights and 
duties of parents over their children are recognised in Articles 3(2) and 5 of the CRC.  
1452  Pillay at para 108.  
1453  Article 29(1) of the CRC.  
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schools; 2) summary of the current law protecting the freedom of religion of children in 
private schools and 3) problems and recommendations. 
 
3.1  SUMMARY OF CURRENT LAW PERTAINING TO PRIVATE SCHOOLS  
 
Article 26(3) of the UDHR confers on parents the “right to choose the kind of education” their 
children should receive. This provision recognises that parents have the right to choose 
between public and private education.1454 The ICESCR obliges States Parties to respect the 
educational freedom of parents by allowing them to choose and establish private educational 
institutions.1455 Similarly, Article 11(4) of the ACRWC allows parents to choose schools for 
their children “other than those established by public authorities”, provided that these schools 
conform to the minimum standards approved by the state. Furthermore, Article 18(4) of 
ICCPR states that parents have the right to ensure the religious and moral education of their 
children in accordance with their religion or other beliefs.  
 
In this regard, section 29(3) of the Constitution allows for the establishment of private schools 
that cater for the particular needs of cultural, linguistic or religious groups, provided that 
certain minimum standards are upheld by the school.1456 Although these schools are private – 
they are bound to the Bill of Rights in terms of section 8(2) of the Constitution and must act 
within its parameters (where applicable). Correspondingly, the Schools Act provides for the 
establishment of private schools provided that these schools maintain a standard that is not 
inferior to public schools. Although private schools are generally independently funded, the 
state is not precluded from subsidising them.1457 Importantly, the right to establish private 
schools assists in protecting the rights of religious communities to preserve their religion and 
culture through education.  
 
In addition, section 29(3) of the Constitution enhances the cultural and linguistic rights 
encapsulated in sections 30 and 31 of the Constitution, including the right “to form, join and 
maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society.”1458 
However, section 31(2) contains a qualification that cultural rights may not be exercised in a 
                                                          
1454  Ssenyonjo (n438) 360. 
1455  Article 13(3).  
1456  Section 29(3)(c). 
1457   National Norms and Standards for School Funding, GN 2362, GG 19347 of 12 October 1998, provides 
uniform national norms on private schools subsidies; Section 48(2) of the Schools Act.   
1458  Section 31 (1)(b). 
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manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights. Sections 30 and 31 of the 
Constitution are in accordance with Article 30 of the CRC and Article 12 of the ACRWC, 
which grant children of religious minorities the right to enjoy their own culture and to profess 
and practise their own religion in community with other members of their group.1459 In 
addition, the UDHR1460 and the CRC1461 affords children the right to participate freely in 
cultural life. The rights in sections 29(3) and 31 of the Constitution are supplemented by the 
Constitution’s protection of freedom of association, which includes the right to establish, join, 
dissolve, leave or participate in the activities of an association, as well as the right not to 
join.1462  
 
Furthermore, section 29(3)(a) of the Constitution expressly prohibits admission criteria in 
private schools that are based solely on race.1463 This is particularly important in light of 
South Africa’s once racially divided education system. This is in accordance with the ICERD, 
which places responsibility on States Parties to eliminate racial discrimination in all 
spheres.1464 It requires that States Parties guarantee the right to equality before the law 
without any distinction on “race, colour, or national or ethnic origin.”1465 In this regard, the 
CRC Committee has confirmed that “[e]ducation should thus be accorded one of the highest 
priorities in all campaigns against the evils of racism and related phenomena.”1466  
 
Overall, the inclusion of the right to establish private schools in section 29(3) of the 
Constitution is in accordance with the various international human rights instruments to which 
South Africa is party.1467  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1459    See Chapter 3 para 5.4.  
1460         Article 27.  
1461        Article 31.  
1462  Section 18.  
1463  See also section 7 of the Equality Act.  
1464  Article 2.  
1465    Article 5. 
1466       CRC General Comment No. 1: The Aims of Education, 17 April 2001, CRC/GC/2001/1 para 11.  
1467  Article 26(3) of the UDHR and Article 13 of the ICESCR discussed in Chapter 3; Article 2 of the First 
Protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights.   
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3.2  SUMMARY OF CURRENT LAW PROTECTING THE FREEDOM OF 
RELIGION OF CHILDREN IN PRIVATE SCHOOLS  
 
It should be noted that the children’s rights discussed on paragraph 2.1 are also applicable to 
this discussion. Particularly relevant are section 28(2) of the Constitution, which contains the 
best interests of the child principle, and section 10 of the Constitution, which protects the 
child’s inherent right to dignity.  
 
Aside from specific children’s rights (discussed above), children acquire religious rights in 
terms of Article 14(1) of the CRC and Article 9 of the ACRWC.  In these children’s rights 
instruments, children are expressly mentioned as the holders of rights. Although Article 14(2) 
of the CRC protects the right of parents to direct their child in the exercise of his or her rights 
(by virtue of the child’s age and immaturity); it is recognised that this must be done “in a 
manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child.”1468 This implies that, as the child 
evolves and matures, the direction given by parents may need to diminish.1469  
 
In addition, the UDHR, the ICERD1470, the ICCPR1471 and the Declaration1472 guarantee 
everyone the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, which includes the right to 
manifest such beliefs whether in public or in private. Importantly, Article 18(2) of the ICCPR 
recognises that freedom of religion entails the absence of any coercion which would impair a 
person’s freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his or her choice. This provision 
coincides with the Constitutional Court’s definition of freedom of religion, which entails the 
absence of coercion or constraint; meaning that freedom of religion may be impaired when 
people are forced to act or refrain from acting in a manner contrary to their religious 
beliefs.1473 Importantly, however, the CRC does recognise that manifestations of religion may 
be limited in order to “protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental 
rights” of others.1474  The Declaration also protects the right of the child to be brought up in 
                                                          
1468  Discussed in Chapter 3 at paragraph 5.4.  
1469  Discussed in Chapter 4 at paragraph 2. 
1470    Article 5(d)(vii). 
1471  Article 18(1). 
1472  Discussed in Chapter 2; Article1(1). 
1473  Lawrence; Prince; Christian Education.  
1474  Article 14(3).  
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the “spirit of understanding, tolerance, friendship among peoples”, and “respect for freedom 
of religion or belief of others.”1475 
 
The Constitution guarantees everyone the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, 
belief and opinion in section 15. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court in Christian Education 
held that freedom of religion includes the right of people to be “different”.1476 That entails 
being who they are without being compelled to adopt the religious and cultural norms of 
others.1477 Moreover, in this case, the court recognised the inherent link between freedom of 
religion and human dignity.1478 This link between religion and dignity was also recognised in 
the Constitutional Court cases of Prince1479and Pillay.1480  Similarly, it is emphasised in 
Article 3 of the Declaration, which recognises discrimination on the basis of religion as an 
offence against human dignity.  
 
Importantly, section 15(2) of the Constitution allows for religious observances to be 
conducted at “state or state-aided institutions”, provided that they are conducted on an 
equitable basis and attendance is voluntary. Importantly, however, the Constitution recognises 
that freedom of religion is not absolute. The right to manifest religious beliefs may be limited 
if the limitation is “reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom.”1481 This means that a child’s right to manifest religious 
beliefs in schools may be limited in order to protect the legitimate goals of the school or the 
rights of other learners within the school, if such limitation complies with the requirements of 
section 36 of the Constitution. 
 
Inevitably intertwined with freedom of religion, is the right not to be unfairly discriminated 
against on the basis of religion. Article 7 of the UDHR and Article 26 of the ICCPR recognise 
                                                          
1475  Article 5(3). 
1476  Christian Education at para 24; Kroeze (n1127) 478; In Prince, the minority came to the conclusion that 
there was a duty on the courts to guarantee the Rastafari a reasonable means within which to exercise their 
religious rights (para 163). The minority made the decision to safeguard the “right to be different” (para 
170). 
1477   Christian Education at para 24 
1478  Para 36.   
1479  In Prince, Ngcobo J stated at para 51: “There can be no doubt that the existence of the law which effectively 
punishes the practice of the Rastafari religion degrades and devalues the followers of the Rastafari religion 
in our society. It is a palpable invasion of their dignity. It strikes at the very core of their human dignity. It 
says that their religion is not worthy of protection. The impact of the limitation is profound indeed.”    
1480  Langa CJ stated at para 62: “[R]eligious and cultural practices are protected because they are central to 
human identity and hence to human dignity which is in turn central to equality.”  
1481   Section 36 of the Constitution.  
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the right of all people to equal protection of the law, which requires a prohibition on 
discrimination on the basis of religion. In addition, the Declaration aims to prevent and 
eliminate discrimination on the basis of religion.1482 The Constitution protects the right to 
equality in section 9.  Furthermore, section 9 prohibits unfair discrimination by the state1483 
and any person1484 (including a private school), whether directly or indirectly, on numerous 
grounds, including religion. The reference to unfair discrimination signifies that in certain 
circumstances, discrimination may be fair. This would be the case where the discrimination 
serves a legitimate societal goal. For example, the specific exclusion of discrimination1485 on 
the basis of race in section 29(3) implies that a measure of discrimination on the basis of 
religion and culture may not be unfair.1486 The discussion below questions whether a complete 
waiver1487 of the freedom of religion of a non-adherent child is an appropriate measure. 
Furthermore, the right of non-discrimination is reiterated in section 6 of the Equality Act.1488 
Significantly, the Equality Act, which applies to both the state and private persons,1489 
requires that the existence and extent of reasonable accommodation of diversity be considered 
as a factor in the determination of unfair discrimination.1490  
 
Lastly, children are conferred educational rights. The right to education is acknowledged in 
the UDHR,1491 the CRC1492 and the ICESCR1493. In addition, Article 28(1) of the CRC 
recognises the right of the child to education, “with a view to achieving this right 
progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity.” The Declaration,1494 the CRC1495 and the 
ACRWC1496 highlight the need for education to promote understanding, tolerance and 
friendship among all religious groups. This is purported to be necessary in order to prepare 
                                                          
1482    Article 4.  
1483  Section 9(3).  
1484  Section 9(4).  
1485  It is questioned in the discussion below whether a certain measure of discrimination necessitates a complete 
waiver of religious freedom. 
1486  De Waal & Currie (n18) 486; Devenish (n52) 154.  
1487  This entails an agreement not to exercise a right in future. 
1488  Religion is mentioned as a prohibited ground in section 1 (xxii)(a). 
1489  Section 5.  
1490  Section 14(3)(i)(ii). 
1491  Article 26(1). 
1492  Article 28(1). 
1493  Article 13(1).  
1494  Article 5(3).  
1495  Article 29(1). 
1496  Article 11(2)(d). 
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children for a “responsible life in a free society.”1497 The Constitution guarantees the right to 
“basic education” and “further education” in section 29.1498  
 
The right to establish private schools and the religious freedom of non-adherent learners was 
weighed up in the case of Wittmann.1499 In this case, the court held that the right to establish 
private schools1500 recognised the freedom to establish “parochial educational institutions with 
confessional religious observances and instruction, the attendance at which may be made 
obligatory.”1501 The reasoning of the court was that “the outsider”, having being made fully 
aware of the religious ethos of the school, had the option not to join. In other words, 
associational rights entail that “the outsider” cannot be allowed to join on their own terms.1502 
The court held that:  
 
“The right to exclusivity on the ground of culture, language or 
religion includes the right to exclude non-users of that language 
and non-adherents of that culture or religion, or to require from 
them conformity.”1503 
 
Despite the fact that the decision was made in terms of the interim Constitution - which was 
held to have no vertical effect,1504 the court nevertheless analysed the legal issue as if section 
14 of the interim Constitution was applicable. In doing so, Van Dijkhorst J employed such a 
narrow definition of the term “state-aided institution” that it meant that a private school which 
was subsidised by the state to the extent of R1.5 million per year, did not fall under the 
definition of a state-aided aided institution.1505 This meant that (even if the interim 
Constitution was applicable) the private school was not bound by section 14(2) of the interim 
                                                          
1497  Du Plessis and Another v De Klerk n1. 
1498   Section 29(1), discussed fully in Chapter 5.  
1499   Wittmann is discussed in Chapter 5.  
1500  As per section 32(c) of the interim Constitution.  
1501  In Wittmann at para 90, the court stated: “Does this mean that private parochial schools which do not 
receive State aid may not prescribe obligatory attendance at their morning prayers and confessional 
religious instruction classes? The answer is negative.”  
1502  In Wittmann at para 90-91, the court held that: “In respect of these educational institutions the fundamental 
freedom of religion of “outsiders” is limited to the freedom of non-joinder. Outsiders cannot join on their 
own terms and once they have joined cannot impose their own terms.”  
1503  Wittmann at para 90.  
1504  In Wittmann at para 93, the court held that: “The interim Constitution and in particular section 14(2) is not 
applicable to the relationship between the plaintiff and the German school as the latter is not a “state-aided 
institution” and organ of state. Even if it were, the plaintiff has waived the right to rely on section 14(2) of 
the interim Constitution.”  
1505  Wittmann at para 85.  
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constitution (the equivalent of section 15(2) of the Constitution) and could therefore compel 
its pupils to attend religious observances.1506  
 
In this case, the court held that when a parent agrees to submit to a private school’s 
constitution and rules, they in effect waive their child’s freedom of religion.1507 This decision 
indicated that the waiver of the freedom of religion of the child in the case of private schools 
is not unconstitutional in the case of private schools.1508 This interpretation of the right to 
establish private schools has implications for children’s rights, education rights and freedom 
of religion of learners attending private schools that need to be addressed.  
 
3.3 PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT POSITION 
 
It is important to point out that the Wittmann decision was made in respect of the interim 
Constitution, which was held to have vertical effect only. This means that the interim 
Constitution (particularly section 14(2)) was not applicable to the relationship between the 
plaintiff and the private school. The situation under the interim Constitution was as follows: 
since private schools were not bound by section 14 of the Constitution, gaining admission into 
private school entailed an automatic waiver of the freedom of the religion of the child (that is, 
where the private school is not religion neutral). There was no constitutional duty on the 
private school to recognise the freedom of religion of a non-adherent learner, with the result 
that the child could be compelled to attend religious instruction and religious observances.  
 
Contrastingly, section 8(2) of the Constitution provides for the horizontal effect of the Bill of 
Rights - meaning that the provisions of the Bill of Rights apply to the conduct of private 
persons (to the extent that they are applicable). Private schools, therefore, cannot act outside 
the bounds of the Bill of Rights. Under the Constitution, the wording of section 15(2)1509 
indicates that it is applicable only to the “state or state-aided institutions”; however, section 
                                                          
1506  De Waal & Currie (n18) 303.  
1507  In Wittmann at paras 90-91, the court held that: “I hold therefore that even if the German school is a State-
aided institution and organ of state the right of non-attendance in section 14(2) of the interim Constitution 
can validly be waived and that the plaintiff did just that by subjecting herself to the association’s 
constitution and the school’s regulations.”  
1508  Wittmann at para 91-92. 
1509  Section 15(2) states: “Religious observances may be conducted at state or state-aided institutions, provided 
that- (a) those observances follow rules made by the appropriate public authorities; (b) they are conducted 
on an equitable basis; and (c) attendance at them is free and voluntary. See discussions on state-aided 
institutions in Chapters 5 and 6.  
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15(1)1510 applies to both state and private institutions.  This means that private schools which 
do not fall under the definition of “state-aided institution” are not bound by  the limitations 
placed on the conducting of religious observances by section 15(2),  but are bound by section 
15(1);1511 whereas, private schools which are defined as “state-aided institutions” are bound 
by both sections 15(1) and 15(2).  
 
Nevertheless, since there has not been a Constitutional Court decision on this issue, the 
Wittmann interpretation stands as the highest authority on the issue of the waiver of freedom 
of religion in private schools. As a result, private schools continue to circumvent their 
obligations in terms of freedom of religion by setting up school rules which require a 
waiver1512 of the religious freedom of the non-adherent child upon admission into the school. 
 
The current problem is not that private schools expressly exclude children of other faiths, but 
rather that they may require conformity with the religious ethos of the school by all learners 
who attend the school. From the private school’s perspective, the waiver of the religious 
freedom of the non-adherent children assures them that the chosen religious ethos of the 
school will not be jeopardised or compromised by the presence of individuals adhering to 
other religions or no religion at all.1513 This is an important consideration for the school. 
However, it has severe implications for the child because it means that the school can compel 
                                                          
1510  Section 15(1) states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and 
opinion.”  
1511  This section impliedly protects the right of the child to non-attendance of religious instruction.  
1512  Unlike the situation under the interim Constitution, the waiver of freedom of religion is not automatic upon 
admission. Since private schools are bound to the Constitution, the waiver must be express. The word 
“require” is used because the private school is in the powerful position to set the rules of admission 
(namely, that child who attends the school, must attend religious observance and religious instruction of the 
chosen faith of the school). Parents are given the “choice” to submit to these rules – which would entail 
waiving their child’s religious freedom. Parents make the “choice” to waive, knowing that if they do not, the 
private school will refuse admission of their child into the school. It is the school rules that determined that 
a waiver would be necessary. Despite the requirement that a waiver should be exercised freely and with 
intention to waiver (see Chapter 6), one can argue that when two contracting parties have unequal 
bargaining power- the aspect of voluntariness must be questioned. Ultimately it is the private school that 
holds the child’s educational fate in their hands and is the more powerful party to the contract. In  this 
regard, Woolman argues that not all parties to a contract are in a position to bargain or exercise fully 
autonomous choices: “the traditional conception of the common law relies upon the fiction that our private 
law provides a neutral backdrop for agreements, contractual and otherwise, between ‘fully autonomous 
individuals’. This traditional view of the common law is, in turn, wedded to the idea of the sanctity of 
contract.” “We also share the belief that the Supreme Court of Appeal’s classically liberal approach to the 
law of contract reinforces ‘the poverty and powerlessness’ of many South Africans . . . through the 
structured silence of [contractual] disputes that never make it to court.” See Woolman (n1136) 11; Section 5 
(3) of the Schools Act states: “No learner may be refused admission to a public school on the grounds that 
his or her parent- (b) does not subscribe to the mission statement of the school.” The same protection is not 
afforded to children in private schools.  
1513  The existence of other methods to preserve the religious ethos of private schools is discussed below.  
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the child to attend religious observances and religious instruction and restrict the child from 
manifesting their own religious beliefs or non-belief within the school environment.  
 
If a waiver of freedom of religion is in place, the situation for non-adherent children under the 
Constitution is in effect the same as it was under the interim Constitution- they have no 
religious freedom within the private school. The major concern is that private schools can 
operate with complete disregard for the freedom of religion of non-adherent children. It must 
be pointed out, however, that some private schools choose to admit and reasonably 
accommodate non-adherent children without requiring conformity from them.1514 This is 
addressed below.  
 
As mentioned above, there has not been a Constitutional Court decision on the 
constitutionality of the waiver of the religious freedom of a child in order to attend a private 
school; nor is there a constitutional provision dealing with the waiver of rights. Therefore 
there is no definitive answer on whether it is constitutionally permissible for a person to 
waive a fundamental human right and, if so, under which circumstances it would be 
permitted.1515 What is more, the waiver in this case is more complicated; because the non-
adherent child is the holder of the right to freedom of religion1516 and yet the right is being 
waived by the parent on behalf of the child.1517 
 
This means that the waiver of a child’s freedom of religion may result in a clash between the 
child’s individual right to freedom of religion and the parent’s authority over the child’s 
educational and religious upbringing.1518  
 
Importantly, international human rights instruments and the Constitution recognise children as 
the holders of their own specific children’s rights and religious rights - aside from the rights 
                                                          
1514  This is discussed further below. 
1515  See discussion in Chapter 6.  
1516  Article 14(1) of the CRC; Article 9 of the ACRWC; section 15 of the Constitution; Article 28(1) of the CRC 
makes reference to the child as the holder of the right to education, without reference to the rights of 
parents.  
1517  An alternative viewpoint is that the parent is not waiving the child’s freedom of religion but is waiving his 
or her authority over the child’s educational and religious upbringing. Nevertheless, even if the parent is 
waiving his or her own right and not the child’s, the religious freedom (and other rights) of the sufficiently 
mature child is inevitably impacted upon by the decision.  
1518  Article 26(3) of the UDHR, Article 18(4) of the ICCPR and Article 14(2) of the CRC.  
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afforded to everyone.1519 Both international law and domestic law emphasise the importance 
of the child’s voice and child participation in matters that affect the child’s rights1520- with the 
best interests of the child being the guiding principle.1521 The case of Pillay emphasised the 
importance of hearing from the person whose religious/cultural rights are at issue - that being 
the child concerned.1522 It can therefore be argued that, although children cannot be 
completely autonomous by virtue of their inexperience and vulnerability, once they are 
sufficiently mature, they have the right to express themselves in accordance with their own 
religion or beliefs.1523 A child (of sufficient maturity) may wish to assert their freedom of 
religion or be exempt from religious observances/religious instruction and may find the 
waiver to be a violation of their freedom of religion– which they did not choose to waive. 
 
On the other hand, although parents are not expressly given the constitutional right of parental 
authority over their children; the state often relies on the choices/decisions of parents in order 
to fulfil its constitutional obligations towards children.1524 The role of the parent in matters 
pertaining to the education of the child is emphasised in international law.1525 Although 
parents generally direct the education of their children,1526 it is arguable whether this would 
include the decision on whether or not to waive the child’s freedom of religion in order to 
acquire access into a particular private school. It must be questioned, (if waivers are 
constitutionally permissible) whether one person may waive a right on behalf of another.  
 
Importantly, the contract law indicates that a right (as conferred by a contract) may be waived 
by an agent on behalf of a principal.1527 One can argue that the parent is the agent of the child 
for purposes of educational decisions relating to the child.1528  After all, the parent is allowed 
to choose the type of education the child should receive (public or private);1529 the parent 
selects a school based on various factors; the parent agrees to submit to the schools rules and 
                                                          
1519  Section 28 of the Constitution; the Children’s Act, the CRC and the ACRWC. 
1520  Article 12 of the CRC, Article 4 of the ACRWC and section 10 of the Children’s Act. 
1521  Article 5(4) of the Declaration and section 28(2) of the Constitution.  
1522  Pillay at para 56.  
1523  See discussion in Chapter 4.  
1524  De Waal & Currie (n18) 457. 
1525  Discussed in Chapter 3.  
1526       Christian Education at para 15. 
1527  In Pretorius v Greyling 1947 1 SA 171 (W): “if in this case it is the agent who waived the rights then it 
must be proved that he himself knew all the relevant facts as well as the principal’s legal rights and intended 
to waive those rights, and it must also be proved that he was authorised to waive his principal’s rights.” See 
Christie (n619) 514.  
1528  See issue of agency discussed in Chapter 4.  
1529  See summary in paragraph 3.1 above; Article 26(3) of the UDHR; Artcile 13(3) of the ICECSR and Article 
5(2) of the Declaration.  
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regulations on behalf of the child and the parent is entitled to make decisions about the 
religious or moral education of the child in accordance with their wishes and beliefs.1530 
However, what the contract law makes clear is that the services of an agent must be carried 
out in accordance with the law, morality and public policy,1531 if not - no action arises out of 
it.1532 Contract law indicates that the courts will not enforce any arrangement (including a 
waiver) by a parent that is detrimental to the interests of the child - on the basis that it is 
contrary to public policy.1533  
 
This raises the important point that, even in cases where waivers are legally permissible (as 
with contractual rights), they may be unenforceable for being contrary to public policy.1534 In 
this regard, public policy amounts to the values that South African society holds “most 
dear.”1535 What is contrary to public policy is reflected in the values and provisions of the 
Constitution. It stands to reason that any arrangement that is contrary to the values and 
provisions of the Constitution is contrary to public policy and therefore unenforceable.1536 
The case law indicates, however, that this principle must be exercised cautiously, only in clear 
cases where the harm to the public is “substantial and incontestable.”1537 The question is: if 
one were to extract this principle and apply it to the issue of the waiver of freedom of religion 
in private schools, would the enforcement of a waiver be in accordance with the values that 
South African society reveres? In order to establish that, one must first look at the dangers 
that the enforcement of such a waiver presents to society. 
 
The societal harm of sectarian private schools that do not accommodate diversity is that they 
prevent children from different religious backgrounds from sharing their common 
experiences, which only increases divisiveness within society.1538 It results in the creation of 
exclusive groups of young children who never engage with children who are “different” to 
them. Levinson points out that in order to tolerate or respect others, one needs to interact with 
                                                          
1530  Article 18(4) of the ICCPR. 
1531  Grotius 3.1.12.3; Grotius 3 1 42; Voet 2 14 16. 
1532  Kerr (n621) 54-55.  
1533  See discussion in Chapter 4 at paragraph 2. 
1534  Christie (n619) 210, 398-399. 
1535  Barkhuizen at para 28. 
1536  Para 29.  
1537  Sasfin at para 12; Fender v St John-Mildmay (1938) AC 1 at 12. 
1538   SAHRC “The Exclusionary Policies of Voluntary Associations: Constitutional Considerations” 10. 
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them in meaningful ways, particularly at a young age before prejudices become hardened.1539 
This religious divisiveness is contrary the objectives of education in terms of Article 29(1) of 
the CRC, Article 11(2)(d) of the ACRWC, and Article 5(3) of the Declaration which 
emphasise the need for education to promote “understanding, tolerance and friendship” 
among all religious groups. It also runs contrary to the states goals of nation-building and 
celebrating diversity through education.1540 After all, the Preamble of the Constitution states 
that, “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity.” Correspondingly, the 
court in Pillay observed that there is a “need for solidarity between different communities in 
our society” and the Constitution “does not envisage a society of atomised communities 
circling in the shared space that is our country, but a society that is unified in its diversity.”1541 
 
Furthermore, due regard must be had for the impact of waivers of this nature on the children 
concerned. It has been established in this thesis that freedom of religion is a freedom that is 
inherently intertwined with each person’s identity and dignity.1542 It can be argued that the 
complete waiver of the freedom of religion of a child has the potential to impair the 
fundamental human dignity of non-adherent learners. Ultimately, the child whose freedom of 
religion have been waived finds him/herself being compelled to attend religious 
instruction/religious observances contrary to his/her beliefs and restricted in terms of 
manifesting their own beliefs, in order to comply with school rules - a situation one could 
deem a “Hobson’s choice”.1543 In the case of Christian Education, it was argued by the 
applicant that parents have a divinely imposed responsibility for the training and bringing up 
their children.1544 However, the court held that parental consent does not override the state’s 
responsibility to protect safety and inherent dignity of all children.1545  
 
                                                          
1539  Levinson & Levinson “‘Getting Religion’: Religion, Diversity and Community in Public and   Private 
Schools” in Levinson (ed) Wrestling with Diversity (2003) 104; Bilchitz states: “Furthermore, unfair 
discrimination in the private sphere – particularly in a society so scarred by the effects of discrimination in 
the past – easily spills over into the public realm.” See Bilchitz (n982) 298. 
1540  Pillay at paragraph 107; Fourie at para 60; The goals of nation-building and celebrating diversity are 
mentioned in South Africa’s educational policies on religion and language (discussed in Chapter 5 and 
below).  
1541  Para 155. 
1542  Christian Education at para 36.  
1543  In Pillay at para 62, Langa J states that: “The traditional basis for invalidating laws that prohibit the exercise 
of an obligatory religious practice is that it confronts the adherents with a Hobson’s choice between 
observance of their faith and adherence to the law.” This was also mentioned in the case of Prince at para 
44 wherein Ngcobo J stated: “They are forced to choose between following their religion or complying with 
the law.” 
1544  Christian Education at para 5. 
1545  Paras 49-50. 
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Importantly, section 28(2) of the Constitution and numerous international human rights 
instruments1546 emphasise that in all matters pertaining to children, the best interests of the 
child must be the paramount concern. This includes upholding the best interests of all children 
within private schools. Compelling a child to participate in religious observances and to 
receive sectarian religious instruction in a faith that is not his or hers, cannot be in the child’s 
best interests. Although private schools may have religious and associational rights that need 
protection, this does not absolve the state from its duty to protect the best interests and well-
being of the non-adherent children within these schools.  In Pillay, the Constitutional Court 
did not enforce the contractual undertaking (waiver) by a parent that the child would abide by 
school rules (which required that the child would avoid certain forms of religious expression 
in school). The rules were found to be discriminatory towards the child on the basis of 
religion and culture. The court recognised that upholding such a contractual undertaking 
would give rise to unjust results for the child. Contrary to Wittmann, the court in Pillay would 
not allow a learner child to be discriminated against as a result of an agreement between the 
parent and the school.1547  
 
Another important consideration is that parents may have legitimate, well-founded reasons for 
having selected a particular private school that they believe serves the best interests of their 
child. For example, there may be a limited choice of schools in small communities; the 
chosen school may be a historically privileged school with better facilities than other schools 
or the school may offer particular subjects or extra-mural activities that other schools do not. 
This means that children of certain faiths have opportunities to attend better quality schools 
than others- without having to forgo their religion or other beliefs. One can argue that it is in 
the child’s best educational interests to be allowed to benefit from a private school without the 
school requiring a waiver of their religious freedom. It is submitted that non-adherent children 
should be given the equal opportunity to attend the best school that their parents can afford as 
adherent learners. The non-adherent child may well be a suitable candidate for admission in 
many ways - other than the fact that do not ascribe to the chosen religion in the school.  
 
Consequently, it is submitted that the current approach is contrary to public policy for not 
being in accordance with the dignity, equality and best interests of school-children. In 
addition, it undermines the states goals of nation-building and celebrating diversity and 
                                                          
1546  See Article 3 of the CRC, Article 4 of the ACRWC and Article 5 of the Declaration. 
1547  Discussed in Chapter 6.  
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therefore presents a substantial and incontestable danger to the interests of society. As a 
result, the current approach must be challenged. Even if waivers of freedom of religion are 
found to be constitutional in certain circumstances,1548 in this particular context, they should 
not be enforceable by the law. It is submitted that a definitive answer is required from the 
Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of the waiver of the freedom of religion of the 
non-adherent learners in private schools. An interpretation of this issue under the final 
Constitution, may well lead to a different conclusion than in Wittmann.  
 
The problem with the current situation lies in the fact that the Wittmann interpretation of 
section 29(3), presumes that the waiver of the freedom of religion of non-adherents is 
essential to ensuring the practice and preservation of the religion ethos of the private school. 
De Waal and Currie agree with this presumption and assert that section 29(3) would mean 
very little if such a waiver is not recognised as constitutionally valid.1549 However, in a case 
where two fundamental rights (which are crucial to democracy) are in conflict, the courts have 
the task of balancing the two.1550 In general, when this occurs, the provisions of the 
Constitution are interpreted in a way that they do not conflict with one another.1551 
Furthermore, when interpreting a right, courts are required to promote the values that 
“underlie an open and democratic society, based on human dignity, equality and freedom.”1552 
This is analogous with ascertaining the legal convictions or “boni mores” of the community- 
which would require protecting the dignity and best interests of children.1553 
 
This thesis argues that it is possible for section 29(3) and section 15 of the Constitution to be 
interpreted in a manner in which the associational rights of the school and the freedom of 
religion of non-adherent learners can co-exist in harmony. There is proof of this in the fact 
that many private schools accept and reasonably accommodate non-adherent children, while 
at the same time maintaining their religious ethos and continuing to conduct religious 
observances with the other adherent learners. In these schools, the associational rights of the 
school survive the presence of non-adherent children who still hold their religious freedom - 
subject to reasonable and justifiable limitations in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. 
                                                          
1548  For example, in the case of Garden Cities.  
1549  De Waal & Currie (n18) 44.  
1550  Section 36(2) of the Constitution.  
1551  Rautenbach & Malherbe Constitutional Law (2009) 357; De Waal & Currie (n18) 163. 
1552  See Chapter 1 paragraph 3.  
1553  De Waal & Currie (n18) 140.  
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This entails that freedom of religion may have to be limited in order to give effect to section 
29(3) - but not completely waived.  
 
3.4  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In light of the above, it is recommended that reasonable accommodation (as per section 
14(3)(i)(ii)  of the Equality Act)1554 in private schools should be enforced in order to protect 
the freedom of religion of the non-adherent child while at the same time respecting the 
religious/associational rights of the school.1555 Reasonable accommodation offers an 
alternative to enforcing conformity via a waiver of the freedom of religion of the child. It is 
conceded that the state should not unnecessarily interfere in the running of private schools –
however, it should not tolerate a complete disregard for the religious freedom of children 
either. It is submitted that the state should ensure that private schools assure a minimum level 
of tolerance, pluralism1556and non-discrimination and this can be achieved through reasonable 
accommodation. This would be in accordance with sections 9, 15 and 29(3) of the 
Constitution and Article 29(1) of the CRC.  
 
The reasonable accommodation principle requires that a school take positive action to 
accommodate diversity1557 where such accommodation does not impose too great a burden on 
the school. It requires schools to accept the diversity in children who are “different”, rather 
than attempting to reject it. The positive action may be as simple as granting an exemption 
from certain aspects of the code of conduct on the basis of religion.1558 This would entail that 
a private school admits non-adherent children with their religious differences and does not 
compel them to attend school assemblies, sing hymns, participate in a nativity play or attend 
religious instruction, for example, but rather allows the child to engage in constructive 
activities when religious observances or religious instruction is being carried out. The rights 
                                                          
1554  Discussed in Chapter 4.  
1555  One could counter-argue this by stating that all religious communities have an equal right to establish 
private schools based on their own faith and therefore there is no need for “outsiders” to apply for their 
child to be accepted into a private school which is not of their faith and no need for private schools to 
compromise on their associational rights.  In other words, all communities can establish private schools in 
terms of which their identities resonate best with their own religious convictions. However, an important 
point to the contrary, is that not all communities have access to the funds of sufficient numbers to be able to 
establish a private school/s. 
1556  Beiter (n450) 171. Section 46(3) of the Schools Act states that: “the standards to be maintained by such 
school will not be inferior to the standards in comparable public schools.” It is submitted that certain 
minimum standards should pertain to reasonable accommodation of diversity as well.  
1557  Pillay at para 75.  
1558  Para 79; See the recommendation by Prof Amor (discussed in Chapter 3 at paragraph 5.4).  
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of adherent learners are not encroached upon since they can continue to engage in the required 
religious activities and religious instruction of the school, despite the presence of non-
adherent children. The same degree of accommodation may not be expected of private 
schools as public schools.1559  
 
Furthermore, if a non-adherent child were to be allowed to manifest their own religious 
beliefs in a private school- this manifestation would not be without limitation.1560 The child 
would be bound by the school’s code of conduct and religious exemption processes. If the 
non-adherent child wishes to manifest a religious belief which imposes an unreasonable 
burden on the school or threatens the academic standards, discipline or chosen religious ethos 
of the private school- the manifestation may be disallowed.1561 However, if a religious 
practice does not impose a burden or is not a threat to the order or religious ethos of the 
school - there is no reason why the private school cannot accommodate it. For example, if a 
Muslim child attending a Christian private school wants to conduct Islamic prayers in a 
private area within the school, where the Christian majority are not exposed to it and the 
school has an area available. In this case, there is no unreasonable burden on the school, nor 
any threat to its religious ethos.  
 
It is submitted that non-waiver of freedom of religion and reasonable accommodation in 
private schools will ensure that children of all religions will be able to access the school of 
their parent’s choice (subject to affordability and places being available in the school) without 
having to choose between their religion and the best quality education available to them.1562 
This would be in the best interests of all learners regardless of their faith. Through reasonable 
accommodation, adherent learners will learn to interact with children of different faiths, as 
they will more than likely have to do once they leave the school environment. In other words, 
the practice of reasonable accommodation in private schools will prepare them for life in the 
religiously diverse society that exists beyond the school walls, while at the same time 
maintaining and practising their own religious beliefs.  
 
                                                          
1559  See Pillay at para 114 in which the court stated: “The position may also be different in private schools, 
although even in those institutions, discrimination is impermissible. Those cases all raise different concerns 
and may justify refusing exemption.” 
1560  Section 36 of the Constitution; Article 14(3) of the CRC.  
1561  Pillay at para 114; For example, if the fictional scenario in Chapter 4, paragraph 3.3 (regarding the Muslim 
learner wanting to wear a full burka to school) occurred in a private school.  
1562  This eliminates the “Hobson’s Choice” mentioned above.  
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It must be made clear that this recommendation pertains to religion-based private schools and 
not all religious associations/institutions. Unlike other religious associations which have 
primarily religious goals, private schools carry out important societal goals such as facilitating 
the right to education and protecting the rights and best interests of its learners in its role as 
responsible “parent” (in loco parentis). One can argue that private schools exercise a public 
function in educating children in terms of the state’s requirement of compulsory education1563 
and that the state exercises some control over these schools through registration requirements 
and subsides.1564 Therefore it is submitted that the associational rights of private schools 
cannot be treated the same in the law as the associational rights of purely religious 
associations. The protection of children’s rights in schools may require a greater degree of 
interference by the state. After all, it is the state’s duty to ensure that “education in all schools 
is conducted in accordance with the spirit, content and values of the Constitution.”1565 
 
4  TEACHING RELIGION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
  
Undoubtedly, the issue of teaching religion in schools is highly contentious. Dreyer asserts 
that religion education in schools is the area in which the “complex intersection of the 
histories of religion, politics and education becomes visible.”1566 There are polarised views on 
whether or not religion should be included in the public school curriculum and if so, whether 
it should be religious instruction in one faith or religion education about different religions. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the state has opted to include religion education as a compulsory 
subject in the public school curriculum through the National Policy. This section analyses the 
impact of the current policy on the rights of learners and parents. This discussion is divided 
into three sections, namely: 1) summary of the history and current law on teaching religion in 
schools; 2) problems with the current position and 3) recommendations.   
 
                                                          
1563  Section 3(1) of the Schools Act.  
1564  This was argued on behalf of the plaintiff in Wittmann at para 88.   
1565  Christian Education at para 12 (emphasis added). 
1566  Dreyer (n283) 41. 
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It is important to note that this discussion does not question the National Policy in its entirety. 
It focusses only on the issue of teaching of religion in schools.1567  
 
4.2   SUMMARY OF THE HISTORY & CURRENT LAW ON TEACHING 
RELIGION IN SCHOOLS1568 
 
The historical development of religion in schools1569 evidenced that South African education 
has been characterised by religious inequality. It is evident that Christianity (more 
specifically, Calvinism) was privileged above other faiths in the school system since the 
commencement of formalised education in South Africa. The apartheid education system 
endorsed the ideology of Christian National Education (“CNE”), which entailed promoting 
Christian values through the education system.1570 This favoritism towards the majority faith 
in the education laws and policies, impacted severely upon the religious rights of children of 
minority faiths. After the adoption of the final Constitution as supreme law, the policy of 
CNE could not be continued.1571 The privileging of one faith in the education system did not 
correspond with the right to equality, the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of 
religion and the right to freedom of religion1572 afforded to everyone by the Constitution.  
 
It was important to place the issue of teaching religion in schools in its historical context in 
order to generate a better understanding of the rationale behind the current laws and policies 
pertaining to religion in schools - which emphasise equality between faiths and respect for 
diversity.  
 
Although the Constitution does not endorse a state religion; it does not completely separate 
church and state either. In the South African context, recognition must be given to the fact 
that the majority of the population is religious and the majority subscribes to Christianity. It 
stands to reason therefore, that the Constitution and other state laws and policies, give due 
respect to religion in general.1573 The Constitution emphasises the importance of religion in 
                                                          
1567  There are numerous provisions in the National Policy, such as those on religious observances, religious 
expression and respecting religious holidays, that are not in question. 
1568  Take note that the discussion in paragraph 2.1 and 3.1 above are also applicable to this discussion.  
1569  Chapter 2. 
1570  Summers & Waddington (n115) 5; See Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953; National Education Policy Act 39 of 
1967; Education of Training Act 90 of 1979 and National Education Policy Amendment Act 103 of 1986.  
1571  Dreyer (n283) 42.  
1572  Section 15.  
1573  Discussed in Chapter 6 paragraph 2. 
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South African society, while at the same time respecting the freedom of religion of each 
individual in section 15. However, it is important to note that religious freedom may be 
limited if “reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom”– for example if necessary to pursue a legitimate state goal.1574 
 
Importantly, section 15 of the Constitution protects not only freedom of religion but also 
“conscience”, “thought”, “belief” and “opinion”. As already established, the term “freedom” 
denotes an absence of coercion or constraint on one’s beliefs.1575 The term “belief” protects 
the right to beliefs that are not centred on “God” or a deity. In other words, the right in section 
15 recognises and protects non-religious belief systems. Overall, section 15 protects the right 
to hold, announce and manifest religious beliefs, but does not include the right to receive 
religious or religion education in public schools.1576  
 
Nonetheless, the National Policy1577 reflects the state’s belief that it is the responsibility of 
public schools to educate learners about religion.1578 Several strategies were considered by the 
state for dealing with the issue of teaching religion in schools - including the complete 
removal of religion from public schools. However, when considering the social context within 
which the National Policy operates - the state believed that a policy which completely 
excluded religion from public schools would have resulted in outrage from the religious 
majority and would not promote respect for religion as a whole.1579 Therefore the state opted 
for a co-operative model of education which left room for interaction between religion and 
state. It meant that religion could be allowed in public schools but in manner in which 
(purportedly) respects the freedom of religion of each person and protects everyone from 
religious discrimination.  
 
The National Policy was drawn up in consultation with various religious leaders of the 
different religions. Whereas the previous policy allowed for religious instruction in just one 
faith if the SGB saw fit; the new Policy emphasises that imposing religious instruction in one 
faith upon learners is not in accordance with the Constitution.1580 As a result, the National 
                                                          
1574  Section 36 of the Constitution. Discussed in Chapter 6.  
1575  Lawrence; Prince; Christian Education. 
1576  Van der Schyff (n34) 153; Discussed in Chapter 6. 
1577  The background to the National Policy and its provisions are discussed in Chapter 5.  
1578  National Policy para 1.  
1579  National Policy para 3.  
1580  National Policy paras 6, 7 and 12. 
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Policy emphasised that sectarian forms of religious instruction have no place in South African 
public schools.1581 Instead, it introduced “religion education” - a comparative study of all 
religions – as a compulsory subject in the public school curriculum. As mentioned in Chapter 
5, religion education forms part of the Life Orientation Learning Area for Grade R – Grade 
12.1582 In addition, the National Policy introduced a separate subject of “religious studies” as 
an optional, specialised and examinable subject form Grade 10-12.1583 Religion education was 
introduced under the premise that the state is not responsible for the religious upbringing of a 
child, but rather for providing knowledge about different religions.1584 Religious instruction is 
recognised as primarily the responsibility of the home, the family, and the religious 
community.1585 The National Policy aims to teach about all religions from a neutral, academic 
point of view with the aim of giving due respect to the equal value of all religions,1586 in the 
hope that this will foster understanding, reduce prejudice and encourage interaction between 
children of different faiths.1587 From the state’s perspective, a policy of this nature furthers a 
state’s legitimate goal of increasing religious tolerance and celebrating diversity.1588  
 
Nevertheless, the National Policy is not without its problems. The next section highlights the 
problem areas associated with the current position. For purposes of this discussion, 
cognisance must be taken of section 15, section 9, section 10, section 28 of the Constitution as 
well as the related international law provisions, which have been summarised in paragraphs 
2.1 and 3.2 above. A few of these provisions are particularly relevant and need be emphasised 
once again. Importantly, Article 14 of the CRC and Article 9 of the ACRWC recognise the 
right of parents to direct the education of their children. In addition the Declaration provides 
that a child shall have access to education in the matter of religion or belief that is consistent 
                                                          
1581         Joubert (n1028) 1.  
1582  National Policy para 32; See Prinsloo (n1057) 320; The subject forms part of the Life Orientation Learning 
Area, under the focus area: Social Development from Grade R to 9 and Learning Outcome 2: Citizenship 
Education from Grade 10 to 12.   
1583  National Policy para 33 states: “A new subject called Religious Studies shall also be introduced in the FET 
band for matriculation (or FETC) purposes, as an optional, specialised, and examinable subject, with a 
possible career orientation towards teaching, social work, community development, public service, and 
related vocations. This curriculum is still in development, and other subjects of religious specialisation, may 
be included from Grade 10-12.”; See Dreyer n283 44; Take note that the subject of “Religious Studies” still 
maintains a distinction between religion education and religious instruction but it allows learners to 
specialise in a specific context. See more on this in the Learning Programme Guidelines for the FET. See 
discussion in Prinsloo (n1057) 321.  
1584   See the Manifesto.  
1585  National Policy para 55. 
1586  National Policy para 4.  
1587   National Policy para 19.  
1588  See Minster’s forward in National Policy. 
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with the wishes of his or her parents and that the child shall not to be compelled to “receive 
education” against the wishes of their parent.1589 Also, Article 18(4) of the ICCPR requires 
that states respect the rights of parents to ensure the religious and moral education of their 
children in conformity with their own beliefs. Importantly, the Human Rights Committee has 
commented that Article 18(4) entails that if the subject matter involves instruction in a 
particular faith, the option must be given to parents to withdraw their children from 
attendance.  However, Article 18(4) allows for public schools to provide education in the 
general history of religions and ethics - if it is given in a neutral and objective way and shows 
due respect for the convictions of parents who are not religious.1590  
 
Furthermore, it was noted in Chapter 6 that the South African Charter of Religious Rights and 
Freedoms (The Charter), includes the right of every person to educate and to have their 
children educated in accordance with their religious or philosophical convictions.1591 This 
entails that public schools must consult with parents on matters pertaining to religion and 
must allow parents to withdraw their children from any activities or programs which are not 
in accordance with their religious or other beliefs.1592 The Charter was signed by 
representatives of every major religious group in South Africa; which indicates that the 
religious communities in South Africa expect the state to respect the rights of parents with 
regards to the religious upbringing of their children.  
 
4.3    PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT POSITION 
 
From the outset, it is submitted that the National Policy is correct in removing sectarian 
religious instruction from public schools as this would not be in accordance with the freedom 
of religion or equality rights of any learner who is not of the chosen faith. Also, in light of the 
history of religious discrimination1593 and the Constitution’s recognition of equality as a 
founding value, the state should not be involved in the promotion or favouritism of one faith 
at the expense of all others.1594 Although the religious majority may still wish for religious 
                                                          
1589  Article 5(2).  
1590   Discussed in Chapter 2.  
1591  Article 7.  
1592  Article 7.  
1593  In recent years the courts have expressed the importance of considering historical context in cases 
pertaining to religion. See Prince at para 152. See High Court decision referred to in Pillay at para 17. 
1594  Freedman mentions the equality aspect of freedom of religion which prevents government from favouring 
one religion over another. See Freedman (n1170)100; O’Regan J expressed this same sentiment in the 
minority judgement of S v Lawrence at 128. See discussion in Chapter 6.  
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instruction in one faith to be included in public schools,1595 and although their opinion must 
be considered – the majority opinion cannot be decisive.1596 The state, in pursuit of its goals, 
must attempt to strike a balance between acknowledging the majority religion while at the 
same time respecting the rights of religious minorities. The removal of sectarian religious 
instruction and the inclusion of religion education in the National Policy is an attempt at 
finding this balance. 
 
However, it must be recognised that the subject of “religion” in any format, is contentious. 
The very mention of religion as a topic sparks controversy because many people who are 
religious, fiercely guard their faith as part of their identity. In other words, to people who are 
religious, their religion is often so intertwined with their identity, self-worth and dignity1597 
that to question or encroach on their religion is offensive to them as a person. As a result of 
the link between religion, identity and dignity, religion education is not the same as any other 
purely academic subject1598 in the school curriculum and cannot be treated the same. Due to 
the fact that religion is based on personal and individualistic beliefs1599 – one has to question 
whether or not it is in accordance with freedom of religion and belief to be compelled by the 
state to learn about religion (in any format). 
 
The National Policy triggers an important question, namely: where does religion education 
end and religious instruction begin? A theoretical distinction is made between religion 
                                                          
1595  Dreyer writes that “Many Christian organizations, from a variety of positions, opposed the new policy…The 
major criticism from the Christian sector of the South African society has been the multi-faith or multi-
religious approach to the teaching of religion in public schools.” Dreyer has found that: “Some Christian 
groups, perhaps longing for the time when a theocratic model of church and state was dominant in South 
Africa, criticize this model as one in which the government is not fulfilling its obligations.” See Dreyer 
(n283) 45 and 49. 
1596  In S v Makwanyane at paras 88 and 89, the Constitutional Court recognised that: “Public opinion may have 
some relevance to the enquiry, but in itself, it is no substitute for the duty vested in the Courts to interpret 
the Constitution and to uphold its provisions without fear or favour. If public opinion were to be decisive 
there would be no need for constitutional adjudication. The protection of rights could then be left to 
Parliament, which has a mandate from the public, and is answerable to the public for the way its mandate is 
exercised, but this would be a return to parliamentary sovereignty, and a retreat from the new legal order 
established by the 1993 Constitution.” “This Court cannot allow itself to be diverted from its duty to act as 
an independent arbiter of the Constitution by making choices on the basis that they will find favour with the 
public.” 
1597  Christian Education at para 36.  
1598  In the case of Prince, Ncgobo J pointed out that religion is not based on provable facts. He said: “Religion is 
a matter of faith and belief.” A religious practice may strike someone outside the faith as bizarre or illogical, 
but the practice nevertheless deserves constitutional protection. He stressed that humans should be free to 
believe in what they cannot prove. See Prince at para 42. 
1599  Explained in Chapter 6.  
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education and religious instruction in the policy itself.1600  However, in practice, it is uncertain 
what type of information would be considered neutral/objective and what type would be too 
religious. It is difficult to determine whether the religion education curriculum borders on 
being religious or not.  For example, the National policy pays explicit attention to spirituality 
in paragraph 19, which states that: “Religion Education should enable pupils to engage with a 
variety of religious traditions in a way that encourages them to grow in their inner spiritual 
and moral dimensions.” This indicates that the National Policy has not just educational goals 
but also spiritual goals. Another example is that the National Policy states that in the 
Intermediate Phase of education, children will learn “stories, songs, sacred places, founders, 
rituals, and festivals.”1601 In this case, the subject matter extends beyond learning about the 
history or ethics of a religion.1602 Many questions arise from this, such as: Do songs include 
hymns? Are religious teachings not encompassed in the stories? When learning about the 
rituals of others, how in depth does the information go? Furthermore, according to the 
National Policy, the Senior Phase of religion education includes the teaching of spiritual 
philosophies and how they link to social practices.1603 Are spiritual philosophies 
neutral/academic information? Also one has to question whether it is for the state to determine 
what type of information is offensive/not offensive to anyone’s religious sensibilities. One 
can argue that this can only be determined by the holder of the religious freedom (or their 
parent in the case of very young children).  
 
It is submitted that if the line between religion education and religious instruction is not 
clearly drawn in law and in practice, there is potential for the infringement of freedom of 
religion.1604 It is for this reason that Amor, in his report as Special Rapporteur, recognised the 
potential value of religion education in society but argued that whenever “education in the 
field of religion” is part of the school curriculum – it should be optional, that is, the right to 
                                                          
1600  See Chapters 1 and 5.  
1601  National Policy para 51.  
1602  History and ethics of religions are mentioned as acceptable topics in Article 18(4) of the ICCPR. See 
Chapter 3 para 5.4.  
1603  National Policy para 45.  
1604  This was recognised in the Canadian case of Canadian Civil Liberties Association v Ontario (1990) 46 CRR 
316, where the Ontario Court of Appeal held that a regulation which provided for religion education in 
public schools was unconstitutional, despite its provision that sectarian religious instruction would be 
avoided and that attendance was voluntary. Although section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter prohibited 
religious indoctrination and not religion education - the court was of the opinion that religious education is 
the equivalent of religious indoctrination, regardless of how the subject matter is presented. The court 
recognised that it is difficult to draw a definitive line between what is “religion” and what is “religious”.  
Discussed in Wittmann at para 70; In this regard Chidester writes: “Nevertheless, Christian opponents of the 
policy insisted that anything that touched their religion was religious” See Chidester “Unity in Diversity: 
Religion Education and Public Pedagogy in South Africa 2008 55 Numen 272 -293. 
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withdrawal should be available to the conscientious objector.1605 The rationale behind this 
perspective is that any education in the field of religion has the potential to infringe freedom 
of religion and the element of voluntariness is what safeguards freedom of religion. 
 
The next question is whether or not it is the duty of public schools to teach about religion. 
Some believe that public schools should operate as an extension of the parents and continue 
the work of the parents as far as religious instruction is concerned. Ideally, they would like 
their children to receive religious instruction in their own faith in public schools.1606 Others 
believe that it is not the task of public schools to teach about religion at all.1607 The National 
Policy is premised on the state’s assumption and proposition that it is the responsibility of 
public schools to educate children about religions.1608 In this regard, it is submitted that it is 
the duty of public schools to provide an education1609 in the best interest of all children1610 
while ensuring equality1611 amongst them and respecting the individual religious freedom of 
each child.1612 This may include instilling them with values which teach them to become 
responsible citizens in the outside world. However, the National Policy links this promotion 
of values in schools with the teaching of religion.1613 It upholds religion as the vehicle for the 
transmission of values to children and the answer to what it views as a decline in morals in 
society.1614 While it is acknowledged that religion may be an effective reinforcement 
                                                          
1605  See full quote in Chapter 3 at paragraph 5.4.  
1606  van der Walt (in referring to religious parents) states that: “They also insist that their particular confessional 
religion education, or at least education linked to their own religion, be included in the public school 
curriculum. They argue that education, particularly religion education, is a unity, and that no gap should 
exist between parental home, church and school education. Since a child is a unity, such a gap would be 
detrimental to holistic upbringing.”  See van der Walt “Religion in education in South Africa: was social 
justice served?” 2011 31(3) SAJE 381 382; van der Walt also found that in a study in Norway in 2000: 
“31% of the parents interviewed (all of them churchgoing Christians) said that they were not happy with the 
general religion education course offered in the public schools. They wanted the school to convey to the 
children that what they learnt at home was right and true. The more religiously active parents were more 
insistent than the passive ones that the school should confirm the religion taught at home.” See van der Walt 
“Institutional identity: a possible solution to the religion in/and education quandary” 2010 75(2) Koers 325 
331. 
1607  For example, the secularist viewpoint is that religion should play no part in public life.  
1608  National Policy para 1.  
1609  Section 29 of the Constitution.  
1610  Section 28(2) of the Constitution.  
1611  Section 9 of the Constitution.  
1612  Section 15 of the Constitution.  
1613  Para 7.  
1614  Par 31 states: “We are all concerned about the general decline in moral standards in our country, and the 
high rates of crime, and the apparent lack of respect for human life, are worrying factors in this regard. We 
find ourselves in need of moral regeneration. For this to happen, the commitment of all people of good will 
is required. As systems for the transmission of values, religions are key resources for clarifying morals, 
ethics, and building regard for others.” 
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mechanism for morality, it must be recognised that it is not the only vehicle.1615 It can be 
argued that it is possible for a school to instil values in children in a way that does not involve 
religion and is not anti-religious. For example, the values of justice, equality, respect, 
truthfulness, compassion and non-violence (along with other constitutional values) can be 
taught through various methods in schools.1616 The teaching of these values can contribute to 
responsible citizenship and promote respect between all people of all walks of life. 
 
Furthermore, there is concern that the National Policy interferes with the rights of parents to 
ensure the religious and moral education of their children in accordance with their beliefs1617 - 
a principle enshrined in international human rights instruments1618 and included in Article 7 of 
the Charter. This is of particular concern to parents of very young children. It can be argued 
that a parent can make little objection to their child learning neutral/academic information 
about other religions. However, as alluded to above, parents may question the neutrality of the 
information being imparted. This indicates that the translation of the objectives of the 
National Policy into a “neutral” curriculum- is problematic.  
 
If a parent believes (based on their interpretation of religious texts) and has taught a child that 
their religion represents the exclusive truth or is the only “true” religion - they may find 
lessons which present other religions and non-religion as equally valid, to be an infringement 
of their beliefs.1619 They may not wish for their children to be taught about other religions 
which contradict what they believe to be the exclusive truth. For example, certain learning 
outcomes require the learners to relate different religions to broader social issues such as 
abortion, euthanasia, suicide, capital punishment and gender relations.1620 This may be the 
type of subject matter that parents would prefer to guide their children on in accordance with 
their own religious beliefs. If this is so, one could argue that the parent should have the right 
of withdrawal. The curriculum is not drawn up in conjunction with parents to allow them to 
                                                          
1615  Roux states: “It is also true that religions are not the only source of spirituality, value and morals for 
society”. See Roux “Religion in Education: Who is Responsible?” special edition 3 2009 Alternation 3 16.  
1616  See Niewenhuis (n606)17. 
1617         van der Walt 2012 Koers (n1606) 330.  
1618       Article 18(4) of ICCPR, Article 5(2) of the Declaration and Article 14(2) of the CRC; As mentioned above, 
respect for the rights of parents are also recognised in Articles 3(2) and 5 of the CRC.  
1619  van der Walt submits that: “the proponents of mainstream religions reject this secular view by arguing that 
since their own religion has the only true god and hence operates with revealed truth, it would be good for 
society to be guided by it.” See van der Walt 2011 SAJE (n1606) 382.  
  1620          Learning Outcome 3.1 for Grade 10 (NCS/LPG 2008b: 39); In this regard Prinsloo states: “It is often in 
exploring a specific belief system’s view on such topics that learners, teachers and the communities 
surrounding the leaner are ‘defamiliarised’ to what they thought they knew or expected.” See Prinsloo 
(n1057) 404. 
 
 
260 
monitor the type of information being transferred to their children. The parent cannot ensure 
that information is “neutral” or how in depth into religion it delves. Neither do SGBs have a 
say in the curriculum content on behalf of parents.1621 As a result, parents could argue that it 
is their duty to educate children about religion (or other belief systems) as they see fit until 
such time as the child is sufficiently mature to explore the subject on their own.1622  
 
However, from the state’s perspective, it could be argued that the inclusion of religion 
education in the school curriculum is justified as it allows the state to fulfill its goals of 
celebrating diversity and nation-building.1623 Although the state recognises the need for 
religious instruction in the home – it evidently believes that there are certain state goals that 
cannot or are not being achieved through religious instruction at home. Religious instruction 
in the home may be negative or prejudicial towards other faiths or may ignore other faiths 
completely. Without religion in education in schools, children may grow up to fear or reject 
religious differences. The National Policy envisages a society in which children grow up to 
respect and be tolerant of each other’s religions and beliefs.1624 It aims to cater to the social 
reality which the child will inevitably encounter outside of school.  This is an important 
consideration.  
 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that parents are the primary educators of children in matters of 
religion and the National Policy creates an inevitable conflict between the role of the parent 
and the role of the state as educators about religion. This means that children may have to 
contend with a situation where religious instruction by parents and the “neutral” information 
selected for religion education (in accordance with the state’s goals), may contradict each 
other. It may be disturbing and unconstitutional1625 for learners to see their own religion being 
depicted in unfamiliar ways.1626 It may also be confusing if religious education conducted by 
                                                          
1621   Prinsloo states: “While satisfaction was expressed with the final policy, there was a number of voices who 
stated that the implementation of the policy should be monitored by parents, teachers and school governing 
bodies. Some of these remarks indicate that the government should not be completely trusted to abide by the 
policy.” See Prinsloo (n1057) 303 and 350.   
1622   One could counter-argue that by a certain age the “damage” of not receiving religion education, is already 
done. For example, prejudices may already be set in.  
1623        Para 10 of the National Policy states: “This policy for the role of religion in education is driven by the dual 
mandate of celebrating diversity and building national unity.” 
1624       This is consistent with Article 5(3) of the Declaration which protects the right of the child to be brought up 
in the “spirit of understanding, tolerance, friendship among peoples,” and “respect for freedom of religion or 
belief of others.” 
1625        In terms of section 28(1)(d) and 28(2). 
1626   American Academy of Religion “Guidelines for Teaching about Religion in K-12 Public Schools in the 
United States” (2010) 17. 
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parents in the home contradicts what is taught in the classroom.1627 Prinsloo indicates that: 
“The educational study of religion may then lead to a confessional crisis for the 
learner….”1628 This is particularly true for very young learners, who may lack sufficient 
maturity to grapple with this contradiction. This will affect children in the very lower grades. 
Consequently, the appropriateness of the grade level at which religion education is 
commenced is a matter for concern. 
 
There has also been criticism that teaching religion from an academic/objective1629 standpoint 
is virtually impossible. One reason put forward is that “neutral” teaching takes away from the 
very essence of the religions being taught.1630 It can be argued that religion is by nature 
devotional1631and therefore cannot necessarily be reduced to a set of “objective facts”. In fact, 
it can be argued that reducing religion to an academic subject, gives rise to a situation where 
there is no room for genuine inter-faith dialogue in the classroom (which the National Policy 
aims to achieve).  It is true that the National Policy was drawn up in consultation with 
representatives from major religious groups.1632 This means that religious leaders eventually 
(after much criticism and debate) accepted the position of a multi-faith approach.1633 One can 
                                                          
1627   Adhar & Leigh point out that some parents object to the multi-faith approach because: “at best it would be 
confusing for their children, and at worst it may involve participation in [matters] that are opposed to their 
religion.” See Adhar & Leigh (n26) 237.  
1628        See Prinsloo (n1057) 404. 
1629   There are those who embark on religious studies at University level as a so-called “academic” subject - but 
the difference is at that level the subject is being taught by person who has achieved a certain level of 
expertise in that field; the learner is in adult and mature enough to grapple with the complexities of the 
subject matter and the learner is studying the subject by choice therefore the question of whether the 
information is neutral or religious becomes irrelevant- the learner  has consented to attending the class.  
1630    Potgieter writes: “Because the Policy also does not attempt to level out all of the divisive intrinsic 
differences among the various religions in the country, moral relativists, favouring a Nurturant Parent 
approach to morality, may rightly criticise the Policy because of the reductionism it implies.” He states 
further: “Put differently: open, inter-religious dialogue between the adherents of the different faiths and 
religions represented in a school or a classroom becomes a virtual impossibility in a situation….” See 
Potgieter “Morality as the substructure of social justice: religion in education as a case in point” 2011 31(3) 
SAJE 394 400 and 402; Grayling states: “They may rightly complain that the rich and complex variety [of 
religions] is far too great for a brain-only attempt to explain them.” See Grayling Thinking of answers 
(2010) 10; Snyman states: “This misunderstanding of the nature of true religion is characteristic of the 
whole policy.” This comment was made in respect of the Draft Policy but the same holds true for the final 
Policy. See Snyman “The Draft Policy on Religion in Education: A Clear example of Stare Interference” 
2003 Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap 43 51.  
1631        Alluded to in Prince at para 42.  
1632   Prinsloo indicates that: “Between 15 August and 11 December 2001, Minister Asmal held nine extensive 
consultations with leaders from various religious organisations, as reported on in an Analytical resumé of 
discussions between Minister Asmal and religious leaders on the matter of religion in education (Dated 13 
December 2001).” See Prinsloo “The South African Policy on Religion and Education (2003): A 
Contradiction in a Secular State and Age?” 2009 (special edition 3) Alternation 31 45.  
1633   Prinsloo asserts: “The formulation of the Policy was deeply controversial and various stakeholders from 
various faith communities contested the different drafts…Though the final Policy was supported by all 
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presume that their acceptance was partly out of wanting to keep religion in public schools in 
some form (since the single-faith approach was not an option). But one can argue that what 
has been kept is not “religion” in the true sense of the word (meaning a devotional subject) 
but the state’s version of religion (a “neutral” curriculum that the state wishes to instil in 
children).    
 
Another significant issue affecting “neutrality” of religion education is that every educator has 
his or her own view on religion.1634 The National Policy entails that teachers put their 
personal religious beliefs aside in order to teach about other faiths.1635 The situation at present 
is that teachers who belong to a particular faith may be unwilling or reluctant to educate 
learners about different religions. In fact, teachers may express their own personal religious 
sentiments in the classroom and may influence or even pressure learners into adopting a 
specific religious viewpoint. This would be illegal- but also difficult (or impossible) to 
monitor. In this regard, Waddington contends as follows: 
 
 “For teachers to remain totally neutral and objective is an almost 
impossible task, even if one does try to bracket out one’s feelings, 
preferences and prejudices. It is not surprising, then, that many practioners 
in education maintain that there is no such thing as 
neutrality….[I]ndoctrination goes far beyond what a teacher might say or 
not say in a classroom…, but includes attitudes and methodology which is 
employed in the lesson. One can add to this the nonverbal communication, 
such as body language, which may influence students to accept a 
particular standpoint which is not their own, but that of the teacher.” 1636   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
major religions, the Policy is still, more than five years since its implementation, controversial and 
contested.” See Prinsloo (n1632) 34.  
1634        Section 7(1) of the Schools Act states that: “every learner and every member of staff of a public school shall 
have freedom of religion.” 
  1635  This impacts upon the religious freedom of teachers. This lack of concern for the religious identities of 
teachers has been subject to criticism by religious groups. Dreyer states: “On the basis of practical 
theological research we do, however, challenge the multi-tradition approach as an appropriate model for 
achieving the educational aim of enhancing the capacities for mutual recognition and tolerance due to the 
relative neglect of the religious identities of teachers and learners.” See Dreyer (n283) 57; Nevertheless, if 
these reluctant teachers are given the option to refuse to teach the curriculum based on their religious 
beliefs, in the same way, they could refuse to teach the science curriculum, for example, which teaches 
about evolution (if this is contrary to the religious beliefs). This would lead to impractical situations for the 
Department of Education. 
1636   See Summers & Waddington (n115) 201-202; Chizelu states: “it is important to note that it is very easy to 
take advantage of pupils’ emotions in order to influence them toward the teacher’s convictions. RE teachers 
should avoid taking advantage of pupils’ emotions to induce pupils to accept their convictions; to do so is to 
abuse of the teacher’s profession.” See Chizelu Teaching Religious Education in Zambian Multireligious 
Secondary Schools (2006) 117. 
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This current situation puts parents in the position to simply trust that teachers are teaching in 
an objective and pluralistic manner with no religious bias.1637 This is a difficult expectation 
for parents in light of the history of religious discrimination that took place in schools under 
the old system. As a result, there is concern that teaching about religion may leave room for 
religious indoctrination (even in subtle forms)1638 in schools.  
 
Furthermore, there are contentions that the National Policy allows for a situation in which one 
religion may be privileged above others. The argument is that by teaching about religion at 
all, there is room for promoting one religion over the others. This is contrary to the objective 
of the National Policy and the Constitution. In recent times the debate has been re-opened by 
individuals contending that despite the new approach, Christianity is still promoted and 
privileged in the classrooms of some public schools.1639 Some may argue that the majority of 
the country belongs to the Christian faith and therefore it is not unfair for schools to reflect 
the religious expectations of the majority. In other words, it is fair for public schools to show 
due respect to the majority faith. However, one could counter-argue that too much 
acknowledgment of the majority faith may be a disguised continuance of preference for the 
majority faith, which is contrary to section 9 of the Constitution. State schools should not be 
engaged in religious favouritism. This would undermine attempts at creating multi-faith 
                                                          
1637      Jensen “Religious Education in Public school- a must for a secular state: a Danish perspective” 2002 The 
Council of Societies for the Study of Religion (CSSR) Bulletin 83 87. 
1638   In the case of Lawrence at para 90, Chaskalson P, admitted that constraints on freedom of religion could be 
imposed in subtle way. See discussion in Chapter 6.  
1639  van der Walt observes: “Although the debate seemed to have died down somewhat after the promulgation of 
the Policy in 2003, a visit to schools, particularly schools that used to be based on a Christian ethos, will 
show that it has been business as usual. Many schools continue marketing themselves as having a Christian 
ethos, and in some of them, confessional or sectarian Christian religious education is still being offered.” 
See van der Walt 2011 SAJE (n1606) 381; See also Prinsloo (n1632) 35; De Vos writes: “This story came 
back to me when I read in the Afrikaans media that Prof George Claassen of Stellenbosch University has 
launched a campaign to try and prevent public schools from using teaching time to conduct religious 
instruction at schools. Claassen is also upset that some schools describe themselves as having a ‘Christian 
character’ and as institutions where ‘Christian values’ (whatever that may mean) are taught. He is also upset 
that some schools organise something called a ‘Jesus week’ during which children are encouraged to pin 
yellow ribbons to their uniforms to show that they are Christians.” He states further “I would say a school 
breaches the provisions of section 15 if it states that it has a ‘Christian character’ and teaches ‘Christian 
values’ or where it endorses a ‘Jesus week’ but fails to endorse other religious activities of minority 
religious groups or non-believers. Such actions would make it very difficult for non-believers or believers of 
non-majority faiths from opting out of the religious activities at schools and the non-believers or believers 
of other faiths will be indirectly coerced into a specific Christian religious observance – something 
prohibited by the Constitution.” See De Vos “Do we have freedom of conscience and religion at public 
schools?” 22 September 2009 at http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/do-we-have-freedom-of-concience-
and-religion-at-public-schools/ (Date accessed: 3 July 2012); Rousseau states: “The place where this 
freedom is threatened is in schools, where despite official policy which insists on religious neutrality, many 
schools continue to abuse their captive and impressionable audiences by proselytizing for one specific 
religious viewpoint or another.” See Rousseau (n1012).  
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understanding (which is the Policy’s purported objective). In this regard, Van der Schyff 
contends that the true advancement of religious freedom must take into account all religions 
represented in South Africa equally.1640  
 
Also, it must be noted there are different denominations and differing practices within one 
religion and therefore is difficult to teach about a particular religion from one standpoint.1641 
For example, even within Christianity, there are different denominations and therefore 
different expectations as to what religion education about Christianity should entail. It has 
been stated that:   
 
“A basic premise of religious studies is that religions are not 
internally homogeneous but diverse. In schools and in popular 
culture, faith traditions are often presented as a single set of beliefs, 
practices, and representations without internal variation.”1642   
 
This means that people within the same religion may not agree on the correctness of the 
“objective” information supplied in the curriculum. Much of the manner in which religion is 
understood and practised is based on personal interpretation. Teaching about one 
interpretation shows favouritism towards a particular brand of a particular religion and side-
lines others.  In other words, if the curriculum is based on the most popular brand of beliefs 
within a religion – it amounts to religious favouritism of that one brand.   
 
A further problem with the National Policy is that it does not take into account the widespread 
“religion illiteracy”1643 amongst teachers, which may lead to perpetuation of stereotypes, 
caricaturing and disparagement of faiths.1644 For example, if a teacher who is of the Christian 
faith is required to teach aspects of Hinduism such as reincarnation and the worship of 
different deities, concepts that he or she knows little about or strongly disagrees with, he or 
she may present the information as being fictional/not truthful. This means that all religions 
may not be portrayed as being equally valid. This may impact upon the religious freedom, 
equality rights, and dignity of the child whose religion is being questioned or ridiculed. 
Furthermore, what is taught in the classroom may be also affected by the teacher’s 
                                                          
1640      Van der Schyff (n34) 153. 
1641      Mitchell (n25) 5.  
1642     American Academy of Religion (n1626) 17. 
1643  National Policy para 37.    
1644      National Policy Para 35.  
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(mis)interpretation of the curriculum.1645 This indicates that the inadequate teacher training 
for this subject area1646 may hamper the objectives of the National Policy.1647 As mentioned in 
Chapter 6, the problems with religion education lie not only in the provisions of the National 
Policy1648 but also the manner in which the subject is taught.  
 
Furthermore, the National Policy refers to the fact that pupils will be exposed to “a variety of 
religious and secular belief systems.”1649 Some religious conservatives have interpreted 
“secular” and “secularisation” to mean anti-religious or atheistic.1650 It is thereby perceived as 
reflecting a state of false neutrality which is unacceptable to them.1651In other words- some 
                                                          
1645  Jansen states: “There is evidence from curriculum research to show that even when teachers in the same 
national context are provided with the same curriculum specifications, they translate them into very 
different meanings based on who they are and also where they are in a specific school locale.” Jansen “The 
Politics of Salvation: Pushing the Limits of the Rainbow Curriculum” in Mangayi (ed) On becoming a 
democracy (2004) 67.  
1646  Jacobs states: “It also appears that teachers do not feel they have been sufficiently trained and, given the fact 
that often teachers have to teach LO without receiving any, or very little, training, effectiveness becomes 
questionable.” See Jacobs “Life Orientation as experienced by learners: a qualitative study in North-West 
Province” 2011 31 SAJE 212 213; Pillay states: “Subject knowledge and experience are important factors to 
consider with regard to LO teachers, but could become a problem if they are not trained to teach LO. This 
was confirmed by Rooth who found that 30% of all teachers in her national study were not specifically 
trained in teaching LO (footnotes omitted).” “LO teachers, firstly, need to be effective counsellors so that 
they could help learners with the multitude of social problems that exist in society. However, the problem is 
that most LO teachers have not been trained in basic counselling skills. (footnotes omitted)” See Pillay 
“Keystone Life Orientation (LO) teachers: implications for educational, social, and cultural contexts” 2012 
32 SAJE 167 167-168, 174-175; Van Deventer states: “Irrespective of what the situation is, it seems that LO 
is taught by a broad spectrum of teachers that are not specialists in this field, insufficient support from the 
Department of Education (DoE) does not improve the situation. The fact that LO is taught by teachers that 
are not LO specialists is an important aspect, since the epistemology and skills of the teachers who teach a 
learning area/subject determine the status and practice of that learning area/subject (footnotes omitted)” See 
van Deventer “Perspectives of teachers on the implementation of Life Orientation in Grades R–11 from 
selected Western Cape schools” 2009 29 SAJE 127 128; Mosia states: “In this study teachers acknowledged 
that they resist curriculum implementation for various reasons, for example they are not learning area 
specialists, and they are allocated the learning area without their consent or any in-service training.” See 
Mosia How secondary school teachers understand, respond to and implement life orientation (2011) 124. 
1647  Venter states: “Grasping the intent reflected by the document demands interpretative skills that are normally 
not required of school teachers. This is not to say that the members of the teaching profession are generally 
incapable of dealing with complex documents. It is merely stating the obvious fact that no one called upon 
to teach about religion in terms of the Policy will be able to conform to its demands.” See Venter (n873) 
451-452.  
1648  For example, paragraph 19 discussed above.  
1649        The National Policy undertakes to teach about “secular values” in paragraph 30.  
1650   Prinsloo (n1632) 31; Examples of headlines in response to the Draft Policy include “Asmal Braak Gal oor 
Christene” (Beeld, 22 March2001);“Christelike Toorn Ontvlam teen Asmal’ (Beeld, 23 March 2001) and 
“Groot Grief oor Asmal en die Christene” (Rapport, 25 March 2001). These articles show the dismay by the 
majority faith at an inter-religious approach; Potgieter states that because of government’s refusal to adopt a 
model of model of confessional pluralism, the National Policy can also be interpreted as the “establishment 
of a (state) religion in the form of secularism and neutralism.” See Potgieter (n1630) 400. See also Colditz 
Comment on the Draft Policy ‘Religion in Education’ (2003) 32-37; Chidester states: “The new policy, 
Christian critics argued, violated the provisions of both the Bible and the new South African Constitution.” 
See Chidester (n1604) 272-293.   
1651   In this regard, Benson states: “Where there is a realm of competing belief systems (including atheism and 
agnosticism alongside religions), the removal of religious expression or practice leaves agnosticism and 
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religious conservatives view neutral religious teachings as anti-religious. It does not recognise 
the particular religious identities of teachers, learners or their parents. According to this 
perspective, the purely academic study of religion is not congruent with freedom of religion 
as contained in section 15 of the Constitution.1652 
 
Although the National Policy envisions that all religions can be afforded equal respect in the 
school curriculum in a manner that does not infringe upon the religious freedom of any child, 
the successful translation of the National Policy into practice is questionable. Recognition 
must be given to the fact that the theoretical principles of the National Policy may not be the 
lived experience of school-children.1653 It is submitted that the abovementioned problems 
should be given considerable attention by the state; since it impacts upon the daily lives of 
learners and their best interests should be paramount.   
 
4.4  RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
The major problems with the current position on religion education are as follows: 1) In 
practice, there is no definitive and objectively determinable line between religious instruction 
and religion education; 2) the National Policy makes it the duty of each school to teach about 
religion on a compulsory basis, meaning there is no option for a conscientious objector to 
withdraw from attendance and 3) inadequately trained teachers may teach about religion in a 
manner which is contrary to the objectives of the National Policy.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
atheism publically validated but under the guise of ‘neutrality’ and almost invariably ‘invisible’. Such an 
implicit hegemony is anything but neutral. Though the rationale for such ‘neutrality’ is sometimes described 
as a response to historical religious strife what this ‘neutrality’ results in can be seen not to be neutral at all 
once atheism and agnosticism are viewed, as they should be, as belief systems. Under the false neutrality of 
‘secularism’ (as defined by the man who coined the term) it is then a virtual open season on the public 
sphere involvement of religions.” See Benson (n842) 28.   
1652   Snyman states: “Neutrality is also not equivalent to freedom of religion.” See Snyman (n1630) 49. 
Religious conservatives may regard religion education as the removal of “true” religion from public 
schools- which to them is anti-religious. In a society which reveres religion in general - religious majority 
may find it offensive to be compelled to learn about secularism as an equally valid belief system to religion. 
Potgieter asserts that the religious majority quietly submitted to the National Policy despite the fact that they 
find it unsatisfactory. He states: “Can the fact that most South Africans silently acquiesced with the Policy 
be construed to indicate that they are satisfied with it, or should it rather be ascribed to the fact that they feel 
intimidated by the power of the ruling party?” See Potgieter (n1630)398. 
1653   de Waal et al state: “However, despite South Africa’s fundamental constitutional values of human dignity, 
equality and freedom, as well as the express constitutional protection of religious beliefs, whether the 
National Policy has been implemented as designed is another matter ….” “No serious research has been 
undertaken to date to determine how South African public schools are implementing the National Policy.” 
See de Waal et al (n1027) 62. 
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As a result of these problems,  an argument could be made for the provisions of the National 
Policy on compulsory religion education to be reconsidered, with a view to only permitting 
religion education in schools as an optional/elective subject in secondary schools1654 and not a 
compulsory school subject in the public school curriculum. Hypothetically speaking, if this 
were to happen, it would alleviate the problems with regards to neutrality of information since 
those attending the classes would be doing so voluntarily. In other words, religion education 
or religious studies would still be available, but those who do not wish to attend would have 
the choice of an alternative class or alternative constructive activity to attend in that time 
period.  In this way, those who are interested in the subject and do not find it offensive or an 
encroachment on their religious freedom (by their own individual assessment), are free to 
attend. But those who find the subject to be an encroachment on their religious freedom- are 
free to decline. The assessment would be a subjective one and not an objective one. After all, 
it is exceedingly difficult to find a solution which satisfies everyone.   
 
This hypothetical solution would coincide with the court’s ruling in Kotze v Kotze - that 
failure to recognise a person’s “freedom of choice” to learn about religion may be damaging 
to that person’s development.1655 If sectarian religious instruction is no longer acceptable and 
compulsory religion education in different faiths leaves room for the potential infringement of 
numerous fundamental rights of school-children, then perhaps this option of non-compulsory 
religion education in school is the best solution in the interests of learners of all faiths. This 
solution would be in accordance with section 15 of the Constitution. 
 
However, there is a problem with arguing in favour of a child’s freedom of choice when it 
comes to school subjects. Religion education is not the only subject that is connected to a 
learner’s individual rights. What about subjects related to language and culture? It is 
submitted that language and culture are as integrally linked to a person’s identity as religion. 
As previously mentioned, the current South African school curriculum encompasses learning 
about various cultures and compels learners to learn more than one language- a home 
language and an additional language. Furthermore, the state intends on incorporating the 
compulsory learning of an African language into the public school curriculum as early as next 
                                                          
1654  For the reason that secondary school learners who choose to learn about religion are more mentally and 
emotionally mature to be able to cope with the complex subject matter and to handle the complicated issues 
or contradictions that may arise from learning about religion at school. This will also respect the rights of 
parents to be the primary educators of very young children on matters of religion. 
1655  Para 631E G.  
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year.1656 Importantly, the rationale behind the impending change in the school language policy 
is purported to be the “changing profile of learner population” and the need to foster “social 
cohesion”.1657  It is submitted that it would be unthinkable and to the detriment of children to 
exclude language or culture from schools based on the freedom of choice of the child.1658 It is 
clear that the social context in which South African children live, has triggered the need for 
certain subjects (such as languages and Arts and Culture) to be compulsory. The same 
argument can be made with regards to the inclusion of religion education in the curriculum. 
Without religion education, the school system would produce young citizens who have not 
grappled with issues of diversity - and will be unprepared to deal with diversity in the outside 
world. 
 
It stands to reason therefore that if learners are given the freedom of choice with regards to 
learning about different religions, the argument could be made for them to exercise freedom 
of choice with regards to learning languages or learning about different cultures in school. 
This could lead to a situation where each learner could refuse to learn about any subject that is 
not in accordance with their religion or other beliefs. For example, a child could refuse to 
attend Natural Science classes if the subject teaches about evolution – a concept which goes 
against the child’s religious beliefs. The state would then be put in a position to create 
individualised curriculums that are dependent on the freedom of choice of each child- a 
situation which is practically impossible for public schools to manage.  
 
All in all, the inclusion of diverse religions, cultures and languages in the school curriculum, 
mirrors the social reality of a diverse South African population. Despite the problems 
associated with compulsory religion education, it is submitted that freedom of choice has to 
be limited by the society in which one lives. Inevitably, all South African children will 
encounter a culturally, linguistically and religiously diverse society outside of the school 
walls and it is to their benefit that they are prepared for this reality while in school. Clearly, 
religion education in different faiths is the state’s attempt at a compromise between the two 
unacceptable extremes of completely removing the teaching of religion from public schools 
                                                          
1656  Discussed in Chapter 5 at paragraph 4.3.  
1657  The Department of basic education spokesperson Panyaza Lisufi stated that: “Social cohesion is the reason 
we have started the programme. You can’t have South Africans having a translator between them when 
speaking.” See eNCA “New language policy on the cards for schools” at http://www.enca.com/south-
africa/indigenous-african-languages-sa-schools (Date accessed: 9 July 2013). 
1658  The benefits of learning more than one language and learning about different cultures in the school 
environment are already mentioned in Chapter 5 at paragraph 4.3. 
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and allowing devotional religious instruction in public schools. In other words, if it does 
encroach upon the religious freedom of learners and/or their parents, it is a reasonable and 
justifiable limitation of the right in furtherance of a legitimate state goal, namely nation-
building through the celebration of diversity. 
 
It is therefore recommended that the current position should be maintained. It gives due 
respect to religion in general – which the majority of the public expects - and at the same time 
is far more inclusive and respectful of minority religions and non-religion than previous 
policies. Furthermore, the National Policy acknowledges the history of religious 
discrimination in schools and is careful to protect those who are identified as “different”.1659 
This is a vast improvement in the protection of minority religious rights and the promotion of 
diversity in South African schools. However, it is recommended that the National Policy and 
corresponding curriculum be revisited in order to ensure that all provisions and learning 
outcomes are aligned with the objectives of nation-building and not any other purely 
religious/spiritual objectives.1660 In accordance with freedom of religion, all provisions with 
purely spiritual goals need to be amended or removed.  
 
Lastly, it is submitted that National Policy will only be beneficial to school-children if it is 
implemented properly by highly trained and specialised teachers.1661 It stands to reason that 
an improvement in teacher training for this subject is essential to achieving the aims of the 
National Policy. Many of the problems mentioned above can be improved or alleviated if the 
curriculum is taught in the manner envisaged by the National Policy. It is therefore 
recommended that the state make a concerted effort to improve teacher training in the area. 
However, with the National Policy already being ten years into implementation and with 
standard of teacher training in South Africa gradually declining (both in general and 
particularly with regards to this subject),1662 it is questionable whether this is even possible.   
                                                          
1659         National Policy para 62.   
1660  For example, paragraph 19 of the National Policy (mentioned above) contains spiritual goals that are not 
only concerned with nation-building.  
1661  See Jacobs (n1646) 213; Pillay states: “the many social issues in the country warrant the need for highly 
trained and specialized LO teachers, especially when they are expected to contribute to the holistic 
development of learners….”  See Pillay (n1646) 167-168.   
1662  Roux “We need to be honest about RiE’s current academic stance in SA. Initiatives taken and built up over 
many years seem not to be sustainable in teacher training.” See Roux (n1615) 7; Modisaotsile states: “Other 
challenges include: poor teacher training; unskilled teachers; lack of commitment to teach by teachers; poor 
support for learners at home; and a shortage of resources in education….” See Africa Institute of South 
Africa “The Failing Standard of Basic Education in South Africa” March 2012 Policy Brief 1 2;  Clarke 
“What happened to teacher training?” at http://mg.co.za/article/2010-10-05-what-happened-to-teacher-
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1  INTRODUCTION  
 
This study recognised and examined the integral connection between children’s rights, 
education rights and freedom of religion when dealing with legal issues pertaining to religion 
in South African schools.   
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis placed the topic in perspective by providing a general overview of the 
study which included: a statement of the research problem; the importance and purpose of the 
thesis; the scope of the study; a summary of the issues to be addressed in the remaining 
chapters as well as the structure of the thesis. 
  
Chapter 2 discussed the historical development of religion in South African schools spanning 
from 1652 to 1996. It illustrated that South Africa’s history was tainted by the unequal 
treatment of religions. It revealed that historically, one brand of Christianity, namely 
Calvinism, was promoted in many aspects of the law, including in education. Religious 
favouritism in schools was displayed most vigorously through the implementation of Christian 
National Education in schools, with little or no regard for minority religions.  It was the 
adoption of the interim Constitution is 1993, and later the Constitution in 1996, that made it 
necessary for the South African government to transform educational laws and policies to 
being more inclusive of minority religions and respectful of religious diversity in schools. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
training (Date accessed: 4 July 2013); Irin “South Africa: Poor marks for education” at  
http://www.irinnews.org/report/92677/south-africa-poor-marks-for-education (Date accessed: 5 July 2013); 
Centre for Development and Enterprise “SA needs more and better teachers – CDE” at 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71654?oid=257291&sn=Detail&pid=71
654 (Date accessed: 4 July 2013); Sapa “Teacher training quality needs improvement: DA” at 
 http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Teacher-training-quality-needs-improvement-DA-20120424 
(Date accessed: 3 July 2013); Sapa “Standard of education ‘a crisis’ ” at 
/www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Standard-of-education-a-crisis-20120419 (Date accessed: 4 July 
2013).  
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Significantly, the new constitutional dispensation afforded special recognition to children’s 
rights, which had been overlooked in the past.  
 
Chapter 3 focussed on South Africa’s obligations to protect children’s rights, education rights 
and freedom of religion, at world and regional levels through customary international law and 
various human rights instruments. It was noted that South Africa has adopted specific 
constitutional provisions regarding the status of international law in South African law and by 
doing so has committed to giving effect to them. These international provisions are relevant to 
issues pertaining to religion in schools and impact directly and indirectly on the protection of 
children’s rights, education rights and freedom of religion rights at state level. The influence of 
the relevant international human rights instruments on South African law was revealed 
throughout the remaining chapters.  
 
Chapter 4 acknowledged and discussed the connection between children’s rights and issues 
pertaining to religion in schools. It aimed to show that the issues pertaining to religion in 
schools cannot be considered without children’s rights in mind. It contained evidence of a 
significant improvement in children’s rights in the context of education. For one, the 
Constitution contains a section specifically dedicated to children’s rights, namely section 28. 
This section recognises the particularly vulnerable position of children. In addition to these 
specific children’s rights, children are also afforded other rights in the Bill of Rights, most 
notably the rights to dignity and equality. Significantly, section 28(2) of the Constitution 
includes the provision that in all matters pertaining to children, the best interests of the child 
should be a primary consideration. Significantly, recent, prominent case law emphasises the 
importance of this principle in matters pertaining to religion and education. Furthermore, this 
Chapter indicated that children’s rights in the Constitution are supplemented by comprehensive 
child-care legislation in the form of the Children’s Act, which recognises the rights of children 
to participate in matters that affect them. Importantly, the Children’s Act places a duty of care 
on schools and educators over all learners within the school environment. Overall, Chapter 4 
formed the theoretical foundation for the discussion in Chapter 7 on the role that children’s 
rights should play in the legal issues around religion in South African schools.  
 
Chapter 5 recognised the link between the right to education and matters pertaining to religion 
in schools. It dealt with education rights as contained in section 29 of the Constitution as well 
as other inter-related constitutional rights- such as freedom of association. It also discussed the 
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education legislation and policies relevant to the role of religion in schools, including the 
National Policy on Religion and Education. In this regard, the Chapter raised concerns about 
whether the provision of compulsory religion education in public schools is in accordance with 
freedom of religion- a matter which was addressed in detail in Chapter 7. In addition, this 
Chapter illustrated that the right to education should be a key consideration in matters 
pertaining to freedom of religion in schools. Furthermore, it emphasised the connection 
between the best interests of the child and matters pertaining to education and recognised that 
in light of the past, one of the state’s primary educational duties is equalising access to 
education. Most importantly, this Chapter discussed the right to establish private schools based 
on religious grounds in terms of section 29(3) of the Constitution. It alluded to concerns about 
the impact of this right on the freedom of religion of non-adherent children- a matter that was 
comprehensively addressed in Chapter 7.  
 
Chapter 6 discussed freedom of religion as contained in section 15 of the Constitution as well 
as other inter-related rights such as cultural rights and freedom of expression. It emphasised 
that the Constitution does not endorse a particular religion, but instead guarantees everyone the 
right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion. This means that non-
religious beliefs are equally protected alongside religion. However, the South African social 
context1663 requires that the religious majority be acknowledged by the law. This means that 
schools can create rules which acknowledge the majority faith. However, in doing so, they 
may not unfairly discriminate against minority faiths. In this regard, schools must be aware of 
seemingly neutral rules that apply to all, but have the effect of discriminating against some on 
the basis of religion- in other words indirect discrimination. Importantly, the decision in Pillay 
indicated that the courts recognition of the impact of indirect discrimination on minority faiths 
has evolved significantly since the decision of Lawrence; however, the effect of this decision 
on a practical level remains to be seen. Chapter 6 also discussed the impact of the reasonable 
accommodation principle in the school environment. In this regard, the Pillay case required 
that sincerely held religious and cultural practices must not only be accommodated- but 
celebrated. This set a precedent for the generous accommodation of religious and cultural 
practices in schools. However, Pillay made it clear that if accommodation of the religious 
practice imposes an unreasonable burden on the school, the practice should be disallowed. The 
                                                          
1663  It was mentioned in Chapter 1 that the majority of South Africans are religious.  
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impact of this decision on the freedom of religion of children in private schools was explored 
further in Chapter 7.  
 
Chapter 7 addressed some of the major concerns pertaining to the issue of religion in schools 
that have been identified in the study, namely: 1) the role of children’s rights in issues 
pertaining to religion in schools; 2) the religious rights of children in private schools and 3) the 
teaching of religion in public schools.  It contains summaries and findings on these issues as 
well as recommendations for improvement. 
 
Lastly, this concluding chapter makes a summary of the findings and recommendations 
contained in Chapter 7 and brings the thesis to a general conclusion.  
  
2  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS   
 
This thesis found that there is inadequate recognition and application of children’s rights in 
matters pertaining to religion in schools. Policy makers have not at all times made the express 
link between children’s rights and issues pertaining to religion in schools. For example, at 
present there is no express mention of children’s rights or the best interests of the child in the 
National Policy, nor in the Schools Act.1664 Furthermore, there are no specific national 
guidelines on religious/cultural exemptions to assist schools in developing their own 
procedures. As a matter of compliance with section 28 of the Constitution, it is submitted that 
children’s rights must be incorporated as an integral component in codes of conduct, polices 
and religious exemption procedures in schools. Accordingly, it is recommended that the 
National Policy and Schools Act be amended so as to recognise the key role of children’s 
rights in issues pertaining to religion in school. This inclusion of children’s rights will create 
legal obligations for schools in respect of the inclusion of children’s rights in 
religious/cultural exemption procedures.  
 
It is recommended further that “National Guidelines on Religious/cultural Exemptions” in 
schools be developed in order to foster a child-friendly and child-centred approach to dealing 
with religious/cultural exemptions. Ultimately, these guidelines will illustrate how children’s 
rights can be incorporated on a practical level in the school environment. Such guidelines will 
                                                          
1664       Aside from section 8(5).  
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set specific legal parameters within which schools can develop religious/cultural exemption 
procedures that best suit each school. It is submitted that the application of children’s rights in 
matters relating to freedom of religion in schools will strengthen the state’s commitment to 
“realise the best possible education for our children.”1665 
 
It has been argued that the right to establish private schools includes the right to require 
religious conformity from non-adherent learners by way of a complete waiver of their 
religious freedom. This means that a private school can compel a non-adherent child to attend 
religious observances and religious instruction (in accordance with the religious ethos of the 
school) and restrict the child from manifesting their own religious beliefs within the school. 
This interpretation essentially allows private schools to operate with complete disregard for 
the freedom of religion of non-adherent children. At present if, for example, a Hindu parent 
who wants to enrol his or her child in a private school with a Christian religious ethos (for the 
reason that the school offers the best quality education/best facilitates available in the area) 
and the school requires a waiver of the freedom of religion of the child as an admission 
requirement - the parent must choose to either waive the Hindu child’s religious freedom, or 
find an alternative school for the child. If the parent chooses to waive the freedom of religion 
of the child, the child can be compelled to attend Christian religious instruction and religious 
observances and can be restricted from manifesting Hindu beliefs. It is submitted that this 
approach is contrary to public policy and fails to take due cognisance of the dignity, equality 
and best interests of school-children. Furthermore, it undermines the states goals of nation-
building and celebrating diversity in that it allows for the creation of exclusive groups of 
young children who never interact with people of different faiths. 
 
This abovementioned interpretation of section 29(3), presumes that the waiver of the freedom 
of religion of non-adherents is necessary in order to preserve the religious ethos of the private 
school.  However, it is submitted that there is a way for the rights of private schools and the 
rights of the non-adherent child to co-exist in harmony through the application of the 
reasonable accommodation principle in private schools. Consequently, it is recommended that 
reasonable accommodation in private schools should be enforced in order to protect the 
freedom of religion of the non-adherent child while at the same time respecting the 
religious/associational rights of the school. This will ensure that children of all faiths will be 
                                                          
1665     Malherbe “The Constitutional dimension of the best interests of the child as applied in education” 2008 TSAR 
284.  
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able to access a private school of their parent’s choice without having to forsake their 
religious freedom. Also, it will prepare adherent learners for the social reality of a religiously 
diverse South Africa which exists outside of the school environment. If a private school does 
not require a waiver and instead reasonable accommodates the learner, he or she can be 
exempted from religious instruction and religious observances and given constructive 
activities during those times; whilst the adherent learners can continue to conform to the 
religious ethos of the school. The non-adherent child’s manifestations of their own faith can 
be limited in terms of the school’s code of conduct in order to protect the safety and rights of 
others and the educational goals of the school. It is submitted that this approach would be in 
accordance with constitutional values and would benefit South African society as a whole.  
 
This thesis addressed concerns about the current legal position on teaching religion in South 
African public schools. It found that the removal of sectarian religious instruction from public 
schools is correct. However, it is questioned whether or not the provision of religion 
education on a compulsory basis (as per the National Policy) is consistent with freedom of 
religion. It was found that although the provision of compulsory religion education in public 
schools impacts upon the freedom of religion of learners and their parents, (if taught 
correctly) it is a reasonable and justifiable limitation of the right in that it pursues a legitimate 
state goal – namely- nation-building through the celebration of diversity. It was therefore 
recommended that the current position should be maintained since it provides a compromise 
between the two unacceptable extremes of removing the teaching of religion from public 
schools and allowing religious instruction in public schools.  
 
It was also found that although the objectives of the National Policy may be praiseworthy, the 
successful translation of its objectives into practice is problematic. The implementation of the 
objectives of the National Policy may, in particular, be hampered by inadequately trained 
teachers. As a result, it is submitted that a vast improvement of teacher training in the area, is 
imperative. The further problem addressed is that there is no definitive and objectively 
determinable line (in law or in practice) between religious instruction and religion education. 
In some instances the provisions of the National Policy and the learning outcomes of the 
corresponding religion education curriculum contain purely spiritual objectives as opposed to 
objectives that are in line with nation-building. In accordance with freedom of religion, this 
thesis recommended that any provisions that have purely religious/spiritual objectives must be 
amended or removed.  
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